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I begin to sing of rich‑haired Demeter, (awesome) goddess –
of her and her trim‑ankled daughter whom Aidoneus rapt away,
given to him by all‑seeing Zeus the loud‑thunderer.1
1. THe ToPic aND THe ceNTraL qUeSTioN
1.1. THe ceNTr aL qUeSTioN
‘marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent of the intending 
spouses.’ article  16(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human rights is clear 
about how it should be. Yet the words ‘i do’ are not always spoken out of free 
will: some marriages are the result of deception, manipulation, threats or physical 
abuse – practices that are generally not associated with the term ‘marriage’. This 
book is about a phenomenon known as forced marriage: a marriage (i.e. a marital 
or marital‑like association), which at least one of the partners entered into against 
their will as a result of some form of coercion exerted by another party.2 more 
specifically, this research focuses on the criminalisation of this practice on two 
different levels: the field of Dutch criminal law and the field of international 
criminal law, with a particular focus on the rome Statute of the international 
criminal court.
The study revolves around the following central question:
Should forced marriage be criminalised under Dutch and international 
criminal law, and if so, how?
1 first sentence of the Homeric ‘Hymn to Demeter’. The hymn tells the story of Demeter, 
whose daughter Persephone was abducted by and forced into a marriage with Hades. english 
translation: H.g. evelyn‑White, Hesiod, the Homeric Hymns, and Homerica, Harvard: 
Harvard University Press (Loeb classical Library) 1914.
2 This preliminary definition of forced marriage will be tested in subsequent chapters and 
will be applied to several situations that prima vista seem to be relevant for this definition. if 
necessary, the working definition will be reformulated at the end of Part i of this book. also: 
see chapter 1, paragraph 4 for definitional issues. 






This research question is divided into three sub‑questions:
1. What does the phenomenon of forced marriage entail?
2. What is the doctrinal basis for criminalisation under Dutch criminal 
law and international criminal law and what are the differences and 
similarities between these two levels?
3. What is the current legal framework for dealing with forced marriages 
under Dutch criminal (and civil) law and international criminal law and 
what are the differences and similarities between these two levels?
The central question can be answered after these three questions have been 
addressed.
1.2 . NaTioNaL crimiNaL LaW: a comPariSoN 
BeTWeeN THe NeTHer LaNDS aND eNgLaND
in 2008, almost 3,500 cases concerning forced marriage took place in germany 
and in the same year,3 between 5,000 and 8,000 cases concerning forced 
marriage occurred in england.4, 5 forced marriages are also a daily reality in the 
Netherlands. There are no hard statistics on the prevalence of forced marriages in 
the Netherlands, but the Dutch minister of Social affairs believes that each year, 
hundreds of people are forced to marry against their will.6
over the past years, several european countries, such as Norway, Belgium, 
germany, Scotland and england have responded to the practice of forced 
marriage by turning it into a distinct criminal offence. in the Netherlands, the 
act of forcing someone to enter into a marriage against their will is a criminal 
act that prima vista falls within the ambit of several general offences, such as 
coercion (article 284 Dutch criminal code). Yet there have been debates about 
separately criminalising forced marriage and thereby following the example of 
neighbouring countries. This gives rise to the question of whether this would be 
3 mirbach et al. 2011, pp. 22 and 28–29. according to the study, forced marriages cover those 
situations in which at least one of the spouses was forced to enter into a formal or informal 
(so including those conjugal associations entered into through a religious or social ceremony) 
marriage as a result of the exercise of force or threat of appreciable harm, and this spouse either 
did not dare to resist or refuse the marriage, or found that no consideration was given to his 
refusal. See chapter 2, paragraph 2.1.
4 Kazimirski et al. 2009, pp. 24 and 28. Note that both studies concern forced marriages that had 
already taken place, as well as situations that could potentially result in a forced marriage.
5 Where this book refers to ‘england’, the jurisdictions of both england and Wales are implied, 
unless explicitly stated otherwise.
6 g. Herderscheê, ‘Steviger aanpak “honderden gedwongen huwelijken”’, De Volkskrant 
7  June 2013 (available at <www.volkskrant.nl/vk/nl/2686/Binnenland/article/detail/ 
3454111/2013/06/07/Steviger‑aanpak‑honderden‑gedwongen‑huwelijken.dhtml> 
 last accessed December 2013).






opportune. Should forced marriages be codified as a distinct offence in Dutch 
criminal law? or are there other adequate (legal) alternatives for dealing with this 
phenomenon? for the purpose of answering these questions, a legal comparison 
will be made with england.7 This legal comparison runs through the book like a 
red thread.
a comparison with england is interesting, because, after first explicitly 
deciding not to criminalise forced marriage (in 2005) and instead adopting a 
civil law approach, the english government decided in 2012 to create a specific 
offence of forced marriage to supplement the civil law framework. The reasons the 
english government gave for creating specific criminal legislation are analysed 
and compared with the arguments used in Dutch debates on the criminalisation 
of forced marriage. The catalogue of legal(‑political) arguments that arises 
from the comparison will assist in determining the desirability of (separate) 
criminalisation in the Netherlands. The main focus of this book is the criminal 
law, but because of the partly civil law approach to forced marriages in england, 
the research also describes, compares and evaluates civil law aspects. The english 
civil law framework that was specifically created for dealing with forced marriages 
will be analysed and compared to the Dutch civil law framework in order to 
determine whether it is necessary to implement additional civil law instruments 
in the Netherlands.
1.3. iNTer NaTioNaL crimiNaL LaW: a SPecific 
focUS oN Sier r a LeoNe aND camBoDia
The taking of brides by the victors is a common occurrence during conflicts. 
There are reports of forced marriages taking place during the conflicts in inter 
alia rwanda, Uganda, Darfur, the central african republic and the Democratic 
republic of congo.8 But this practice was especially rife during the civil war in 
Sierra Leone and under the rule of the Khmer rouge in cambodia; two situations 
that will be highlighted in this book. in Sierra Leone, thousands of women and 
girls were abducted by rebels and forced into so‑called bush marriages with their 
abductors. in cambodia, the Khmer rouge allegedly forced thousands of men 
and women to marry as part of a strategy to obtain control over people’s sexuality 
and to facilitate population growth.
The research question is ultimately concerned with the criminalisation of 
forced marriage in the rome Statute, but there are three reasons for the specific 
focus on Sierra Leone and cambodia – two situations that are not dealt with by 
the international criminal court (icc) but by other (internationalised) courts – 
7 See infra paragraph 2 for the method of legal comparison.
8 See m. Bastick, K. grimm & r. Kunz, Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict. Global Overview 
and Implications for the Security Sector, geneva centre for the Democratic control of armed 
forces 2007. 






in this book. first, the forced marriages that took place during these conflicts 
have been well‑documented and researched, meaning there exists a wealth of 
information, as opposed to forced marriages that occurred during other conflicts, 
such as in Kenya and the central african republic. Secondly, the Special court 
for Sierra Leone has issued several ground‑breaking decisions and judgements 
regarding (the criminality and legal qualification of) forced marriages.9 Thirdly, 
because the Sierra Leonean and cambodian forced marriages are different in 
many aspects, the two situations make for an interesting comparison.
irrespective of the high prevalence of forced marriages in conflict situations, 
the practice is not a specific crime under international criminal law, in the sense 
that it is not separately criminalised in any of the statutes of the international 
criminal tribunals, the internationalised courts or the icc. instead, it is 
prosecuted under the umbrella of existing crimes. in 2008, the Special court for 
Sierra Leone (ScSL) became the first international criminal court to recognise 
that forced marriage can constitute a crime against humanity, charged as an 
‘other inhumane act’.10 The judgements of the ScSL may influence the activities of 
the icc seeing as forced marriages occurred on a large scale in the majority of the 
situations that are currently before the icc, including the Democratic republic 
of congo, the central african republic and Darfur. as will be demonstrated in 
chapter 3, the forced marriages that took (and take) place during these situations 
bear many similarities with the forced marriages that took place during the civil 
war in Sierra Leone. This makes the Sierra Leonean case study of particular 
relevance for the criminalisation of forced marriage in the rome Statute.
forced marriage is a multi‑layered practice which may result in or be 
accompanied by acts that are already recognised as crimes under international law, 
such as rape, forced pregnancy, torture, sexual slavery and forced labour. However, 
forced marriage also encompasses a violation of the rights to self‑determination 
and individual autonomy, more specifically, the imposition of marital status by 
coercion, an act that is not criminalised as such under international criminal law. 
The gravity of this practice begs several questions. Should this act be included as 
a separate offence in the rome Statute? if so, should it be categorised as a crime 
against humanity, or perhaps as a war crime or (also) as an act of genocide?11 
9 at the start of this research, it was expected that (before the completion of the research) 
the extraordinary chambers in the courts of cambodia (eccc) would issue at least one 
judgement dealing with the forced marriages that were orchestrated by the Khmer rouge in 
the 1970s. Unfortunately, the completion strategy of the eccc has caused severe delays in the 
proceedings and the first judgement concerning forced marriage is not expected for several 
years (see chapter 8).
10 afrc appeal Judgement, paras. 199–200.
11 The crime of aggression is not included in this study because it is manifestly different from 
the other three core crimes. aggression concerns the responsibility of states for unlawful 
aggressive acts. it is a crime that can only be committed by leaders and high‑level policy 
makers and it concerns the law governing the recourse to conflict (cassese et al. 2013, p. 136). 
Pursuant to article 8bis(2) rome Statute, an act of aggression means ‘the use of armed force by 
a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, 






maybe forced marriage should not be codified as a distinct offence: perhaps it is 
caught by the definitions of enslavement and/or sexual slavery. This research aims 
to answer these questions.
1.4. comPariSoN BeTWeeN THe NaTioNaL aND 
iNTer NaTioNaL LeVeL of crimiNaLiSaTioN
The reasons for including national as well as international criminal law into this 
research need some elaboration. as stated, forced marriages take place in times 
of peace as well as in times of conflict. There is considerable divergence between 
times of peace and conflict as regards the circumstances surrounding forced 
marriages, the degree of coercion that is used and the possible consequences of 
the phenomenon.12 Nevertheless, in essence, forced marriages prima facie concern 
the same behaviour in both situations: coercion used to make a person enter into 
a marital(‑like) association against that person’s will. Because of the prevalence of 
forced marriages in and out of conflict, questions regarding the criminalisation of 
this practice have arisen both on the level of international and national criminal 
law. Studying the doctrinal foundations of criminalisation on these two levels can 
result in new insights into criminalisation issues.
2. oUTLiNe aND meTHoDoLogY
2.1. oUTLiNe
This book consists of four parts. Part i addresses the first sub‑question: in 
this part forced marriage is described and defined. The concepts of marriage, 
force and coercion are analysed and explained (chapter 1) and the causes and 
consequences of the practice of forced marriage as it takes place in the Netherlands 
and england (chapter 2) and in conflict situations (chapter 3) are discussed and 
compared. Part ii focuses on sub‑question 2 and puts forward several criteria 
for criminalisation that can be used when assessing whether or not a certain 
act should be (separately) criminalised under Dutch and international criminal 
law. first, Dutch and english theories of criminalisation are used to extract a 
set of criteria for criminalisation on the level of national criminal law (chapter 
or in any other manner inconsistent with the charter of the United Nations’ (article 8bis(1) 
rome Statute – see resolution 6 of the review conference, 13th plenary meeting, 11  June 
2010). examples of acts of aggression are the invasion, attack or bombardment by the armed 
forces of a state of the territory of another state (resolution 6 of the review conference, 13th 
plenary meeting, 11 June 2010). as stated by cryer et al. ‘(a)ggression provides an occasion for 
the commission of other crimes’ (cryer et al. 2010, p. 317). Seeing as forced marriage cannot 
constitute an act of aggression, the crime of aggression is not relevant to this research.
12 This will be demonstrated in chapter 3, paragraph 7.






4), and next the field of international criminal law is studied with the purpose 
of finding a doctrinal basis for criminalisation in the rome Statute (chapter 5). 
The findings of these two exercises are compared in chapter 6. Part iii of this 
book centres on sub‑question 3 and presents the legal framework with regard to 
forced marriages. crimes codified in Dutch and english criminal law (chapter 7) 
and international criminal law (chapter 8) that may be relevant to the practice 
of forced marriage are discussed and analysed. in addition, different criminal, 
civil and administrative measures that could be used to deal with this practice 
are discussed. Part iii also includes a two‑level comparison between the legal 
frameworks of the Netherlands and england on the one hand and the national 
and international frameworks on the other hand (chapter 9). The fourth and final 
part of this book contains the analysis and conclusions (chapter 10).
2 .2 . meTHoDoLogY
This book is based on traditional doctrinal legal research and the necessary 
information was drawn from three main sources: statutory law, case law and 
doctrine. for the delineation of the situation regarding forced marriages in the 
Netherlands and england, primary and secondary sources of law were used: 
criminal codes, acts of Parliament and academic literature. The relevant case law 
of Dutch and english criminal courts was analysed and scholarly, governmental 
and Ngo documents were used to obtain information on the historical, political, 
economic and social contexts, and the impact of forced marriages on those 
involved. in addition, several informal semi‑structured interviews were held with 
victim‑support charities, Ngos, people working within government departments 
and agencies and those with (professional) experience with forced marriage.13
The sources of international law are non‑exhaustively enumerated in 
article  38 of the Statute of the international court of Justice. They are: treaty 
law, customary law, general principles of law and – as a subsidiary means for 
determining the law – judicial decisions and the writings of the most qualified 
authors. for the legal analysis in this book, first, the statutes of the icc (i.e. the 
rome Statute), the ScSL, the international criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (icTY) and international criminal Tribunal for rwanda (icTr), and 
the Law on the establishment of the extraordinary chambers in the courts of 
cambodia (eccc) were analysed. The icc’s elements of crimes and rules of 
Procedure and evidence were also taken into account. The elements of crimes 
(eoc) more fully detail the crimes enumerated in the rome Statute, but are not 
binding on the judges of the icc; in accordance with article 9(1) rome Statute, 
13 interviews were conducted with employees of the forced marriage Unit (London), the office 
of the Prosecutor (London), and the iranian Kurdish Women’s rights organisation. The 
transcripts of these interviews are on file with the author.






they ‘shall assist the court in the interpretation and application of articles 6, 7 and 
8’. in addition, the relevant case law of the icc, icTY, icTr, ScSL and the eccc, 
and scholarly (legal) literature, such as handbooks, dissertations, commentaries 
and articles were consulted. The literature study was not limited to legal writings; 
where applicable, psychological and sociological publications were consulted, 
seeing as these disciplines offer quantitative and qualitative data concerning 
forced marriages and provide a clear perspective on the actual reality of this 
practice. finally, Ngo and UN reports, victim studies and sources of human 
rights law (such as the Slavery convention, the Universal Declaration of Human 
rights and the convention on the elimination of all forms of Discrimination 
against Women) were consulted.
The comparative legal analyses of the Netherlands and england on the one 
hand and the level of national and international criminalisation on the other 
hand (Part iii) are based on the method of legal comparison identified by gorlé, 
Bourgeois, Bocken and reyntjens: describing, juxtaposing, explaining and 
evaluating.14 first, the Dutch and english legal frameworks relating to forced 
marriages are described. Then, these legal frameworks are juxtaposed, filtering 
out the similarities and differences, which are subsequently explained. finally, 
the results are evaluated: what is the best solution, is there a ‘best’ solution and 
what lessons can be learned from the foreign system? This exercise is repeated for 
the comparison between national criminal law and international criminal law.
3. eVaLUaTiVe frameWorK: a TaLe of TWo 
THeorieS
This book’s point of departure is a normative question: (how) should forced 
marriage be criminalised? in order to answer this question, an assessment 
framework consisting of several criteria or principles for criminalisation will 
be drafted. There are significant differences between international and national 
(Dutch) criminal law. as a result, the approach taken to select criteria for 
criminalisation for the two levels also differs. Therefore, the different fields of law 
are first studied separately and the criminalisation criteria that are distilled from 
these fields of law are then compared to each other. The reasons for choosing this 
approach instead of opting for one overarching criminalisation framework ought 
to be elucidated.
for one thing, it is important to understand the actual nature and background 
of the two fields of law: international criminal law, a mix of international law and 
criminal law, was created to deal with only the ‘most serious crimes of concern 
14 f. gorlé, g. Bourgeois, H. Bocken & f. reyntjens, Rechtsvergelijking, Brussels: e. Story‑Scientia 
1991, p. 28–30.






to the international community’15 and does not aspire to be a complete code of 
all the offences in the world.16 Domestic criminal law systems, on the other hand, 
developed against a different background. at the time the (criminal) laws of most 
(european) states were codified – during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
century – a national criminal code was regarded as the exclusive source of criminal 
law applicable within the territory of a state.17 Therefore, it will not be surprising 
that there are some disparities between the systems of adolescent international 
criminal law and mature national criminal law. The biggest difference, obviously, 
is the substance and the quantity of criminalised conduct – four core crimes 
(crimes against humanity, war crimes, genocide and aggression) prohibiting 
only the most heinous of acts on the international level as opposed to a plethora 
of offences on the national level, ranging from very serious crimes, such as 
murder and rape, to minor offences, such as shop lifting and indecent exposure. 
another difference concerns the aims of criminal law: aims of international 
criminal justice that are not recognised as goals of domestic criminal justice 
include post‑conflict reconciliation and the telling of the history of a conflict.18 in 
addition, as a relatively new field of law, international criminal law does not have 
the same number of crystallised theories regarding the criminalisation process 
that domestic legal systems have; over the years, conduct was mostly criminalised 
on a spasmodic ad hoc basis.19
Because of the differences between national and international criminal law, 
two separate frameworks are formulated. The first pertains to Dutch criminal 
law and is presented in chapter 4. in Dutch legal doctrine, extensive literature 
exists with regard to principles or criteria for criminalisation. These theories of 
criminalisation form the starting point for criminalisation under Dutch law and 
in line with the legal comparison interwoven throughout this book, literature on 
english criminalisation theories was also studied.
The second set of criteria for criminalisation concerns international criminal 
law and is constructed in chapter 5. Seeing as no actual, established theories of 
international criminalisation exist, criteria for criminalisation are uncovered 
using an inductive approach. By studying the taxonomy of the core crimes in the 
rome Statute and the structure of these different provisions coupled with their 
drafting history, several relevant criteria and stepping‑stones emerge. as a result 
of this inductive approach, the chapter on international criminalisation bears 
more resemblance to a road map than to a framework and is considerably longer 
than the chapter on criminalisation under Dutch law.
15 Preamble (4) and (9) and article 5 rome Statute.
16 See articles 10 and 22(3) rome Statute.
17 cryer 2008, p. 124.
18 cryer et al. 2010, p. 22. 
19 Saul 2008, p. 210.






4. ScoPe aND LimiTaTioNS
4.1. THe ScoPe of ‘forceD mar riage’
forced marriage is a broad term. in general, a forced marriage can be said to 
consist of three stages: the stage leading up to the wedding, the actual celebration 
of the marriage, and subsequent marital life. forms of coercion can be present 
during each of these stages. So depending on how it is defined, ‘forced marriage’ 
can include a multitude of acts, such as force relating to entering into a marriage, 
but also force with regard to remaining in the marriage – i.e. the absence of the 
possibility to divorce. an initially forced marriage can become voluntary over 
time; an initially voluntary marriage can become forced over time. as stated, 
in this book, the following (working) definition of forced marriage is adopted: a 
marriage at least one of the the spouses entered into as a result of some form of 
coercion exerted by another party.20 The definition thus refers to stages one and 
two described above – the pre‑wedding and actual wedding stages – and therefore 
excludes cases of so‑called marital captivity, where one or both of the spouses 
are not able to legally and/or religiously dissolve their marriage. Nevertheless, a 
marriage that was entered into against the will of at least one of the spouses may 
very well result in marital captivity.21 Therefore, this practice will be addressed 
in some chapters. The word ‘marriage’ in the definition does not exclude other 
(legal/social) conjugal‑like associations such as civil or registered partnerships.
4.2 . THe ScoPe of ‘iNTer NaTioNaL crimiNaL LaW’
every handbook on international criminal law commences with a paragraph 
devoted to the term ‘international criminal law’.22 This is not only a logical, but 
also a welcome and necessary introduction to this field of law, as there exists 
some confusion as to what precisely constitutes an international crime due to the 
plethora of terms that are used: international crimes, international crimes largo 
and stricto sensu, crimes under international law, transnational crimes and ius 
cogens (international) crimes.23 The distinction between international criminal 
law largo sensu on the one hand and stricto sensu on the other hand is the most 
common and useful dichotomy.24 The former refers to treaty crimes and includes 
transnational crimes; these crimes do not create direct criminal responsibility 
20 Those cases in which coercion is used to prevent someone from entering into a marriage thus 
fall outside the scope of this book.
21 Pursuant to Dutch law, the term ‘forced marriage’ also covers the phenomenon of marital 
captivity (see Parliamentary Proceedings (Lower House) 2012/2013, 11, p. 49). 
22 See e.g. cryer et al. 2010, pp. 3–21.
23 Bassiouni 2008, p. 133. in this regard, see also cryer 2008, pp. 107–111.
24 N. Boister,‘Transnational Criminal Law?’, European Journal of International Law (14) 2003, 
pp. 953 and 955.






under international law. instead, states are obliged by treaty to criminalise 
the offences in their domestic laws.25 The locus of the criminal prohibition of 
transnational crimes, therefore, is the municipal law of the prosecuting state: 
the treaty places obligations on states, and not on individuals. in contrast, the 
locus of the proscription of international crimes stricto sensu is the international 
legal order.26 in this book, the term ‘international criminal law’ is used to refer 
to this narrower field of international criminal law: the offences that fall within 
the jurisdiction of the international criminal tribunals and the icc. These 
are offences for which international criminal law directly imposes individual 
criminal liability.27 consequently, the term ‘international crime’ is used to refer to 
the crimes of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and aggression – the 
so‑called ‘core crimes’. This subdivision is also known as supranational criminal 
law.28
The manuscript was concluded in april 2014 and the law in this book is stated as 
at 1 may 2014.
25 gaeta 2009, pp.  63–65 and 69–70, draws a clear distinction between international crimes 
proper (i.e. the core crimes) and treaty‑based crimes.
26 cryer 2008, pp. 108–109.
27 milanović 2011, p. 28. Some crimes, such as torture and enslavement, can be both core crimes 
as well as transnational crimes (cryer 2008, p. 108).
28 See De Brouwer 2005 and r.H. Haveman, o. Kavran & J. Nicholls (eds.), Supranational 
criminal law: a system sui generis, antwerp: intersentia 2003.
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Before going into the issue of forced marriages in times of peace and conflict, it 
is important to first understand what ‘marriage’ and ‘force’ exactly entail. only 
after taking careful cognisance of these concepts is it possible to start dissecting 
the phenomenon of forced marriage. To this end, this chapter provides the book’s 
conceptual framework. first, the concept of marriage is elucidated and with the 
help of sociological definitions, a universally applicable definition of marriage is 
formulated (paragraph 2). in paragraph 3, several universal and regional human 
rights instruments are analysed. as a direct consequence of the Nazi racial laws 
prohibiting mixed marriages between certain ethnic groups and the injustices 
committed under the veil of marriage during the Second World War – such as 
child marriages and marriage as a cover for slavery – the international community 
saw fit to formulate marriage as a human right. By including the right to marry 
in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human rights (UDHr), the international 
community gave expression to the importance of this institution and its central 
position in society.29 an entire gamut of international human rights treaties now 
contain provisions on the right to marry and on the equality between men and 
women during every stage of the marriage. after discussing these instruments, 
the concepts of coercion and consent are explored. finally, in paragraph  4, a 
working definition of forced marriage is presented; if necessary, this working 
definition will be revised after the description and discussion of the practice of 
forced marriage as it takes place in times of peace and conflict (chapters 2 and 3). 
a separate sub‑paragraph is devoted to the practice of arranged marriages. 
Paragraph 5 contains some concluding remarks.
29 alkema 1984, p.  145. for the drafting history of the UDHr and the goals of achieving 
equality between men and women, see UN economic and Social council, UN Doc. e/Hr/18/
rev.1, 16 may 1946, pp. 2–4 (available at <http://daccess‑dds‑ny.un.org/doc/UNDoc/geN/
gL9/902/06/PDf/gL990206.pdf?openelement>, last accessed December 2013).
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2.1. THe SocioLogY of mar riage
marriage as a way of organising life and formalising relationships has existed 
as a social institution in all societies throughout history.30 Throughout recorded 
history, marriage has been the main vehicle by which (private) property 
was exchanged and handed down to new generations, and by which sexual 
relationships and the position of children in society were regulated. at the same 
time, marriage has also always been one of the most important means of creating 
alliances, expanding networks, exerting political influence and enhancing social 
status.31
While the institution of marriage may be as old as the hills, the definition 
of marriage is not written in stone. marriage, as opposed to, for example, birth 
– which is a biological event – is a dynamic social construct which is defined in 
terms of law and custom and may therefore vary considerably from society to 
society.32 marriage refers both to the act of marrying, as well as to the continuing 
condition of the marital status, and, like ownership, it is generally understood as 
a legal title.33 consequently, the way in which marriage is defined in a particular 
society depends on the national laws governing the civil law marriage contract 
or the (religious) traditions or customs applicable to the union. But even within 
one particular society, customs and laws regarding marriage can differ. in Sierra 
Leone, for example, there are three recognised types of marriage: marriages under 
islamic, civil and customary law.34 customary marriages, in turn, vary among 
the different ethnic groups.35 The challenge is to adopt a cross‑culturally valid 
definition of marriage. Such a universally applicable definition, if at all possible, 
will inevitably remain general due to the major differences between societies, 
both with regard to the formalities of what is considered a ‘wedding’ and to its 
cultural and social connotations.36 for example, in most societies, marriages 
are, at least in theory, based on the free and full consent of both parties, but in 
other societies the consent of the relatives of the spouses may substitute their own 
consent. in some traditions, a marriage is regarded as a union of two families; 
30 according to coontz 2005, pp. 24 and 32–33, the Na people of china were the only people who 
did not grant marriage a prominent place in their society.
31 coontz 2005, p.  48. e. Bartels, ‘gedwongen uithuwelijking: definitie, praktijk en culturele 
achtergronden’, in: SPior, Hand in hand tegen huwelijksdwang, SPior: rotterdam 2007, p. 28.
32 UN Demographic Yearbook 2008, p. 9.
33 J. allain, ‘The definition of slavery in international law’, Howard Law Journal (52) 2008–2009, 
p. 257; and rude‑antoine 2005, pp. 13–16.
34 Human rights Watch 2003a, pp. 15–16; and Scharf 2005, p. 79.
35 See in general afrc expert report Thorsen.
36 With regard to the fact that the cultural and social connotations of marriage differ from one 
society to another, see ectHr 24 June 2010, appl. No. 30141/04 (Schalk and Kopf v. Austria), 
para. 62.
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in others, it is seen purely as a union of two individuals.37 Some cultures permit 
polygamy; others prohibit it.38 finally, in some societies, marriage requires some 
sort of formalisation in the form of a contract, registration or ceremony, whereas 
in other societies, no so such formalities are required for a couple to be considered 
married.39 in addition, the legal and social consequences that are attached to the 
marital status – such as inheritance, legal paternity and tax‑related matters – may 
vary from one society to another.40 Because of all of these differences, criteria 
such as cohabitation, running a joint household, division of domestic tasks 
and ritual recognition have each proved to be too limiting to serve as universal 
characteristics of marriage.41 and arguably, Western notions of marriage 
might be too exclusionary: they carry certain euro‑american connotations of 
love and marriage, namely that love (and passion) is the basis for partnering.42 
consequently, sociologists and anthropologists have emphasised the need to 
re‑conceptualise these notions in context, by looking at the meaning of certain 
concepts within a particular society.43
anthropologists attempting to avoid using such narrow elements and/or 
a purely Western concept of marriage have defined marriage in several more 
abstract ways. Broadly speaking there are two approaches to defining marriage: 
one focuses on the act that establishes the union and on the other focuses on the 
consequences that are the result of the act of marriage. Some anthropologists, 
such as gough in 1959, define marriage by referring to the legitimacy of the 
children resulting from this relationship, thereby linking legitimacy to marital 
status.44 However, seeing as many (matrilineal) societies are quite unfamiliar with 
the concept of illegitimate children and as many countries have by now rejected 
the traditional legal distinction between legitimate and illegitimate children, this 
definition of marriage no longer rings true.45 others, such as Leach, argue that 
a cross‑culturally applicable definition of marriage does not exist since there is 
37 r.J. Simon & H. altstein, Global perspectives on social issues. Marriage and divorce, New York: 
Lexington Books 2003, p. 5.
38 for example, polygamy is accepted in some mormon communities, in a limited number of 
islamic states and among certain african peoples, see m. Koktvedgaard Zeitzen, Polygamy: 
a cross‑cultural analysis, oxford: Berg Publishers 2008, esp. pp. 3–4. 
39 See e.g. on the so‑called ‘common‑law marriage’ Krause & meyer 2007, pp. 54–57.
40 in many societies, the marital status also has consequences with regard to criminal liability, 
expressed in the doctrine of spousal privilege (Scharf 2005, p. 85), see for example article 217(3) 
Dutch code of criminal Procedure.
41 coontz 2005, pp. 26–31.
42 This is different in some other cultures: for example, most cambodians interviewed by LeVine 
placed values such as loyalty, kindness and harmony over love (LeVine 2010, pp. 27–29). With 
regard to cultural connotations of ‘marriage’ see also: Del Vecchio 2011.
43 in this regard, compare mcKay and mazurana’s arguments pertaining to the notions of ‘child’ 
and ‘childhood’ in different societies, mcKay & mazurana 2004, p.  119. When discussing 
‘marriage’, it is important to look at the meaning of this institution within the country in 
question (for an example in Sierra Leone, see coulter 2009, p. 220).
44 e.K. gough, ‘The Nayars and the definition of marriage’, The Journal of the Royal 
Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland (89) 1959, p. 23.
45 alkema 1984, p. 162.
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such a large variety of (sub)types of marriages. Therefore, he proposed defining 
all the different institutions of marriage in terms of the allocation of classes 
of rights that result from a marriage. Leach listed ten examples of such rights, 
including property rights, legal parenthood and monogamy, stressing that these 
rights differ across cultures.46 according to Leach, marriage is therefore ‘a set 
of legal rules under which such items of property (e.g. goods, titles, and social 
status;47 iH) are handed down from generation to generation’.48 another approach 
to defining marriage was proffered by Bell. in 1997, Bell defined marriage in terms 
of a right to sexual access. in his view, marriage is a relationship that provides a 
husband with a demand‑right of sexual access and obliges a wife to yield to this 
demand.49 This definition is problematic in the sense that Bell does not explain 
what he means by ‘demand‑right to sexual access’, which leaves this term open 
to the interpretation that a husband has the right to sex on demand.50 Whereas 
this might once have been the case, the criminalisation of marital rape in many 
jurisdictions (and its condemnation by the UN Declaration on the elimination 
of Violence against Women) most certainly has clarified that – at least in many 
societies – marriage does not establish a ‘right’ to sex on demand.51 Therefore, 
Bell’s definition is not (or at least no longer) universally applicable.
The 2008 UN Demographic Yearbook provides a more neutral definition, 
defining marriage as ‘an act, ceremony or process by which the legal relationship 
of husband and wife is constituted’. The legality of this relationship ‘may be 
established by civil, religious or other means as recognised by the laws of 
each country or area’.52 even though this definition is broad, inclusive and 
non‑ethnocentric, it is discriminatory in the sense that it grammatically appears 
to exclude same‑sex marriages. in light of the recent legalisation of same‑sex 
marriages in several countries and in view of the customs in certain cultures 
that provide for the possibility of women marrying women and men marrying 
men, a definition that includes such marriages is warranted. The following 
anthropological definition, which in part takes Leach’s rights‑based approach, 
offers a solution. it appears inclusive enough to be cross‑culturally valid: it 
is non‑ethnocentric, gender‑neutral with respect to marriage partners and it 
includes the possibility of polyandrous and polygynous marriages. according 
to this definition, formulated by anthropologists Haviland, Prins, Walrath and 
46 e.r. Leach, ‘Polyandry, inheritance and the Definition of marriage’, Man (55) 1955, p. 183.
47 coontz 2005, p. 28.
48 e.r. Leach, ‘The Social anthropology of marriage and mating’, in: V. reynolds & J. Kellett 
(eds.), Marriage and Mating, oxford: oxford University Press 1991, p. 93. 
49 D. Bell, ‘Defining marriage and legitimacy’, Current Anthropology (38) 1997, p. 241. in a reply 
to the comments on his article, Bell explained that this definition is actually a criterion by 
which marriage may be identified (D. Bell, ‘reply’, Current Anthropology (38) 1997, p. 250).
50 m.L. Burton, ‘comments’, Current Anthropology (38) 1997, p. 245.
51 However, in 2006, at least 53 countries still accepted marital status as a valid legal defence in 
rape cases (The Secretary‑general, In‑depth Study on All Forms of Violence Against Women, 
delivered to the General Assembly, UN Doc. a/61/122/add.1, 6 July 2006, p. 89).
52 UN Demographic Yearbook 2008, p. 8.
Forceandmarriage.indd   16 20-5-2014   10:41:55
intersentia 17




mcBride, marriage is ‘a culturally sanctioned union between two or more people 
that establishes certain rights and obligations between the people, between them 
and their children, and between them and their in‑laws’.53 These rights and 
obligations may relate to inter alia property, sex, child rearing, labour, inheritance 
and status.54 according to Stone, ‘the only generalization one can make about 
marriage is that everywhere it entails intimate, if not emotionally charged, 
relationships between spouses, and everywhere it creates in‑laws’.55 marriage thus 
involves a comprehensive union of spouses, a special link to children and norms 
of permanence and exclusivity.56
2 .2 . DefiNiTioN of mar riage
a large range of international, regional and national human rights instruments 
contain provisions regarding the institution of marriage (see infra paragraph 3.1). 
Several of these instruments are specifically devoted to marriage and include 
provisions pertaining to the requirement of free and genuine consent, the 
condemnation of child marriages and the overall equality of men and women 
during all stages of a marriage. Yet none of these treaties, conventions, declarations 
or resolutions provide a (legal) definition of marriage. Therefore, recourse needs 
to be taken to other sources, such as case law and the interpretation of legal 
documents. as evidenced by the link between the words ‘marry’ and ‘to found 
a family’ in article 12 european convention on Human rights (ecHr), at the 
time of the promulgation of the ecHr, marriage was regarded as the bedrock 
of the family within the european legal order and was therefore primarily 
aimed at procreation.57 it follows from earlier case law of the european court 
of Human rights (ectHr) that in most european countries, marriage was 
traditionally seen as a community between a man and a woman, contracted in 
a formalised procedure and based on permanence.58 Due to societal changes as 
a result of which founding a family is no longer intrinsically linked to marriage, 
the ectHr no longer adheres to this strict interpretation of marriage. marriage, 
in the context of the ecHr, is now regarded as a legally and socially recognised 
and formalised form of (long‑lasting) cohabitation that is based on exclusivity 
with regard to sexuality and on the mutuality of material and moral support and 
53 Haviland et al. 2010, p. 473.
54 Haviland et al. 2010, p. 473. a more general definition is proffered in a report of Plan UK: 
‘marriage is a formalised, binding partnership between consenting adults’ (Plan UK 2011, 
p. 2).
55 Stone 2000, p. 187.
56 S. girgis, r.P. george & r.T. anderson, ‘What is marriage?’, Harvard Journal of Law & Public 
Policy (34) 2011, p. 252. 
57 Van grunderbeeck 2003, p. 198.
58 Van grunderbeeck 2003, p. 199. in almost all societies, marriage is intended to be a long‑term 
(lifelong) commitment (LeVine 2010, p. 58).
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affection.59 Whereas this characterisation of marriage might be valid for most 
european and other Western countries, it does not necessarily hold true for other 
societies. as stated previously, the formal requirements for marriages vary from 
one country to another, as do the legal and social consequences. consequently, 
the legal definition of this institution also varies.60
However, when abstracting from the formal (ceremonial) requirements 
and the specific rights and obligations associated with it, it is possible to arrive 
at a description of marriage that is universally applicable. a marriage, whether 
religious or civil, must be seen as a contract between two or more persons61 and, 
for the purpose of this research, is defined as:
Any union between two or more people which, in a specific society is legally, 
culturally and/or religiously sanctioned, which is binding, and which, within the 
particular context of that society, establishes certain rights and obligations between 
these people and is seen as marital or marital‑like.
This broad and expansive definition allows for many different types of unions 
to be characterised as marriage.62 ‘marriage’ thus refers to a person’s civil or 
marital status, which reflects all legally sanctioned forms of partnership within 
a particular societal context that change the legal status of the parties concerned 
and that create mutual rights and obligations between the partners. in this way, 
many different forms of marriage and legally sanctioned marital‑like associations, 
such as registered or civil partnership63 and other unions that are equated with 
marriage in a particular society, will fall within the ambit of the definition.
59 Van grunderbeeck 2003, p. 238.
60 Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th edition, 2004, defines marriage as ‘the legal union of a couple as 
husband and wife’. The 2006 3rd pocket edition of Black’s Law Dictionary defines marriages as 
‘the legal union of a couple as spouses’.
61 Sheffield City Council v. E and Another (2005) fam 326, para. 141(x). marriage is regarded as 
such in muslim law, as well as in Hindu and christian laws on marriage (Siddiqi 2005, p. 286).
62 Del Vecchio 2011, pp. 17–18 argues for such an inclusive definition.
63 even though a partnership does not always have the same status and the same benefits as 
a marriage, it still establishes certain rights and obligations between partners. moreover, in 
some countries, partnerships and other legal forms of cohabitation are often equated with 
marriage (see e.g. alkema 1984, pp. 153–154). for example, in the Netherlands, the two unions 
are equal with regard to the legally prescribed conditions for entering the union and the rights 
and obligations between the partners (article 80b of Book 1 of the Dutch civil code). for 
differences, see chapter 7.
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3. COnSEnSUS FACIT nUPTIAS: coercioN, 
coNSeNT aND HUmaN rigHTS
3.1. HUmaN rigHTS iNSTrUmeNTS
3.1.1. Introduction: the legal effects of human rights instruments
The legal effects of the human rights instruments listed in the following two 
sub‑paragraphs vary from one instrument to another: some create positive and/
or negative obligations for States Parties; others only contain recommendations 
or guidelines. covenants, statutes, protocols and conventions, are legally binding 
for those States that have consented to be bound by them, by ratifying or acceding 
to them.64 These instruments are broadly called treaties: international agreements 
that are governed by international law and concluded in written form, whether 
that agreement is embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related 
instruments and whatever its particular designation. agreements can be made 
between one or more States and one or more international organisations.65 
individuals are not party to these human rights treaties: States are. Human rights 
treaties require States to undertake to respect and ensure human rights. When 
implementing the duty to respect and ensure human rights, States have a double 
obligation: they must refrain from violating these rights and at the same time 
protect civilians from violations committed by other civilians. in this way, the 
treaties have indirect horizontal effect.66 in addition, the preambles of several 
human rights instruments state that individuals also have a duty to respect human 
rights. These preambular considerations are not binding. However, common 
article 5(1) of the international covenant on civil and Political rights and the 
international covenant on economic, Social and cultural rights stipulates that 
nothing in these covenants:
‘may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage 
in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights 
and freedoms recognized herein or at their limitation to a greater extent than is 
provided for in the present covenant.’
This common provision has been interpreted as forbidding the abuse of human 
rights by non‑State actors, including individual citizens.67
64 See article 26 of the 1969 Vienna convention, article 26 of the 1986 Vienna convention and 
<www2.ohchr.org/english/law>.
65 See article 1(a) 1969 Vienna convention, article 1(a) 1986 Vienna convention.
66 Saul 2008, pp. 234–235.
67 UNcHr, Terrorism and Human Rights: Preliminary Report by Special Rapporteur K. Koufa, 
7 June 1999, UN Doc. e/cN.4/Sub.2/1999/27, paras. 22–23; and Saul 2008, pp. 235–236.
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Principles, recommendations, and resolutions, unlike treaties, are instruments 
that have no binding legal effect. They do, however, provide guidance to States 
and often also have a certain moral force.68 These non‑binding documents are 
also known as ‘soft law’: they are not law, but are important nonetheless and 
can exercise influence in the fields of international law and politics.69 general 
recommendations made by the committee on the elimination of Discrimination 
against Women, for example, may be regarded as soft law: the recommendations 
are not binding, but are important in connection with the convention on the 
elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women.70
The legal effects of the instruments of the eU are discussed in article 288 
of the Treaty on the functioning of the european Union. Pursuant to this 
provision, regulations are binding in their entirety and are directly applicable in 
all member states of the eU. Directives are also binding, but only as to the result 
to be achieved and not with regard to the means with which the result is to be 
achieved. Decisions are also binding in their entirety, whereas recommendations 
and opinions have no binding force.
3.1.2. Universal human rights instruments
The right to marry out of free will is recognised in a plethora of universal human 
rights documents. article  16 UDHr recognises the right of men and women 
of full age to marry and found a family and stipulates that ‘marriage shall be 
entered into only with the free and full consent of the intending spouses’.71 This 
right also incorporates the right not to marry.72 article 10(1) iceScr stipulates 
that ‘marriage must be entered into with the free consent of the intending 
spouses’.73 The iccPr formulates the principle of consent to marriage negatively: 
article 23(3) iccPr explicitly prescribes that ‘no marriage shall be entered into 
without the free and full consent of the intending spouses’.74 on several occasions, 
the Human rights committee, the body that monitors the implementation of 
the iccPr, has spoken out on the equality of rights between men and women 
in general and with regard to marriage in particular. for example, in general 
68 Shaw 2008, pp. 115–121.
69 Shaw 2008, pp. 117–118.
70 Shaw 2008, pp. 323–324.
71 See also resolution 843 (iX) of the UN general assembly on the Status of women in private 
law: customs, ancient laws and practices affecting the human dignity of women, 17 December 
1954. This resolution urges states to abolish laws and practices that limit women’s complete 
freedom in the choice of a spouse.
72 gill & anitha 2011, p.  6; and L. Lindholt & S. Schaumburg‑müller, Human rights in 
development. Yearbook 2003, Leiden: Brill 2005, p. 381.
73 Note that ‘free and full consent’ implies absence of coercion: someone who was forced to marry 
will not have entered into that marriage with free and full consent.
74 Bahrain, israel and Kuwait made reservations with regard to article 23 iccPr in those cases 
in which the provisions of article 23 conflict with their national (religious) laws, see: <http://
treaties.un.org>.
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comment No. 28, the committee enumerated a triad of factors that may prevent 
women from being able to freely make the decision to marry: the lack of a statutory 
minimum age for marriage, the practice whereby a (male) guardian consents to 
the marriage instead of the woman herself, and the practice whereby a rapist may 
limit or exclude criminal liability by marrying the rape victim, and whereby at 
the same time, the victim is pressured (by her relatives or the community at large) 
to accept this marriage. in addition, the committee refers to restrictions on (re)
marriage imposed on women and not on men, and the practice of polygamy, 
noting that this violates the dignity of women and constitutes discrimination 
against women.75
another important human rights instrument is the convention on the 
elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women (ceDaW). This 
convention not only acknowledges the principle that marriage is entered into 
only with free and full consent, but also guarantees the right of men and women to 
freely choose a spouse (article 16(1)b). Several countries made reservations with 
regard to article  16. although no country specifically referred to article  16(1)
(b), twelve states parties made reservations with regard to article 16 as a whole.76 
it is therefore assumed that these states do not consider themselves bound by 
article 16(1)(b) insofar as this provision is incompatible with their national laws.77 
The committee on the elimination of Discrimination against Women, the UN 
treaty body that monitors the ceDaW, has made many recommendations on issues 
affecting women. one of these recommendations, general recommendation 
No.  21, pertains to article  16 ceDaW and equality in marriage and family 
relations. This recommendation elaborates on the right to choose a spouse and the 
ways in which this right is sometimes restricted by certain cultural and religious 
practices, resulting in forced marriages. The recommendation concludes that 
‘(s)ubject to reasonable restrictions based for example on a woman’s youth or 
consanguinity with her partner, a woman’s right to choose when, if, and whom 
75 UN Human rights committee, General Comment no. 28: Equality of rights between men and 
women (article 3), ccPr/c/21/rev.1/add.10, 29 march 2000, paras. 23–24.
76 algeria, Bahrain, egypt, india, iraq, israel, maldives, micronesia, morocco, Singapore, 
Thailand and the United arab emirates (see Declarations, reservations, objections and 
notifications of withdrawal of reservations relating to the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women, meeting of States Parties to the convention on the 
elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women, fourteenth meeting, New York 
23 June 2006, UN Doc. ceDaW/SP/2006/2, 10 June 2006).
77 These states made reservations to article 16, insofar as this article is incompatible with their 
national laws (algeria, israel and Thailand), the islamic Shari’a (Bahrain, egypt, iraq, malaysia, 
maldives, morocco and the United arab emirates), or religious or personal laws (Singapore). 
india declared that it shall abide by and ensure the provisions of article 16 ‘in conformity with 
its policy of non‑interference in the personal affairs of any community without its initiative 
and consent’. (See Declarations, reservations, objections and notifications of withdrawal of 
reservations relating to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women, meeting of States Parties to the convention on the elimination of all forms 
of Discrimination against Women, fourteenth meeting, New York 23  June 2006, UN Doc. 
ceDaW/SP/2006/2, 10 June 2006).
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she will marry must be protected and enforced at law’.78 The right to free choice 
of a spouse is likewise enshrined in the UN Declaration on the elimination of all 
forms of Discrimination against Women (article 6(2)(a)).
Several other human rights instruments condemn the practice of forced 
marriage. article 1(1) of the convention on consent to marriage, minimum age 
for marriage, and registration of marriages79 expressly stipulates that:
‘No marriage shall be legally entered into without the full and free consent of 
both parties, such consent to be expressed by them in person after due publicity 
and in the presence of the authority competent to solemnize the marriage and of 
witnesses, as prescribed by law.’80
The 1965 UN recommendation on consent to marriage, minimum age for 
marriage and registration of marriages reiterates free consent as a condicio 
sine qua non for marriage. The 1985 UN Nairobi forward‑looking Strategies for 
the advancement of Women also address the importance of basing a marriage 
agreement on freedom of choice (paragraph  73). in 1991, the UN general 
assembly adopted a resolution concerning the implementation of the Nairobi 
forward‑looking Strategies.81 The importance of free and full consent to marriage, 
in the light of early marriages, was also stressed in the Beijing Declaration and 
Platform for action, which was adopted during the fourth World conference 
on Women in September 1995.82 a resolution concerning actions and initiatives 
to implement the Beijing Declaration adopted by the UN general assembly five 
years later sums up actions to be taken by national governments to eradicate 
harmful customary or traditional practices, such as early and forced marriage.83
The final instrument that ought to be mentioned is the Supplementary 
convention on the abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and institutions and 
Practices Similar to Slavery. article  1(c) of this convention explicitly classifies 
several marriage practices as slavery‑like, namely any institution or practice 
whereby:
78 ceDaW committee, general recommendation No. 21.
79 The convention on consent to marriage, minimum age for marriage, and registration of 
marriages has 55 States Parties (December 2013).
80 Bangladesh made a reservation to this provision, reserving the right to apply this provision 
insofar as it relates to the question of legal validity of child marriage, in accordance with the 
personal laws of different religious communities of the country (see <http://treaties.un.org>). 
No other state party made reservations relating to the requirement of full and free consent.
81 UN general assembly, Implementation of the nairobi Forward‑looking Strategies for the 
Advancement of Women, UN Doc. a/reS/46/98, 16 December 1991.
82 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, Fourth World Conference on Women, 15 September 
1995, UN Doc. a/coNf.177/20 (1995), para. 274.
83 UN general assembly, further actions and initiatives to implement the Beijing Declaration 
and Platform for action, UN Doc. a/reS/S‑23/3, 16 November 2000.
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(i) a woman, without the right to refuse, is promised or given in marriage on 
payment of a consideration in money or in kind to her parents, guardian, 
family or any other person or group; or
(ii) The husband of a woman, his family, or his clan, has the right to transfer her 
to another person for value received or otherwise; or
(iii) a woman on the death of her husband is liable to be inherited by another 
person.84
in order to put a stop to these institutions and practices, the Supplementary 
convention on the abolition of Slavery prescribes that its 12385 states parties 
take (legislative) action with regard to the minimum age of marriage, consent to 
marriage and registration of marriages (article 2).
3.1.3. Regional human rights instruments
Whereas most international legal instruments stipulate the conditions that make 
a marriage valid and implicitly condemn the practice of forced marriage,86 the 
majority of regional instruments are explicitly directed at the illegality of forced 
marriages. article 6 of the Protocol to the african charter on human and peoples’ 
rights on the rights of women in africa stipulates that member states enact 
legislative measures to guarantee that the minimum age of marriage for women 
is eighteen, that no marriage takes place without the free and full consent of both 
parties and that monogamy is encouraged as the preferred form of marriage.87 
further, article 19(i) of the 1981 islamic Declaration of Human rights stipulates 
that no person may be married against his or her will. article 5(a) of the 1990 
cairo Declaration on Human rights in islam states that men and women have 
the right to marry regardless of their race, colour or nationality.88 article 33 of 
the 2004 arab charter on Human rights89 holds that men and women of full age 
have the right to marry and that no marriage can take place without the full and 
free consent of both parties. article 17(3) of the american convention on Human 
84 article 1(c) Supplementary Slavery convention.
85 as of December 2013.
86 UN Division for the advancement of Women, Forced and early marriage: a focus on central 
and eastern Europe and former Soviet Union countries with selected laws from other countries. 
Expert paper prepared by C. Thomas, UN Doc. egm/gPLHP/2009/eP.08, 19  June 2009, 
pp. 5–6; endnote 1.
87 Note that the african charter on human and peoples’ rights makes no reference to marriage. 
The african Union, which adopted the african charter on human and people’s rights and its 
protocols, has 53 members. The Protocol on the rights of women in africa was, in December 
2013, ratified by 30 members of the african Union (see <www.au.int>). 
88 Note the absence of religion (and gender). The cairo Declaration on Human rights in islam 
was adopted by the organization of islamic cooperation which has 57 (December 2013) 
member states.
89 The arab charter on Human rights was adopted by the council of the League of arab States. 
The League has 22 member states. in December 2013, seven member states had ratified the 
charter (see < www.lasportal.org >).
Forceandmarriage.indd   23 20-5-2014   10:41:56
24 intersentia




rights also stipulates that no marriage shall be entered into without the free and 
full consent of the intending spouses.90
in contrast to the abovementioned regional human rights instruments, the 
european convention on Human rights91 is silent on the right to enter into 
marriage only with free and full consent.92 article  12 ecHr lays down the 
right of men and women of marriageable age to marry and found a family, in 
accordance with the national laws governing the exercise of these rights. as is the 
case in many other human rights documents, the right to marry encapsulated in 
the ecHr is restricted to the so‑called ‘one‑off action’ of entering into marriage, 
so the right to form a legal union and obtain a legal status.93 it does not extend 
to any rights or obligations that are created by this legal status. These rights are 
protected by other provisions, such as the right to family life (article 8 ecHr).94 
The equality of the spouses with regard to rights and responsibilities during all 
stages of the marriage is laid down in article 5 of Protocol No. 7 to the ecHr. The 
second relevant european human rights instrument, the charter of fundamental 
rights of the european Union (cfreU) does not explicitly require the consent 
of both parties either, but only specifies, in article 9, that the right to marry is to 
be guaranteed in accordance with the national laws governing the exercise of this 
right. Unlike the ecHr, the cfreU does not refer to the right of men and women 
to marry, leaving out any reference to gender. Both article 12 ecHr and article 9 
cfreU include in addition to a positive right to marry, a negative right, i.e. the 
right not to marry,95 although the ectHr has not yet asserted this.96 a right to 
90 The american convention on Human rights was adopted by the organization of american 
States. in December 2013, 24 of the 35 members of the organization had ratified the convention 
(see <www.oas.org>). None of the member states made reservations with regard to article 17.
91 Signing and ratifying the ecHr is a precondition to becoming a member state of the council 
of europe. The council of europe has 47 member states (see < http://hub.coe.int/>).
92 Nonetheless, article 12 ecHr does seem to implicitly include the right to marry free from any 
coercion (Liberty, Liberty’s Briefing: forced marriage (civil Protection) Bill, London January 
2007, p.  4; Schmidt & rijken 2005, p.  14; and Van grunderbeeck 2003, p.  207). moreover, 
forcing someone to marry against his or her will may constitute a violation of the underlying 
principles of personal autonomy and human dignity, and of the right to respect for private and 
family life, enshrined in article 8 ecHr (Liberty, Liberty’s Briefing: forced marriage (civil 
Protection) Bill, London January 2007, p. 4; and Van grunderbeeck 2003, p. 207).
93 D. gomien, D. Harris & L. Zwaak (eds.), Law and practice of the European Convention on 
Human Rights and the European Social Charter, Strasbourg: council of europe Publishing 
1996, p. 253.
94 Van grunderbeeck 2003, pp. 199–200.
95 Van Dijk et al. 2006, p. 843. in the same manner, the freedom of religion also includes the right 
not to have a religion, see ectHr 18 february 1999, appl. No. 24645/94, para. 34 (Buscarini 
and others v. San Marino). article  11, which guarantees the positive right to freedom of 
association, also confers a negative right not to join an association, see ectHr 30 June 1993, 
appl. No. 16130/90 (Sigurdur A. Sigurjónsson v. Iceland), para.  35. See also N. copeland, 
‘Library Briefing: forced marriage in the eU – the legal situation’, Library of the european 
Parliamant, 30 June 2011; Liberty, Liberty’s Briefing: forced marriage (civil Protection) Bill, 
London January 2007, p. 4.
96 Van grunderbeeck 2003, p. 207.
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divorce is not guaranteed by article 12 ecHr, or by article 5 of Protocol No. 7 
to the ecHr.97
on the level of the council of europe, several resolutions have been passed 
that concern the issue of forced marriage. resolution 1468 (2005) of the council 
of europe Parliamentary assembly on forced marriages and child marriages 
condemns forced marriage and defines it as the union of two persons to which at 
least one of whom has not given their full and free consent.98 The Parliamentary 
assembly urges member states to refrain from recognising forced marriages 
and child marriages contracted abroad, to facilitate the (automatic) annulment 
of forced marriages and to regard as rape any coercive sexual intercourse that 
victims are subjected to within a forced marriage and child marriage. in addition, 
the resolution asks member states to consider criminalising forced marriage 
as an independent criminal offence.99 The recommendation of the committee 
of ministers to member states on the protection of women against violence 
classifies forced marriage as a harmful traditional practice that may constitute 
violence against women, and recommends that member states prohibit marriages 
concluded without the consent of the persons100 concerned.101
in april 2011, the council of europe adopted the convention on preventing 
and combating violence against women and domestic violence.102 This convention 
builds on the previously mentioned 2002 recommendation of the committee of 
ministers on the protection of women against violence and sets legally binding 
standards with regard to the prevention of violence against women and domestic 
violence, the protection of the victims and the punishment of the perpetrators. 
for this purpose, the convention establishes a number of criminal offences and 
requires the parties to ensure that several forms of violence against women, 
including forced marriage, are criminalised (articles 33–39), but parties are not 
97 ectHr 18 December 1986, appl. No. 9697/82 (Johnston and others v. Ireland), para. 54. See 
also Van Dijk et al. 2006, pp. 852 and 987; and Van grunderbeeck 2003, pp. 261–265.
98 resolution 1468 (2005) of the council of europe on forced marriages and child marriages, 
5 october 2005, para. 4. See also recommendation 1723 (2005) of the Parliamentary assembly 
on the resolution on forced marriages and child marriages, 5 october 2005.
99 resolution 1468 (2005) of the council of europe on forced marriages and child marriages, 
5  october 2005, paras.  14.2–14.4. in 2001, in a recommendation concerning domestic 
slavery, the Parliamentary assembly also recommended the committee of ministers to ask 
the governments of member states to ‘make slavery and trafficking in human beings, and 
also forced marriage, offences in their criminal codes’ (recommendation 1523 (2001) of the 
council of europe on domestic slavery, 26 June 2001).
100 it may be presumed that the committee of ministers meant ‘forced marriages concluded 
without the consent of one or both of the persons concerned’.
101 recommendation rec(2002)5 of the committee of ministers to member states on the 
protection of women against violence, 30 april 2002. 
102 convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence 
cm(2011)49 of the committee of ministers of the council of europe (7 april 2011). Pursuant 
to article 75, the convention will enter into force once ten countries, of which at least eight are 
council of europe member states, have ratified it. in December 2013, eight member states had 
ratified the convention and another 24 had signed it, including the United Kingdom and the 
Netherlands.
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obliged to introduce specific provisions that criminalise this conduct.103 article 37 
establishes the offence of forced marriage and requires parties to criminalise the 
intentional conduct of forcing someone (adult or child) to enter into a marriage. 
Likewise, parties are to criminalise the intentional conduct of luring an individual 
abroad with the purpose of forcing this individual to enter into a marriage.
according to the explanatory report, the term ‘forcing’ refers to ‘physical 
and psychological force where coercion or duress is employed’. The offence of 
forced marriage is completed once a marriage is concluded to which at least one 
party did not voluntarily consent as a result of the use of force, coercion or duress. 
in case of intentionally luring a person abroad with the intention of forcing 
the person to marry against his or her will, the marriage does not have to be 
concluded for the offence to be completed.104 in accordance with article 41, parties 
are required to establish as an offence any attempts to commit a forced marriage 
and the aiding or abetting of a forced marriage. article  44 requires parties to 
establish jurisdiction over the offences described in the convention on the basis 
of the principles of territoriality, and active and passive nationality. in addition, 
parties should establish jurisdiction over the offences when either the victim or 
the perpetrator has his or her habitual residence in their country. further, the 
convention eliminates the requirement of dual criminality for the most serious 
offences enumerated in the convention, which includes forced marriage. The 
convention also stipulates that when these offences are committed by nationals 
of the party concerned, jurisdiction should not be subordinated to the condition 
that prosecution can only be initiated when the victim has reported to offence or 
when the relevant authorities of the state in which the offence was committed filed 
charges.105 in addition to criminalising certain conduct, the convention requires 
parties to ensure that victims also have access to adequate civil law remedies. 
a  victim of a prospective forced marriage should, for example, be able to turn to 
a civil law court to acquire a court order or injunction (article 29).106 article 32 
specifically deals with the civil consequences of forced marriages and stipulates 
that parties shall take (legislative) measures to ensure that marriages that were 
concluded under force ‘may be voidable, annulled or dissolved without undue 
financial or administrative burden placed on the victim’.
103 explanatory report to the council of europe convention on preventing and combating 
violence against women and domestic violence (ceTS No. 210), paras. 21 and 155.
104 explanatory report to the council of europe convention on preventing and combating 
violence against women and domestic violence (ceTS No. 210), paras. 195–197.
105 explanatory report to the council of europe convention on preventing and combating 
violence against women and domestic violence (ceTS No. 210), para. 228.
106 explanatory report to the council of europe convention on preventing and combating 
violence against women and domestic violence (ceTS No. 210), para. 157.
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on the level of the european Union, a Directive of 5 april 2011 concerning 
human trafficking links this phenomenon to forced marriage.107 in accordance 
with this Directive, the concept of human trafficking also covers forced marriages 
insofar as they fulfil the constitutive elements of trafficking in human beings. 
The issue of forced marriage is also on the agenda of the eU outside the context 
of human trafficking. in June 2011, a hearing was organised by the european 
foundation for Democracy at the european Parliament. During this hearing, the 
issue of criminalising forced marriage at eU level was discussed.108
3.2 . coercioN aND force109
There is no such thing as complete and absolute free will. coercion is commonplace 
to human existence and indeed inevitable in human interaction. Different forms 
of coercion are used in many aspects of daily life: people are pressured into 
working for a living, minors are forced to attend schools, and the law – which is 
enforced – is used to make people do or refrain from doing certain things. in this 
sense, coercion must be seen as a valuable social and legal practice. Without it, 
there would be chaos. Nevertheless, not all forms of coercion are acceptable, nor is 
coercion desirable in all contexts: forcing someone to sign a contract at gunpoint 
can hardly be regarded as a practice that is to be encouraged.
The verb ‘coerce’ derives from the Latin coercere, which means to confine, 
to control or to constrain. in very broad terms, coercion may be defined as the 
act of making someone do, omit or undergo something that this person would 
not have done otherwise, by attaching to the scenario that the coerced person 
does not comply certain consequences that are perceived as harmful or negative 
by the coercee. according to Black’s Law Dictionary, coercion may consist 
of physical force or threat of physical force. for this purpose, the dictionary 
distinguishes between actual force, constituting a physical (violent) act on the 
one hand, and constructive force, which is often intangible and includes threats 
and intimidations, on the other hand.110 Bayles lists five conditions that apply to 
coercion: (1) X has the double intention of making Y do a and (2) of further 
hurting Y if he does not do so. (3) To this end, X threatens harm if Y does not do 
a. (4) as a result of this threat, Y does a, which, (5) had he not been threatened, 
107 Directive 2011/36/eU of the european Parliament and of the council of 5  april 2011 on 
preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims, and 
replacing council framework Decision 2002/629/JHa (oJ 2011, L 101/1).
108 This hearing has yet to receive a follow‑up.
109 This paragraph and the next discuss the concept of coercion and consent in general, for 
more information on the meaning of coercion and consent in Dutch and english criminal 
law specifically, see chapter 7. This chapter will also go into the question as to under which 
circumstances the coercion used to establish a forced marriage may amount to a criminal 
offence.
110 Black’s Law Dictionary, 3rd pocket edition, 2006. 
Forceandmarriage.indd   27 20-5-2014   10:41:56
28 intersentia




he would not have done.111 in accordance with requirement 2, coercion can be 
distinguished from persuasion by the coercer’s further intention of harm to the 
coercee if he does not act as the coercer wants.112 This intention is not present in 
situations of persuasion. Lindenberg states that the concept of (criminal) coercion 
consists of five different elements: involuntariness, inevitability, the coercee’s 
awareness of the coercion, the coercer’s awareness of the coercion and causality. 
criminal liability for coercion thus requires that the coercee acted as a result of 
the coercion exercised by the coercer (causality), that he did not want to act as he 
did (involuntariness), that he had no other reasonable option but doing what the 
coercer wanted (inevitability), that the coercer intended to force the coercee to do 
something (coercer’s awareness), and that the coercee experienced the coercer’s 
acts as coercive (coercee’s awareness – which is particularly relevant in case of 
non‑physical coercion).113
There are many different gradations of coercion. coercion is often difficult 
to prove and is often expressed verbally so that the manner in which something 
is said (e.g. intonation, what the perpetrator means, how the victim interprets 
this), the circumstances in which something is said, who says it, etc., all become 
relevant aspects.114 The question of whether or not someone was forced, depends 
on both objective circumstances as well as subjective experiences of the persons 
involved.115 Some young people might experience any family involvement/
interference as a form of pressure or coercion and a limitation of their free partner 
choice, whereas others value their parents’ opinion, take into consideration their 
wishes and seek their blessing.116
The case law of the different international and internationalised tribunals 
and the icc elements of crimes offer guidance in determining what force and 
coercion mean in the context of international criminal law. The first case in which 
the concepts of force and coercion were addressed under international criminal 
law was the Akayesu case. in this case, the icTr Trial chamber had to formulate 
a definition of the crime of rape. Holding that rape is a physical invasion of a 
sexual nature, committed on a person under circumstances which are coercive, 
the Trial chamber stated that ‘coercion’ is not restricted to physical force: 
111 in his paper, Bayles lists ‘Y does a’ as a separate condition (m.D. Bayles, ‘a concept of coercion’, 
in: J.r. Pennock & J.W. chapman, Coercion, New York: aldine‑atherton inc 1972, p. 24).
112 m.D. Bayles, ‘a concept of coercion’, in: J.r. Pennock & J.W. chapman, Coercion, New York: 
aldine‑atherton inc 1972, p. 28.
113 Lindenberg, pp. 20–35 and 133–175. coercion is a distinct criminal offence pursuant to Dutch 
law. in accordance with article 284 of the Dutch criminal code, a person is guilty of criminal 
coercion when he unlawfully coerces a person to do, not do or tolerate something by an act of 
force or another hostile act or by threat of force or threat of another hostile act, directed against 
the victim or a third person. in the Netherlands, the act of forced marriage is subsumed under 
this particular offence. The particular meaning of coercion in Dutch criminal law and the 
different elements of article 284 are discussed in detail in chapter 7).
114 Schmidt & rijken 2005, p. 8.
115 Schmidt & rijken 2005, p. 31. gill & anitha 2011, pp. 13, 55 and 91–92.
116 De Koning & Bartels 2005, pp. 45 and 61.
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‘threats, intimidation, extortion and other forms of duress which prey on fear 
or desperation’ may also constitute coercion.117 in addition, the Trial chamber 
stressed that coercive conditions may be inherent in certain situations, such as 
in armed conflicts.118 The icTY Trial chambers in the Čelebići and Kvočka et al. 
cases endorsed this conclusion.119 The icTY appeals chamber in the Kunarac et 
al. case went a step further by considering that the circumstances prevailing in 
most cases charged under international criminal law will be almost universally 
coercive.120 The icTr Trial chamber in the Muhimana case concurred with this 
opinion.121 furthermore, both ad hoc tribunals have stated that coercion is also 
inherent in captivity, in the sense that captivity vitiates consent.122
The ad hoc tribunals’ assessment of force and coercion is mirrored in the icc 
elements of crimes. Pursuant to a footnote clarifying the element ‘forcibly’ – 
which is included in the definition of the crime of genocide by forcibly transferring 
children – force is not restricted to physical force, but may include threat of force 
or coercion.123 The concepts of non‑physical (threat of) force and coercion are 
further elaborated in the definitions of the crimes of rape, enforced prostitution 
and sexual violence. Taking enforced prostitution as an example, the first element 
of this crime requires that the perpetrator caused one or more persons to engage 
in one or more acts of a sexual nature:
‘by force, or by threat of force or coercion, such as that caused by fear of violence, 
duress, detention, psychological oppression or abuse of power,124; iH against such 
person or another person, or by taking advantage of a coercive environment or 
such person’s or persons’ incapacity to give genuine consent’.125
a footnote explains that natural, induced or age‑related incapacity may render a 
person incapable of giving genuine consent.
3.3. coNSeNT
Seeing as marriage and consent are closely interconnected – several international 
and regional human rights instruments regard the free and genuine consent 
117 Akayesu Trial Judgement, para. 688.
118 Akayesu Trial Judgement, para. 688.
119 Čelebići Trial Judgement, para. 495; and Kvočka et el. Trial Judgement, para. 178.
120 Kunarac et al. appeal Judgement, para. 130.
121 Muhimana Trial Judgement, para.  546. See also De Brouwer 2009, pp.  583–593 and and 
Gacumbitsi appeal Judgement, paras. 147–157.
122 Akayesu Trial Judgement, para. 688; Kunarac et al. Trial Judgement, para. 646; Furundžija 
Trial Judgement, para. 271; Kvočka et al. Trial Judgement, para. 178.
123 article 6(e)‑1 icc eoc.
124 The words ‘such as’ indicate that this list is not exclusive (Boon 2001, p. 651).
125 icc eoc article 7(1)(g)‑3.
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of both parties as the condicio sine qua non for a valid marriage (see supra 
paragraph  3.1) – it is important to also take into consideration the concept of 
consent. rude‑antoine states that the ‘consent to marriage depends simultaneously 
on psychological intent – inner commitment – and on a declaration of intent at 
the time the marriage is contracted’.126 in the case of forced marriages, inner and 
declared consent will not necessarily be consistent: victims will have been forced 
to say ‘i do’ during the actual marriage ceremony (declared intent)127 against their 
will (inner intent). Unless someone clearly voices his true inner intent, a person’s 
inner intent will be difficult to determine, especially in those cases where there is 
no actual physical evidence that someone was forced to marry.128
Pursuant to Dutch and english law, consent cannot be qualified as valid when 
it was given as a result of coercion. article 12(c) of the english matrimonial causes 
act 1973 stipulates that a marriage is voidable on the ground that either party to 
the marriage did not validly consent to it, as a consequence of duress, mistake, 
unsoundness of mind or otherwise; and pursuant to article 1:71(1) Dutch civil 
code, a spouse can request the annulment of a marriage if this marriage was 
contracted under the influence of an unlawful serious threat.129
on the international level, the discussions pertaining to coercion and consent 
mainly take place in light of the definition of rape, but it is possible to put these 
discussions in a broader context. consent and coercion constitute two different 
ways of understanding and conceptualising a criminal act: whereas consent 
focuses on the will and behaviour of the victim, coercion centres on the conduct of 
the perpetrator.130 in accordance with the spectrum of human rights instruments, 
a marriage requires the free and full consent of both parties. consent must be 
given voluntarily, as a result of the victim’s free will, assessed in the context of 
the surrounding circumstances.131 it cannot be said to be full and genuine when 
it was formed under coercive circumstances. it has been held that the presence 
of factors such as coercion, force, or threats of force may evidence the absence 
of consent, and that coercion in general encompasses most conduct that negates 
consent.132 and seeing as the circumstances in situations where the majority 
of international crimes are committed are almost universally coercive, which 
126 rude‑antoine 2005, p. 40.
127 Note that the bush wives in Sierra Leone (see chapter 3) were not even required to declare 
intent: they became bush wives to their captors merely by the declarative act of these captors.
128 rude‑antoine 2005, p. 21.
129 Note that the Dutch marital coercion (civil law) Bill proposes to amend article 1:71(1) of the 
Dutch civil code, deleting ‘unlawful serious threat’ and instead making coercion a ground for 
interruption (see the legal framework set out in chapter 7).
130 K.a. Koenig, r. Lincoln & L. groth, The jurisprudence of sexual violence. Sexual violence & 
accountability project working paper series, Human rights center University of california, 
Berkeley may 2011, p. 44.
131 afrc Trial Judgement, para. 694. See also Kunarac et al. appeal Judgement, para. 127.
132 rUf Trial Judgement, paras. 1470–1471; Kunarac et al. Trial Judgement, paras. 458–459 and 
Muhimana Trial Judgement, para. 546.
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negates any consent, then true consent of the victim under those circumstances 
is virtually impossible.133
This is reflected by rule 70 of the icc rules of Procedure and evidence 
pertaining to the principles of evidence in case of sexual violence. This rule states 
that in case of sexual violence, the icc shall be guided by and, where appropriate, 
apply the following principles relating to the issue of consent:
(a) consent cannot be inferred by reason of any words or conduct of a victim 
where force, threat of force, coercion or taking advantage of a coercive 
environment undermined the victim’s ability to give voluntary and genuine 
consent;
(b) consent cannot be inferred by reason of any words or conduct of a victim 
where the victim is incapable of giving genuine consent;
(c) consent cannot be inferred by reason of the silence of, or lack of resistance by, 
a victim to the alleged sexual violence;
(d) (…).
as for the elements of rape, enforced prostitution and sexual violence, rule 70 
creates the presumption of non‑consent in coercive situations and only allows 
for the affirmative defence of consent when it cannot be established that the 
circumstances under which the crime was committed were coercive.134 When this 
is the case, the admissibility of evidence of consent is subsequently discussed and 
assessed in camera.135 forced marriages that take place in times of conflict often 
occur against the background of coercive circumstances, which means that the 
issue of consent will not, in principle, have to be examined by a court.136
4. a (PreLimiNarY) DefiNiTioN of forceD 
marriage
4.1. forceD mar riage: a (WorKiNg) DefiNiTioN
Defining marriage in general, and forced marriage in particular, is difficult. This 
was recognised in a 2005 study by the council of europe on forced marriage in 
its member states:
133 Kunarac et al. appeals chamber, para. 130. See also De Brouwer 2009, pp. 583–593.
134 Boon 2001, pp. 652–653.
135 See rule 72 of the icc rules of Procedure and evidence.
136 compare the appeal Judgement in the case against the former leaders of the rUf: ‘Having 
thus found, inter alia, that the victims were subject to enslavement, force and coercion, the 
Trial chamber did not have to examine the issue of consent, and in particular to have assessed 
whether every victim did not consent’ (rUf appeal Judgement, para. 740).
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‘Selecting a definition is not straightforward, for two reasons: firstly because the 
social and moral dimensions of marriage are not easily contained within a legal 
definition, and secondly because of the dual meaning of “marriage”, designating 
both the immediate act that initiates the state of being married, and the state itself 
as a continuing condition.’137
forced marriage is often regarded as an umbrella term used to denote a complex 
variety of acts. Perhaps as a result of the difficulties that surround it, there exist 
a great many definitions of the phenomenon, stemming from national and 
international case law, government documents, Ngo reports and literature.138 
This multitude of definitions have two things in common: lack of consent on 
the side of at least one of the spouses and an emphasis on coercion exercised by 
another party. in the context of this book, forced marriage is defined as:
a marriage (i.e. a marital or marital‑like association), which at least one of the 
partners entered into against their will as a result of some form of coercion exerted 
by another party.
The word ‘marriage’ in this definition should be understood in the way it was 
defined in paragraph 2.2 (supra), that is: a union between two or more people 
which, in a specific society is legally, culturally and/or religiously sanctioned, 
which is binding, and which, within the particular context of that society, 
establishes certain rights and obligations between these people and is seen 
as marital or marital‑like. a forced marriage therefore refers to a sanctioned, 
binding partnership between two (or more) people.139 The act of causing a forced 
marriage refers to forcing someone to enter into such a partnership against that 
person’s will.
a central element of a forced marriage is the exertion of force. as will 
be demonstrated in the next chapters, forced marriage can occur through 
psychological abuse, emotional blackmail, social pressure, physical violence, 
abduction or a combination of these factors. But when does force or pressure 
become criminal?140 especially on the level of national law, it will be important 
to distinguish between forced marriages and arranged marriages. By juxtaposing 
the two practices, the definition of forced marriage will become clearer and better 
demarcated.
137 rude‑antoine 2005, p. 16.
138 for the different definitions of forced marriages in international criminal law, english law and 
Dutch law, see chapters 2, 3, 7 and 8.
139 compare in this regard the Sierra Leonean bush marriages (chapter 3): these associations are 
not seen as official marriages by the Sierra Leonean communities, but in the bush culture of the 
civil war, they were regarded as officialised conjugal associations.
140 The criminality of coercion is further explored in chapter 7.
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4.2 . ar r aNgeD mar riage
Until two centuries ago, parental involvement in spousal selection was the norm 
rather than the exception in euro‑american society, especially amongst the 
aristocracy.141 marrying out of love and free choice are therefore relatively new 
cultural ideals in Western civilisation. it was not until the end of the eighteenth 
century, during the enlightenment, that the idea of love marriages started 
to become popular. Hitherto – as in most societies worldwide – marriage was 
regarded as such an important economic and sometimes even political institution 
that love, a transitory and volatile emotion, was not considered to be the primary 
reason for a marriage. marriage was a means of accumulating resources, rising 
up the social ladder, increasing a family’s labour force, forging political alliances 
or securing succession by providing a family with an heir. companionship was a 
secondary goal and love a possible but not a necessary bonus.142 Because marriage 
was such an important strategic political and economic weapon, more often than 
not, parents, kin and others were actively involved in arranging the marriages of 
their children, choosing potential partners on the basis of their compatibility.143 
The practice of the arrangement of marriages thus performed an important 
function in society.144
Nowadays, in many countries, parents (or other relatives) still take a leading 
role in arranging the marriages of their children, for many of the same reasons 
mentioned above. The practice of arranged marriage, which takes place on all 
continents, but most commonly in india, the middle east, Japan, china and 
parts of africa,145 gives expression to a communal view of marriage and plays an 
important role in preserving culture, tradition and the community, symbolising 
the union of two families instead of just two individuals.146 as stated by Siddiqi, 
referring specifically to the importance of marriage in Bangladesh, ‘(m)arriages 
can seal or undermine existing social relations of kinship and alliance and often 
set a public precedent for similar future arrangements’.147 Seeing as the arranging 
of marriages is a custom148 (and not so much part of religious practice149), the 
141 Samad & eade 2003, p. 43; and a.S. roy, Marriage Customs and Ceremonies in World Religions, 
Victoria, Bc: Trafford Publishing 2005, p. 186.
142 coontz 2005, pp. 6 and 19.
143 coontz 2005, pp. 5 and 15; and Samad & eade 2003, p. 41.
144 Parrot & cummings 2008, p. xii.
145 a.S. roy, Marriage Customs and Ceremonies in World Religions, Victoria, Bc: Trafford 
Publishing 2005, pp. 185–186. roma communities in europe are also known for arranging 
marriages, also between minors; see J. Timmerman, ‘When her feet touch the ground: 
conflict between the roma familistic custom of arranged juvenile marriage and enforcement 
of international human rights treaties’, Journal of Transnational Law & Policy (13) 2004, 
pp. 475–497.
146 an‑Na’im 2000, p. 3. 
147 Siddiqi 2005, p. 295.
148 although arranged marriages are also often economically driven. See Plan UK 2011, p. 8.
149 arranged marriages are practiced by people of all major religions. for example, in the 
United States of america, some mormon fundamentalist communities are known to arrange 
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customs pertaining to this tradition vary strongly from one culture to another.150 
in general terms though, it can be said that an arranged marriage is any marriage 
which parties other than the two spouses actively took part in bringing about, 
usually by selecting the potential marriage partners and introducing them to each 
other with the aim of having them enter into marriage.151 it has also been defined 
as a ‘contractual agreement, written or unwritten, between two families, rather 
than individuals’.152
in diaspora communities, arranged marriages are considered to be a way to 
preserve culture and tradition, affirm ethnic identity,153 strengthen family ties, 
especially with relatives abroad, enhance social networks and status, and affirm 
group boundaries.154 Transnational arranged marriages may also arise out of a 
sense of duty towards relatives in the ‘home’ country, giving them an opportunity 
to gain entry to a more economically developed country. further, the feeling that 
the marriage pool in the immigration country is limited as a result of which a 
suitable match must be found abroad can be a reason for transnational arranged 
marriages.155
There are many different types of arranged marriages. qureshi distinguishes 
three: planned, delegated and joint‑venture marriages. in a planned arranged 
marriage, parents take care of the entire process and select a spouse without 
consulting their child. a delegated arranged marriage implies that children, 
especially sons, tell their parents what kind of partner they would like and the 
parents take these criteria into consideration when selecting a spouse. This type 
of arranged marriage usually also allows for chaperoned interaction. in the 
joint‑venture arranged marriage, both children and their parents are actively 
involved in the process of selecting a spouse.156 it appears that the risk of coercion 
marriages between their members (P. mcavoy, ‘Should arranged marriages for teenage girls be 
allowed?’ Theory and Research in Education (6) 2008, p. 5). 
150 it would not be right to present a monolithic view of all (arranged) marriage practices as the 
particularities are very diverse amongst different cultures: practices in arranged marriages 
include the future husband building a house for his future wife (in cambodia, see Pich‑Sal, 
Le mariage Cambodgien, Sihanouk: Université Buddhique Preah, pp. 1–4), the family of the 
bride giving (the family of) the groom a dowry (india) and the future husband symbolically 
presenting the bride’s family with kola nuts (Sierra Leone, see afrc expert report Bangura). 
Therefore, this chapter will discuss general characteristics of arranged marriages that are 
similar across many cultures.
151 for example, Scharf 2005, p.  87 defines an arranged marriage as the practice whereby the 
intending spouses delegate the process of selecting a spouse to members of their family.
152 a.U. Zaidi & m. Shuraydi, ‘Perceptions of arranged marriages by young Pakistani muslim 
women living in a Western society’, Journal of Comparative Family Studies (33) 2002, p. 496.
153 conversation with Senior Policy advisor of the crown Prosecution Service (dd. 20  april 
2012); an‑Na’im 2000, p. 3; and D. Bradley, ‘Duress and arranged marriages’ The Modern Law 
Review (46) 1983, p. 500.
154 Siddiqi 2005, p. 294.
155 Samad & eade 2003, pp. v and 48–49.
156 r.B. qureshi, ‘marriage Strategies among muslims from South asia,’ in: Y. Haddad en J. Smith 
(eds.), Muslim Communities in north America, albany: SUNY Press 1991, p. 185, reproduced 
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is highest in the context of the so‑called planned arranged marriages; once 
coercion is used, this type of arranged marriage will become a forced marriage.
4.3. NoTioNS of SHame aND HoNoUr
as stated, (many of) the reasons for parental/family involvement in marital 
affairs mentioned above are similar across cultures and times: there might be 
financial considerations, motivations related to endogamy, or a marriage between 
two people may be arranged in order to fulfil a pledge made between the parents 
years ago, or even in order to repay a debt.157 a concept that plays a very important 
role in the practice of arranged marriage specifically in South indian and islamic 
culture, but also in catholic and Protestant culture, is honour.
all cultures are to a certain extent familiar with the concept of honour defined 
as virtue, and all cultures value virtuous behaviour, altruism, and moral integrity 
and character.158 But certain cultures and societies attach more importance to 
the notion of honour than others. in these so‑called honour cultures, honour 
manifests itself as a central theme in everyday life, and to a large extent dictates 
social activity, determining interaction between people, and permeating all social 
layers.159 approximately 80% of the world population lives in an honour culture 
and derives an important part of their sense of self‑esteem from honour.160 in 
many of these societies, honour is mainly linked to the reputation of men, which 
in turn is based on their ability to protect their family and the extent to which 
others respect them. female honour, on the other hand, is tied up with the 
avoidance of shame and upholding the family’s reputation, requiring modesty, 
chastity and obedience.161 in many honour cultures, male honour is linked 
to female purity and women are seen as the bearers of family honour; their 
(sexual) behaviour can uphold family honour or bring dishonour and shame.162 
controlling female sexuality is therefore important in many honour cultures. for 
example, traditional Latin‑american cultures historically required unmarried 
women to be virgins, wives to be faithful, and widows to be chaste, ‘the system 
in a.U. Zaidi & m. Shuraydi, ‘Perceptions of arranged marriages by young Pakistani muslim 
women living in a Western society’, Journal of Comparative Family Studies (33) 2002, p. 496.
157 See inter alia iKWro, Response to the government consultation on forced marriage, february 
2012, p. 7; and muslim arbitration Tribunal, Liberation from forced marriage, 2008, para. 3.2.
158 cPS Legal guidance Honour‑Based Violence and forced marriage, p. 12; Vandello & cohen 
2003, pp.  997–998 (see this article specifically with regard to the importance of honour in 
certain South american societies).
159 examples of honour cultures are middle eastern, South asian, arab and american South anglo 
cultures (such as Texas), mediterranean societies, and iberian influenced South‑american 
cultures (see Vandello & cohen 2003, pp. 998 and 1000).
160 m. albrecht, ‘Huwelijksdwang en eer’, in: SPior, Hand in hand tegen huwelijksdwang, SPior: 
rotterdam 2007, p. 43.
161 Vandello & cohen 2003, p. 998.
162 meetoo & mirza 2007, p. 191; and Vandello & cohen 2003, pp. 998–999.
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of family honour thereby sought to prevent and constrain the sexual activity of 
single daughters and married women’.163 Honour being of the utmost importance, 
parents will often want their (female) children to get married before they become 
sexually active to prevent any shame being brought upon the family.
Seeing as obedience and refraining from pre‑ or extramarital sexual relations 
are fundamental elements of female behaviour for upholding family honour, 
choosing one’s own marriage partner or having a boyfriend is often regarded 
as dishonourable. in such cases, modifying the woman’s behaviour can reclaim 
honour.164 it is in this setting that the concept of (family) honour comes to the fore 
as the main motivator for external involvement in decisions related to marriage. 
Honour dictates that children marry a spouse who is regarded as appropriate in 
the eyes of the family and community and as a consequence, the family of the 
child will take a leading role in selecting this partner from within a limited circle 
of suitable partners. Suitability generally refers to religion and religiousness, 
lineage, profession, wealth or means and societal position.165 free choice marriages 
potentially threaten the honour of the family, because they make it more difficult 
for the parents to exercise control over potential marital alliances and to rein in 
their children’s choice to suitable partners from within an acceptable circle.166
in a report published by the muslim arbitration Tribunal on forced marriage 
in england, the Tribunal explained the link between marriage and the concepts of 
honour and pride, explaining that the following types of marriage are especially 
motivated and affected by honour:
1. marriages that have been agreed at the birth of the children must be fulfilled 
irrespective of later circumstances and desires of the parties;
2. marriages that are dictated by the caste of the families;
3. marriages that are decided by historical local friendships of members of the 
family;
4. marriages that are the product of familial necessity, e.g. the desire to settle a 
poorer wing of the family;
5. marriages that are decided by the material aspirations and advancements of 
the parents;
6. marriages that are linked to political aspirations of the parents either within 
the family or the community;
163 m. Nazzari, ‘an urgent need to conceal’, in: L.L. Johnson & S. Lipsett‑rivera (eds.), The faces 
of honor: Sex shame, and violence in colonial Latin America, albuquerque: University of New 
mexico Press 1998, p. 104.
164 Sen 2005, p. 47. in this way, a (forced) marriage (often with the offender) may also be used 
to ‘restore’ honour after rape or sexual abuse/assault (cPS Legal guidance Honour‑Based 
Violence and forced marriage, p. 13).
165 e.Y. Krivenko, Women, Islam and International Law, Leiden: martinus Nijhoff 2009, pp. 60–61.
166 Siddiqi 2005, p. 294. See also Bakker & felten 2012, pp. 14–15 and 47–48 for an account of 
the ways in which children’s marriage choices are limited in Dutch orthodox Protestant 
communities.
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7. marriages that solidify the strength of one parent’s side of the family over the 
other;
8. marriages that protect the interests of the parents in their ancestral 
agricultural farmland, by the family of the other spouse;
9. marriages that are primarily aimed at fulfilling the care/needs of the 
parents.167
in these types of marriages, the wishes of the two individuals who are to be 
married are often subjugated to those of their parents and thus of secondary 
importance.168
although the majority of publications focus on honour and shame in (South) 
asian cultures, it should be noted that these concepts are not foreign to Western 
european culture either.169
4 .4. forceD ar r aNgeD mar riageS
The reasons why parents may resort to force when their children do not agree 
to marry according to their wishes are complex and diverse. Key motivations 
for forced marriages, especially in migrant communities, include building 
stronger families to strengthen ties and links, and preserving certain cultural 
and religious traditions and values of the home country, even though these may 
have changed.170 a forced marriage may also be a response to pressure either 
from peer groups or extended family, for example because an agreement was 
reached about marriage a long time ago, or because family members abroad wish 
167 muslim arbitration Tribunal, Liberation from forced marriage, 2008, para. 3.2.
168 muslim arbitration Tribunal, Liberation from forced marriage, 2008, para. 3.2.
169 This can be demonstrated by an english forced marriage case from 1986: when a 17‑year‑old 
girl refused to marry him, the rejected lover falsely informed the girl’s parents that she was 
pregnant. The girl’s father, presumably to prevent the shame of an extramarital pregnancy, 
threatened to put her in a convent or home unless she agreed to marry the man in question. 
Subjected to grave fear of virtual incarceration, the girl succumbed to her father’s threats 
and married the man in question. once married, it became clear that the girl had not been 
pregnant. Upon a petition of nullity, the judge held that the marriage was void for duress as a 
result of threats of incarceration uttered by her father (McLarnon v. McLarnon (1968) 112 S.J. 
419). See also a more recent irish case, where a woman married the man who got her pregnant 
out of fear of losing her position in society and her job: her parents had told her to marry him, 
otherwise she would be shunned, and her employer had made it clear she could not stay on 
as an unmarried mother (W. (C.) v. C. (1989) i.r. 696). See also paragraph 4.5 infra on forced 
marriages in Dutch orthodox Protestant communities.
170 cPS Legal guidance Honour‑Based Violence and forced marriage, p.  5; and conversation 
with Senior Policy advisor cPS (20  april 2012). in this regard it is interesting to note the 
concept of fossilisation of cultural practices. often it is the case that especially first generation 
immigrants hold on to traditions and ideals that were part of their lives at the time they left 
their birth country in the 1950s/1960s, whereas in that country, these traditions and values 
have changed in the meantime (a choice by right: The report of the Working group on 
forced marriage 2000, p. 14).
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to obtain foreign citizenship through marriage. in these situations, parents can 
be pressurised to marry their children off to the extent that they themselves may 
even be attacked.171 other reasons for forced marriages are achieving financial 
gain, fulfilling long‑standing family commitments, or simply not accepting a 
person’s wish to remain unmarried.172 in cases concerning a person with a mental 
or physical disability, parents may wish to provide their child, or themselves, with 
a caregiver in the form of a spouse.173 These motivations are very similar to the 
motivations underlying arranged marriages.174
in a 2007 report, the Special rapporteur on Trafficking in Persons listed the 
following types of forced marriages:
‘The different kinds of forced marriage listed include: to settle debt (afghanistan); 
to receive dowry payment (Tanzania); to further cultural/economic interests, e.g. 
forced marriages initiated by landlords or local commanders who overrule girls/
women and parents (afghanistan); to gain control over daughters’ lives by sending 
daughters back to the home country to marry local men (United Kingdom, United 
States of america, france, austria and Switzerland); of girls to men from overseas 
in order for them to obtain residence permits as husbands (United Kingdom, 
germany); to display status, e.g. bride wealth (Kenya); as inheritance when a 
widow is forced to marry a dead husband’s brother, or a widower marries a dead 
wife’s younger sister without her consent (africa); in trokosi or devadasi, when 
young girls are forcibly married to a local god, represented by a priest (ghana 
and india); after abduction or kidnapping (afghanistan, ghana, Serbia among the 
roma people); to any willing groom, often men with disability or of lower class, 
to a girl who is impregnated while living at home by a male relative (Kenya); to 
“protect” a girl’s virginity and counteract promiscuity (Kenya); as compensation 
when men of one extended family have killed a man of another extended family 
(afghanistan); to relieve poverty and for economic gain (Zambia); and to facilitate 
female genital mutilation (ethiopia).’175
The underlying cause for the vast majority of forced marriages in most cultures, 
however, appears to be linked with protecting or upholding family honour, which 
includes preventing relationships that are regarded as unsuitable by parents, 
relatives or community members.176 This holds for South asian, North african, 
171 Kazimirski et al. 2009, p. 16.
172 Demos 2012, p. 15.
173 Kazimirski et al. 2009, p. 16. research has demonstrated that physically and mentally disabled 
people constitute a significant percentage of the total number of victims of forced marriage 
(cPS Legal guidance Honour‑Based Violence and forced marriage, p. 23; and Probert 2008).
174 Proudman 2011, p. 33.
175 UN Human rights council: report of the Special rapporteur on Trafficking in Persons 2007, 
para. 28.
176 The Missing Link: A joined up approach to addressing harmful practices in London, London: 
imkaan 2011, p.  4; choudhry 2011, p.  70; conversation with iKWro campaigns officer 
(14  may 2012). The transcript of the interview is on file with the author; and Report of the 
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Turkish, Surinam‑Hindustani as well as orthodox Protestant and very strict 
catholic communities. Honour, in turn, can be traced back to patriarchy and the 
resulting hierarchical power relationships between men and women and between 
parents and children; it is, as Sen states, based on patriarchal notions of ownership 
and control of women.177
family honour is especially used as a reason to control female behaviour.178 
as explained above, in many (honour) cultures, women are seen as the bearers of 
family honour. Upholding family honour requires deference, obedience, modesty 
and chastity. in this context, having a (sexual) relationship may often be regarded 
as behaviour that causes shame. a forced marriage, therefore, is often triggered 
when a woman (or man) exercises her right to self‑determination either by 
choosing her own partner,179 or by rejecting the spouse selected by her family.180 
refusing to participate in an arranged marriage can be seen as a transgression of 
the code of honour and this may result in the use of force.181 as an‑Na’im puts 
it: ‘the honor of a family is tied primarily to the status of the woman, leaving 
her much more vulnerable to the persuasion and coercion into a union to which 
she objects’.182 in the context of preventing shame and protecting honour, forced 
marriages can also be used as a means to correct ‘unwanted’ behaviour, such as 
alcohol and drug use, criminal activities or sexual orientation.183, 184
4 .5. aN eX amPLe: forceD mar riageS iN DUTcH 
orTHoDoX ProTeSTaNT commUNiTieS
illustrative in the context of the forced/arranged marriage dichotomy and the 
concept of honour is a recent study focusing on the prevalence of domestic violence 
in some orthodox Protestant communities in the region known as the Dutch Bible 
Working Group on Contemporary Forms of Slavery on its twenty‑eighth session, UN Doc. e/
cN.4/Sub.2/2003/31, 27 June 2003, para. 11.
177 Sen 2005, p. 48.
178 Heaton, mccallum & Jogi 2009, p. 9; gangoli, razak & mccarry 2006, p. 13; and razack 2004, 
p. 165.
179 See e.g. Hirani v. Hirani (1984) 4 fLr 232 (ca).
180 razack 2004, p. 164.
181 Sen 2005, p. 49.
182 an‑Na’im 2000, p. 4.
183 The Right to Choose: Multi‑Agency Statutory Guidance for Dealing with Forced Marriage, 
London: fmU, January 2010, p. 9, para. 36; and a choice by right: The report of the Working 
group on forced marriage 2000, p.  14. LgBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender) 
people may be forced into marriage to ‘cure’ their sexual orientation (cPS Legal guidance 
Honour‑Based Violence and forced marriage, p. 12).
184 indeed, as a result of deeply ingrained homophobia in conservative communities, lesbian, gay, 
bisexual and transgender people appear to be at high risk of being forced into a marriage 
(Demos 2012, p. 15).
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belt.185 This study concludes that in these communities, mechanisms of group 
pressure and social exclusion comparable to those prevalent in honour cultures 
are used to keep up appearances – indeed, it could be argued that these strict 
Protestant communities can be characterised as honour cultures. if community 
members do not adhere to the (moral) rules of the religious community, they 
will bring shame and dishonour upon themselves and their relatives, which puts 
them at risk of banishment.186 in many communities, a child’s partner choice 
is severely limited by its parents: parents want their child to marry someone 
who belongs to the same religious community – note that there are countless 
different denominations and sub groups in Protestantism – and who is strict 
enough in their religious belief and practice. if the child chooses a partner from 
a different religious community, some strict parents will do everything in their 
power either to have the partner in question convert to their particular belief 
or to prevent the marriage altogether. The respondents in the study report that 
parents and other family members use both psychological violence, in the form 
of humiliation, and threats of hell and damnation, exclusion and disownment, 
as well as physical violence to prevent marriages that are seen as undesirable.187 
in addition to preventing marriages, forced marriages are not uncommon either, 
especially in cases of extra‑marital pregnancy, although it appears that in many 
circles the taboo is being lifted and replaced by a more open‑minded view. The 
report defines a forced marriage as a marriage that one or both partners entered 
into involuntarily as a result of coercion or pressure exerted by parents, family 
members, relatives or community members.188 especially in case of homosexuality, 
some parents might pressurise their child to marry someone belonging to the 
opposite sex.189 force relating to marriage also arises in cases of extra‑marital 
pregnancies. in many orthodox Protestant communities, sex and marriage are 
inextricably linked to each other: extra‑marital sex is seen as a sin which becomes 
even more problematic when resulting in extramarital pregnancy because the 
sin then becomes visible for all. in the traditional and very closed Protestant 
communities in the Dutch Veluwe region, extramarital pregnancy can result 
in a forced marriage. in these communities, unmarried mothers are completely 
excluded from religious and social life; they are regarded as bringing disgrace to 
their families. a couple that has had extramarital sex will be required to publicly 
confess to their sins. refusing the marriage that is subsequently ‘proposed’ by the 
church and parents can result in banishment.190
185 for more details on forced marriage in the Netherlands and in autochthon Dutch communities, 
see chapter 2.
186 Bakker & felten 2012, pp. 14, 28, 31 and 49. The study does not provide any statistical data on 
the number of forced marriages taking place in these Protestant communities.
187 Bakker & felten 2012, pp. 18–22 and 47–48.
188 Bakker & felten 2012, p. 15.
189 Bakker & felten 2012, pp. 22 and 48.
190 Bakker & felten 2012, pp. 20 and 31.
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Therefore, what is stated above with regard to South asian, Turkish and 
North african communities is in part also applicable to very conservative 
religious autochthon communities in the Netherlands. indeed, it would appear 
that notions of shame and honour play more important roles in conservative 
and closed communities in general, which puts members of these communities 
who wish to make their own choices at a higher risk of practices such as forced 
marriage.
4.6. DiSTiNgUiSHiNg ar r aNgeD mar riageS from 
forceD mar riageS
it is often stated that it is possible to draw a sharp line between arranged marriages 
and forced marriages. The main reasons for making such a clear distinction 
pertain to the desire to express cultural sensitivity, and not to appear racist or to 
stigmatise arranged marriage in general.191 To this end, arranged marriages are 
distinguished from forced marriages on the basis that in an arranged marriage, 
even though parties other than the spouses took a leading role in choosing 
the partner, both spouses fully and freely consented to the marriage. a forced 
marriage, on the other hand, takes place without the free and full consent of one 
or both of the spouses.192 in this light, it has been suggested that arranged and 
forced marriages are best situated along a continuum of consent, alongside the 
degree of choice offered to spouses in the arrangement of marriages.193 on the 
one end are the arranged marriages in which the final decision to get married 
lies with the intending spouses; on the other end are the arranged marriages 
in which force was used to obtain ‘consent’. in between these two extremes lies 
a grey area and it is this grey area that makes the perspicuous distinction of 
arranged marriages from forced marriage an arduous task.194 Due to the many 
forms of arranged marriages and the degrees of choice offered to spouses in the 
arrangement of marriages, coupled with the complexity with which (passive) 
coercion may manifest itself within family relations, unlike what is often stated, 
such a sharp distinction cannot be made.195 in addition, it should be noted that 
191 enright 2009, p. 332; and Deveaux 2007, p. 172.
192 See foreign and commonwealth office 2006, p.  4. The governments of austria, canada, 
Norway and germany have made this distinction in the same manner, see UN Human rights 
council: report of the Special rapporteur on Trafficking in Persons 2007, para. 25. 
193 rights of Women, Forced Marriage: A Wrong not a Right. Rights of Women Response to the 
Home Office/Foreign and Commonwealth Office Consultation on Criminalisation, p. 5.
194 Sigma Huda, former Special rapporteur on the Human rights aspects of the Victims of 
Trafficking in Persons, stresses that the line between an arranged marriage and a forced 
marriage is in some cases thin (UN Human rights council: report of the Special rapporteur 
on Trafficking in Persons 2007, para. 26).
195 enright 2009, pp.  339–340; Scharf 2005, pp.  88–89; and Samad & eade 2003, p.  43. The 
choice may also be restricted because the spousal selection was limited by the marriage 
arrangements: which means the man or woman in question can only choose from a limited 
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the reasons why families practice arranged marriages are very similar to the 
motives for forced marriages. What complicates matters even more is the fact that 
in certain cultures, such as South asian cultures, it is considered shameful for an 
unmarried woman to express individual desire, and specifically with regard to 
matters of marriage, women are expected to refrain from voicing their opinions 
too explicitly.196 indeed, when asked whether she consents to a marriage, a woman 
is not expected to answer directly. consent may be inferred from body language 
such as smiling, averting the eyes or covering the face, and is often assumed in 
the absence of explicit verbal rejection.197 Therefore, claiming that it is possible to 
draw a strict line between forced and arranged marriage misjudges the amount 
of pressure and multifaceted forms of coercion (in the form of social expectations 
and emotional pressure) men and women may be exposed to in the context of an 
arranged marriage.198
although high value is attached to the consent of both spouses in many 
cultures in which arranged marriages are customary,199 it is difficult to establish 
the degree to which consent to an arranged marriage was actually free and full. 
obviously, not every arranged marriage is also a forced marriage, but women 
and men may be under severe pressure by their relatives and might marry for 
the good of their family, clan or community. The pressure exerted in most forced 
marriages often consists in socio‑cultural expectations and emotional pressure.200 
The reluctant, or forced, consent that is given as a result can hardly be qualified 
as ‘free and full consent’ as required by international human rights instruments. 
There are many shades of coercion ranging from passive and implicit pressure, 
such as social expectations, to active and explicit force, such as the use of physical 
violence. and, ‘it seems undeniable’, as Deveaux stated, that in the custom of 
arranged marriages ‘short of what would constitute forced marriage, less severe 
forms of pressure on young adults, particularly girls and young women, may 
also be present’.201 certainly, little pressure may be needed when it is applied by 
parents or other important and dominant figures in an individual’s life: parents 
may resort to arguments related to duty, honour, personal affection, religion, 
number of candidates (enright 2009, p. 340, footnote 45). This can violate the right to free 
choice of spouse, as enshrined in article 16(1)(b) convention on the elimination of all forms 
of Discrimination against Women.
196 Siddiqi 2005, pp. 282, 291 and 293.
197 Lucy carroll, ‘arranged marriages: law, custom, and the muslim girl in the U.K.’ Women 
Living under Muslim Laws, Dossier 20, July 1998, p. 5.
198 a. Bredal, ‘Tackling forced marriage in the Nordic countries: between women’s rights and 
immigration control’, in: S. Hossain & L. Welchman (eds.), Honour: Crimes, Paradigms and 
Violence Against Women, London: Zed Books 2005, p. 167; and Deveaux 2007, p. 148.
199 for example among several ethnic groups in Sierra Leone (coulter 2009, pp. 76–84).
200 gangoli, razak & mccarry 2006, p. 10; see also Deveaux 2007, p. 167.
201 m. Deveaux, ‘Personal autonomy and cultural tradition. The arranged marriage debate in 
Britain’, in: arneil et al. (eds.), Sexual justice/cultural justice. Critical perspectives in political 
theory and practice, oxon: routledge 2007, p. 149.
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and social and family obligations.202 Parents may also trick their children into 
situations where they feel they can no longer refuse the marriage: a is introduced 
to or shown a picture of B and agrees to marry B. on the day of the wedding, the 
groom turns out to be B’s much older brother c and a does not want to marry 
c. However, a finds it impossible to say ‘no’: all arrangements for the wedding 
have been made, everything has been prepared, and both c and a’s relatives are 
present.203 further, two studies found that both men and women who initially 
identified their marriages as ‘arranged’, later acknowledged that some element of 
coercion (such as emotional blackmail) had been present, but at that time, they 
did not realise it: even when they did not want the marriage, they listened to their 
parents because it never occurred to them to be disobedient.204
as stated by Sigma Huda, former Special rapporteur on the Human rights 
aspects of the Victims of Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and children: 
‘marriage imposed on a woman205 not by explicit force, but by subjecting her to 
relentless pressure and/or manipulation, often by telling her that her refusal of a 
suitor will harm her family’s standing in the community, can also be understood 
as forced’.206 indeed, moschetti defines arranged marriages as:
‘a form of social construction that informs the girl from a young age of her expected 
familial duties and her understanding of what constitutes bringing “shame” upon 
the family. if a young woman is bodily kidnapped the force is obvious but when a 
marriage is “arranged” by her relatives’ trickery and stealth, she does not realize, 
often until it is too late, that an arranged and forced marriage amounts to much 
the same thing.’207
202 enright 2009, p. 343; and nS v. MI (2006) 1 fLr 444, para. 34: ‘where the influence is that 
of a parent or other close and dominating relative, and where the arguments and persuasion 
are based upon personal affection or duty, religious beliefs, powerful social or cultural 
conventions, or asserted social, familial or domestic obligations, the influence may be subtle, 
insidious, pervasive and powerful. in such cases, moreover, very little pressure may suffice to 
bring about the desired result.’ (citations omitted).
203 This example was given by victims of forced marriage who participated in a focus groups 
organised by the iranian Kurdish Women’s rights organisation in march 2012. other types 
of coercion used to force someone to marry that were listed by the participants included: 
physical violence, imprisonment, heavily controlling a person’s behaviour (subjecting them to 
surveillance by family and (wider) community members), threats of physical violence against 
them or others, emotional blackmail (e.g. telling someone their mother will get seriously ill if 
they refuse to go ahead with the marriage), and taking a person abroad where they are isolated, 
vulnerable, have limited freedom of movement and will have more difficulty to seek help and 
support (see iKWro 2012, p. 7).
204 Proudman 2011, pp. 30–31; and gangoli, razak & mccarry 2006, pp. 10 and 17.
205 The same can of course also apply to men. The definition should therefore be read as also 
applying to male victims.
206 UN Human rights council: report of the Special rapporteur on Trafficking in Persons 2007, 
para. 26.
207 carole olive moschetti, Conjugal Wrongs Don’t Make Rights: International Feminist Activism, 
Child Marriage And Sexual Relativism, Ph.D. Thesis, University of melbourne, Political 
Science Dept., faculty of arts, 2006, p. 270.
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However, also in marriages that are not arranged in the traditional cultural sense, 
many factors may limit an individual’s free choice and possibility to give free and 
full consent. factors that come to mind in this regard are social and financial 
problems that could restrict the marital choice.208 an unplanned pregnancy 
and the prospect of negative reactions from relatives and community members 
can also lead to the decision to marry, or even result in a marriage in which the 
consent of one or both of the parties is procured under duress.209 This latter type of 
marriage was also known as a ‘shotgun marriage’, which refers to cases in which a 
man is forced to marry the woman he allegedly made pregnant.210 Brown remarks 
that marital duress, in any culture, may also result from a strong desire to have 
children, social conformity, sexual attraction, the wishes of one’s family, a sense 
of obligation (e.g. in case of pregnancy), the desire not to hurt the other party, 
the fear of loneliness, and dynastic ambitions.211 in addition, a person’s choice of 
partner may be limited or (subconsciously) influenced by factors such as social 
class, religion, race and nationality.212
Therefore, instead of regarding arranged marriages and forced marriages on 
a continuum of consent – as discussed above – forced marriages and free choice 
marriages should be regarded alongside this continuum. arranged marriages can 
feature across the entire width of the spectrum, including on both extremes. as 
was stressed by Justice Singer in his judgement in the case SK (Proposed Plaintiff), 
regarding the question of whether the High court of england and Wales has 
jurisdiction in a suspected forced marriage case involving an adult:
‘i emphasise, as needs always to be emphasised, that there is a spectrum of forced 
marriage from physical force or fear of injury or death in their most literal form, 
through to the undue imposition of emotional pressure which is at the other end 
of the forced marriage range, and that a grey area then separates unacceptable 
forced marriage from marriages arranged traditionally which are in no way to be 
condemned, but rather supported as a conventional concept in many societies. 
Social expectations can of themselves impose emotional pressure and the grey 
area to which i have referred is where one may slip into the other: arranged may 
become forced but forced is always different from arranged.’213
208 enright 2009, pp. 341–342 and 348.
209 See e.g. McLarnon v. McLarnon (1968) 112 S.J. 419, where a father forced his daughter, whom 
he falsely believed to be pregnant, to marry the man who claimed to have impregnated her. 
210 Shotgun marriages were not uncommon in nineteenth and early twentieth century United 
States (see Brown 1967, pp. 837–860; and Krause & meyer 2007, p. 52).
211 Brown 1967, p. 847.
212 a.H. manchester, ‘marriage or Prison: The case of the reluctant Bridegroom’ (1966) 29 The 
Modern Law Review, p. 624. De Koning & Bartels 2005, p. 61 state that personal, economic, 
social, political, cultural and demographic factors determine or influence the decision (whom) 
to marry.
213 Judgement of Justice Singer regarding SK (Proposed Plaintiff) (2004) eWHc 3202 (High court 
of Justice family Division), para. 7.
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The barrier between arranged marriage and forced marriage is thus a permeable 
one. What it boils down to is that, in the end, in each individual case, the question 
of whether or not either or both of the spouses entered into the marriage under 
duress will have to be evaluated by taking into consideration all circumstances of 
the specific case.
5. coNcLUDiNg remarKS
The institution of marriage is as old as society and (some equivalent of it) exists 
in all cultures. a marriage can be defined as a union between two or more people 
which, in a specific society is legally, culturally and/or religiously sanctioned, 
which is binding, and which, within the particular context of that society, 
establishes certain rights and obligations between these people and is seen as 
marital(‑like). Traditionally, parental involvement played an important role in 
spousal selection and other decisions relating to marriage. in a large part of the 
world, this is still the case. modern marriage is characterised by the requirement of 
consent: consent of the spouses, specifically to the marriage. This is confirmed by 
a large number of binding and non‑binding human rights documents. Universal 
and regional human rights instruments discern the right to marry and the right 
not to marry without full and free consent. This means that forced marriage, i.e. 
a marriage celebrated against the will of at least one of the partners as a result of 
some form of coercion that was exerted, constitute a human rights violation. in 
many cases, a marriage arranged by parties other than the spouses themselves 
will be at the basis of a forced marriage. That is to say, an arranged marriage may 
turn into a forced marriage in those cases where the wishes of the arrangers are 
not in line with the wishes of the one(s) for whom the arrangements are made, 
and the former nevertheless force the latter to enter into the marriage. concepts 
of shame and honour (protecting family honour) are the underlying cause of the 
majority of forced (arranged) marriages. Because of the subtle forms of coercion 
and pressure that can be applied (e.g. in the form of socio‑cultural expectations, 
that, to a certain extent, are internalised) it is not always easy to establish the 
degree to which consent to an arranged marriage was actually free and full, and 
thereby distinguish between arranged and forced marriages. This may change if 
(threats of) physical violence has been used as a means of coercion.
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FoRced mARRIAges In 
the netheRlAnds And englAnd
1. iNTroDUcTioN
The practice of forced marriage is not something that is generally associated with 
Western europe. often, it is assumed that this only happens in ‘other’ countries. 
Yet research shows that forced marriages are a daily reality in europe. in england, 
the majority of forced marriages take place in indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi 
communities; in the Netherlands, moroccan, Turkish and Surinamese Hindustani 
communities are mostly associated with the practice.214 granted, the bulk of 
forced marriages are contracted in migrant communities, but as was discussed 
in chapter 1 and will be demonstrated below, forced marriages are not foreign 
to traditional Dutch and english communities either: they also take place in 
orthodox Protestant and strict catholic circles.
in order to get a clear picture of the practice of forced marriage, this chapter 
describes forced marriages as they occur in the Netherlands and england, 
focusing on prevalence, victims, perpetrators, key motivations and consequences. 
as was stated in the previous chapter, this research defines ‘forced marriage’ as a 
marriage at least one of the partners entered into against their will as a result of 
some form of coercion exerted by another person.215
2. forceD marriage iN THe NeTHerLaNDS
2.1. Pr eVaLeNce
forced marriage is a hidden phenomenon that is difficult to quantify.216 most 
known and alleged cases of forced marriage take place within the context of 
the families of the spouses.217 often, they become visible only after the situation 
214 See below.
215 for a comparison between (the legal frameworks concerning) forced marriages in the 
Netherlands on the one hand and england on the other hand, see chapter 9.
216 acVZ 2005, p. 20.
217 Schmidt & rijken 2005, pp. 7–8.
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has escalated and has resulted in domestic or honour‑related violence.218 
anthropologists, legal researchers and law enforcement professionals have noted 
that victims of forced marriage are reluctant to go to the police, as this could 
compromise their relationship with their family and community.219 as a result 
of these complicating factors, and because neither the police nor the Public 
Prosecution Service (PPS) specifically registers cases of forced marriage, there are 
no exact figures on the prevalence of this practice in the Netherlands.220
research suggests that this phenomenon takes place predominantly within 
the three largest migrant groups in the Netherlands (Turkish, moroccan and 
Surinamese Hindustani communities) and within Somali, afghan, chinese, 
Sinti and roma communities.221 it should be noted, however, that the concept 
of non‑voluntary marriage is not foreign to tight‑knit (religious) autochthon 
communities either.222
in the early 1960s and early 1970s, two sociological studies were carried out 
with the aim of mapping the frequency of forced marriage in the Netherlands and 
finding possible sociological explanations for this phenomenon.223 This research 
covered the four most common philosophies of life in the Netherlands in those 
periods: roman catholic, calvinistic Protestant, Pietistic reformed ((reformed) 
Presbyterian church), and liberal/non‑ecclesial. forced marriage was defined as 
a marriage in which a child was born within seven months after the marriage 
was entered into.224 in other words, the researchers classified as ‘forced’ those 
marriages that were (or appeared to be) the result of pre‑marital pregnancy. in 
the Netherlands of the 1960s and 1970s, it would be likely that many cases of 
pre‑marital pregnancy resulted in marriage, because pre‑marital sex was not 
generally accepted, and pre‑marital pregnancy was, in some regions at least, 
regarded as shameful.
Nevertheless, the definition used by the researchers is questionable, since it 
arguably also encompassed completely voluntary marriages, e.g. those cases in 
218 cornelissens, Kuppens & ferwerda 2009, p. 34 and acVZ 2005, p. 72.
219 De Koning & Bartels 2005, p. 52.
220 Parliamentary Papers II (Lower House) 2011/12, 32 840, no. 6, p. 7; and cornelissens, Kuppens 
& ferwerda 2009, p. 12. in 2012, the city council of amsterdam received reports about three 
instances of forced marriage and/or abandonment; in 2013 that number was thirteen (see ‘meer 
meldingen gedwongen huwelijken in amsterdam’, Het Parool 8 December 2013, available at 
<www.parool.nl/parool/nl/7/miSDaaD/article/detail/3541342/2013/11/08/meer ‑meldingen‑
gedwongen‑huwelijken‑in‑amsterdam.dhtml> last accessed December 2013).
221 cornelissens, Kuppens & ferwerda 2009, p. 31; De Koning & Bartels 2005, p. 23; and acVZ 
2005, pp. 2, 17 and 24. forced marriages have also been reported in iranian, iraqi, Pakistani, 
Sudanese and Sri Lankan communities (acB Kenniscentrum 2010, p. 25).
222 Kool 2012, p. 46, footnote 66: native Dutch forms of forced marriage: the obligation to marry 
in case of pre‑marital pregnancy in certain religious Dutch communities. See also chapter 1, 
paragraph 4.5.
223 g.a. Kooy & m. meuls, Enforced marriage in the netherlands: a statistical analysis in order to 
test some sociological hypotheses, Wageningen: Landbouwhogeschool Wageningen 1967; and 
cramwinckel‑Weeda 1975.
224 cramwinckel‑Weeda 1975, p. 4.
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which a man and woman had already decided to get married before the woman got 
pregnant. at the same time, this definition would have excluded non‑voluntary 
marriages where there had been no pregnancy or pre‑marital sex. The researchers 
collected their data through marriage and birth registers and found that between 
1969 and 1971, 16.7% of all marriages in the Netherlands could be qualified as 
forced marriages according to their definition. as a result of changing social 
mores with regard to pre‑marital sexual intercourse, combined with an increase 
of effective use of trustworthy contraceptives (most notably the introduction 
of the birth control pill in 1963 followed by the intra‑uterine device and the 
morning after pill in 1970), and a less disapproving attitude towards abortion, the 
researchers noted that the number of ‘forced’ marriages strongly decreased in the 
following years.225
more recent research concerning domestic violence in Dutch orthodox 
Protestant communities highlights that parental and communal pressure with 
regard to marriage still take place in autochthon groups in this day and age.226 
although the researchers do not provide any statistics, it appears that in certain 
closed and very traditional Dutch circles, parents have a strong hand in the spousal 
selection process and, although this is increasingly uncommon, pre‑marital 
pregnancy can result in severe pressure to get married.227
interestingly, research conducted in the past ten years indicates that 
the practice of forced marriage within Turkish, moroccan and Surinamese 
Hindustani communities in the Netherlands is also waning.228 although parents 
and other relatives still play a part in spousal selection, autonomy and free 
choice are becoming more and more important. Young people more often take 
the initiative in finding their own partners, or they are introduced to potential 
spouses by their friends.229 at the same time, many parents have stopped using 
coercion, often because they have had bad experiences with forced marriages in 
the past: they married off their older sons and daughters and experienced that 
such forced marriages can quickly lead to problems or divorce.230
in this context, a study on the prevalence of forced marriages in germany 
carried out by order of the german government is worth noting. according to 
the study, forced marriages cover those situations in which at least one of the 
spouses was forced to enter into a formal or informal (so including those conjugal 
associations entered into through a religious or social ceremony) marriage as a 
result of the exercise of force or threat of appreciable harm, and this spouse either 
did not dare to resist or refuse the marriage, or found that no consideration was 
225 cramwinckel‑Weeda 1975, pp. 6–8, 17 and 40.
226 Bakker & felten 2012.
227 more on this in chapter 1 (paragraph 4.5).
228 De Koning & Bartels 2005, pp. 23 and 27.
229 De Koning & Bartels 2005, pp. 29, 34 and 37.
230 De Koning & Bartels 2005, p. 71.
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given to his or her refusal.231 The researchers concluded that in 2008, in germany, 
almost 3500 cases of (threatened) forced marriage took place, but that the actual 
number is probably higher, because victims are reluctant to report the practice. of 
the 3443 cases, 60% concerned threatened forced marriages and 40% concerned 
forced marriages that had already taken place. The majority of these reported 
forced marriages took place in families with a migration background; the highest 
percentage in families from a Turkish background.232 The Dutch minister of 
Security and Justice pointed out that this research might offer an indication of 
the extent of the problem of forced marriages in the Netherlands because of the 
similarities between the german and Dutch migration populations.233 There 
might be certain similarities, but it would not be prudent to extrapolate estimates 
on the number of forced marriages in the Netherlands from the figures in this 
study.
2 .2 . BacKgroUND of forceD mar riageS iN THe 
NeTHer LaNDS
The majority of forced marriages have roots in the practice of arranged marriage. 
as explained in chapter 1, there are many different gradations of arranged 
marriages, ranging from those in which parents or other family members direct 
the entire process and select a spouse without consulting or interacting with 
their child, to those in which both parents and children are actively involved in 
the arranging of the marriage and selection of the spouse. in the Netherlands, 
the practice of arranged marriages is mostly found in moroccan, Turkish and 
Surinamese Hindustani communities. Within these specific cultures, children 
are generally brought up with values concerning absolute respect for parents and 
the ideal of marriage. from childhood onwards, girls are told that they will marry 
and become a mother and as a girl grows older, parents, relatives and community 
members will make insinuations regarding future marriages.234 as is the case 
with most values on which children are brought up, regardless of their cultural or 
religious background, these ideals are often internalised by the children and thus 
become difficult to set aside once they have grown into adults.235 marriage is often 
also surrounded by heavy social pressure. in some cultures, this pressure works 
several ways: parents see it as their duty to make sure their children marry (before 
a certain age) and therefore feel pressure from their community when they do not 
231 mirbach et al. 2011, p. 18.
232 mirbach et al. 2011, pp. 22, 24 and 28–29.
233 Parliamentary Papers II (Lower House) 2011/12, 32 840, no. 6, p. 4.
234 especially in Surinamese Hindustani culture, marriage is (or at least was) regarded as inevitable 
and self‑evident: only through marriage are men and women able to fully participate in all 
parts of social life and are they seen as full members of the Surinamese Hindustani community 
(De Koning & Bartels 2005, pp. 25, 46, 52 and 56).
235 De Koning & Bartels 2005, p. 59.
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succeed in achieving this. at the same time, children experience pressure to get 
married, both from within their family as well as from the larger community.236 
Pressure to marry is often exerted psychologically and not so much by means 
of physical violence, although in extreme cases, physical force is also used.237 
emotional blackmail, social pressure and the concept of family honour may 
be used to convince someone to marry and can result in severe psychological 
coercion. insistent talking and persuasion by different family members are other 
tactics that are applied.238
research suggests that victims are often afraid to reject the partner selected 
by their parents, so it is possible that no actual or active coercion, force or 
pressure was exerted, but that a victim was just afraid to speak his or her mind.239 
internalised ideals of respect, honour and marriage, and social pressure working 
two ways combined with the fact that often the communication between parents 
and their children on the subject of sexuality and marriage is not optimal, makes 
men and women often feel they cannot refuse a marriage candidate selected by 
their parents.240 in reality, however, they may in fact have the possibility to do so, 
although in many cases this would be a theoretical option, since exercising agency 
and autonomy in matters relating to marriage might result in social sanctions 
with severe consequences such as ostracism.241 This implies that the perception 
of pressure may be shaped by a lack of communication between parents and 
their children.242 and when marriage parties fail to make their wishes known to 
their parents (e.g. that they do not want to marry (the selected person)), parents 
may not realise that their children feel pressurised and experience their (i.e. the 
parents’) actions as coercion. However, it has been remarked and may be assumed 
that – at least in general – parents will know if their child wants something or not, 
even if the child has not voiced this.243
once an arranged marriage has been publicly announced, rejecting it will 
become more difficult: those involved fear to disrespect their parents and bring 
shame on the family. The pressure to marry also increases once individuals have 
refused several suggested candidates and grow older.244 This indicates that the 
complexity of the practice of arranged marriages can raise the stakes for parents 
as well as for their children and can have a negative impact on the ability of 
prospective spouses to freely and genuinely consent to a marriage.
in practice, it appears to be very difficult to assess whether a marriage is forced 
or not. even for friends and family members of the spouses, this is not readily 
236 De Koning & Bartels 2005, p. 49.
237 cornelissens, Kuppens & ferwerda 2009, p. 29; De Koning & Bartels 2005, pp. 38 and 46.
238 De Koning & Bartels 2005, pp. 51 and 57.
239 Schmidt & rijken 2005, p. 44.
240 De Koning & Bartels 2005, p. 61.
241 De Koning & Bartels 2005, pp. 28, 30–32 and 58.
242 De Koning & Bartels 2005, p. 70.
243 cornelissens, Kuppens & ferwerda 2009, p. 28.
244 De Koning & Bartels 2005, pp. 46, 48 and 49.
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ascertainable, especially since many marriage candidates are afraid to say ‘no’. in 
those cases in which one of the parties to the marriage clearly shows that he or she 
does not want to marry, either by explicitly speaking out or by running away from 
home, or when physical violence is used, may relatives, friends or outsiders be able 
to recognise an (intended) marriage as forced.245 in other cases, the pressure or 
force that was at the bedrock of the marriage could remain invisible.
2 .3. VicTimS aND PerPeTr aTorS
Both men and women may experience pressure or coercion when it comes to 
making the decision to marry, but in general, it seems that men have more freedom 
of choice and more options to negotiate partner selection with their parents.246 in 
the majority of cases, the perpetrators of forced marriages are family members of 
the victims, most notably the parents, but aunts, uncles, cousins, nieces, nephews, 
siblings and grandparents may also be involved. as was explained above, the 
larger community can also be responsible for or contribute to the social pressure 
that is felt by the victims.247 furthermore, it is possible that the intended spouse 
(i.e. the person that the victim is forced to marry) also exerts force.
2 .4. caUSeS
reasons why parents might interfere with their children’s marriage choices 
relate to their wish to correct or prevent behaviour they regard as ‘unwanted’, 
e.g. preventing girls from having boyfriends, or boys from becoming criminal. 
Parents might also meddle in their children’s affairs out of disapproval of the 
partner chosen by the child itself, or in order to arrange a right of residence for 
a family member or a friend from the (grand)parents’ country of origin.248 The 
latter type of marriage will, depending on the circumstances, (also) qualify as 
a so‑called sham marriage, that is a marriage that is entered into not with the 
intention of fulfilling the marital duties that the law attaches to the marital status, 
but with the aim of gaining admission to the Netherlands.249 Several other reasons 
why parents interfere in marital affairs can be distinguished, including economic 
motives (maintaining or expanding family the fortune), strengthening family 
245 cornelissens, Kuppens & ferwerda 2009, p. 29; De Koning & Bartels 2005, pp. 50 and 52.
246 De Koning & Bartels 2005, p. 38.
247 See inter alia De Koning & Bartels 2005, p. 49.
248 Schmidt & rijken 2005, pp. 8–9; and De Koning & Bartels 2005, pp. 39–40. among Surinamese 
Hindustani there appear to be less migration pressure and fewer ‘kin’ marriages (De Koning & 
Bartels 2005, p. 49). 
249 See also chapter 7.
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ties (usually resulting in a marriage between (second) cousins250) and the wish 
to preserve and maintain culture, resulting in endogamy.251 other factors that 
have been listed as explanations for forced marriage relate to the characteristics 
of patriarchal culture: the importance of virginity, protecting family honour, and 
obedience to one’s father.252
often, parents (also) act or believe they act for their children’s own benefit: 
they believe they know what is best for their children.253 as stated, the majority of 
forced marriages take place within the context of the family. outside of the family 
context, forced marriages usually take place in the course of human trafficking,254 
although forced marriages that occur within a family can also amount to human 
trafficking (see infra paragraphs 2.5 and 2.6).
2 .5. coNSeqUeNceS
The consequences of a forced marriage can be severe and range from resignation 
to one’s fate (limiting an individual’s personal development) to being forced to live 
and start a family with someone against one’s will (which has a large impact on the 
personal privacy of individuals), mental illness, abuse, rape, domestic violence, 
or suicide.255\256 research indicates that suicide rates and suicidal thoughts and 
behaviour are most prevalent among girls and young women of Turkish and 
Hindustani descent.257 Van Bergen concluded that, amongst other factors, ‘the 
extent to which young women are restricted in important life choices plays a 
crucial role’.258 When and whom to marry is such an important life choice.259 
Those who resist a marriage arranged by their families are at risk of becoming 
socially isolated, being taken from school, being abandoned abroad, and/or losing 
contact with family members. in extreme cases, refusing a marriage may result in 
250 it is estimated that approximately 25% of the Turkish and moroccan Dutch marry within 
their (extended) families (Parliamentary Paper II (Lower House) 2009/2010, 32 175, no. 1, p. 6, 
referring to e.J.W.m. Troe, Ethnic differences in fetal growth, birth weight and infant mortality. 
The Generation R Study, rotterdam: erasmus University 2008, p. 86).
251 acVZ 2005, p. 23.
252 rude‑antoine 2005, p. 30.
253 Schmidt & rijken 2005, p. 9.
254 See e.g. guideline of the Public Prosecution Service on human trafficking within the meaning 
of servitude and labour exploitation (2012r002), 1 may 2012.
255 Parliamentary Papers II (Lower House) 2011/12, 32 175, no. 35 (Prevention of forced marriages 
2012–2014), p. 1.
256 anticipating what will be argued in the next chapters: acts such as rape and domestic violence 
taking place within a forced marriage are distinct, independent criminal offences; they are not 
elements of the offence of forced marriage (see chapter 10).
257 <www.movisie.nl/smartsite.dws?id=139877> last accessed December 2013.
258 See ‘failure to recognise wishes of young female migrants leads to suicide attempts’, 16 June 
2009, available at <www.nwo.nl/nwohome.nsf/pages/NWoa_7T3cL8_eng> last accessed 
December 2013.
259 See D.D. van Bergen, Suicidal behavior of young migrant women in the netherlands: 
a comparative study of minority and majority women, amsterdam: VU 2009.
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exclusion from the family or even honour killings.260 There is also research that 
uncovers a higher suicide rate among Dutch Surinamese men and young Dutch 
men from Turkish descent, but in this research, this higher prevalence of suicide 
was not explicitly linked to forced or arranged marriages.261
forced marriages may also result in forms of enslavement; there are many 
reports of slavery‑like exploitation within forced marriages. The Dutch rapporteur 
on Human Trafficking has recorded several cases of (predominantly) women 
who were either forced to marry or who initially entered into the marriage of 
their own volition, and were subsequently used as slaves.262 The majority of these 
women came from outside the Netherlands and were brought to the Netherlands 
for the purpose of the marriage. Dutch courts have also dealt with such cases. 
one of these cases concerns a young moroccan woman. When she was fifteen 
and lived in morocco, a moroccan‑Dutch man came to her village to ask for her 
hand. Within a week, the two were married. after eight months, her husband 
came back to morocco to bring her to the Netherlands where, as she had been 
promised, she would start school. once in the Netherlands, the girl was locked in 
her mother‑in‑law’s house. Her passport was taken away from her and she was not 
allowed to learn Dutch. She was beaten and raped by her husband and, over the 
course of several years, forced to prostitute herself. after the two had divorced, 
the man married another moroccan woman, brought her to the Netherlands and 
also forced her to prostitute herself. The man was convicted of several counts of 
human trafficking and sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment.263
2 .6. Tr aNSNaTioNaL DimeNSioNS
in the Netherlands, the majority of forced marriages take place in immigrant 
communities, and as a result, forced marriages play a role in the context of 
marriage migration (see also the example given in the previous paragraph).264 
260 De Koning & Bartels 2005, p. 50.
261 m.J. garssen, J. Hoogenboezem & a.J.f.m. Kerkhof, ‘Zelfdoding onder migrantengroepen 
en autochtonen in Nederland’, nederlands Tijdschrift voor Geneeskunde (150) 2006, 
pp. 2143–2149.
262 for an example of a voluntary (sham) marriage resulting in sexual exploitation, see court 
of appeal amsterdam 11  april 2013, ecLi:NL:gHamS:2013:BZ8541. Human trafficking, 
Seventh report of the National rapporteur, The Hague: Bureau Nrm october 2009, p. 531.
263 District court Utrecht 1  June 2011, ecLi:NL:rBUTr:2011:Bq6884. for more examples 
and judgements that have not been published, see Human trafficking, Seventh report of the 
National rapporteur, The Hague: Bureau Nrm october 2009, pp. 531 ff and Parliamentary 
Papers II (Lower House) 2012/2013, 33 488, no. 3.
264 it is estimated that at least 20% of the Turkish Dutch and 15% of the moroccan Dutch marry 
a partner from their (grand)parents’ country of origin (Parliamentary Paper II (Lower House) 
2009/2010, 32 175, no. 1, p. 4). Bijlage bij Kamerstukken II 2009/10, 32 175, no. 9, ‘factsheet 
huwelijksmigrantes: beeldvorming en feiten anno 2009’ van e‑quality, p. 10. See also <www.
cbs.nl/nl‑NL/menu/themas/bevolking/publicaties/artikelen/archief/2011/2011–3512‑wm.
htm> last accessed December 2013.
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Two forms, which can both amount to human trafficking, can be distinguished: 
it is possible that a foreign spouse is brought to the Netherlands to marry or after 
having married someone who lives in the Netherlands. in this scenario, it is 
possible that both spouses were forced to marry, but it is also possible that only 
one of them was forced. in the case that the foreign spouse is the one who was 
pressurised into a marriage, and especially if it is a woman, she may find herself in 
a difficult situation in the Netherlands. There have been reports of men marrying 
women from abroad, bringing them to the Netherlands and subsequently making 
them completely dependent on them, for example by not applying on their behalf 
for a residency permit, as a result of which the woman’s stay in the Netherlands 
becomes illegal.265
a second possibility is that a Dutch citizen is brought overseas, often by 
deception, to marry there.266 oftentimes, but not always, this is combined with 
a form of pre‑planned abandonment: parents abandon their daughter or son 
abroad, often completely against the child’s will and without any identification 
or travel documents.267 There, they will be forced to marry a partner selected 
by their relatives.268 This practice of abandonment has received quite a lot of 
attention in the Netherlands over the past few years.269 abandonment is most 
prevalent among communities originating from morocco and Turkey, but there 
have also been reports of children being abandoned in egypt, Pakistan, iran, 
Somalia and afghanistan.270 There are no exact figures on how many people are 
abandoned abroad each year, but in its action plan regarding forced marriage 
and abandonment, the Dutch Labour Party (Pvda) notes that each year, dozens, 
possibly hundreds of school‑age children do not return to school after the summer 
holidays.271
265 acB Kenniscentrum 2010, p. 27.
266 acB Kenniscentrum 2010, p. 27. This might qualify as human trafficking, see also chapter 7.
267 Not only children, but also adults, particularly women, are abandoned abroad, usually by their 
(ex) husbands who abandon them in a foreign country in order to get rid of them, acVZ, Tegen 
de wil achtergebleven. Een advies over in herkomstlanden achtergelaten vrouwen en kinderen, 
The Hague: acVZ april 2005, p. 19.
268 See e.g. the story of Sarah, a Dutch girl of Somali descent whose mother took her to Somalia 
when she was sixteen. in Somalia, she was forced to marry an uncle who subsequently raped 
and assaulted her. after two years, she managed to return to the Netherlands: J. groen, 
‘ontsnapt aan een “vieze oom” in mogadishu’, Volkskrant 25 July 2012, pp. 6–7.
269 See e.g. Parliamentary Papers II (Lower House) 2003/04, 29 742, no. 1–27 (interpellation 
regarding the abandonment of women and children in morocco).
270 acVZ, Tegen de wil achtergebleven. Een advies over in herkomstlande achtergelaten vrouwen 
en kinderen, The Hague: acVZ april 2005, p. 20.
271 Partij van de arbeid, Huwelijksdwang en achterlating: Pvda plan van aanpak, November 
2009; see also ‘achterlating gezinsleden in buitenland strafbaar stellen’, Volkskrant 7 June 2012 
(available at <www.volkskrant.nl/vk/nl/2686/Binnenland/article/detail/3267401/2012/06/07/
achterlating‑gezinsleden‑in‑buitenland‑strafbaar‑stellen.dhtml> last accessed December 
2013); and movisie, Factsheet huwelijksdwang: feiten en achtergrondinformatie, November 
2009, p. 4.
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3. forceD marriageS iN eNgLaND
3.1. Pr eVaLeNce
in england and Wales, forced marriage, which is cross‑governmentally defined 
as ‘a marriage conducted without the valid consent of both parties, where duress 
is a factor’,272 is still very much a hidden problem: like in the Netherlands, it is 
underreported and difficult to detect.273 The low visibility of forced marriages 
due to the fact that they often take place in domestic settings in hard‑to‑reach, 
tight‑knit communities together with the inconsistent recording of instances 
of forced marriage across many agencies and organisations, are listed as factors 
that impede the detection of this practice.274 The attitude of many professionals, 
including police officers, educators and social services may also have contributed 
to the relatively low reporting rate of forced marriages: over the past few years, 
many professionals have indicated that they are (or at least were) unwilling to 
intervene in possible cases of forced marriage for fear of appearing racist.275 on 
top of this, there also seems to be a gap in the knowledge about the existing legal 
framework of forced marriage due to a low level of awareness of the phenomenon 
of forced marriage and the legal remedies available, especially among 
professionals.276 many – though not all – victims of (potential) forced marriages 
are believed to be reluctant to report their ordeal to the authorities: they may be 
afraid of the consequences (e.g. they may fear retaliation from relatives or be wary 
of police involvement), or they may accept the value system of their culture and 
believe they have caused or would cause their family dishonour by reporting a 
forced marriage. others might not speak english and/or might not know where 
to go. further, those with an insecure immigration status may fear deportation 
– a threat that is also used by perpetrators to keep victims in the marriage.277 
Back home, they may face further violence/harassment, because of the shame of 
272 choice by right 2000, p. 6; cPS Legal guidance Honour‑Based Violence and forced marriage, 
p. 6.
273 Home office, Forced marriage – a consultation. Summary of responses, June 2012, p.  3. in 
2008, the muslim arbitration Tribunal 2008, para. 3.3 wrote that the cases reported to the 
authorities are only the tip of the iceberg.
274 Kazimirski 2009, pp.  37–39. See also N. Khanum, Forced marriage, family cohesion and 
community engagement: national learning through a case study of Luton, Luton: equality in 
Diversity march 2008, p. i.
275 Demos 2012, p. 14; and Home affairs committee, Forced Marriage (Hc 2010–12, 880), oral 
evidence ms J. Sanghera, pp. ev 8 and 9.
276 During a 2010 meeting held by Karma Nirvana, an Ngo based in Leeds dedicated to helping 
victims of forced marriage, 76% of the front line services and professionals who might 
encounter instances of forced marriage (including educators and social workers) were not 
aware of the legal status of forced marriage or the existence of forced marriage protection 
orders (Demos 2012, p. 13). in general, there is very little awareness of the forced marriage 
(civil Protection) act (Demos 2012, p. 40).
277 cPS Legal guidance Honour‑Based Violence and forced marriage, pp. 24–25.
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their failed marriage.278 a reason why immigrant women in particular might not 
report a (threatened) forced marriage, or indeed other forms of violence, is that 
they grew up in countries where women in general do not go to the police with 
these problems.279
as a result of the hidden nature of forced marriage, there is a lack of reliable 
data on the prevalence of the phenomenon.280 There are, however, some reports 
containing estimates. a report published in 2009, basing its estimates on the 
number of forced marriage cases encountered by national and local organisations, 
estimated that the number of reported forced marriages (involving either actual 
forced marriage or threats of forced marriage) in england in 2008 lay between 
5,000 and 8,000.281 Several organisations believe that these figures, which are 
quoted in the Home office consultation document, are exaggerated and that the 
total number of forced marriages is considerably lower and more in line with 
the number of cases reported to the so‑called forced marriage Unit (fmU).282 
in 2011, the Home office reported that, since its creation, the number of cases 
reported to the fmU has risen every year. The fmU, which is a joint venture 
between the foreign and commonwealth office and the Home office, was created 
to provide advice and support to (potential) victims of forced marriage and give 
information to professionals dealing with these cases.283 in 2008, the fmU dealt 
with 1618 cases, in 2009 that number was 1682 and in 2010 the total number of 
cases in which the fmU provided advice or support peaked at 1735.284 in 2011, 
the number dropped to 1468; in 2012, this was 1485, in 2013, it was 1302.285 The 
growing number of Ngos that offer advice and support to (potential) victims of 
forced marriage, for example by means of a helpline, might explain the drop in 
the number of cases reported to the fmU in 2011. for many victims, Ngos might 
278 However, if immigrants can demonstrate that they have experienced domestic violence in a 
relationship with a British or settled partner, they may be allowed to remain in the UK. This 
also applies when a person can demonstrate that they fear gender‑related prosecution in their 
country of origin (cPS Legal guidance Honour‑Based Violence and forced marriage, pp. 25 
and 42–43).
279 iKWro 2012, p. 5.
280 choice by right 2000, p. 11. 
281 Kazimirski et al. 2009, pp. 24 and 28. it is not clear from this report whether the estimate of 
5,000–8,000 also includes forced marriages that were reported in 2008, but that had taken 
place before 2008. in 2000, the estimated number of forced marriages taking place annually in 
the UK was set considerably lower, at around 1,000 (an‑Na’im 2000).
282 Southall Black Sisters 2012, para. 21; ashiana Network 2012, p. 2; and Diversity Subcommission 
of the family Justice council 2012, para. 10.
283 in 2000, the foreign and commonwealth office (fco) created the community Liaison 
Unit to provide advice and support to (potential) victims of forced marriage. in 2005, this 
unit transformed into a joint venture with the Home office becoming known as the forced 
marriage Unit (The Right to Choose: Multi‑Agency Statutory Guidance for Dealing with Forced 
Marriage, London: fmU, January 2010, p. 4).
284 Home office, Forced Marriage Consultation, December 2011, p. 5.
285 fmU, Statistics on Forced Marriage between January and December 2012; available at <www.
gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/141823/Stats_2012.pdf> 
last accessed December 2013.
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be easier to approach as these organisations often have people present from the 
same ethnic background and/or who speak the same language.286
forced marriage appears to be on the increase in england, but it is not 
possible to say this with certainty; it is also possible that the increase in the 
number of reported cases is due to the spotlight that was aimed at forced 
marriages by the awareness raising campaigns of the past few years. There are 
three noticeable trends. first, forced marriages take place more often in a broader 
range of communities, including those that were originally not associated with 
the practice (including irish Traveller and eastern european communities). 
Secondly, a higher percentage of men step forward as victims of forced marriages 
and thirdly, it has become clear that not only first and second, but also third and 
fourth generation english citizens are faced with forced marriages.287
Like honour‑based violence,288 the crown Prosecution Service (cPS) 
regards ‘forced marriage’ as an umbrella term covering a multitude of criminal 
offences.289 in april 2010, the cPS first started flagging cases of forced marriage 
with the aim of recording any criminal offence of threatening behaviour, violence 
or psychological, physical, sexual, financial or emotional abuse that was carried 
out in the context of a forced marriage, i.e. crimes committed in order to coerce 
someone to enter into a marriage, or crimes committed after a forced marriage 
has taken place. These offences are then flagged both as forced marriage and as 
the specific offence (e.g. rape or kidnap) on the cPS case management System.290 
Harassment taking place in the course of forcing someone to marry will therefore 
be flagged as harassment and as forced marriage. Between November 2012 and 
July, 41 defendants were prosecuted for offences flagged as forced marriage 
– defined by the cPS as ’a marriage conducted without the valid consent of one or 
both parties where duress is a factor’291 – with 70.7% resulting in a conviction.292
286 conversation with a member of the forced marriage Unit (dd. 20 march 2012). The transcript 
of the interview is on file with the author.
287 Demos 2012, pp. 14–15. See also the concept of fossilisation of cultural practices, explained in 
chapter 1, paragraph 4.4, footnote 170.
288 The government and cPS define honour‑based violence as ‘a crime or incident, which has or 
may have been committed to protect or defend the honour of the family and/or community’, 
see cPS Legal guidance Honour‑Based Violence and forced marriage, p. 4. on the dubious 
term ‘“honour”‑based violence’, see cPS Legal guidance Honour‑Based Violence and forced 
marriage, p. 4; and Welchman & Hossain 2005, pp. 6–8.
289 cPS Legal guidance Honour‑Based Violence and forced marriage, pp. 4 and 16.
290 cPS Legal guidance Honour‑Based Violence and forced marriage: guidance on identifying 
and flagging cases, paras. 4–5 and 8.
291 cPS Legal guidance Honour‑Based Violence and forced marriage, p. 6.
292 cPS Violence against Women and girls crime report 2012–2013, July 2013, p. 45. in 2010–
2011, 41 defendants were prosecuted for offences flagged as forced marriage, with just under 
50% resulting in a conviction (cPS Violence against Women and girls crime report 2010–
2011, November 2011, p. 34).
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3.2 . VicTimS aND PerPeTr aTorS
most cases of forced marriage in england and Wales concern young women in 
their (early) teens293 and early twenties.294 although women constitute the largest 
proportion of victims of forced marriage, men also fall victim to this practice.295 
initial figures displayed a large difference between the ratio of male and female 
victims, with approximately 85% of the victims being female and 15% male. more 
recent estimates point towards an increase in male victims – perhaps due to 
awareness raising campaigns – 70% female to 30% male.296 research has shown 
that physically and mentally disabled people are also at risk of being forced 
into a marriage by their relatives and constitute a significant percentage of the 
total number of victims of forced marriage.297 The majority of cases arise from 
communities with a cultural background in the indian subcontinent, i.e. Pakistan, 
india and Bangladesh,298 but the fmU also deals with cases involving families 
from the middle east, the Horn of africa, North africa and eastern europe.299 
in addition, there have been forced marriages involving families who originate 
from the UK and ireland, such as members of irish traveller communities.300 in 
all of these communities, lesbian, gay, bisexual and transsexual (LgBT) people 
293 in 2008, 41% of forced marriage cases reported to the ten local authorities interviewed by 
Kazimirski et al. involved minors (Kazimirski et al. 2009, p. 23).
294 There have also been several instances of considerably younger and older victims. in 2012, one 
of the cases the fmU dealt with concerned a two‑year‑old girl; the oldest victim assisted by the 
fmU in that year was 71 (fmU, Statistics on Forced Marriage for 2012; available at <www.gov.
uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/141823/Stats_2012.pdf> last 
accessed December 2013).
295 for a recent example of a male victim of forced marriage, see the case of a British boy who was 
sent to Nigeria by his mother in an attempt to force him into a marriage (‘first person jailed 
for breaking forced marriage laws’, Solicitor First, 15 february 2011). for other examples see 
Buckland v. Buckland (1967) 2 W.L.r. 1506; and Heaton, mccallum & Jogi 2009, p. 19.
296 Home affairs committee, Forced Marriage (Hc 2010–12, 880), p.  4; and choice by right 
2000, p. 19. The 30:70 ratio is based on the cases reported to Karma Nirvana. according to 
the information on the website of the fmU, of the 1468 possible instances of forced marriage 
it dealt with in 2011, 78% concerned female victims and 22% male victims (see <www.fco.
gov.uk/en/travel‑and‑living‑abroad/when‑things‑go‑wrong/forced‑marriage/> last accessed 
December 2013).
297 cPS Legal guidance Honour‑Based Violence and forced marriage, p.  23; see also Probert 
2008, pp. 395 et seqq. Specifically: Forced Marriage and Learning Disabilities: Multi‑Agency 
Practice Guidelines, London: fmU, December 2010.
298 in 2008, 97% of those seeking assistance with regard to forced marriage from the ten local 
authorities interviewed by Kazimirski et al. were identified as asian, of which 72% were from 
Pakistani families (Kazimirski et al. 2009, p. 22). See also choice by right 2000, p. 11. in 2008, 
64% of cases that came to the attention of the fmU related to Pakistani victims, 15% related to 
Bangladeshi victims, and 8% related to indian victims (Kazimirski et al. 2009, p. 22).
299 Home affairs committee, Forced Marriage (Hc 2010–12, 880), p. 4; and Heaton, mccallum & 
Jogi 2009, p. 6.
300 Heaton, mccallum & Jogi 2009, p. 6; and The Women’s Health council, Translating Pain into 
Action A Study of Gender‑based Violence and Minority Ethnic Women in Ireland, february 
2009, pp. 155–157.
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have been identified as a potentially vulnerable group at risk of being forced into 
a marriage.301
a wide selection of people can become involved in forcing someone to 
marry. Victims are generally forced to marry by their parents and close relatives, 
but extended family members and even community members or the future 
spouse may also be involved.302 a broad range of perpetrator age has been 
identified in research: victims may be pressurised by much younger siblings and 
great‑grandparents alike.303 in general – and especially in South asian contexts – 
the main perpetrator is the father of the victim (often aided by the mother), who 
is regarded as the head of the family: he decides when and whom his children 
will marry, although he, in turn, may be pressured by his relatives or community 
members.304
3.3. caUSeS
The reasons why parents resort to force when their children do not agree to marry 
according to their wishes are complex and diverse. Key motivations that have been 
identified for forced marriages in South asian communities include: responding 
to pressure either from peer groups or extended family; building stronger families, 
strengthening ties and links; preserving certain cultural and religious traditions 
and values; achieving financial gain; preventing relationships that are regarded 
as unsuitable by parents, relatives or community members; protecting family 
honour (izzat) and preventing shame (sharam); fulfilling long‑standing family 
commitments; assisting claims for UK citizenship; and correcting unwanted 
behaviour, such as alcohol and drug use or criminal activities.305
as stated, the underlying reason for the majority of forced marriages 
appears to be upholding family honour by controlling (female) behaviour.306 in 
South asian traditions, women are seen as the bearers of family honour; their 
(sexual) behaviour can uphold family honour or bring dishonour.307 modest 
sexual behaviour, refraining from pre‑ or extramarital sexual relations and 
obeying parents’ wishes are key elements to female behaviour that upholds family 
honour. choosing one’s own marriage partner or having a boyfriend are therefore 
301 Demos 2012, p. 15; cPS Legal guidance Honour‑Based Violence and forced marriage, p. 12.
302 There can be as many as fifteen people involved, see Home affairs committee, Forced Marriage 
(Hc 2010–12, 880), oral evidence ms J. Sanghera, p. ev 9; and Heaton, mccallum & Jogi 2009, 
p. 3.
303 Kazimirski et al. 2009, p. 18.
304 conversation with Senior Policy advisor at the cPS (20  april 2012); conversation with 
iKWro campaigns officer (14 may 2012). The transcripts of the interviews are on file with 
the author.
305 The Right to Choose: Multi‑Agency Statutory Guidance for Dealing with Forced Marriage, 
London: fmU, January 2010, p. 9, para. 36; and choice by right 2000, p. 14.
306 Proudman 2011, p. 13; and razack 2004, p. 165.
307 meetoo & mirza 2007, p. 191.
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often regarded as actions that bring dishonour. in those cases, modifying the 
transgressor’s behaviour – for example by a (forced) marriage – can reclaim 
honour.308
3.4. coNSeqUeNceS
The consequences of forced marriage are diverse. Victims may suffer from 
isolation, feelings of guilt, shame, betrayal and fear.309 Because the majority of 
victims are forced to marry by their relatives, these non‑consensual marriages 
often also negatively impact family relations.310 other possible results of a forced 
marriage are rape, physical and psychological violence, forced pregnancy, forced 
child bearing, and domestic servitude.311 men and women who run away from 
home to escape (the threat of) a forced marriage may find themselves hiding in 
fear of their own relatives, facing harassment and/or social ostracism. in order to 
restore family honour, some families may take recourse to extreme measures to 
bring runaways back home and a rejected or failed (forced) marriage may even 
result in murder.312
in addition, forced marriage involving children or young adults generally 
has a negative impact on health, personal development, education and economic 
status.313 further, research has shown that rates of (attempted) suicide are 
considerably higher among South asian women living in Britain than among 
other groups in the United Kingdom.314 Notably, family disputes over marriage 
and arranged marriages are cited as significant contributory sociocultural factors 
to the instances of (attempted) suicide by South asian women.315 This highlights 
the psychological impact that forced marriage can have on women, even when 
individual incidents of pressure or violence may appear relatively minor when 
seen in isolation.316
308 Sen 2005, p. 47.
309 Heaton, mccallum & Jogi 2009, p. 7.
310 The feeling of betrayal may be so strong that even in those cases in which the victim established 
a loving relationship with the person he/she was forced to marry, the relationship between 
the victim and those family members who forced him/her to enter into the marriage are 
permanently disrupted (gangoli, razak & mccarry 2006, p. 11).
311 cPS Legal guidance Honour‑Based Violence and forced marriage, p. 33.
312 The Right to Choose: Multi‑Agency Statutory Guidance for Dealing with Forced Marriage, 
London: fmU, January 2010, p. 12; and choice by right 2000, p. 15.
313 Demos 2012, pp. 12 and 17–23.
314 in the United Kingdom, the suicide rate among South asian women is almost twice that of 
white women (m.H. Hicks & D. Bhugra, ‘Perceived causes of suicide attempts by U.K. South 
asian women’, American Journal of Orthopsychiatry (73) 2003, p. 455).
315 See e.g. N. Thompson & D. Bhugra, ‘rates of deliberate self‑harm in asian: findings and 
models’, international review of Psychiatry (12) 2000, pp. 39 and 41.
316 choudhry 2011, p. 74.
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3.5. Tr aNSNaTioNaL DimeNSioNS
many forced marriages that occur in england very clearly also have international 
dimensions. There are cases in which British nationals from South asian 
communities are forced into a marriage with a foreign national and are either 
taken overseas – through deception or force – to marry and live with their spouse 
or are required to act as a sponsor for their spouse’s immigration.317 it is estimated 
that each year, hundreds of 14‑, 15‑ and 16‑year‑old girls and boys disappear from 
schools and suffer this fate.318 There have also been cases in which parents initially 
did not have the intention to marry their children off, but who, once abroad, were 
pressurised by family or community members into doing so.319 Victims report 
having their passports taken away and in some cases reported having been 
drugged before being transported abroad.320 There have been reports of women 
who were kept abroad until they became pregnant, making it more difficult for 
them to exit the marriage.321 There are also cases in which a foreign national is 
brought to england for the purpose of a forced marriage.322 according to a report 
issued by the muslim arbitration Tribunal, in over 70% of all marriages between 
an english citizen and a foreign national from the asian subcontinent, an element 
of force or coercion is present before the marriage takes place.323
4. coNcLUDiNg remarKS
This chapter has demonstrated that forced marriages mainly take place in 
traditional and closed communities that attach great value to family honour 
and keeping up appearances. in the context of Dutch and english society, forced 
marriages are especially prevalent among communities with origins in india, 
Bangladesh, Pakistan, morocco, Turkey and Surinam, but also in orthodox 
Protestant circles and (roman catholic) irish traveller communities.
forced marriage is a hidden practice that often takes places within the privacy 
of the family. it is mainly used as a means to control (female) children and uphold 
traditional values, both with the aim of protecting family honour. it is possible 
that only the future spouse exerts pressure on the victim, but in most cases, 
317 choice by right 2000, p. 12; and nS v. MI (2006) 1 fLr 444.
318 conversation with a member from the forced marriage Unit (interview dd. 20 march 2012); 
L. Tickle, ‘forced marriage: the pupils who vanish in the holidays’, The Guardian 9 april 2012; 
and Multi‑agency practice guidelines: Handling cases of Forced Marriage, London: fmU, June 
2009, p. 54.
319 Home office, Forced marriage – a consultation. Summary of responses, June 2012, p. 12.
320 cPS Legal guidance Honour‑Based Violence and forced marriage, p. 36; and choice by right 
2000, p. 12.
321 choice by right 2000, p. 15.
322 choice by right 2000, p. 12.
323 muslim arbitration Tribunal 2008, para. 3.3(e). it is not clear how the muslim arbitration 
Tribunal calculated this percentage.
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parents and relatives are the ones forcing the victim(s) to enter into a marriage. 
The force used is very diverse and ranges from (threats of) physical violence to 
psychological pressure (such as emotional blackmail) exerted by a large variety 
of people over a long period of time. Threats of disownment and social exclusion/
ostracism are especially effective in closed and traditional communities because 
these mechanisms (i.e. disownment and exclusion) are used to display public 
disapproval if a community member transgresses what is deemed to be acceptable 
(see also chapter 1 on the differences between arranged and forced marriages).
These types of forced marriages ought to be distinguished from the forced 
marriages that occur outside the context of the family. The latter type of forced 
marriage are often linked with human trafficking, generally involve more physical 
violence and are often (also) brought about by others than the victim’s relatives – 
although forced marriage taking place within family circles may also amount to 
trafficking.
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all is fair in love and war. This statement still seems to be true today. in conflict 
situations, the taking of brides by the victor is a common occurrence. Through 
the years, many conflicts around the world have been marked by the abduction of 
women and girls who were forced into what is generally referred to as ‘marriages’ 
with their captors.324 There are reports of forced marriages taking place during the 
conflicts in inter alia afghanistan, angola, cambodia, the Democratic republic 
of congo, east Timor, guatemala, Kashmir, Liberia, mozambique, myanmar, 
Peru, rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan (Darfur), and Uganda.325 This 
chapter focuses on the phenomenon of forced marriages in the situations that 
have been or are being tried before the icTY, icTr, icc, ScSL and eccc with 
an emphasis on the forced marriages that took place during the civil war in Sierra 
Leone and under the Khmer rouge in cambodia. as was stated in the general 
introduction, this book focuses on these two situations because of the high 
prevalence of forced marriage during the two conflicts. in addition, the conflict 
of Sierra Leone was chosen because it resulted in the first case law concerning the 
act of forced marriage under international criminal law.
in this chapter, first, acts of forced marriage during the rwandan genocide 
and the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia are discussed. The third paragraph 
focuses on situations currently before the icc. The practice of forced marriage 
was (or is) prevalent to some extent in all situations, but in some more than in 
others. The conflict in Uganda is especially infamous for the high number of 
child abductions coupled with forced marriages and this particular topic has 
324 However, see chapter 10, where it is argued that in many cases, ‘marriage’ is the wrong label 
to describe conduct that in fact amounts to (sexual) enslavement. for the sake of readability, 
however, this chapter will consistently use the word ‘marriage’, sometimes in combination 
with the prefix ‘bush’.
325 for a global overview, see m. Bastick, K. grimm & r. Kunz, Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict. 
Global Overview and Implications for the Security Sector, geneva centre for the Democratic 
control of armed forces 2007. 
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been well‑documented. Therefore, paragraph 3 will mainly focus on Uganda. The 
situations in other countries under investigation by the icc are briefly discussed, 
mainly for the practical reason that there is little information on (the prevalence 
of) forced marriages taking place in those situations. Next, the practice of forced 
marriage as it took place during the conflicts in Sierra Leone (paragraph 4) and 
cambodia (paragraph 5) will be discussed, forming the main focal point of this 
chapter.326 This descriptive part is followed by two comparative paragraphs. in 
paragraph  6, the Sierra Leonean ‘bush marriages’ and the cambodian Khmer 
rouge marriages are compared and differences and similarities are highlighted. 
Where applicable, reference will be made to the forced marriages that took place 
during other conflicts discussed in this chapter. in paragraph  7, the types of 
forced marriages as described in this and the previous chapter are compared with 
each other: what are the differences and similarities between forced marriages 
that take place during conflict situations and those that occur in times of peace? 
Paragraph 8 contains some concluding remarks.
The main aim of this chapter is cataloguing empirical data regarding forced 
marriages. The analysis of the legal aspects related to the practice of forced 
marriage takes place in Part iii of this book.
2. forceD marriageS DUriNg THe coNfLicTS 
iN rWaNDa aND THe former YUgoSLaVia
2.1. rWaNDa
6  april 1994 marked the start of the genocide in rwanda. in one hundred 
days, Hutu extremists killed almost one million Tutsis and moderate Hutus. it 
is estimated that during this time frame of a little over three months, between 
250,000 and 500,000 women and girls were raped.327 in addition to (gang) rape, 
Tutsis and moderate Hutus were subjected to forced incest, sexual mutilation 
and forced nudity.328 What is less commonly known is that some women were 
singled out and forced into marital‑like relations with individual Hutu militia.329 
at checkpoints, roadblocks or other places where people were being attacked, 
members of the Interahamwe – a paramilitary Hutu organisation – would select 
women and girls and take them as their wives, sometimes through bizarre 
wedding ceremonies, but in general, simply by declaring a woman to be their 
326 The case law of the ScSL and eccc pertaining to the practice of forced marriage is discussed 
in the legal framework (chapter 8).
327 Human rights Watch 1996, p.  24 and UN commission on Human rights: report on the 
situation of human rights in rwanda 1996, para.  16. for a selection of testimonies of rape 
victims, see De Brouwer & Ka Hon chu 2009.
328 UN commission on Human rights: report on the situation of human rights in rwanda, 
para. 18.
329 Kalra aptly calls this practice ‘rwanda’s secret’, see Kalra 2001.
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‘wife’.330 militia leaders would sometimes hand out women as rewards to men 
who had killed many Tutsis, and Hutu rebels occasionally sold the women 
and girls they captured to other Hutus, who would then turn them into their 
‘wives’.331 These forced marriages, which lasted anywhere between a few days to 
several months, in some cases even continuing after the genocide had ended, 
resulted in prolonged physical and psychological suffering.332 The victims often 
served as second or third wives to Hutu men and many were repeatedly raped, 
beaten, threatened with death, forced to perform domestic duties and in addition 
had to maintain an intimate relationship with their tormentors.333 a lot of 
survivors who were forced into a marriage in a twisted way owe their lives to 
their captors, a fact which is accompanied by feelings of both shame and guilt, 
seeing as most of the victims’ relatives did not survive and in some cases, were 
even killed by the very men they had to call ‘husband’.334 moreover, upon their 
return to their communities, the women, like other victims of sexual violence, 
faced stigmatisation and condemnation because survivors accused them of 
collaborating with Hutu extremists.335 Having nowhere to go or because they had 
not been able to escape – there are reports of Hutus taking their ‘wives’ with them 
when they fled rwanda – some women remained with their captors for unknown 
periods after the genocide.336 for example, Hyacintha Nirere – one of the women 
who survived the genocide and whose testimony was recorded in the book The 
Men Who Killed Me – was forced to stay in a marriage with a member of the 
Interahamwe for two years. When this man fled to the Democratic republic of 
congo, he left Hyacintha, who was six months pregnant, behind.337
forced marriage has not been charged before the icTr. it was, however, 
obliquely mentioned in several judgements.338 for example, the Trial chamber 
has found that callixte Kalimanzira, minister of the interior of the interim 
government of rwanda during the genocide, had ordered the killing of young 
Tutsi girls who had been forced into marriages with Hutu men because they could 
cause problems.339
330 Human rights Watch 1996, p. 58 and Kalra 2001, p. 201.
331 african rights 1995, p. 780, Human rights Watch 1996, pp. 58–59 and Kalra 2001, p. 209.
332 Kalra 2001, p. 205; Human rights Watch 1996, p. 1; and african rights 1995, p. 781.
333 Kalra 2001, pp. 201 and 205; and african rights 1995, pp. 778–779.
334 Human rights Watch 1996, p. 74. african rights 1995, p. 783, recorded the testimony of a 
young Tutsi woman who was given as a ‘wife’ to a member of the Interahamwe, who got her a 
Hutu iD card so he could ‘keep’ her.
335 Human rights Watch 1996, pp. 56 and 74; and Kalra 2001, pp. 202–203.
336 Kalra 2001, p. 202; Human rights Watch 1996, p. 62; and african rights 1995, p. 748.
337 De Brouwer & Ka Hon chu 2009, pp. 121–122.
338 See also Muhimana Trial Judgement, paras.  310–315 and 322: ‘in light of the coercive 
circumstances (…) the chamber is not persuaded by the testimonies of Defence Witnesses DaB 
and Dac that Witness Bg consented to “marry”, or cohabit with mugonero, an Interahamwe, 
who had participated in killing other refugees who had been in hiding with the witness.’ See 
also Akayesu Trial Judgement, paras. 435–436.
339 Kalimanzira Trial Judgement, paras. 717, 721 and 728–729.
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2.2 . THe for mer YUgoSLaVia
During the wars that raged on the territory of the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, 
sexual violence was committed on a large scale against women, children and men. 
although atrocities were perpetrated by and against all sides, the majority of the 
sexual assaults were committed by Serbs against muslim and catholic croat 
women.340 rapes were committed in the houses of the victims, in the streets, 
in the woods and in detention centres. in some of these detention centres, also 
known as rape camps, women and girls were held for the purpose of rape.341 Some 
soldiers, usually commanders or other high ranking soldiers, would select women 
and girls from these detention facilities and take them to a house or apartment. 
Locked in these houses for varying periods of time, ranging from several hours to 
several months, the girls were (gang)raped by their captors and forced to perform 
domestic chores. it has been said that the conditions these girls and women were 
kept in are similar to what the former bush wives in Sierra Leone endured during 
their captivity (see infra paragraph 4).342 a good example of this type of sexual 
enslavement is provided by the icTY case against Kunarac, Kovač and Vuković, 
three former (sub‑)commanders of the military police of the Bosnian Serb army. 
Dragoljub Kunarac was found guilty of having kept two girls in an abandoned 
house for approximately six months and was convicted of rape and enslavement.343 
During at least two of these months, he continuously raped one of the girls whom 
he had reserved exclusively for himself, forbidding other soldiers to rape her. The 
other girl was raped for a period of six months by another commander, referred 
to in the Trial Judgement as DP6. Whilst in captivity, the girls were beaten, 
threatened, kept in constant fear and forced to perform domestic tasks and obey 
all demands made by Kunarac and DP6. even though at some point, the girls 
were given keys to the house, the Trial chamber held that they were not free to 
go where they wanted seeing as they had nowhere to go and had no place to hide 
from their captors. The second accused, radomir Kovač, was found guilty of 
detaining four girls in his apartment for several months and treating them as 
his property and was convicted of rape, enslavement and outrages upon personal 
dignity. The girls were beaten and threatened and were repeatedly raped by Kovač 
(who had reserved one of the girls exclusively for himself) and other occupants 
of and visitors to the apartment. Whilst in captivity, the girls were also forced to 
perform domestic duties such as laundering, cooking and cleaning.344
Several other cases that were on trial before the icTY dealt with similar 
issues, although no mention was made of any forced (domestic) labour carried 
340 Serbs married to muslims were also targeted (Krajišnik Trial Judgement, paras. 445 and 567).
341 De Brouwer 2005, p. 9; and Salzman 1998, pp. 349 and 359.
342 Kalra 2001 p. 215.
343 Kunarac et al. Trial Judgement, para. 745. Note that the icTY Statute does not list the crime of 
sexual slavery.
344 Kunarac et al. Trial Judgement, paras. 728, 739–741, 747–752, 761 and 775.
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out by the victims. miroslav Bralo was found guilty of unlawfully confining 
a Bosnian muslim woman in a house for a period of two months. During her 
captivity, she was repeatedly raped.345 Bralo was convicted of inter alia rape and 
unlawful confinement. Dragan Zelenović was convicted of rape for keeping four 
women in a house for several months, during which time he and others raped the 
women.346
although none of the icTY judgements explicitly deal with instances of 
forced marriage, the Trial chamber in the Kvočka et al. Trial Judgement did list 
forced marriage, alongside sexual mutilation and forced abortion, as an example 
of a crime that falls within the ambit of sexual violence.347
3. forceD marriageS aND THe SiTUaTioNS 
Before THe icc
as of January 2014, eight situations have been brought before the icc: the 
central african republic, Kenya, Darfur (Sudan), the Democratic republic of 
congo, Uganda, the republic of côte d’ivoire, Libya and mali. Several reports 
indicate that forced marriages – to a greater or lesser extent – took (or still take) 
place in at least seven of the eight situations. Libya, at this stage, appears to be the 
exception.348 in this paragraph, the forced marriages as they took place during the 
different conflicts will be briefly described, as will the legal steps that have been 
taken by the Prosecutor and the icc.
3.1. côTe D’iVoir e
in 2002, civil war broke out in côte d’ivoire. Several factions fought each other, 
aided by mixed groups of mercenaries from Libya and Sierra Leone. after a peace 
agreement was signed in 2007, the 2010 presidential elections resulted in a second 
civil war when two candidates, alassane ouattara and Laurent gbagbo, both 
claimed victory and took up office.349 initially, the icc investigation focused on 
345 Bralo Sentencing Judgement, paras. 15–16 and 33.
346 Zelenović Sentencing Judgement, para. 27.
347 Kvočka et al. Trial Judgement, para. 180, footnote 343.
348 The author found no (official) reports of cases of forced marriages taking place during the arab 
Spring in Libya that started early 2011. There have, however, been reports of cases concerning 
Libyan men forcing Syrian refugee women and girls into marriage (see inter alia BBc news, 
Libyans ‘exploiting Syrian women’ with marriage offers, 20 September 2012 (available at <www.
bbc.co.uk/news/world‑middle‑east‑19660293> last accessed December 2013).
349 according to the icc Prosecutor there are reasonable grounds to believe that pro‑gbagbo 
forces committed crimes against humanity, and that it is likely that similar crimes were 
committed by pro‑ouattara forces (see Pre‑Trial chamber iii, Decision on the Prosecution’s 
provision of further information regarding potentially relevant crimes committed between 
2002 and 2010, No. icc‑02/11 22 february 2012).
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the violence during this second ivorian war, but in 2012, Pre‑Trial chamber iii 
expanded its authorisation for the investigation in côte d’ivoire to include crimes 
that were allegedly committed during the first civil war.350 Ngo reports are rife 
with accounts relating to rape and sexual slavery. many women were abducted by 
fighters and forced to marry them. These forced marriages bear many similarities 
with the forced marriages that took place during other african conflicts, such as 
the civil war in Sierra Leone (see infra paragraph 4) and the rwandan genocide: 
women were forced to live with their captors for periods ranging from several 
weeks to over a year. Some were forced to take an active part in the fighting. many 
had to wash, cook and clean and were regarded as the ‘property’ of individual 
fighters, which ensured some modicum of protection from crimes such as gang 
rape by other rebels.351 Laurent gbagbo and his wife Simone gbagbo have both 
been charged with four counts of crimes against humanity: murder, rape and 
other forms of sexual violence, other inhumane acts, and persecution.
3.2 . KeNYa
another country that has seen a surge of post‑election violence is Kenya; murder, 
rape, acts of persecution and forcible transfer were committed in the run‑up to 
and in the wake of the 2007 elections. There are many reports on the wave of 
sexual violence – especially in the form of rape – that washed over the country, 
but accounts of sexual slavery or forced marriages are relatively limited. in its first 
publication on the post‑election violence, the Kenya National commission on 
Human rights did state that there were reported cases of men taking advantage of 
vulnerable women and girls by forcing them into marriages.352 it appears that in 
Kenya, forced marriages were not as endemic as in other (african) conflicts under 
investigation before the icc.
3.3. THe ceNTr aL africaN r ePUBLic
The central african republic has been torn by violent conflict on and off ever since 
decolonisation in 1960. During a recent armed conflict between government and 
rebel forces, many civilians were killed and raped, with violence reaching its peak 
350 Pre‑Trial chamber iii, Decision on the Prosecution’s provision of further information 
regarding potentially relevant crimes committed between 2002 and 2010, No. icc‑02/11 
22 february 2012.
351 Human rights Watch, ‘My Heart Is Cut’. Sexual Violence by Rebels and Pro‑Government Forces 
in Côte d ’Ivoire, august 2007, pp. 41–46; and amnesty international, Briefing to the Committee 
on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women. Cote d’Ivoire, London: amnesty 
international 2011, p. 6.
352 Kenya National commission on Human rights, On the Brink of the Precipice: A Human Rights 
Account of Kenya’s Post‑2007 Election Violence, august 2008 (Preliminary edition), para. 405.
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in 2002 and 2003. in addition to acts of murder and rape, several cases concerning 
forced marriages have been reported.353 it appears that the majority of these forced 
marriages took (and take) place in the context of child soldiering.354 members or 
rebel groups abduct girls and force them into marriages. a 2013 report of the 
Secretary‑general of the UN on sexual violence in conflicts mentions several 
cases of girls being forced into marriages with members of the armed Convention 
des patriotes pour la justice et la paix en Centrafrique.355 The investigations of the 
icc focus on one accused, Jean‑Pierre Bemba gombo, who is charged with the 
war crime of pillaging, and with rape and murder as crimes against humanity 
and war crimes.356
3.4. r ePUBLic of maLi
in January 2012, civil war broke out in the republic of mali in which several 
islamic and nationalist rebel groups started fighting the government. in July 
2012, the government of mali referred the situation to the icc.357, 358 it appears 
that many rebel groups abduct women and girls and force them into marriages. 
There are reports that some islamist rebel groups threaten parents in the regions 
they control into handing over their daughters for marriage.359 it has been 
suggested that fighters force women and girls into religious marriages as a means 
to legitimise their (sexual) enslavement.360
3.5. Democr aTic r ePUBLic of coNgo
The conflict in the Drc started in the 1990s and involved a number of different 
rebel groups and fighting forces, such as the Force de résistance patriotique en 
Ituri (frPi), the Front des nationalistes et intégrationnistes (fNi), the Forces 
patriotiques pour la libération du Congo (fPLc) and the Union des Patriotes 
Congolais (UPc).361 The icc Prosecutor has charged five former leaders of 
353 Women’s initiative for gender Justice, In Pursuit of Peace, april 2010, p. 32.
354 UNicef, Central African Republic Situation Report, 13 June 2013.
355 UN ga/Sc, Report of the Secretary‑General on sexual violence in conflict, UN Doc. 
a/67/792–S/2013/149, 14 march 2013, para. 21.
356 See Bemba Gombo Decision on the confirmation of the charges, 15 June 2009.
357 See office of the Prosecutor, Situation in Mali Article 53(1) Report, 16 January 2013.
358 at the time of writing (December 2013), no one had yet been charged.
359 UN ga/Sc, Report of the Secretary‑General on sexual violence in conflict, UN Doc. 
a/67/792–S/2013/149, 14 march 2013, para. 54.
360 See UNSc 6948th meeting, 17 april 2013, UN Doc. S/PV.6948, pp. 7–8 (statement by Saran 
Keïta Diakité); and <www.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2013/5/girls‑receive‑a‑visit‑from‑a‑
different‑man‑every‑night‑a‑new‑husband/> (last accessed December 2013).
361 another rebel group that has been active in the conflict in the Drc is the Democratic forces 
for the Liberation of rwanda, founded by rwandan génocidaires who fled to the Drc after the 
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several such groups; the cases against two of them are relevant to this study. in 
his submission of the public version of the document containing the charges 
against Katanga,362, 363 the Prosecutor alleged that there is evidence that during an 
attack on a village called Bogoro, women were raped and then taken to military 
camps, where some of them were given as ‘wives’ to their captors.364 During the 
confirmation of the charges hearing, the Prosecution reiterated that forcibly 
marrying abducted women to their rapists was common practice within the frPi 
and the fNi.365 in the decision on the confirmation of the charges in the case 
against Katanga, the icc Pre‑Trial chamber briefly expressed itself on forced 
marriages when it stated that:
‘in the view of the chamber, sexual slavery also encompasses situations where 
women and girls are forced into “marriage”, domestic servitude or other forced 
labour involving compulsory sexual activity, including rape, by their captors. 
forms of sexual slavery can, for example, be “practices such as the detention of 
women in ‘rape camps’ or ‘comfort stations’, forced temporary ‘marriages’ to 
soldiers and other practices involving the treatment of women as chattel, and as 
such, violations of the peremptory norm prohibiting slavery.”’366
it would seem that the icc Pre‑Trial chamber thus concurs with the afrc and 
charles Taylor Trial Judgements (see chapter 8) in holding that forced marriage is 
not a distinct crime (in the form of an ‘other inhumane act’) but a form of sexual 
slavery that is completely subsumed under this offence.
1994 genocide. according to ertürk, the Special rapporteur on violence against women, its 
causes and consequences, ‘the sexual atrocities committed in South Kivu are (…) reminiscent 
of those perpetrated by interahamwe militia during the rwandan genocide. The atrocities are 
structured around rape, sexual slavery and forced marriage’ (UN Human rights council, 
Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Yakin 
Ertürk, Addendum Mission to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, UN Doc. a/Hrc/7/6/
add.4, 28 february 2008, para. 21). See also UN office of the High commissioner for Human 
rights, Report of the Mapping Exercise documenting the most serious violations of human rights 
and international humanitarian law committed within the territory of the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo between March 1993 and June 2003, august 2010, paras. 722 and 6068.
362 mathieu Ngudjolo chui was also charged in this case, but in December 2012 he was acquitted 
of all charges and released (The Prosecutor v. Mathieu ngudjolo, case No. icc‑01/04–02/12, 
Judgement pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, 18 December 2012).
363 Note that on 7 march 2014, the icc Trial chamber acquitted Katanga of the charges relating 
to rape and sexual slavery. Katanga was found guilty of inter alia willful killing as a war crime 
and murder as a crime against humanity (see The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, case No. 
icc‑01/04–01/07, Trial Judgement, 7 march 2014).
364 Katanga and ngudjolo Chui Prosecution’s submission of public version of document containing 
the charges, para. 89.
365 Katanga and ngudjolo Chui confirmation of charges Hearing, p.  64, lines 9–11. See also 
pp. 19, 22, 23 and 25–27.
366 Katanga and ngudjolo Chui Decision on the confirmation of charges, para. 431. The Pre‑Trial 
chamber cites from the report of the former Special rapporteur on the issue of systematic 
rape, sexual slavery, and slavery‑like practices in armed conflict, mcDougall (UN commission 
on Human rights: contemporary forms of slavery 1998, para. 8).
Forceandmarriage.indd   72 20-5-2014   10:42:00
intersentia 73




in march 2012, Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, alleged founder of the UPc and fPLc, 
was convicted of enlisting and conscripting children under the age of 15 years into 
the fPLc and using them to actively participate in hostilities in the context of an 
international and non‑international armed conflict.367 in his opening statement 
in the case against Lubanga, the Prosecutor also referred to forced marriages and 
described how commanders sent (child) soldiers to look for girls and to bring 
them to the camp. The Prosecutor stated that as soon as the girl’s breasts started 
to grow, Lubanga’s commanders could select them as their forced wives, adding 
that ‘wife’ is the wrong word, as the girls were transformed into sexual slaves.368 in 
the Prosecution’s closing Brief, dated 1 June 2011, the Prosecutor recognised that 
the term ‘child soldiers’ is not restricted to children who actively fight, but also 
includes ‘children whose roles are essential to the functioning of the armed group, 
such as those working as cooks, porters, messengers, as well as girls recruited 
for sexual purposes and forced marriage’.369 The Trial chamber considered this 
broad definition of child soldiering, but did not reach a conclusion on whether 
acts of sexual violence and forced marriage are properly included within the scope 
of ‘using (children under the age of 15) to participate actively in hostilities’. The 
Decision on the confirmation of charges contained no facts relating to sexual 
violence and basing a decision on evidence introduced during the trial would 
be impermissible, seeing as the rome Statute prescribes that Trial chamber’s 
Decision shall not exceed the facts and circumstances described in the charges 
and any amendments to them.370
3.6. SUDaN
The conflict in the Sudanese region of Darfur started in 2003. There are several 
reports on the prevalence of sexual slavery and forced marriage taking place 
in Sudan.371 according to these reports, the Janjaweed, a government‑backed 
armed militia group, abduct women and children from villages, confine them for 
protracted periods of time, ranging from days to years, and subject them to (gang) 
rapes and force them to perform all sorts of labour.372 many of the women and 
girls are forced into marriage with their captors or their captors’ relatives, or are 
367 Lubanga Trial Judgement.
368 The Prosecutor v. Lubanga, case No. icc‑01/04–01/06‑T‑107‑eNg, opening Statement, p. 12 
lines 7–10.
369 The Prosecutor v. Lubanga, case No. icc‑01/04–01/06, Prosecution’s closing Brief, 1  June 
2011, para. 139. See also paragraph 6.3.1 infra.
370 Lubanga Trial Judgement, para. 630.
371 See e.g. Darfur consortium 2009, Doctors Without Borders, The Crushing Burden of Rape: 
Sexual Violence in Darfur, 8 march 2005 and The UN international commission of inquiry, 
october 2004, Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United 
nations Secretary General, 25  January 2005, pp.  89 et seq. and report of the international 
eminent Persons group, Slavery, Abduction and Forced Servitude in Sudan, 22 may 2002.
372 Darfur consortium 2009, pp. 8–9.
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transported from Darfur to the capital, Khartoum, or other parts of Sudan, where 
they are made into wives of government soldiers.373 as regards the involvement 
of government soldiers, several sources state that the Sudanese army is also 
actively involved in systematically kidnapping girls for the purpose of forced 
marriage. Witness testimonies in Ngo reports provide evidence that soldiers 
receive money in exchange for abducted women and girls.374 The investigation 
into the situation in Darfur focuses on six individuals who allegedly bear the 
greatest responsibility for crimes committed in this Sudanese region. of the six 
men, four are accused of sexual violence crimes: ahmad Harun and ali Kushayb 
are accused of the war crime of outrages upon personal dignity and rape as a war 
crime and crime against humanity. President al Bashir is accused of rape as a 
crime against humanity and abdel raheem Hussein is charged with rape as a 
crime against humanity and war crime.375
3.7. UgaNDa
The conflict in Uganda started when the National resistance army of President 
Yoweri museveni came into power in 1986. Supporters of the previous government 
fled to the north of Uganda and the south of Sudan where they united in opposition 
groups, which fought the government. in the second half of the 1980s, several 
splinter groups came into being, one of them a religious and military group which 
later became known as the Lord’s resistance army (Lra). The Lra, led by Joseph 
Kony, ostensibly aimed to overthrow the Ugandan government and in pursuit of 
this goal, killed, mutilated and raped countless civilians.376
extensive research has been done into the practice of forced marriages within 
the Lra.377 The Lra is most notorious for the abduction of children, who are 
then used as child combatants, slaves or ‘wives’.378 abductees served multiple 
roles within this rebel group. a 2004 population study of former female Lra 
captives reveals that 51% of the abducted girls at one point served as a wife to a 
373 Darfur consortium 2009, p. 10.
374 Darfur consortium 2009, p. 10.
375 See e.g. The Prosecutor v. Oman Hassan Ahmed Al Bashir, case No. icc‑02/05–01/09, Second 
warrant of arrest, 12 July 2010.
376 Human rights Watch 2003b, p. 4. The Lra is not the only group in Uganda that commits 
violations of humanitarian and human rights law: there are reports that the government 
forces, the Uganda Peoples’ Defence forces, have also committed unlawful killings, rapes and 
beatings (amnesty international 2008, p. 5).
377 See inter alia annan et al. 2011, annan et al. 2009, carlson & mazurana 2008, Sway 2008, and 
mcKay & mazurana 2004.
378 it is estimated that at least 66,000 children have been abducted by the Lra since 1986 (Sway 
2008, p.  44). more recent reports estimate that between 60,000 and 80,000 youths were 
abducted by the Lra for at least a day: approximately 26% of the population of female youth 
and 47% of male youth (annan et al. 2011, p. 883).
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fighter, in addition to being a porter, food producer, and fighter herself.379 There 
is evidence that these forced marriages were perpetrated in a widespread and 
systematic manner in northern Uganda with abductions of girls being carried 
out for the very purpose of forcibly marrying them to Lra fighters.380 The Lra 
leaders decided how many girls should be abducted; the commanders’ demand 
for ‘wives’ determined in part the number of female abductions.381 records 
– detailing the number of (new) abductees, escapees and deceased – were kept on 
female abductees so that the top leaders would know exactly how many girls there 
were in a camp at any given time and how many were available for distribution. 
if the commanders were of the opinion that there were not enough marriageable 
women, they would instruct units to abduct specified numbers of girls.382 The 
commanders reportedly favoured educated girls as they were able to assist the 
fighters with medical care, planning, record‑keeping, logistical support and radio 
communication. This confirms that women and girls had a specific and strategic 
role within the Lra: according to the former intelligence officer to Kony’s alleged 
right‑hand man Vincent otti, otti refused to trade women for weapons or 
medicine with arab Sudanese fighters, because he said the girls were needed in 
the Lra camps.383
The Lra imposed a puritanical code of conduct on its members that 
governed fighting, eating, praying, washing and sexuality. There were strict 
rules concerning sex and civilian rape and the use of sexual violence was 
highly controlled by strong norms and sanctions.384 control over sexuality was 
exercised through a rigid hierarchical structure and by means of violence and 
intimidation.385 intercourse was permitted only within sanctioned Lra wedlock. 
Sexual contact outside of these ‘marriages’ was strictly forbidden and punishable 
by death. This provides evidence for the thesis that forced marriages were part of 
the Lra’s military strategy and the social order created by the commanders.386 
forced marriages were used to enhance control over the fighters, maintain 
strict discipline, govern relations within the group, create social cohesion and 
contain the spread of HiV and other STDs. forced marriages, combined with 
the prohibition of sex (and rape) outside of these marriages thus had a strategic 
379 mcKay & mazurana 2004, pp. 73 and 135–136.
380 SWaY 2008, p. 39; carlson & mazurana 2008, pp. 8 and 14; and Human rights Watch 1997, 
p. 107.
381 annan et al. 2011, p. 885.
382 carlson & mazurana 2008, p. 18.
383 annan et al. 2011, p. 886 and carlson & mazurana 2008, pp. 20 and 22.
384 See also annan et al. 2011, p. 883.
385 carlson & mazurana 2008, p. 17.
386 amnesty international 1997, p. 19. annan et al. 2009, p. 25 compare the Lra with disciplined, 
ideological groups such as the Sri Lankan Tamil Tigers who used abduction, forced marriage 
and the prohibition of sex (and rape) outside of these marriages as a strategic way to create 
social cohesion and to maintain control over a group of fighters.
Forceandmarriage.indd   75 20-5-2014   10:42:00
76 intersentia




instrumental purpose.387 There is also evidence that the forced marriages served 
ideological goals, namely to populate a new acholi nation in northern Uganda 
and to produce future fighters, mothers and workers for the Lra. either way, it 
has been suggested that the control of sexual violence and the instrumental use of 
forced marriages have contributed to the effectiveness and longevity of the Lra.388 
Within the context of the forced marriages, pregnancy was broadly promoted, 
and it even seems that (forcibly) impregnating forced wives was policy within 
the Lra. girls who did not conceive were given medication; girls who attempted 
to prevent or abort pregnancies were put to death. There are even reports from 
former Lra fighters who state that their sex lives with their wives were monitored 
and there are testimonies from women who claimed that some men did not want 
to have sex with their wives, but were ordered to do so by commanders with the 
aim of conceiving children.389
The Lra seems to have had a policy of not raping prepubescent girls for two 
reasons. first, because they were regarded as unfit for sexual activity as they could 
not conceive yet and secondly, because they needed to remain free from STDs to 
ensure they were ‘clean’ when they were given to commanders as wives.390 once 
the girls were deemed sexually mature, around the age of twelve, they were made 
wives of individual Lra fighters, who usually had several wives, the total number 
depending on their rank.391 Women who refused to go with the men they were 
given to could be punished by rape, torture or even death.392 conflicting reports 
have been given as regards the question of whether or not men were at liberty 
to refuse a ‘wife’: some researchers report that men could not disobey the order 
given by a commander to take a wife,393 others were informed by former Lra 
members that boys and men could both request and refuse wives.394
387 annan et al. 2009, pp. 1 and 10–12. This contrasts sharply with the practices of the afrc and 
rUf in Sierra Leone (see infra), who did not use prohibition of civilian rape, but rather used 
the commission of gang rape of civilians as a means to bind rebels to the group (annan et al. 
2009, p.  12 and D.K. cohen, ‘The role of female combatants in armed groups: women and 
wartime rape in Sierra Leone (1991–2002)’, in: Annual Convention of the International Studies 
Association, New York, 2009). The Lra on the other hand, used non‑sexual physical violence 
to sever ties between the captive and her or his relatives and community and at the same time 
to bind abductees to the group, forcing them to beat, mutilate or murder other abductees, 
civilians and family members (annan et al. 2011, p. 884 and mcKay & mazurana 2004, p. 28).
388 annan et al. 2009, p. 12.
389 carlson & mazurana 2008, pp. 23–24; and allen 2005, p. 28.
390 SWaY 2008, p. 41 and carlson & mazurana 2008, p. 22, Human rights Watch 2003c, p. 28. This 
also explains the Lra’s preference for young girls: when abducted before reaching puberty, the 
chances of the girls carrying any STD is relatively small (Human rights Watch 2003c, p. 19). 
otti allegedly had girls checked for physical and sexual illnesses at a local hospital before he 
took them as his wives (carlson & mazurana 2008, p. 20).
391 Human rights Watch 1997, pp. 3 and 30–31. Human rights Watch 2003b, p. 14. SWaY 2008, 
p. 42. 
392 carlson & mazurana 2008, p. 19.
393 allen 2005, p. 28. Therefore, it cannot be ruled out that some men were also victims of the 
forced marriages.
394 carlson & mazurana 2008, p. 18.
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once in an Lra marriage, the women were at the complete mercy of their 
husbands, who had absolute power over them and who could discipline and 
even kill them.395 Some former Lra wives reported that they had been treated 
very badly; others stated that they had been treated relatively well. one woman 
explained that she and the man she was forced to marry, who had also been 
abducted, got along well.396 for some girls, being given to a commander meant 
that they had more privileges than they had had as a common servant: they 
were no longer required to perform hard labour, they received more food and 
sometimes shared in the looted goods. But in their new role as ‘wife’, they could 
now be subjected to repeated rape by their husband, in many cases resulting in 
STDs and pregnancies.397
The duration of the Lra marriages exceeds the duration of the average forced 
marriage in other african conflict situations: there are reports of girls who were 
married for as long as five, nine or even ten years, although others were married 
for shorter periods of time.398 it is estimated that the average Lra marriage lasted 
somewhere between three and four years.399 The average duration of abduction 
is assessed at 11.4 months for females and 9.1 months for males.400 research 
conducted by SWaY (Survey of War‑affected Youth), a research programme in 
northern Uganda, reveals that about one quarter of abducted girls were given as 
wives to Lra fighters and commanders.401 Half of the women who were forced to 
assume the role of wife gave birth to children of those marriages.
in general, these former Lra wives reported having suffered significantly 
more overall violent events (an average of thirteen forms of violence as opposed 
to an average of eight forms of violence reported by other female (long‑term) 
abductees) and stayed longer in captivity.402 moreover, the victims of forced 
marriages and their children were less likely to be released by the Lra (and the 
Lra did frequently release or leave behind children) because they were regarded 
as the property of Lra fighters and therefore most had to organise their own 
escape. Victims also reported that their captor husbands threatened them with 
death: should they try to escape, they would be killed and should they manage to 
escape, their children and relatives would be murdered.403 it is not clear how many 
women still remain in captivity today, but those who managed to escape were 
sometimes hounded by their Lra husbands.404 agnes, a woman who stated she 
395 carlson & mazurana 2008, p. 21.
396 annan et al. 2011, p. 884.
397 Human rights Watch 2003b, pp. 13–14. SWaY 2008, p. 41.
398 amnesty international 2008, p. 11; Human rights Watch 2005, p. 58; Human rights Watch 
2003b, p. 14.
399 SWaY 2008, p. 54.
400 annan et al. 2011, p. 883.
401 SWaY 2008, p.  40: approximately 10% of all 619 female interviewees – abducted and not 
abducted – were forced wives.
402 SWaY 2008, pp. vii, 26 and 54.
403 SWaY 2008, pp. 36 and 41–44; Human rights Watch 2003b, p. 15.
404 carlson & mazurana 2008, pp. 27–28.
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became the second wife of otti in 1995, escaped after nine years. after her escape, 
otti is said to have written a letter, threatening to kill everyone in her parish, 
unless she was returned to him. according to a relative of this woman, the Lra 
went to agnes’ village and beat her mother to death.405 This example illustrates 
that even after their escape, some women are still in the grip of their tormentors.
although girls and boys alike suffered the most horrifying ordeals, Human 
rights Watch emphasises the uniqueness of the girls’ plight due to the additional 
abuses they suffered in the form of sexual violence.406 The Lra marriages have 
left a lurid legacy: more than 50% of the victims of forced marriages who returned 
from captivity have one or more children from their Lra husbands and these 
single child‑mothers are often (initially) left to their own devices.407 Like most 
victims of sexual and gender‑based violence, women and girls who were subjected 
to forced marriages face widespread stigma, to such an extent that, upon return 
from captivity, even the children born out of these forced marriages may be 
discriminated against.408 in the patriarchal society of the acholi people, who live 
in northern Uganda, a child belongs to its father and his family, but children born 
out of recognised wedlock belong to the mother and her clan.409 Seeing as neither 
Ugandan statutory law,410 nor Ugandan customary law or practice411 recognise 
the forced marriages that were contracted by the Lra, the children born out of 
these unions belong to the mother.412 in the long‑run, most mothers reported 
that they and their children were accepted by their communities and families 
although there are also reports of children being rejected.413 in general, though, 
girl mothers did face higher levels of rejection and stigma.414
as well as the problems they face as a result of the enforced pregnancies, 
these girls, upon return to their community, also have difficulties adjusting to 
the traditional role of women in Ugandan society: they are expected to conform 
to stereotypical female behaviour after having become used to fighting, harsh 
405 Human rights Watch 2005, p. 58.
406 Human rights Watch 2003c, p. 30.
407 amnesty international 2008, pp. 11–12. of the 619 girls and women interviewed by SWaY, 
35.9% of the women who had been forcibly married had one child by her captor, 12% had two 
children and 3.7% had three children (SWaY 2008, p. 43).
408 amnesty international 2008, p. 12.
409 carlson & mazurana 2008, pp. 29 and 53.
410 The freedom to marry by consent is enshrined in article 31(3) of the constitution of Uganda, 
which stipulates that ‘marriage shall be entered into with the free consent of the man and 
woman intending to marry’.
411 according to customary law of the acholi and Langi people, two ethnic groups who live in the 
northern parts of Uganda, bride and groom, as well as their respective parents, are required 
to consent to the marriage. The husband‑to‑be is subsequently required to provide a dowry 
to the bride’s father. Without this dowry, the marriage is invalid (carlson & mazurana 2008, 
pp. 51–52). 
412 SWaY 2008, p. 44 and carlson & mazurana 2008, pp. 8 and 31. in the eyes of the Lra, however, 
the children belonged to them.
413 annan et al. 2011, pp. 892–897. See also SWaY 2008, p. 80.
414 mcKay & mazurana 2004, p. 87.
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conditions and living with other fighters during their captivity with the Lra.415 
a long time after escaping captivity, they are still traumatised, both physically 
and psychologically.416
recent reports show a more positive picture of victims of forced marriage 
in the long run and suggest that women who were forced into marriage run a 
much lower risk of being rejected by family and community than is popularly 
believed.417 The conclusion of these reports is that upon their return from 
captivity, the majority of victims of forced marriages experience problems with 
reintegration,418 but many of these difficulties, as well as psychological problems, 
decrease over time. according to SWaY, ‘(r)esilience and acceptance rather than 
rejection or trauma is the norm’.419 Due to a lack of qualitative and quantitative 
data from other african countries, it is difficult to say whether the results from 
Uganda are relevant to (the aftermath of) other conflicts, but annan et al. note 
that there are an increasing number of qualitative studies that show a similar 
more positive reintegration image of former abductees.420
in 2003, the Ugandan government referred the situation concerning the Lra 
to the Prosecutor of the icc. arrest warrants have been issued for Joseph Kony, 
Vincent otti, okot odhiambo and Dominic ongwen, who are all still at large. The 
arrests warrants for Kony and otti contain allegations of rape and sexual slavery. 
as regards the internal organisation of the Lra, former icc chief Prosecutor 
Luis moreno‑ocampo, in his Statement on the Uganda arrest warrants, referred 
to the abduction, distribution and use of girls as wives, stating that the Lra 
corrupted language to cover their criminal acts by using the word ‘wife’, whereas 
these girls were, in the view of the Prosecution, used as (sex) slaves.421, 422
415 Human rights Watch 2003c, p. 30.
416 amnesty international 2008, p. 10.
417 Such as carlson & mazurana 2008; and SWaY 2008.
418 The majority of women who were forced to marry Lra combatants experienced problems 
with their relatives and communities in the first weeks after their return, but these problems 
decreased over time. out of 42 girls sampled by mazurana & carlson, 64% stated they intitially 
felt stigma, 41% reported being physically threatened and 10% reported being physically 
attacked (mcKay & mazurana 2004, p. 84). 
419 SWaY 2008, p. viii.
420 annan et al. 2011, p. 881. See inter alia Williamson 2006, pp. 185–205.
421 Statement by the chief Prosecutor on the Uganda arrest Warrants, 14 october 2005, p. 5.
422 in 2008, a special division of the High court of Uganda (the international crimes Division) 
was established to deal with crimes committed during the conflict in Uganda. it is possible 
that, at some stage, this court will also address the practice of forced marriages within the 
Lra.
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4. forceD marriageS DUriNg THe ciViL War 
iN Sierra LeoNe
4.1. coNTeXTUaLiSaTioN: THe coNfLicT iN Sier r a 
LeoNe
in march 1991, civil war broke out in Sierra Leone. During this conflict, which 
lasted over a decade, several rebel groups fought government troops with the aim of 
taking over control of the country. The two most important rebel groups were the 
revolutionary United front (rUf) and the armed forces revolutionary council 
(afrc). The inability of the Sierra Leone army to repel the rebels triggered the 
emergence of civilian‑led paramilitary groups. These groups eventually became 
collectively known as the civil Defence forces (cDf) and fought in support of the 
Sierra Leonean government.423
The Sierra Leone conflict was characterised by exceptionally brutal attacks 
on civilians, as the afrc/rUf systematically rampaged through towns and 
villages.424 Sexual violence was endemic and was committed by all parties. 
although women and men425 of all ages were subjected to atrocities, the majority 
of the victims of sexual violence were pre‑pubescent girls and young adolescents, 
as the rebels favoured virgins.426
4 .2 . forceD mar riageS DUriNg THe ciViL War: 
‘YU Na mi Wef’427
4.2.1. ‘Bush wives’
in an atmosphere of extreme violence, thousands of women and girls were 
abducted by rebels and forced to become their wives.428 The rebels used these 
abductions and subsequent marriages as a means to instil fear in the civilian 
population, break social bonds and destroy the traditional family nucleus.429 Sierra 
Leoneans use the expression ‘bush wives’ to refer to women who were (forcibly) 
423 carlson & mazurana 2004, p. 11 and rUf Trial Judgement, para. 16.
424 rUf Sentencing Judgement, para. 120.
425 men and boys also suffered from sexual violence. for example, there are reports of abducted 
girls abusing abducted boys in rebel camps (mcKay & mazurana 2004, p. 58).
426 rUf Trial Judgement, para. 1409; Trc report 2004–3B, p. 161 (‘Testimony to the commission 
has revealed that all of the armed groups, particularly the rUf and the afrc, perpetrated 
a deliberate policy of abducting pre‑pubescent young girls and raping them, breaking all 
cultural taboos’); and Human rights Watch 2003a, p. 28. 
427 Krio for ‘you are now my wife’, the phrase rebels used to turn women and girls into their wives 
(see K. Sanin, Trial chamber ii – afrc Trial 5  october 2005, U.c. Berkeley, War crimes 
Studies center, Weekly report, Update #57, p. 5).
428 carlson & mazurana 2004, p. 12; and Physicians for Human rights 2002, pp. 2 and 4.
429 oosterveld 2011, p. 52; and rUf Trial Judgement, paras. 1349 and 1351.
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married to rebels during the civil war. ‘Bush’ became the dominant metaphor 
for rebel, because rebels lived in the bush and mostly moved along the bush path. 
The term ‘bush wife’ is therefore synonym for rebel wife. The prefix ‘bush’ also 
emphasises that the marriages that took place in the bush were invalid and not 
socially sanctioned, meaning that they had no legal or cultural value outside of 
the bush.430 Life in these rebel camps would usually mimic the social composition 
of a village and the structure of a family, much as was the case in Uganda (see 
supra). The group in a camp was divided into several smaller groups comprising 
household units. a rebel commander, who could have up to six wives, commonly 
ranging in age from 9 to 19,431 would act as the pater familias of the unit. His 
pseudo family consisted of his captives and recruits. as women could also rise to 
the level of commander, it was also possible that female fighters, even young girls, 
served as heads of these ‘families’.432
Women and girls were usually abducted during attacks on towns and villages, 
and taken to the rebels’ camps. There, the rebels distributed the abductees among 
themselves as their new wives, often after first (gang) raping the women.433 in 
some camps, this ‘distribution process’ was even regulated and registered: in at 
least one camp, the soldiers had to sign before a woman could be given to them as 
a bush wife. Santigie Borbor Kanu, one of the accused and convicted in the afrc 
case which was tried before the ScSL, monitored this process and was the one 
who made rebels sign for women.434 in most cases, a man would simply declare 
the woman to be his wife (‘yu na mi wef ’) and this would make the bush marriage 
a fact. Sometimes married to the very men they had witnessed brutalising their 
relatives, the women were often subjected to continued and inescapable rape.435 
as a result of these rapes, many women became pregnant and were forced to give 
birth, often without assistance of a midwife or access to proper medical health 
care.436 if the father did not want the child, for example because he believed it 
would slow down the group, or if the woman was already pregnant when she 
was abducted, the woman could be forced to undergo an abortion.437 as bush 
wives, some women were compelled to perform domestic labour and to give their 
husbands ‘love and affection’.438 in addition to this, some women were subjected 
430 coulter 2009, pp. 100–101 and coulter 2008, pp. 55–56, footnote 2.
431 rUf Trial Judgement, para. 1411 and mcKay & mazurana 2004, p. 93.
432 coulter 2009, pp. 102–103; and carlson & mazurana 2004, pp. 13–14.
433 coulter 2009, pp. 127–128 found a certain pattern and strategy in the organised manner in 
which most bush marriages followed multiple rapes: abducted women would first be raped by 
several men. Then, at some point, a rebel, usually of higher rank, would intervene and claim 
the women as his ‘wife’, thus rescuing her from further gang rapes. This made many women 
feel loyal to her ‘saviour’. 
434 afrc Trial Judgement, para. 1138; and afrc Transcript 23 may 2005, pp. 76–77.
435 afrc Trial Judgement, para. 1138; and rUf Trial Judgement, paras. 1213, 1413 and 1467.
436 mcKay & mazurana 2004, p. 70; and Human rights Watch 2003a, p. 40.
437 mcKay & mazurana 2004, p. 69.
438 afrc appeal Judgement, paras. 190 and 192. coulter 2009, pp. 113 and 130, found that several 
of her informants, who were wives of rebel commanders, were not forced to do any domestic 
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to drug abuse and mutilations.439 many also contracted STDs as a consequence of 
the frequent sexual abuse in the bush.440
in order to survive in the hostile and uncertain environment in the rebel 
camps, women were required to make themselves useful to their bush husbands:441 
women who were rejected by their husbands were often sent to the front lines or 
had to take part in particularly dangerous missions.442 The way the victims were 
treated depended a lot on their husbands and some women reported they were 
treated relatively well. others experienced only cruelty at the hands of their rebel 
husbands.443
in addition to being completely at their husbands’ mercy and forced to 
pander to their every wish, in many camps, the women were also subjected to 
disciplinary regulations.444 in the Koinadugu and Bombali districts, for example, 
one of the rebels in charge issued disciplinary orders that regulated the conduct 
of the women: a woman who was unfaithful to her husband could be punished 
with up to 200 lashes.445 at the same time, a rebel was expected to provide for 
his wife and children during their captivity under penalty of imprisonment or 
beatings,446 and a rebel who raped another rebel’s wife could be put to death.447 
in some camps, women could report maltreatment they suffered at the hands of 
their husbands to the wives of the camp leaders, who were called ‘mamy queen’ or 
‘de mamy’. These mamy queens would then investigate the situation.448 However, 
coulter found that mamy queens could do little to protect women from their own 
bush husbands.449
4.2.2. Women’s complex roles within rebel groups
What is generally not highlighted in Ngo reports is that many women who were 
forced to become wives of rebels also served as fighters, spies, looters and even 
labour. on the contrary, their husbands would not allow them to do so: their only ‘duty’ was 
to have sex with their husbands. They were, however, encouraged to become fighters (see also 
the testimony of a former wife of a colonel who did not have to do any household chores, afrc 
Transcript 9 march 2005, pp. 57–58; see also paragraph 3.2.2 infra).
439 Human rights Watch 2003a, p. 44; afrc Trial Judgement, para. 1095; and Trc report 2004–
3a, p. 479
440 mcKay & mazurana 2004, p. 62.
441 Denov 2007, p. 8; and Trc report 2004–3B, p. 173.
442 coulter 2009, p. 136.
443 See e.g. Human rights Watch 2003a, p. 34.
444 coulter 2009, p. 107 found that her respondents described life in the rebel camps as marked by 
strict rules and regulations.
445 afrc Trial Judgement, paras. 1122, 1123 and 1138.
446 Human rights Watch 2003a, p. 45.
447 afrc Trial Judgement, para. 1139.
448 afrc Trial Judgement, para. 1123; and afrc Transcript 7 July 2005, pp. 102–106.
449 coulter 2009, p. 106. 
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commanders within the rebels forces.450 research conducted by coulter, and 
carlson and mazurana, which focuses on the totality of experiences and aspects 
of women’s lives in the bush, reveals that women played important military roles 
in both the cDf and in the rebel movements. The figures are eloquent: according 
to estimates, between 10% and 30% of force members of the rUf and afrc were 
women.451 The majority of these women had entered the forces through abduction 
and would never have ‘joined’ the groups otherwise. However, it is not unlikely 
that a small number of girls and women made the (circumscribed) decision to 
join the rebel groups themselves, for example to acquire prestige and resources or 
to escape poverty or domestic violence.452
it is difficult to distinguish between women and girls who were primarily 
fighters and those who were primarily wives as the one role did not exclude the 
other. on the contrary, all women surveyed by carlson and mazurana who 
reported that they were fighters within the rebel movement also indicated that 
they were forced to become rebel wives.453 one third of the women surveyed stated 
they had fighting experience, nearly half had received weapons training and more 
than half indicated that they had been forced to become wives of commanders. 
carlson and mazurana found that the formerly abducted women in their study 
had several additional roles alongside being a fighter: they served as cooks (72%), 
porters (68%), assistants for the sick and wounded (62%), bush wives (60%; only 
8% reported that serving as a bush wife was their primary role), food producers 
(44%), messengers between rebel camps (40%), spies (22%), communications 
technicians (18%) and workers in diamond mines for their captor husbands or 
commanders (14%).454 This shows that women’s and girls’ experiences in rebel 
camps were as complex as they were diverse: they could be abductees, victims of 
rape, forced wives and forced mothers. Yet at the same time, they might also be 
fighters, murderers, spies and looters, providing support to the rebels, whether 
they wanted and intended to or not.
although most abducted women were forced to become fighters and ‘wives’, 
some took matters into their own hands and became, once they had been 
abducted, active within a rebel group.455 This proves that many women were not 
victims without agency.456 it is important to emphasise, however, that the situation 
most abducted women were in constitutes a good example of what aretxaga calls 
‘choiceless decision’: the choice between continuous (gang) rape and death on 
the one hand and becoming a fighter, bush wife or spy on the other hand cannot 
450 although most rUf commanders were male, there is evidence that some were female (Denov 
& maclure 2006, p. 78; and carlson & mazurana 2004, p. 13).
451 carlson & muzurana 2004, p. 6. on female fighters and more specifically the transition from 
rape victim to combatant, see coulter 2009, pp. 135–153.
452 mcKay & mazurana 2004, pp. 14, 23; and coulter 2009, pp. 142 and 151.
453 By contrast, not all bush wives were also fighters.
454 carlson & mazurana 2004, pp. 2 and 12.
455 coulter 2008, p. 58.
456 carlson & mazurana 2004, p. 14 and coulter 2008, pp. 66–69.
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be regarded as an actual choice.457 faced with the very realistic possibility of 
death, many women ‘decided’ to take up weapons themselves: when they became 
fighters, they had better access to food and they would have a gun to protect 
themselves with, which created a sense of empowerment.458 Becoming a fighter, 
just like becoming a wife, was therefore often a strategic move, motivated by fear 
and linked to survival, in the sense that becoming a fighter could improve life in 
the bush.459 Nevertheless, these women would still be subjected to rape and other 
forms of violence. They would thus be victims and at the same time perpetrators 
of atrocities.
The research of coulter and (especially) carlson and mazurana also throws 
more light on the position of bush wives within the rebel camps. Those who were 
married to rebels of higher rank were elevated in their overall status and generally 
enjoyed a certain degree of protection from the other rebels and sometimes 
benefited from the looted items.460 also, coulter found that bush wives often had 
several girls or young women working for them, doing the cooking, laundering, 
cleaning and other domestic work.461 it was not uncommon, therefore, for girls 
to try to attach themselves to rebels in order to secure access to food, rise in the 
rebel hierarchy, and avoid gang rapes.462 However, although some commanders 
had as many as nine bodyguards accompany their wives to both prevent escape 
and provide protection, survivor testimonies demonstrate that being the wife of 
a commander was no hard guarantee against rape by other rebels.463 Still, as the 
bush wife of a commander, some women could exert substantial power within 
the rebel compound. When the commander was out, his wife would often act 
in his absence. Looted food and goods were brought to the commander’s house, 
and the wife (or wives) would then distribute the food among those living in the 
compound.464 There are several accounts of women who used their powers to 
prevent sexual abuse of younger girls. They would, for example, use food to bribe 
or reward younger fighters for not harassing girls. Some commander’s wives also 
had a strategic military role: they would give orders, send out spies and supervise 
looting and killing expeditions. These women were at times also in charge of 
457 B. aretxaga, Shattering silence: women, nationalism and political subjectivity in northern 
Ireland, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1997, p. 61. See coulter 2008, p. 68 on this 
concept in relation to the position of abducted women and girls in Sierra Leone.
458 coulter 2008, p. 60; Denov & maclure 2006, p. 78; and carlson & mazurana 2004, p. 12.
459 coulter 2008, p. 60.
460 coulter 2009, p. 112 and Human rights Watch 2003a, p. 43.
461 coulter 2009, p. 112. in the afrc case, for example, witness Tf1–023, who, against her will, 
was given to a colonel as his ‘wife’, testified that she was raped and detained by the colonel, 
but that she was not forced to do any work. instead, she had several girls working for her. 
She also stated that other people in the rebel camps respected her, because of her status as a 
commander’s wife (afrc Transcripts 9 march 2005, pp. 45 and 57–58).
462 carlson & mazurana 2004, p. 14.
463 carlson & mazurana 2004, p. 14; and Trc report 2004–3B, p. 173; and Women’s commission 
for refugee Women and children, Precious resources: adolescents in the reconstruction of 
Sierra Leone, New York: Women’s commission 2002, p. 61.
464 coulter 2009, p. 103. 
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the small boys unit and small girls unit; units made up of boys and girls aged 
between 6 and 15 who were used for food raids, scouting activities in preparation 
of attacks, and killing expeditions.465 in the absence of their husband, some of 
these wives, who were often still minors, were in charge of entire compounds:
‘They kept in communication with the commander and would select and send 
troops, spies, and support when needed. These girls and young women decided 
on a daily basis who in the compound would fight, provide reconnaissance, and 
raid villages for food and loot. Some counseled their captor husbands on war 
strategies, troop movement, and upcoming attacks.’466
in all these capacities, the women and girls were of vital importance to the rebel 
organisations. as fighters, wives, cooks, nurses, workers, food producers, spies and 
looters, they were a source of military, strategic and logistical support and formed 
the backbone of the rebel forces.467 The ScSL acknowledged the importance of 
forced marriages for the rebels ‘as both a tactic of war and means of obtaining 
unpaid logistical support for troops’.468
4.2.3. Reintegration and stigmatisation
after the war, many women were released or left behind by the rebels who had 
abducted them. others managed to escape. Some were able to return to what 
was left of their pre‑war communities and had few (temporary) problems with 
reintegration.469 others, however, faced more difficulties and were victimised for 
a second time when they experienced that reintegration into their society was 
difficult. although the majority of former bush wives were accepted back by their 
parents and/or immediate family members, they were – like other abductees – at 
the same time stigmatised by their communities, because of their affiliation with 
the rebels.470 Some were also rejected by their families. in order to survive, these 
women often became prostitutes.471
many former abductees, including bush wives, were not considered to 
be innocent victims; people believed they were dangerous and had acquired 
‘bush‑like’ behaviour. even though the majority of women had been abducted 
and raped, for their families, this did not explain why they had stayed with the 
rebels and even fought with them. it was believed that they could have escaped 
465 carlson & mazurana 2004, p. 14. according to witness testimonies, some women also sexually 
abused the girls and boys in these units (Denov & maclure 2006, p. 77).
466 carlson & mazurana 2004, p. 14.
467 coulter 2009, pp. 123 and 157–158.
468 rUf Trial Judgement, para. 2107.
469 coulter 2009, pp. 131 and 193.
470 Williamson 2006, p. 192; and Trc report 2004–2, p. 16.
471 coulter 2009, pp. 203–205.
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if they had wanted to.472 Some women who were married before the civil war 
broke out were rejected by their original husbands and some girls who were no 
longer virgins were deemed unmarriageable and therefore of little worth to their 
families.473 on top of this, many men were afraid of women who had lived in the 
bush – whether or not as a bush wife – and did not want to marry them for that 
reason.474 The belief that women who had spent time in the bush with rebels had 
acquired rebel behaviour and could therefore not be trusted was affirmed due to 
the inability of many girls to assume the ethics of the traditional Sierra Leonean 
woman. after spending a prolonged period of time in an extremely violent 
environment and often having taken on an aggressive attitude to be able to survive 
in this setting, many women had difficulties adjusting to the subservient and 
deferential straitjacket that, especially in rural areas, is the norm for traditional 
Sierra Leonean women. Those women who were able to act in a socially acceptable 
manner, which essentially meant picking up their pre‑war lives as if nothing had 
ever happened and assuming the ethics of the traditional Sierra Leonean woman: 
subservience, acquiescence, deference and diligence, experienced less difficulties 
with reintegration.475
as in Uganda,476 women who had most difficulties with reintegration were 
those who gave birth to children fathered by rebels.477 apart from possible 
problems with attachment that these mothers have themselves, their families and 
communities were unfavourably disposed towards their children who are seen as 
rebels.478 The extent of acceptance of the children is linked to several variables, 
such as the identity of the father (when his identity is unknown, the stigma is 
greater) and the issue of matrilineal versus patrilineal society, although this may 
vary from region to region and tribe to tribe.479
coulter found a correlation between material wealth and the quality of social 
relations in the sense that the extent to which ex‑combatants and former bush 
wives were accepted back by their families was dependent on the degree to which 
they could contribute to the household. contributing to the family’s welfare could 
have positive effects on the reintegration of former bush wives and ameliorate the 
acceptance process, whereas women who returned to their families empty handed 
and unable to generate income were more often stigmatised and marginalised.480 
472 coulter 2009, pp. 121, 134 and 152; and coulter 2008, p. 67.
473 Physicians for Human rights 2002, pp. 65 and 67.
474 coulter 2009, p. 197.
475 coulter 2009, pp. 176–180, 190–193 and 212.
476 Women who had become mothers during their time with the Lra experienced the highest 
level of rejection and stigmatisation (annan et al. 2009, p. 18; see also SWaY 2008, p. 80).
477 it deserves mentioning that many women also gave birth to children fathered by soldiers 
associated with the economic community of West african States monitoring group and the 
UN mission in Sierra Leone (UNamSiL) soldiers. These women and their children were also 
stigmatised (coulter 2009, p. 232).
478 Save the children 2007, p. 43.
479 mcKay & mazurana 2004, p. 54.
480 coulter 2009, pp. 180, 188 and 194.
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another aspect that could either ameliorate or deteriorate the reintegration of 
former bush wives was their post‑war behaviour. Those women who acted in a 
socially acceptable manner after their return from the bush were more easily 
accepted back by their families and communities. Post‑war behaviour could also 
mitigate the effects of loss of virginity. coulter therefore found that it was not so 
much the loss of virginity that made girls unmarriageable in the eyes of society, 
but how they behaved (e.g. behaving aggressively or using abusive language). 
Loss of virginity could be forgotten provided that women behaved in a culturally 
acceptable manner.481
There were also those who stayed with their bush husbands, for example 
because they had nowhere else to go, because they feared no man would ever 
marry them, because their bush husband refused to let them go and kept them 
in captivity for sexual and domestic purposes, or because they had children 
with their husbands.482 Habituation was another reason for staying in the bush 
marriage; after spending years in the bush, from an early age onwards, many 
women did not know any better, they had grown accustomed to their lives in 
the bush, and to their lives with their rebel husbands.483 and in some cases, 
women might have chosen to stay with their bush husbands, because the latter 
had treated them correctly during the war, or because they had developed some 
form of emotional attachment to or affection for their husbands.484 What adds 
to the decision to stay with the bush husband is that when the latter is willing to 
have the bush marriage legitimised, girls and their children have better chances 
of reintegration.485 However, many girls found that their parents refused to 
accept their bush husbands486 and could therefore not formalise their marriage. 
it is important to reiterate that, even though some girls saw their captors as their 
husbands – although the majority had not come to accept their forced bush 
marriage and left their rebels husbands when they had a chance487 – in the eyes of 
the community, bush marriages are unlawful since none of the proper marriage 
traditions had been followed, for example, the man had not asked the woman’s 
481 coulter 2009, pp. 216 and 244. See also Save the children 2007, p. 44.
482 Save the children 2007, p. 44.
483 afrc Trial Judgement, Dissenting opinion Justice Doherty, para. 45.
484 Human rights Watch 2003a, p. 44. in some cases, women might have formed an attachment to 
their bush husband as a result of the Stockholm syndrome, but no research has been done on 
this matter. The Stockholm syndrome is a term used in psychology to describe the phenomenon 
wherein the hostage identifies and empathises with the hostage‑taker (Trc report 2004–3B, 
p. 173). in other cases, women felt a sense of loyalty towards their husbands for saving their 
lives (coulter 2009, p. 208).
485 mcKay & mazurana 2004, p. 56.
486 This was probably (also) due to the ‘don’t ask, don’t tell’ atmosphere: accepting the rebel 
husband would be (publicly) confirming a girl’s past as bush wife. for an example of parents 
who were persuaded by their daughter to give a former rebel permission to officially marry her, 
see Van gog 2008, p. 104.
487 Williamson 2006, p. 191.
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parents for permission to marry her and no bride wealth had been paid.488 This 
does not change the fact that the situations that the women were trapped in, in the 
bush, can be referred to as marital‑like.
5. forceD marriageS iN camBoDia UNDer 
THe KHmer roUge
5.1. coNTeXTUaLiSaTioN: THe KHmer roUge
on 17 april 1975, the Kampuchea People’s National Liberation armed forces and 
the army of the communist Party of Kampuchea (cPK, better known as Khmer 
rouge) marched into the capital of cambodia, overthrowing President Lon Nol 
and rechristening cambodia ‘Democratic Kampuchea’. The fall of Phnom Penh 
brought an end to the civil war that had started in 1970 and it marked the beginning 
of the Khmer rouge’s reign of terror which was to last until 7  January 1979.489 
it is estimated that between 20% and 30% of the total cambodian population 
lost their lives during this period.490 When the Khmer rouge were overthrown 
on 7  January 1979, almost four years after taking over the rule of cambodia, 
approximately 1.5 million cambodians had died from starvation, overwork and 
misdiagnosed and wrongly treated illness. at least another estimated 200,000 
people had been executed.491
Under the command of dictator Pol Pot, the cPK aspired to transform 
cambodia into an autarchic agricultural communist state and a rural‑based 
society, abolishing religion, education, currency and private property, closing 
down hospitals and libraries, severing family ties and destroying legal and judicial 
structures.492 The Khmer rouge divided the population into two categories: on 
the one hand the ethnic Khmer peasants (‘base people’) and on the other hand 
all other citizens of cambodia, including the urban population and educated 
individuals (‘new people’), who were seen as counterrevolutionary.493 The Khmer 
488 mcKay & mazurana 2004, p. 56. in Sierra Leone, marriage is not so much a single event as 
it is a long process that traditionally could start with the engagement of a girl at birth. The 
entire process of engagement and ultimately marriage is very ritualistic and is marked by close 
involvement of the families of both intended spouses. other important features of this process 
are bride wealth and the exchange of labour between the two families (coulter 2009, p. 76).
489 Duch Trial Judgement, paras. 59–62. on 7 January 1979, after a Vietnamese military offensive 
which had started a month earlier and which had led to the fall of Phnom Penh, many Khmer 
rouge officials, including ‘Brother Number one’ Pol Pot, fled into the jungle and lived there 
until the end of the 1990s. in 1997 Pol Pot was arrested. He was about to face trial when he 
died in 1998 (B. Kiernan, The Pol Pot Regime. Race, power and genocide in Cambodia under the 
Khmer Rouge, 1975–1979, New Haven: Yale University Press 2008, preface, p. xix).
490 chandler 1999, p. vii and Heuveline & Poch 2006, p. 102.
491 chandler 1999, p. vii.
492 chandler 1999, p. vii and Duch Trial Judgement, para. 82.
493 Kasumi 2008, p. 15.
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rouge aimed to transform the latter group into peasants and for this purpose, 
emptied towns and cities and sent all inhabitants to agricultural production 
cooperatives where people were forced to work under extreme conditions.494 many 
rural families were similarly forced to abandon their homes and were relocated in 
cooperatives throughout the country.495
The supreme executive authority of cambodia became known under the name 
Angkar (the ‘organisation’) and was responsible for drafting and implementing 
the cPK policy. eliminating or ‘smashing’ enemies of the cPK was arguably 
the most critical aspect of this policy.496 Persons who were deemed ‘enemies’ of 
Angkar, were detained, tortured, made to confess to counterrevolutionary crimes 
and subsequently executed in re‑education, interrogation and security centres, 
such as the infamous S‑21 prison in Phnom Penh, where more than 12,000 people 
were detained and ultimately killed.497 Supporters, officials and sympathisers 
of the former government, people who had enjoyed some form of education 
(especially teachers and students) and capitalists were almost automatically 
classified as ‘enemies’.498
When the Khmer rouge seized power in 1975, the family, as the centre of 
cultural and economic life, formed the very foundation of cambodian society.499 
The cPK ideology included a radical transformation and collective re‑organisation 
of social structures, which resulted in the destruction of traditional family life. in 
order to achieve this goal, the Khmer rouge worked along established lines: after 
evacuation from cities, towns and villages, family members and relatives were 
separated from each other and divided into six different categories according 
to age and sex: boys and girls younger than 14 formed two groups, men and 
women aged between 14 and 50 were two groups, and men and women older 
than 50 constituted the other separate two groups.500 People had to work, live 
and eat with their new labour teams and were only occasionally allowed to see 
their family members.501 collective labour, collective dining and even collective 
motherhood502 were used to demonstrate that the work team had replaced the 
family as the basic social unit with Angkar as everybody’s parents and Pol Pot as 
the eldest brother (‘Brother Number one’).503 in the cooperatives, people were 
indoctrinated with revolutionary ideology. They were made to spy on others and 
494 Duch Trial Judgement, para. 82 and chandler 1999, p. vii.
495 mam 2006, p. 119.
496 Duch Trial Judgement, paras. 85 and 99.
497 Duch Trial Judgement, paras. 23, 141–143 and 208.
498 mam 2006, p. 155 and e. Becker, When the war was over. Cambodia and the Khmer Rouge 
revolution, New York: Publicaffairs 1998, p. 162.
499 mam 2006, pp. 120–121.
500 mam 2006, pp. 125–126.
501 mam 2006, pp. 127–130.
502 in some of these communes, mothers had to leave their babies in special compounds when 
going off to work. in these compounds, children were looked after by wet nurses and women 
who were too old to work (see mam 2000, pp. 10–24).
503 mam 2006, pp. 133 and 142 and chandler 1999, p. 28.
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inform Angkar about possible crimes or missteps. children were taught to see 
their own parents as enemies.504
another strategy that was used to undermine the traditional family was the 
attack on cultural and religious institutions. in cambodia, the metaphysical or 
spirit realm plays a very important role in people’s lives. The belief that ancestral 
spirits and other entities roam the world permeates all layers of existence and 
all facets and stages of life.505 rituals are needed to appease evil or lost spirits 
and honour and remember ancestors who protect individuals from bad karma,506 
which is seen a great source of anxiety. Therefore, in cambodia, there are (or at 
least were) rituals relating to every possible aspect of life: courtship, marriage, 
pregnancy, birth, illness and death, but there are also rituals related to sowing 
and harvesting.507 Under the Khmer rouge, every single one of these rituals was 
abolished, leaving people scared, anxious and lost.508
Part of the cPK policy pertaining to the transformation and collective 
reorganisation of social structures was the systematic compulsory arrangement of 
marriages with the aim of controlling sexuality and reproduction and facilitating 
population growth.509 at the same time, arranged marriages were strategically 
used to deliberately undermine the traditional family and break apart its structure 
and replace the traditional family and kinship bonds with loyalty to Angkar.510 
estimates of how many men and women were married during this period vary 
from tens of thousands to almost half a million.511
closely linked with the marriage policy of the Khmer rouge was the 
introduction of a category of so‑called ‘crimes against morality’, which was 
composed of all acts that were not in accordance with the revolution.512 
extramarital sex (which was regarded as a subversive act that distracted people’s 
504 mam 2006, pp. 142–144.
505 LeVine 2010, p. 29.
506 in its broadest sense, ‘the term karma denotes a system of beliefs that see the physical, social, 
and moral condition of an individual as the result of actions performed by that individual 
in the past, especially but not exclusively in a more or less chronologically distant past life. 
This process is (…) continuous so that it is generally projected into the indefinite future.’ 
(r.P. goldman, ‘Karma, guilt, and Buried memories: Public fantasy and Private reality in 
Traditional india’, Journal of the American Oriental Society (105) 1985, p. 414).
507 LeVine 2010, p. 2.
508 LeVine 2010, p. 33, found that this so‑called ‘spirit‑based anxiety’ resembles the anxiety that 
is evoked by stalking, and calls the Khmer rouge’s abolishment of rituals ‘ritualcide’ (LeVine 
2010, p. 14).
509 Studzinsky 2011, p.  6; Jain 2008, p.  1025; and mam 2006, p.  138. eccc case 002 closing 
order, paras. 216–220.
510 mam 2006, pp. 119–120. 
511 fitzpatrick 2011 (tens of thousands of people), Kimseng 2010 (200,000 people); immigration 
and refugee Board of canada, Cambodia: Forced marriages; whether forced marriage is 
currently practised; protection available from the government; consequences for a woman who 
refuses a forced marriage, 9 December 2003, KHm42219.fe (250,000 women), and case 002 
civil Parties’ co‑Lawyers’ Second investigative request concerning forced marriages and 
forced sexual relations, paras. 9 and 13 (400,000 people).
512 mam 2000, p. 34.
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attention from the revolution and was prohibited in order to maintain social order 
and control) and all forms of non‑functional communication with the opposite 
sex (such as non‑work related conversations) are examples of these moral offences 
and were punishable by imprisonment, forced labour or death.513 rape (outside 
of marriage514) was also seen as an offence against morality and both perpetrator 
and victim were at risk of being punished.
5.2 . KHmer roUge mar riageS iN THe coNTeXT of 
THe coNfLicT
5.2.1. Khmer Rouge marriage policy
marriage, which was a very important and highly esteemed institution before 
the Khmer rouge era and which was seen not merely as a union between two 
people, but as a union between two families, was transformed by Angkar into 
an impersonal public affair without any sentiment. Before the cPK took over, 
most marriages were arranged by the parents of the spouses and involved many 
religious and cultural ceremonies and festivities spread over several days. in 
contrast, during the Khmer rouge regime, especially after 1976, marriages 
were often devoid of family involvement and were conducted en masse, usually 
without the attendance of the parents or other family members of the spouses.515 
The Khmer rouge did away with all rituals surrounding marriage: important 
traditions such as consulting fortune‑tellers with regard to the compatibility of 
the spouses and honouring the ancestors after the wedding ceremony by means 
of offering food were strictly forbidden.516 in most cases, individuals were not 
allowed to choose their partner. instead, Angkar chose for them.
refusal could be met with severe punishment, such as imprisonment, 
torture, rape or death, depending on the status of the individual (base person or 
new person, soldier or civilian) and on how strict the local cPK was.517 accounts 
of people who did not suffer any consequences for refusing a marriage also exist, 
but are relatively rare.518 in general though, it seems that the Khmer rouge was 
more lenient towards base people, who were considered pure revolutionaries. 
Some of them therefore occasionally had a certain amount of credit and margin 
513 Kasumi 2008, pp. 16 and 36; K. anderson, ‘Tang Kim’s dilemma: responding to sexual violence 
under the Khmer rouge’, Searching for the Truth 2005–1, p. 30.
514 marital rape was not a crime in cambodia in 1975. it was first criminalised in 2005, see 
UN committee against Torture, Concluding observations of the Committee against Torture: 
Cambodia, 20 January 2011, UN Doc. caT/c/KHm/co/2, p. 2.
515 Ngor 1989, p. 292.
516 LeVine 2010, pp. 54 and 175.
517 LeVine 2010, p. 122; Kasumi 2008, pp. 18–19 and 44; and mam 2006, p. 139.
518 See LeVine 2010, pp. 20, 28, 59, 102 and 108.
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for negotiation when it came to the selection of a spouse.519 Soldiers generally were 
also granted more liberties when it came to marriage. There is also evidence that 
marriage was used as a reward and compensation system for soldiers: those who 
had contributed to the revolution were given the opportunity to choose a husband 
or wife, as were soldiers who had become handicapped in the line of duty.520
The forced marriages in Democratic Kampuchea were a form of social 
engineering: through the marriages, the Khmer rouge gained control over 
people’s sexuality and reproductive functions and asserted their loyalty, as they 
had to pledge allegiance to Angkar during the wedding ceremony.521 in this 
sense, the marriages were also a test: complying with the order to marry was a 
confirmation of loyalty; resisting the order was an indication that someone might 
be a ‘bad element’.522 The Khmer rouge weddings were depicted as a duty with 
the goal of reproduction: children were needed as new workers for the revolution 
(see infra).523
The marriage policy was disseminated by Angkar through telegrams and 
cPK publications, such as the cPK magazine entitled ‘The revolutionary flag’. 
These documents emphasised the voluntariness of the marriages. However, 
several cPK officials (even those who believed people freely agreed to marriage) 
noted that, in practice, individuals rarely refused an arranged marriage for fear 
of punishment or even death, even though not every refusal was met with violent 
repercussions.524 The marriage policy was implemented throughout Democratic 
Kampuchea in a similar manner, although differences did exist between districts 
and communes. The chiefs of the communes would usually act as matchmakers 
and decide who would marry whom.525 in the early years of the Khmer rouge, 
spouses were selected on the basis of their standing: base people were married to 
base people, new people to new people.526 During the later years however, people’s 
geographical background became a more common ground for pairing.527
519 r.c. Huy, ‘Khmer rouge wedding’, Searching for the Truth (25) January 2002, p. 27.
520 LeVine 2010, p. 97; and Kasumi 2008, p. 19.
521 anderson 2010, p. 29.
522 mam 2000, p.  63. mam argues that the marriages were also a means to optimise labour: 
she states that people were often forced to marry only after their abilities to work had been 
exhausted. as a consequence, according to mam, people were not allowed to marry young, 
unlike the custom in the pre‑Khmer rouge period. instead, people were ordered to marry 
when they were in their late twenties (mam 2000, p. 54 et seq). This particular conclusion is not 
confirmed by other research and does not follow from statistical data: LeVine found that most 
people she interviewed were between the ages of 18 and 24 when they got married (LeVine 
2010, p. 20), an average age span that is corroborated by other research (Heuveline & Poch 
2006, p. 108).
523 Kasumi 2008, p. 17; Jain 2008, p. 1025 and mam 2006, p. 138.
524 case 002 closing order, paras. 216–220.
525 LeVine 2010, p. 147.
526 case 002 closing order, para. 847.
527 LeVine 2010, p. 84.
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The Khmer rouge weddings were impersonal affairs that were performed 
in groups, with the number of couples varying anywhere from 5 to 500.528 The 
sombre ceremonies were solemnised by government officials and were used to 
disseminate cPK propaganda. after listening to speeches from Khmer rouge 
leaders, the names of the men and women were called out, upon which the 
spouses had to stand next to each other, pledge their allegiance to Angkar and 
promise to stay together forever.529 Spouses were not, however, expected to build 
an emotional bond with each other or establish an actual relationship, because 
such a bond could compete with their absolute loyalty to Angkar.530 in some 
communal villages, married men and women were allowed to live together, 
which meant that couples were only separated during day time when they went 
to different work sites.531 others, on the other hand, were re‑located to different 
work camps a couple of days after their wedding and were only allowed to see each 
other once in a while.532
5.2.2. Marriage and the prescription of sexual intercourse
after being married, most couples had to go straight back to work, only to come 
back again late in the evening to spend a few nights together in special huts.533 
Studies show that some couples were told to consummate their marriage on their 
wedding night and that they were spied upon during the nights to make sure they 
did what they were told to do and did not discuss any counterrevolutionary ideas 
with each other.534 research conducted by LeVine demonstrates that whether or 
not couples were ordered to have sexual intercourse strongly depended on the 
community they lived in, as not all commune chiefs prescribed sex. about 40% 
of the 192 people interviewed by LeVine were told to consummate their marriage 
on the wedding night and 30% reported that they were watched by spies during 
the night.535 others were not directly ordered to have sex, but believed Angkar 
expected them to consummate their marriage and would know if they refrained 
from having intercourse.536
528 LeVine 2010, pp. 1 and 20.
529 LeVine 2010, p. 154 and Studzinsky 2011, p. 6.
530 mam 2000, p. 71. 
531 LeVine 2010 pp. 89, 108 and 114.
532 LeVine 2010, p. 82. LeVine 2010, p. 62 found that couples were given between one and three 
days off from work after their wedding. See also mam 2006, p. 138. and as already has been 
stated, in many work camps, men and women lived, worked, ate and slept separately (case 002 
closing order, para. 359).
533 LeVine 2010, p. 90.
534 LeVine 2010, p. 88 and mam 2000, p. 70. LeVine 2010, p. 88 found that, at least with respect to 
the people she interviewed, the order to have sex was often given to the husband alone and not 
(also) to the wife (see also Studzinsky 2011, p. 6).
535 LeVine 2010, p. 88.
536 Duch civil Parties’ co‑Lawyers’ request for supplementary preliminary investigations, 
para. 20. Angkar was deemed amorphous, omnipotent and omnipresent and was so powerful 
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Kasumi found evidence that some men forced their wives to have sex 
with them, without being ordered to do so by the Khmer rouge.537 in most 
cases however, both spouses were forced to have sex and often either did so or 
pretended to do so because they were threatened with death if they refused. Not 
consummating the marriage was seen as disobeying Angkar’s order and some 
couples were forced to have sex at gunpoint.538 Whereas Kasumi found that some 
women were treated cruelly by their husbands, LeVine found that the opposite 
could also be true. one of her male respondents fell victim to a violent wife who 
tried to poison and drown him on numerous occasions.539
The Khmer rouge prescribed intercourse within marriage with a view to 
increase childbirth, as this would result in more workers for the revolution.540 
This was articulated by Pol Pot in a speech he gave in September 1977 and 
was affirmed by him on several other occasions. Pol Pot stated that increasing 
cambodia’s population to 20 million within 10 to 15 years was one of the 
objectives of the cPK.541 in this address, Pol Pot also announced that marriages 
were to be performed in groups of several couples at the same time.542 it appears 
that this speech and the public declaration of the objective of population growth 
had an effect on the post‑marriage protocol: LeVine found that prescriptive 
sex became more common during and after 1978.543 However, despite Angkar’s 
efforts, relatively few children were born during the regime.544 Survivors explain 
that they were often too exhausted, weak and worried to engage in sexual 
activity. Therefore, they merely pretended to have sexual intercourse with their 
spouses.545 in addition, women often became less fertile or completely infertile 
due to malnutrition and maltreatment.546 of those women who did become 
that people actually believed it could read their minds (LeVine 2010, pp.  13, 35, 115 and 
esp. 138–162).
537 Kasumi 2008, pp. 20–22. None of the couples interviewed by LeVine spoke of rape: neither 
those who had been told to consummate their marriage, nor those who had not been told to do 
so (LeVine 2010, p. 89). This might be linked to the fact that the concept of marital rape is still 
relatively new in cambodia: it was first criminalised in 2005 (UN committee against Torture, 
Concluding observations of the Committee against Torture: Cambodia, 20 January 2011, UN 
Doc. caT/c/KHm/co/2, p. 2). it might also be because people still do not want to talk about 
it.
538 Kasumi 2008, pp. 20–22 and 45 and LeVine 2010, pp. 88–89. 
539 after this woman’s father died, she apologised to her husband and he decided to stay with her 
out of pity. They remained married until the woman became violent again and he finally left 
her in 2004 (LeVine 2010, pp. 113–114).
540 Some couples even had to promise during their wedding ceremony that they would have a 
child within a year (Dy 2007, p. 34). 
541 it is estimated that 7.3 million people lived in cambodia in 1975 when the Khmer rouge took 
over (see <countrystudies.us/cambodia/40.htm> last accessed December 2013).
542 case 002 closing order, para. 218.
543 of the respondents married before 1977, 29% were told to have sex, as opposed to 60% of the 
respondents wedded during or after 1978 (LeVine 2010, p. 89).
544 De Walque 2006, pp. 224–225; and Ngor 1989, p. 293.
545 LeVine 2010, pp. 30 and 88.
546 in some cases, famished newlywed women were given bigger rations of protein‑rich food, so 
that they might become able to conceive again. anderson 2010, p. 3; J.S. Bashi, ‘Starvation 
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pregnant, relatively few carried their child to term as a consequence of starvation, 
exhaustion and illness.547
5.2.3. Khmer Rouge marriages: forced or not?548
as stated, the majority of marriages that took place under the Khmer rouge 
were arranged by the cPK. in general, people had no say in the selection of their 
spouse. individuals were literally called out and given the order to marry: they 
were conscripted into marriage as it were.549 Not all people who married during 
the Khmer rouge regime, however, married against their will. There are reports 
of cambodians (mostly soldiers, both male and female) making a formal request 
to Angkar to marry a specific person, such as their fiancé(e)s, and who were given 
permission to wed.550 family members could also ask the chiefs of the communes 
whether their son or daughter could marry a particular person, and if the chief 
believed it was a good match, he or she would grant permission. especially during 
the earlier years of the Khmer rouge, the cPK appeared to have been more 
lenient with regard to the arrangement of marriages. LeVine found that in the 
period before 1977, people were allowed to arrange their own marriages and could 
easily obtain permission from the commune leader. after 1977, this changed. in 
September 1977, the existence of the cPK was officially announced, after having 
already been in power for more than two years.551 as a result, all Khmer rouge 
policies, including the marriage policy, were more strictly enforced.
Pol Pot’s speeches regarding population growth were a second catalyst for 
the stricter enforcement of the marriage policy and post‑marriage protocols.552 
consequently, after 1977, people had less room for negotiation when it came to 
marriages. from then on, the majority of marriages were arranged by Angkar and 
involvement of future spouses or their relatives became less common. commune 
leaders would arrange marriages between people who sometimes had no or little 
prior acquaintance.553 as a result, many people met their partner for the first time 
on the day of the marriage,554 which may be seen as an indication of the coerced 
nature of the weddings. it should be mentioned, however, that in cambodia, both 
prior to and after the Khmer rouge period, it was not uncommon for people to 
marry someone they had never met until the wedding day. Heuveline and Poch 
under the Democratic Kampuchea regime’, Searching for the Truth 2008–2, p. 53; De Walque 
2006, p. 223; Ngor 1989, p. 293.
547 anderson 2010, p. 3. See also De Walque 2006, pp. 224–225.
548 LeVine 2010, p. 31–35, chapter 1: the Khmer rouge weddings: forced or not?
549 LeVine 2010, p. 175 and Kasumi 2008, pp. 18–19 and 44.
550 Heuveline & Poch 2006, p. 110 found that 16% of the women who married during the Khmer 
rouge regime stated that they themselves had chosen their partner.
551 case 002 closing order, para. 18.
552 according to Heuveline & Poch 2006, p. 102, towards the end of their reign, the Khmer rouge 
wanted to counter depopulation by enforcing marriages and pregnancies.
553 LeVine 2010, pp. 23, 25, 75, 83 and 154 and Jain 2008, p. 1024.
554 mam 2006, pp. 136–138. 
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found that, on average, 42% of women who married before (pre‑1975) and after 
(between 1979 and 1999) the Khmer rouge years also reported having met their 
husband for the first time on the wedding day, as opposed to 59.7% of the women 
who married during the Khmer rouge era.555
Nevertheless, there is a distinct difference. in the period before and after 
the Khmer rouge, people would never marry a complete stranger: their parents 
had approved of their future spouse, knew who he or she was and had had close 
dealings with the future in‑laws. The negotiation period in the build‑up to the 
actual wedding was lengthy, fortune tellers had been consulted and in many 
cases, the husband had laboured for the bride’s parents.556 in the Khmer rouge 
era, however, people would be married off to a total stranger. in the atmosphere 
of betrayal and distrust that marked the years 1975–1979, it was difficult for some 
to determine whether or not they could trust this stranger who was now their 
spouse.
cambodia has a long tradition of arranged marriages in which the consent 
of the future spouses is subordinate to that of their parents.557 and as stated, it 
is, or at least did not use to be, uncommon for bride and groom to meet for the 
first time on the wedding day. Therefore, especially against this background of 
arranged marriages, it would be an over‑simplification to claim – as is often done 
in literature – that all marriages arranged by the Khmer rouge were uniformly 
forced. There are many examples of couples that wanted to marry and were 
happy with their marriage.558 The concept of force and the way in which this is 
interpreted by cambodians married during the reign of the cPK was analysed 
by LeVine. The results were quite different from the standard assumptions made 
in studies on Khmer rouge marriages. LeVine found that while people used the 
word ‘forced’ to describe the labour the Khmer rouge required them to carry out, 
none of her 192 respondents, whether they had stayed together or not, used this 
term to refer to their marriages.559 an explanation might be found in the fact that 
marriages arranged by parties other than the spouses themselves are customary 
in cambodia.560 in addition, irrespective of all hardships and anxiety, marriage 
seems to have brought a sense of purpose and belonging to many people’s lives, 
affording couples a small amount of order in the chaos that was the Democratic 
Kampuchea and sometimes even resulting in some more food, rest and comfort.561 
555 Heuveline & Poch 2006, p. 110.
556 LeVine 2010, pp.  61–62; and Pich‑Sal, Le mariage Cambodgien, Sihanouk: Université 
Buddhique Preah, pp. 1–4.
557 LeVine 2010, p. 36. although parents are discouraged from marrying their daughter against 
her will (Heuveline & Poch 2006, p. 101).
558 See e.g. LeVine 2010, pp. 59 and 75–76.
559 LeVine 2010, p. 175.
560 Parents often call on matchmakers to find a suitable spouse for their child (Heuveline & Poch 
2006, p. 101). 
561 LeVine 2010, pp. 15–16, 114 and 126. married persons were considered to be more senior and 
therefore they were generally allowed a little more food and rest, although this depended on 
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as LeVine puts it, ‘people were given a touchstone to vitality in DK (Democratic 
Kampuchea; iH) via the wedding and birth experiences’.562 People again became 
able to imagine a future.563 This was not true for all couples though: some did not 
trust each other in the climate of betrayal that prevailed or fought each other over 
food, and there are accounts of wives reporting their husbands to Khmer rouge 
soldiers.564
quantitative research with a larger sample size than LeVine’s did indicate 
a certain degree of force with regard to the Khmer rouge marriages. Heuveline 
and Poch found that a little over 67% of the 837 women who married during the 
Khmer rouge regime stated that they had consented to the marriage. The other 
32% reported that they had not consented to the marriage and had been forced to 
marry by either non‑relatives or relatives.565 in view of the tradition of arranged 
marriage in cambodia, it is interesting to compare these figures to other years. 
according to Heuveline and Poch’s data, of those women who married pre‑1975 
and between 1979 and 1999, on average almost 7% reported that they had not 
consented to their marriage.566
So despite the fact that marriages to which one of the spouses has not consented 
are not an unfamiliar phenomenon in cambodia, this was more common under 
the Khmer rouge: of the marriages contracted during the Khmer rouge period, a 
larger percentage can be qualified as ‘forced’ as opposed to marriages contracted 
in cambodia in other periods.
in summary, it is not correct to say that all marriages arranged by the Khmer 
rouge were forced marriages. They varied from elective to imposed with distinct 
regional differences.567 in some regions and communes people were almost 
literally forced to marry at gunpoint, in other regions and communes, people 
were awarded some discretion as regards the choice to marry and were allowed 
to choose a spouse or refuse the appointed spouse.568 This depended both on the 
local cPK, as well as on the status of the individual: often, soldiers had more 
options to request or refuse a marriage. also, it is possible that after 1977, more 
marriages were forced: people had less room for negotiation as a consequence of 
the Khmer rouge’s attempt to solidify marriages and the post‑marriage protocol, 
with the aim of achieving the cPK objective pertaining to population growth.569 
the commune chief. Single people, on the other hand, were considered to be the ‘force number 
one’ when it came to working (LeVine 2010, p. 99).
562 LeVine 2010, p. 167.
563 LeVine 2010, p. 127.
564 Ngor 1989, p. 293.
565 Heuveline & Poch 2006, p. 110. The total sample consisted of 8,911 women who married only 
once. of these women, 9.39% married between 1975 and 1978.
566 Heuveline and Poch calculated that on average, of all women in their sample (a total of 8,911 
women who married before 1999) almost 10% reported that they had not consented to the 
marriage (Heuveline & Poch 2006, p. 110). 
567 LeVine 2010, p. 28.
568 LeVine 2010, p. 28.
569 See also eccc case 002 closing order, paras. 216–220.
Forceandmarriage.indd   97 20-5-2014   10:42:02
98 intersentia




Nevertheless, the Khmer rouge marriages – whether they were voluntary or 
forced, whether they provided any comfort or caused more anxiety – had a lasting 
impact on people’s lives and had consequences that stretched far beyond the 
three‑year reign of Angkar. Some people were not allowed to marry their beloved 
but had to marry a stranger; others who fell in love with someone other than their 
spouse after the fall of the Khmer rouge regime could not be together because 
they were already married. The fact that the majority of couples stayed together 
(see infra paragraph 5.2.4) illustrates the impact the marriages had on people’s 
lives. Some report that they are happy and (have learned to) love each other; others 
state they are miserable but remain together out of a sense of loyalty towards a 
deceased family member whom they can no longer ask for permission to separate, 
or because they feel they are obliged to stay married.570 it is therefore justified to 
say that the Khmer rouge’s experiment of social engineering, of arranging and in 
many cases forcing marriages between people on a massive scale has radically and 
permanently altered the course of people’s lives.571
5.2.4. The marriages in post‑conflict Cambodia
although it is not clear exactly how many couples stayed together after the 
collapse of the Pol Pot regime, recently conducted research gives reason to believe 
that the clear majority of spouses remained married to each other after the 
Vietnamese army ousted the Khmer rouge in 1979. LeVine found that over 80% 
of the 192 people she interviewed had stayed with their partner. most couples 
(almost 75%) testified that they stayed together because they had experienced 
each other’s kindness during the most difficult years of their lives. They had, 
for example, shared food when starving, comforted each other and together, 
formed a front against Angkar. other reasons for staying together were children, 
financial considerations, feelings of pity for the partner, or a sense of loyalty and 
duty either to a deceased family member or to the spouse.572 as an additional 
reason for remaining together, 54% of LeVine’s respondents mentioned the fact 
that their extended family had played a role in arranging the marriage.573 Jain 
found that another compelling reason for couples to stay together was the fact 
that they had made a formal commitment to each other to stay together and that 
their communities considered them to be married.574 The marriages had been 
performed by government officials and up to this day, cambodians see them 
570 LeVine 2010, p.  96. one woman interviewed by LeVine stated ‘i don’t want to change the 
Khmer way so we stay together’ (LeVine 2010, p. 123). 
571 LeVine 2010, p. 17.
572 LeVine 2010, p.  19. for a complete overview of reasons the interviewees gave for staying 
together, see LeVine 2010, p. 94.
573 LeVine 2010, p. 95.
574 Jain 2008, p. 1026.
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as legitimate and authentic.575 in addition, divorce576 was (and still is) socially 
unacceptable and for these reasons, many marriages endure.577 another reason 
why so many people decided to remain married is that these individuals shared 
hardships with their spouses; an experience which Heuveline and Poch believe 
might enhance their commitment to the marriage.578 finally, the fact that so many 
people stayed together might also be explained by the fact that cambodians, at 
least the older generation, believe that marriages are predestined by Buddha (kou 
prenh: Khmer for ‘destined mate’). So regardless of the conditions under which 
they wed, some believe that Buddha determined their marriage even before they 
were born.579
6. comPariSoN: THe BUSH marriageS aND 
THe KHmer roUge marriageS
6.1. iNTroDUcTioN
The conflicts in both cambodia and Sierra Leone were marked by forced 
marriages that took place on a large scale. on the surface, it seems the Khmer 
rouge marriages were quite different from the bush marriages. Does closer 
inspection reveal any similarities between these two types of forced marriages? 
This paragraph juxtaposes the bodies of facts of the marriages described above 
and first lines up the most evident differences between the two. Subsequently, 
the cases are analysed for the purpose of finding similarities. The differences and 
similarities described below are generalised for convenience of comparison. for 
example, in most cases, both men and women were victims of forced marriages 
in cambodia, although sometimes one was the victim and the other the 
perpetrator.580 conversely, in most cases in Sierra Leone, the husband was the 
575 LeVine 2010, pp. 26 and 85.
576 LeVine 2010, p.  82, notes that spouses often ask a parent or village elder for permission to 
separate instead of filing for legal divorce.
577 Jain 2008, p. 1026. Nevertheless, in traditional marriages, the road to divorce was relatively 
easier for women than for men: men could only divorce on grounds of infidelity on the wife’s 
part; women could seek a legal divorce unilaterally on a variety of grounds (Heuveline & Poch 
2006, p. 101).
578 Heuveline & Poch 2006, p. 118. interestingly, research shows that Khmer rouge marriages are 
almost as stable as pre‑Khmer rouge marriages and more stable than the marriages that were 
performed in the period following the collapse of Pol Pot’s regime (Heuveline & Poch 2006, 
p. 117).
579 LeVine 2010, pp. 26, 44 and 98: a quarter of all couples interviewed by LeVine, regardless of 
whether they had stayed together, believed that Buddha had arranged their marriage before 
they were born. See also Sok‑Kheang 2007, p. 1.
580 Kasumi 2008, p. 19, recorded the testimony of a former cPK soldier who stated that soldiers 
could ask Angkar’s permission to marry a specific person. if Angkar had granted permission 
but this particular person did not want to marry, he or she would be forced to marry. This was 
especially the case when handicapped soldiers were given the privilege of choosing a spouse: 
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perpetrator, although in some instances men were forced by their commanders to 
take women as their wives.
it is reiterated that one of the goals of this research is to assess if, and if so, 
how the practice of forced marriage should be criminalised in the context of the 
icc, i.e. within the framework of the rome Statute. Yet it seems that the bush 
marriages that took place during the civil war in Sierra Leone are, to a large 
extent, comparable to the forced marriages that took (and take) place during 
seven of the situations under investigation before the icc: côte d’ivoire, car, 
mali, Drc, Darfur, Uganda and Kenya (described above in paragraph 3). in all 
those situations, men (often ‘rebels’) abduct women and girls and force them into 
marriage, which often results in a situation of abuse and enslavement.581 more 
research will need to be done into these cases: currently, there are only a few 
reports that focus on this practice. The forced marriages orchestrated by the Lra, 
however, have been extensively documented and where applicable, they will be 
referred to below.
6.2 . THe Differ eNceS
6.2.1. Policy as a similarity in disguise: state policy versus rebel policy
one of the most striking characteristics of the forced marriages that took place 
during the conflicts in Sierra Leone and cambodia is that in both countries, these 
acts were committed as part of a policy. Yet, because this similarity was the cause 
of many differences (discussed below), it is discussed in this paragraph rather 
than in the paragraph that deals with the similarities.
first, a short foray into the concept of policy is necessary. on the international 
level, there is some discussion with regard to the question of whether the element 
‘attack’ (directed against a civilian population), which is part of the chapeau 
of crimes against humanity, requires the existence of a state or organisational 
policy.582 on the one hand, the ad hoc Tribunals, the ScSL and the eccc have 
rejected a policy element as a separate requirement of crimes against humanity 
in their case law,583 which is consistent with the absence of such an element in the 
often the chosen spouse did not want to marry the disabled cadre, but he or she would then be 
forced to marry (e.g. Kasumi 2008, p. 19).
581 The same goes for forced marriages that took place during the rwandan genocide.
582 cryer et al. 2010, pp. 237–238. Note that a policy element is also (often) inherent in war crimes 
and genocide, see W.a. Schabas, ‘State Policy as an element of international crimes’, Journal 
of Law and Criminology (98) 2008, pp. 953–982.
583 However, in its earlier case law, both the icTY (Tadić Trial Judgement, para. 644, discussing 
policy in the context of the element ‘population’) as well as the icTr (Akayesu Trial Judgement, 
para. 580, linking policy to the element ‘systematic’) did require the presence of a preconceived 
plan or policy for conduct to be classified as a crime against humanity, see robinson 1999, 
p. 49. See also rUf Trial Judgement, para. 79; and Duch Trial Judgement, para. 301.
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statutes of these four courts. The rome Statute, on the other hand, does require an 
element of state or organisational policy in order for conduct to be classified as an 
attack directed against a civilian population and thus a crime against humanity. 
according to article  7(2)(a) rome Statute, the acts enumerated in article  7(1) 
must have been committed pursuant to or in furtherance of a policy to commit 
an attack against a civilian population. The icc eoc explain that the policy to 
commit such an attack ‘requires that the State or organization actively promote or 
encourage such an attack’.584 in exceptional circumstances, the deliberate failure 
of a state or organisation to take action against such an attack may also be seen 
as an encouragement of the attack and thus as an implementation of the policy.585 
This policy element has a low evidentiary threshold and the existence of a plan or 
policy can be inferred from the manner in which acts were committed.586
The forced marriages under the Khmer rouge were part of official state policy 
pertaining to the regulation of marriages. Senior leaders of the cPK wanted a 
greater labour force for the benefit of the revolution and therefore they required 
an increase in birth rates.587 as part of a strategy to obtain complete control over 
the cambodians and to manage their sexuality and reproductive function, the 
leaders of the cPK devised a policy of arranging the marriages of the majority of 
single adults in their twenties and thirties.588 The existence of this policy, which 
was disseminated through propaganda tools such as the magazine ‘revolutionary 
flag’ and by telegrams sent to senior cPK leaders stationed throughout cambodia, 
is evidenced inter alia by the fact that the cPK marriages took place all over the 
country with a similar modus operandi.589
in Sierra Leone, there was no official government policy pertaining to the 
abduction and forced marriage of young girls. rather, the bush marriages were 
part of the rUf/afrc common purpose to gain and exercise political control 
over the territory of Sierra Leone.590 The bush marriages were perpetrated by the 
rebels on a massive, widespread scale throughout the territory of Sierra Leone 
as part of a de facto rebel policy. as is evidenced by the judgements of the ScSL, 
the bush marriages were organised and in some cases regulated by high‑ranking 
584 article 7 introduction sub 3 icc eoc.
585 article 7 introduction sub 3, footnote 6 icc eoc.
586 cryer et al. 2010, p. 238; and robinson 1999, p. 51.
587 This is redolent of the alleged (forcible) impregnation policy within the Lra: testimonies 
of former Lra fighters indicate that pregnancy was promoted within the forced marriage 
and that abortion was punishable by death. in some cases, commanders allegedly ordered 
individual rebels to have sex with their wives and even had the sex lives of their fighters 
monitored (carlson & mazurana 2008, pp. 23–24; and allen 2005, p. 28).
588 although in some cases the spouses were younger or older (case 002 closing order, para. 842).
589 case 002 closing order, para. 1446.
590 The ScSL held that the common purpose of the joint criminal enterprises formed by the 
accused in the afrc and rUf cases was ‘to take any action to gain and exercise political 
control over the territory of Sierra Leone by conduct constituting crimes within the Statute’ 
(afrc appeal Judgement, para.  16; rUf Trial Judgement, para.  376). Note that forced 
marriages were allegedly also committed by the pro‑government cDf.
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commanders in the rebel compounds. for example, the Trial chamber found that 
managing the system of slavery within the afrc faction was one of the tasks 
allotted to Santigie Borbor Kanu, who was chief of Staff of the afrc. He was 
held individually responsible for planning, organising and implementing the 
commission of sexual slavery.591
‘in Bombali District the accused Kanu designed and implemented a system to 
control abducted girls and women. all abducted women and girls were placed in 
the custody of the accused. any soldier who wanted an abducted girl or woman 
to be his “wife” had to “sign for her”. The accused informed his fighters that any 
problems with the women were to be immediately reported back to him, and that 
he would then monitor the situation. The accused issued a disciplinary instruction 
ordering that any woman caught with another woman’s husband should be beaten 
and locked in a box.’592
The systematisation of the bush marriages brings to mind the abduction and 
marriage policy of the Lra. The Lra is infamous for their abduction of young 
children who are then indoctrinated with Lra ideology and forced to become 
fighters, cooks, porters or spies. Within the rebel compounds, the children 
live in communities that are an imitation of traditional ‘families’, headed by a 
commander and consisting of several other young children, fighters and ‘wives’. 
girls who have reached puberty are distributed as wives among the fighters – 
a process which in some camps is ordered and monitored by high‑ranking 
officers.593 Sexual intercourse, which is strictly controlled, is only allowed within 
these marriages. in this way, the marriages have assisted in maintaining discipline, 
enhancing the control over the fighters, creating social cohesion, containing the 
spread of HiV and other STDs, and facilitating childbirth.594 Several authors have 
argued that a clear pattern of command responsibility could be detected with 
regard to the abductions and forced marriages.595 according to these authors, 
detailed records were kept on the age and number of abducted girls. The Lra 
commanders decided how many girls should be abducted and would, if at a given 
time they believed there were not enough marriageable girls available, instruct 
units to abduct specified numbers of girls.596
a consequence of the difference between state policy and rebel policy was 
that in Sierra Leone, girls and women were more randomly forced into marriages: 
‘only’ those who had been abducted were at risk of becoming a bush wife. in 
cambodia, on the other hand, the entire part of the population of cambodia that 
591 afrc appeal Judgement, paras. 289–299 and 302. 
592 afrc Trial Judgement, para. 766.
593 carlson & mazurana 2008, p. 19.
594 annan et al. 2009, pp. 1 and 10–12; and amnesty international 1997, p. 19.
595 carlson & mazurana 2008, pp. 8 and 17–18. See also amnesty international 1997, p. 20.
596 annan et al. 2011, p. 885; and carlson & mazurana 2008, p. 18. 
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consisted of singles roughly between the ages of 18 and 40 were at risk of being 
forced to enter into marriage.
The difference in the type of policy is also reflected in the act that was 
necessary to realise the marriage: in cambodia, the marriages were concluded by 
a third party, usually a government official, during a special ceremony that was 
also conducted by this official. in Sierra Leone, it was usually the bush husband 
who ‘established’ the bush marriage, usually by (publicly) claiming the woman 
as his wife (‘yu na mi wef ’). in some camps, men were required to sign for the 
women who had been allocated to them.597 in a few cases, there would be an 
informal ceremony, during which a commander or camp leader would unite rebel 
and abductee in (bush) marriage.
6.2.2. Victim‑victim versus perpetrator‑victim
a major difference between the marriages that took place in Sierra Leone and 
cambodia is the relationship between husband and wife. in Sierra Leone, this 
relationship was generally one of perpetrator‑victim: the perpetrator was often 
the intended husband himself, save for the few exceptions in which a commander 
forced both parties to marry. Therefore, the victims were usually the wives and 
the perpetrators were usually the husbands. These husbands were the ones who 
committed attacks on the civilian population; they had plundered the women’s 
villages and sometimes killed their relatives. So the women were forced to enter 
into bush marriages with the ‘enemy’. in cambodia, on the other hand, the 
relation between husband and wife was one of victim‑victim: often neither party 
had any say in the decision to marry or in the choice of spouse. The perpetrator 
of the forced marriages (and the enemy) was often a third party: the government 
embodied by Angkar. consequently, in cambodia in most instances both men 
and women were victims of the forced marriage.
This perpetrator‑victim/victim‑victim dichotomy also had its effect on 
crimes that were committed within the marriage. in a forced marriage during 
the civil war in Sierra Leone, rape, sexual violence, (sexual) slavery and physical 
abuse constituted a large part of the victim’s ordeal. Within a forced marriage, 
these crimes were often committed by the victim’s bush husband. in cambodia, 
however, this was not so much the case: and it seems that in the Khmer rouge 
marriages, it was the forced conjugal association in itself that caused much of 
the victims’ (psychological) suffering.598 although in several instances sexual 
intercourse was prescribed, generally both spouses were forced to have sex with 
each other and many only pretended to do so. in those cases in which the sexual 
intercourse constituted rape, the men (husbands) were mostly innocent agents, 
597 See also T. Doherty, ‘Jurisprudential developments relating to sexual violence: the legacy 
of the Special court for Sierra Leone,’ in: a. de Brouwer et al. (eds.), Sexual violence as an 
international crime: interdisciplinary approaches, antwerp: intersentia 2013, p. 167.
598 anderson 2010, p. 39.
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acting out the orders they had been given by camp leaders who had prescribed 
sexual intercourse and monitored them.599 it appears, therefore, that (forced) 
sexual intercourse is more often imposed by a third party in those cases where 
forced marriages are (partly) aimed at procreation. This tallies with accounts of 
some former Lra fighters who stated that they had not wanted to take a wife, but 
were told to do so and were also ordered to have sexual intercourse with these 
women – often for the purpose of procreation. Some even state that their sex life 
was monitored.600
6.2.3. Official versus unofficial
another difference between the Khmer rouge weddings and bush marriages is the 
status of the unions. in cambodia, the marriages were official and state‑sanctioned 
and therefore de iure associations. However, during the Khmer rouge rule, many 
marriages could hardly be qualified as de facto marriages,601 in the sense that 
there often was no actual marital life to speak of. Spouses were not encouraged 
to have a marital relationship, hardly saw each other and in many cases did not 
cohabit.602 after the fall of the Khmer rouge regime, however, the marriages of 
the spouses who remained together did become de facto marriages. The bush 
marriages in Sierra Leone, by contrast, were only de facto marriages and not de 
iure, as argued by several authors.603 The victims were forced to cohabit with their 
bush husbands, have sexual relations with them and do household tasks. Within 
the bush, the marriages were seen as legitimate, but the non‑rebel community 
(the civilian population) did not regard the bush marriages as legitimate unions. 
Bush marriages were seen as illegitimate, uncivilised, and not socially sanctioned 
because none of the proper marriage traditions had been adhered to.604, 605
a corollary to the difference between official versus unofficial marriages 
concerns the annulment of the marriages. it seems that because the bush marriages 
were illegitimate, in Sierra Leone men could easily abandon their wives without 
taking any (legal) action; and after the civil war, those women who had escaped 
their bush husbands were no longer bound to them by the bush marriage. in 
cambodia, this was different: a formal divorce, usually coupled with permission 
599 although there are also examples of men who took advantage of the situation and treated their 
wives badly (see e.g. Kasumi 2008, pp. 17 and 21).
600 carlson & mazurana 2008, pp. 23–24; and allen 2005, p. 28.
601 See also Jain 2008, p. 1026.
602 although, as already explained, in some villages, couples were allowed to cohabit.
603 anderson 2010, pp. 39–40; and Jain 2008, p. 1026.
604 coulter 2009, pp. 100–101 and 220; and coulter 2008, pp. 55–56, footnote 2. compare in this 
sense the Lra marriages, which are not recognised as formal marriages or seen as binding by 
any legal standard in Uganda or within northern Ugandan customary law (SWaY 2008, p. 44; 
and carlson & mazurana 2008, p. 8).
605 Note that the Khmer rouge marriages were not conducted in conformity with the traditional 
marriage customs either (e.g. parental permission and offerings made to appease spirits of 
ancestors), yet the marriages are still seen as official, valid associations.
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to separate by a parent or village elder, was necessary to dissolve the marriage.606 
couples were considered to be officially married in the eyes of the community and 
in addition, divorce was frowned upon. This, along with other reasons, compelled 
many cambodians to stay together after the fall of the Khmer rouge regime. in 
Sierra Leone, many bush marriages ended along with the civil war. Those couples 
who did remain together, for whatever reason, found themselves in a changed 
position: the community did not recognise their association as it had not been 
negotiated or sanctioned by the family or the community and because no bride 
wealth had been paid to the girl’s family.607 Therefore, the bush marriages had to 
be formalised. occasionally, this happened, but there are also accounts of women 
who wanted to stay with their bush husbands, but whose wish to have their 
marriage solemnised was thwarted by relatives or the community, who refused 
formalisation because they did not approve of the relationship.608
6.2.4. Eradicated versus exacerbated gender roles
another difference that should be noted concerns the so‑called conjugal duties 
resulting from the forced marriages. rebels in Sierra Leone forced their wives to 
do (household) chores,609 but in cambodia, the only ‘conjugal duty’ the spouses 
had was procreation. apart from that, they were, like non‑married people, forced 
to work for Angkar. Neither women nor men were assigned household tasks as a 
result of their status as either husband or wife: there were no more households in 
the traditional sense of the word; there was only the collective, and people were 
randomly selected to work in the kitchens and cook for the entire collective.610 
moreover, the Khmer rouge had eliminated many traditional gender roles and 
communalised women’s roles as caretakers.611 in Sierra Leone, on the other hand, 
traditional gender roles perpetuated in the bush and were even exacerbated, 
whereas at the same time, bush wives also transgressed traditional notions 
of femininity when they became fighters. girls appear to have been abducted 
in Sierra Leone (and for example also in Uganda) exactly for their productive 
labour.612 in the camps, girls and women were made to carry out traditional 
gender roles, such as cooking, cleaning and rearing children. in their multifaceted 
roles as wives, girls and women were used to support the fighting forces and thus 
became indispensable to the economy of war, forming the foundations upon 
606 LeVine 2010, p. 82 notes that legal divorce or separation was not established in cambodia. 
However, see the cambodia Law of the marriage and family 1989, article 38 ff.
607 coulter 2009, p. 220; and Scharf 2005, p. 81.
608 See the testimonies of aminata and finda, recorded by coulter 2009, pp. 209 and 219–220.
609 compare also the forced marriages that took place during the rwandan genocide.
610 in some collectives, people were not required to eat in communal dining halls, but were 
allowed to prepare their own food and eat it with their spouse (LeVine 2010, p. 30; Ngor 1989, 
p. 296).
611 mam 2000, p. 10 et seq., and anderson 2010, p. 41.
612 coulter 2009, pp. 67 and 116–117.
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which the fighting forces relied. Bush marriages, therefore, were accompanied by 
a new set of duties for most women. for some, it worked the other way around: 
bush marriages resulted in a decrease in the amount of their duties as they 
rose in the hierarchy and had slaves working for them.613 Angkar, on the other 
hand, used the entire cambodian population, women and men alike, for their 
gender‑neutral productive labour in order to further the revolution. The Khmer 
rouge aimed at eradicating gender roles,614 and indeed, it seems that the Khmer 
rouge valued people not on the basis of their gender, but on the basis of their 
sex: men and women were reduced to their biological differences as they were 
‘used’ for their reproductive functions. marriages were arranged for the benefit 
and purpose of the revolution: marriages would lead to childbirth which would 
facilitate population growth which, in the long run, would result in more workers 
for Angkar, securing the future of Democratic Kampuchea.
6.3. SimiLariTieS
6.3.1. Forced union of two people
The most obvious similarity between the Khmer rouge marriages and the Sierra 
Leonean bush marriages is that in both situations, the conduct involved the union 
of two people in a conjugal(‑like) association. of these two people, at least one 
was forced to enter into this relationship. The marriages took place in coercive 
circumstances, which ruled out the possibility of genuine consent.615
LeVine aptly calls the Khmer rouge marriages ‘conscripted marriages’.616 
The same terminology was used by the co‑Lawyers for the civil Parties in the 
eccc case against Kaing guek eav, the former director of the S‑21 prison camp, 
who spoke of the forced marriages in terms of ‘the conscription into conjugal 
relationships’.617 The qualification ‘conscription’, which refers to the compulsory 
enlistment or enrolment into a national service, usually an army, is also an 
appropriate term for the bush marriages that took place during the civil war in 
Sierra Leone – and several other recent conflicts on the african continent, such as 
in Uganda. in cambodia, men and women were given the order to marry for the 
613 compare in this regard the Lra: often young abductees (referred to as ting ting) were 
responsible for farming, finding water, carrying heavy loads, cooking and cleaning and 
waiting on their commanders and their ‘wives’. once a girl ting ting reached puberty and 
became wife to an individual fighter, she would rise in hierarchy and stand above these young 
slaves (Human rights Watch 2003b, pp. 13–14; SWaY 2008, p. 42).
614 mam 2000, pp. 8–9 et seq.
615 it is reiterated that not all marriages that took place under the Khmer rouge regime can be 
considered to have been forced.
616 LeVine 2010, p. 29.
617 Duch civil Parties’ co‑Lawyers’ request for supplementary preliminary investigations, 
para. 34.
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good of the revolution (i.e. to contribute to its achievement) and were told to report 
themselves at a given place on a given time and date to enter into this prescribed 
marriage.618 in Sierra Leone, abducted women and girls were given to rebel 
fighters as wives. in this capacity, many were not only forced to be subject to the 
sexual wishes of their bush husbands and cook and clean for them, but they also 
provided auxiliary services to the rebel forces: monitoring the food distribution 
process in the camps and the radio communication between the troops, giving 
orders, sending out spies, and leading looting and killing expeditions. in the 
absence of her bush husband, the first wife of a commander could even be in 
charge of the entire rebel compound. Seen in this light, both the Khmer rouge 
unions as well as the Sierra Leonean bush marriages can be regarded as forms of 
conscription.
6.3.2. Compelled to remain in the union (conjugal association) for a certain 
period
Both in Sierra Leone and in cambodia, the perpetrators (the bush husbands and 
members of Angkar respectively) caused the victims to remain in the conjugal 
associations for a certain period of time, varying from several weeks to several 
years. During this period, the victims were made to go through life as husband 
and wife. So the result of these forced conjugal associations was a general status of 
husband or wife and a prolonged association. The victims were not able to dissolve 
the marriage, and were consequently bound by the marriage in the marriage.619 in 
Sierra Leone, a woman could not leave her bush husband, whereas a man could 
easily end the bush marriage by abandoning his wife, for example by leaving her 
behind or sending her to the front line. in some cases, the end of the civil war did 
not bring any change in the women’s possibility to leave the bush marriage: some 
men forced their wives to stay with them; other women had no other option than 
to stay with their bush husbands because they were rejected by their relatives and 
had nowhere to go. in the latter cases, the women could, in theory, leave their 
bush husbands because they were no longer confined to the bush. in practice, 
however, some were still bound to their husbands: no longer directly by the ties of 
the bush marriage, but as a consequence of the adverse effect that this association 
had on their reintegration.
The state‑sanctioned Khmer rouge weddings excluded the possibility of 
separation and remarrying for both parties.620 it is not clear whether divorce was 
at all possible between 1975–1979, but a former sector secretary, whose testimony 
618 See also K. Dy, A history of Democratic Kampuchea (1975–1979), Phnom Penh: Documentation 
center of cambodia 2007, p. 35: ‘The main purpose of weddings, for the Khmer rouge, was not 
to form family units, but to produce children who could serve the revolution.’
619 mattler 2004, p. 28; and Scharf 2005, p. 96.
620 Duch civil Parties’ co‑Lawyers’ request for supplementary preliminary investigations, 
para. 34; and Jain 2008, p. 1026.
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was included in the closing order of eccc case 002 (see chapter 8), stated that, 
even though it was announced that couples were free to divorce, in reality anyone 
who split up a marriage would be in trouble and would be sent away to worksites 
for hard labour.621 The difficulty of separation even extended to the period after the 
fall of the Khmer rouge regime: many couples did not consider themselves able to 
separate and marry someone else because they had sworn to stay together, were 
officially married in the eyes of the community and divorce was not approved of 
socially.
6.3.3. Union created certain obligations and/or rights between spouses
as a result of the forced marital union, certain obligations and/or rights were 
created between the spouses; obligations and/or rights that they did not share 
with others.622 The most obvious consequence of the conjugal association 
was a sanctioned exclusivity between spouses. This exclusivity was reciprocal 
in cambodia: extra‑marital sexual intercourse was prohibited on pain of 
punishment. in Sierra Leone, the bush marriages were also based on exclusivity, 
but this exclusivity was unilateral: the woman was the exclusive sexual property of 
her bush husband; she could not have more than one husband and was not allowed 
to have sexual intercourse with other men. The bush husband, on the other hand, 
was allowed to have more than one wife and could also have extra‑marital sex 
with other women, as long as they were not associated with another rebel.
in addition to exclusivity, the marriages had other consequences that can be 
classified as obligations. in Sierra Leone, the woman had to perform duties that 
are traditionally associated with marriage in this country: many bush wives had 
to perform household tasks, such as washing, cooking and cleaning, they had to 
have sexual intercourse with their husbands and bear and rear children.623 The 
husband, in turn, provided a modicum of protection against the other rebels and 
gave his wife accommodation and food, sometimes allowing her to share in his 
loot. Providing for food and shelter is considered to be a duty of the husband 
in Sierra Leonean marriages.624 So by forcing a girl to become his bush wife, a 
rebel also indicated that he was willing to take on certain responsibilities and 
obligations generally ascribed to husbands.625 in some instances, bush marriages 
would improve the lives of the abductees in more ways than just protection: 
621 case 002 closing order, para. 845. LeVine 2010, p. 83 found one case of divorce: a man and 
woman married under Angkar both asked Angkar permission to separate, one month after 
their wedding, so that the woman could take care of her sick parents. Permission was granted 
and the man, who was a soldier, was sent to a different region, while the woman was allowed 
to stay in her village to look after her parents. it is not clear whether these two people were 
actually divorced, or just physically separated.
622 mattler 2004, p. 13; Scharf 2005, p. 85.
623 This is similar to the forced marriages that took place during the rwandan genocide.
624 coulter 2009, p. 79.
625 afrc expert report Thorsen, p. 16; and coulter 2009, p. 79.
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women could gain more power and esteem and some could delegate household 
tasks to younger slaves.626 in cambodia, marriage could be coupled with forced 
procreation. There are several accounts of couples who shared food with each 
other,627 but seeing as men and women (including spouses) generally did not live 
together, there existed few other rights and/or obligations between spouses apart 
from staying together (as they had pledged to Angkar on the wedding day) and 
having children.
6.3.4. The forced marriages served specific (but different) purposes
The aims with which the Khmer rouge contracted forced marriages were quite 
similar to the objectives of the Sierra Leonean rebels, with a few differences. 
The purpose of the cPK policy that regulated the marriages in cambodia was 
fourfold: marriages were arranged by the cPK to obtain absolute control over the 
interaction between individuals and their sexuality,628 in particular to increase 
population growth, to destroy the traditional family and to reaffirm loyalty 
to Angkar (which had replaced the roles of parents) by making spouses swear 
fidelity not only to each other, but also to Angkar. marriage was also used as a 
reward for those who had already proved their loyalty to Angkar, i.e. soldiers who 
had fought bravely or cPK cadre who had become handicapped in the line of 
duty. The primary goals, however, were obtaining absolute control over people’s 
lives (by taking over the traditional roles over parents in arranging marriages) 
and facilitating population growth by means of enforced procreation within 
marriages.629 extra‑marital sex was a crime against morality, so marriage was a 
prerequisite for procreation.630
The primary goal of the bush marriages in Sierra Leone seems to have been 
establishing a system of individual slavery, whereby commanders and fighters 
with a higher rank had personal slaves in the form of bush wives. in this way, 
the forced marriages were also a means of obtaining unpaid logistical support 
for rebel troops,631 and a method of organising life in the bush. moreover, 
626 compare in this regard also the Lra marriages, which often also allowed women to rise up the 
hierarchical ladder within the rebel camps.
627 See e.g. LeVine 2010, p. 30.
628 compare the Lra’s puritanical code of conduct with regard to sexuality: strict norms 
surrounding sexuality were used to maintain discipline, obtain control over the fighters, and 
to restrict the transmission of STDs (annan et al. 2009, p. 12). further, procreation was also 
a specific goal of the Lra marriages (carlson & mazurana 2008, p. 23–24; and allen 2005, 
p. 28).
629 again, compare the alleged Lra policy of impregnating forced wives.
630 m. Vickery, Cambodia 1975–1982, chiang mai: Silkworm Books 1999, p. 186: ‘one of the DK 
(Democratic Kampuchea; iH) goals, even if only for chauvinistic reasons, was an increase in 
population (…) since sexual relations outside marriage were prohibited by one of the strictest 
regulations of all (…) marriages were used to facilitate childbirth.’ Within many Lra camps, 
extra‑marital sex was also forbidden. intercourse was permitted only within sanctioned, Lra 
wedlock (amnesty international 1997, p. 19; and annan et al. 2009, p. 25).
631 rUf Trial Judgement, para. 2107.
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forced marriages helped keep rebel fighters and commanders committed to the 
movement, because the bush wives satisfied their sexual and emotional needs 
and took care of everyday chores.632 at the same time, the bush marriages in 
Sierra Leone were used as a reward system for rebels and a way to control the 
sexuality of the abducted women and girls.633 a supplementary goal of the bush 
marriages consisted in destroying family and social bonds634 and spreading 
terror and thereby increasing the rebels’ exercise of power and control over the 
population.635 The rebels’ bush marriage policy served no ideological purpose, 
unlike the Khmer rouge’s policy.
6.3.5. Elements of control and ownership636
a final similarity between the forced marriages that took place in cambodia in 
the second half of the 1970s and those that took place in Sierra Leone in the 1990s 
is that both types have characteristics that are redolent of enslavement. rebels 
treated their bush wives as their personal property in Sierra Leone, and the Khmer 
rouge exercised powers attaching to the right of ownership over cambodians, in 
effect enslaving an entire population.637
Pursuant to article 7(2)(c) rome Statute in conjunction with article 1(1) of the 
1926 Slavery convention, the crime of enslavement requires that the perpetrator 
exercised any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership over one 
or more persons. The icc eoc stipulate that this includes ‘purchasing, selling, 
lending or bartering such a person or persons, or by imposing on them a similar 
deprivation of liberty’.638 a footnote elucidates the term ‘deprivation of liberty’, 
holding that this may include trafficking in persons and, in some circumstances, 
reducing a person to a servile status such as by extracting labour or in the manners 
defined in the 1956 Supplementary convention on the abolition of Slavery, the 
Slave Trade, and institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery. in this regard, this 
1956 convention refers to practices of debt bondage, serfdom, certain instances of 
forced marriage (including widow inheritance), and the exploitation of children.
in the Kunarac et al. case, the icTY Trial chamber listed a number of factors 
that are to be taken into consideration in determining whether enslavement was 
committed in a particular case. The factors include:
632 as stated by the Prosecutor in rUf Prosecution final Trial Brief, para. 290.
633 Jain 2008, p. 1026.
634 rUf Trail Judgement, para. 1349.
635 rUf Trial Judgement, paras. 1351–1352 and 2070; and oosterveld 2011, pp. 69–70.
636 Note that in this paragraph, the entire factual complex surrounding forced marriages is 
assessed; the question of whether the forceful conferral of marital status sec could qualify as 
slavery, is addressed in chapter 10.
637 Ngor 1989, p. 289 uses the term ‘war slaves’.
638 article 7(1)(c)‑1 icc eoc.
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‘the control of someone’s movement, control of physical environment, 
psychological control, measures taken to prevent or deter escape, force, threat of 
force or coercion, duration, assertion of exclusivity, subjection to cruel treatment 
and abuse, control of sexuality and forced labour.’639
The bush marriages most strongly resemble enslavement: abducted women 
and girls were given to rebels as wives without the possibility to refuse. in the 
case of most bush marriages, all the above‑mentioned factors quoted from the 
Kunarac et al. case were present to a certain extent. The movements of the bush 
wives were closely monitored: most were guarded by a number of bodyguards, 
both to protect them from attacks from other rebels and to prevent them from 
escaping. many were confined to the rebel compound or their husband’s house 
and could only leave the premises after they had obtained permission. The 
husbands not only controlled their wives’ movements, they also controlled their 
sexuality: a bush wife was not allowed to have sexual intercourse with anyone but 
her husband on pain of severe punishment. in addition, the wives were forced 
to work for their husbands: labour which included portering, cooking, cleaning 
and laundering. The bush wives had to obey their husbands’ demands and were 
often subjected to abuse and cruel treatment. The men treated their wives as 
their personal property,640 and could dispose of them as they saw fit. Bangura, 
the expert witness for the Prosecution in the afrc trial, even argued that the 
rebels used the terms ‘marriage’ and ‘wife’ as a means to express their control 
over the women. The deliberate and strategic use of this terminology worked two 
ways: on the one hand it was a way to openly stake a claim, to express to other 
rebels that a particular woman belonged to a particular man and to demonstrate 
the permanence of the association. on the other hand, the use of the word ‘wife’ 
served to psychologically manipulate the abducted women.641 in the words of the 
rUf Trial chamber: ‘the use of the term “wife” by the rebels was deliberate and 
strategic, with the aim of enslaving and psychologically manipulating the women 
and with the purpose of treating them like possessions’.642
in cambodia, it was not individuals, but the government that enslaved people. 
The cPK evacuated cities and villages and relocated civilians in communities 
where they were forced to work, cultivating the land and constructing irrigation 
projects. if they refused to work or did not work hard enough, they were at risk 
of being sent for ‘re‑education’, a euphemism for being sent to interrogation and 
security centres.643 in many communities, the living conditions were appalling and 
639 Kunarac et al. Trial Judgement, para. 543 (footnotes omitted).
640 compare Kunarac et al. Trial Judgement, para. 728 (and 738): ‘the girls were treated as personal 
property of the accused Kunarac and DP 6, they had to do household chores and they had to 
obey all demands.’
641 afrc expert report Bangura, pp. 15–16.
642 rUf Trial Judgement, para. 1466 (emphasis added).
643 case 002 closing order, para. 145.
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hundreds of thousands of cambodians died as a result of starvation, exhaustion 
and maltreated illness. Not only people’s movements, but also their interaction 
and communication with others and even their thoughts were controlled, as 
many believed Angkar was omnipresent and able to read minds. The complete 
control the cPK had over the cambodians is evidenced by the fact that it was 
able to regulate the marriages that took place from at least 1977 up to 1979 and 
coerce people into conjugal relations and subsequently force them to procreate. 
By prohibiting extra‑marital sexual relations and forcing men and women into 
marriages, often allowing them no say in the selection of a spouse, men and 
women could not have sex with anyone but their spouse and were prevented from 
marrying anyone else.644
When the perpetrator, in addition to exercising powers attached to the 
right of ownership, also causes the enslaved person to engage in one or more 
acts of a sexual nature, the legal requirements of the crime of sexual slavery are 
satisfied.645 in many cases, sexual abuse constituted a large part of the victims’ 
ordeal within the bush marriages. Therefore, the bush marriages also resulted in 
sexual slavery.646 The same may be said for some of the Khmer rouge marriages: 
in those cases in which the Khmer rouge ordered married couples to have sexual 
intercourse with each other, the elements of sexual slavery might be satisfied.647
7. comPariSoN: forceD marriageS iN 
coNfLicT SiTUaTioNS aND forceD 
marriageS iN THe NeTHerLaNDS aND 
eNgLaND
forced marriages happen on a daily basis, in times of conflict, as well as in times 
of peace. Looking at the forced marriages that were described in this chapter and 
the previous one, it immediately becomes clear that there is a difference between 
the perpetrators of these marriages: i.e. the people who force others to enter 
into conjugal associations. in england and the Netherlands, forced marriages 
are often the result of people close to the victim, usually parents and direct kin, 
interfering in the victim’s life. Parents use pressure to force their children to 
enter into a marriage to protect family honour, to fulfil a promise made to the 
644 See also eccc case 002 civil Parties’ co‑Lawyers’ Second investigative request concerning 
forced marriages and forced sexual relations, para. 27: ‘couples were convened, married, and 
then assigned to spend night(s) together and to have conjugal visits later on. People were 
controlled and ordered how, where, and when, to conduct their conjugal life as a wedded 
couple with their new partners. This practice should be considered as enslavement as a crime 
against humanity.’ 
645 article 7(1)(g)‑2 icc eoc.
646 See afrc, rUf and Taylor Judgements.
647 This is further examined in chapter 10.
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parents of the other spouse, to facilitate entrance to a country, and/or because 
they believe they act in their child’s best interests. There are also examples where 
forced marriages take place in a different context, such as in the course of human 
trafficking.648 Dutch courts have dealt with several such cases649 and the Dutch 
Human Trafficking rapporteur reported on several occasions that the police are 
increasingly often confronted with female prostitutes who are victims of human 
trafficking and whose stay in the Netherlands is dependent on a marriage. The 
rapporteur does not deal with the issue of the exent to which these marriages 
are forced, but it would appear justified, considering the circumstances these 
women are in, to assume that at least some of these marriages are forced.650 other 
examples of forced marriages that usually, but not necessarily exclusively, take 
place outside the family context are cases of bride kidnapping.651 apart from these 
exceptions, the majority of forced marriages in the Netherlands and england take 
place in the context of the family and are usually coupled with psychological or 
more subtle forms of coercion. The period over which the coercion is exercised is 
in most cases protracted: this may be illustrated by a Scottish case concerning a 
man of Pakistani origin who had been under pressure from his parents and other 
family members for twelve years to enter into a marriage with his cousin. He was 
told that refusal would bring shame and degradation to his family and he was 
blamed for the death of his father, who had died of a stroke and whose last wish 
had been that his son would agree to the marriage. When his mother’s health 
began declining and his family told him he would need a wife who would take 
care of his mother, he eventually relented and married his cousin. at the time of 
this marriage, he was living with his girlfriend whom he intended to marry and 
with whom he had a child.652
This differs from conflict situations. as demonstrated inter alia by the 
conflicts in Sierra Leone, Uganda, cambodia and the Drc, in times of conflict, 
family members often have no involvement whatsoever in the forced conjugal 
associations that take place and (family) honour is generally not an issue in 
forced marriages. in cambodia, the Khmer rouge took over parents’ traditional 
role in arranging the marriage of their children; in several conflicts in african 
countries, rebel groups abducted women and girls and divided them amongst 
themselves as wives. The run‑up to these marriage is considerably shorter and the 
means of coercion more aggressive and violent; the marriages are usually brought 
about with (threats of) physical violence. in addition, it appears that, in times of 
648 See e.g. guideline of the Public Prosecution Service on human trafficking within the meaning 
of servitude and labour exploitation (2012r002), 1 may 2012.
649 See inter alia District court Utrecht 1  June 2011, ecLi:NL:rBUTr:2011:Bq6884. See also 
chapter 2.
650 Human trafficking, Third report of the National rapporteur, The Hague: Bureau Nrm July 
2004, pp. 83–84.
651 Dutch Supreme court 27 february 1990, nJ 1991, 109; Dutch Supreme court 2 July 1990, nJ 
1991, 110; and Smidt & rijken 2005, pp. 9–10. See also chapter 7 (legal framework).
652 Mahmud v. Mahmud (1994) SLT 599, p. 599.
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peace (that is to say at least in the Netherlands and england), relatively more men 
become victims of forced marriages than in times of conflict (with the exception 
of cambodia). in the latter situations, the vast majority of victims are women.
8. coNcLUDiNg remarKS
as this chapter demonstrates, a complex body of material facts, commonly 
denoted by the umbrella term ‘forced marriage’, occurs in conflicts all over 
the world. it appears that forced marriages are especially prevalent in african 
conflicts: there are reports of forced marriages taking place during the conflicts 
in inter alia angola, the Democratic republic of congo, Liberia, the central 
african republic, mozambique, rwanda, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. in the 
previous paragraphs, the forced marriages that took place during two conflicts in 
particular were highlighted: the bush marriages that took place during the civil 
war in Sierra Leone (‘rebel marriages’) and the forced arranged marriages that 
were contracted by order of the Khmer rouge government (‘government‑planned 
marriages’).
in Sierra Leone, rebels abducted thousands of women and girls and forced 
them into associations that are known as bush marriages: situations of individual 
slavery that were referred to as marriage in the bush, but that were not recognised as 
legitimate marriages by the Sierra Leonean community. in these bush marriages, 
many girls were raped, abused and used as slaves. and although many former 
bush wives were (eventually) welcomed back by their family, they nevertheless 
suffered from secondary victimisation through stigmatisation, discrimination 
and socio‑economic marginalisation, just like the majority of rape victims and 
child soldiers. Stigma, therefore, is not synonymous with rejection or ostracism 
(by family or community) and ought not to be conflated with it.
The practice of forced marriage was also dominant in the 1970s under the 
rule of Pol Pot. During the Khmer rouge regime, the cambodian government 
arranged marriages between civilians as part of policies aimed at population 
growth and breaking all family ties to facilitate complete loyalty to Angkar. The 
systematic arrangement of marriages demonstrated that the Khmer rouge had 
taken over the traditional role of parents of all cambodians. most people had little 
or no say in this matter: they were informed by Khmer rouge officials that it had 
been decided that they would marry a certain person on a settled date and time. 
from interviews with survivors of the Khmer rouge era, it follows that in some 
collectives, married couples were ordered to have sex with each other whereas in 
other collectives, sexual intercourse was not prescribed. as evidenced by the same 
survivor narratives, couples were not expected to build an emotional bond: many 
couples were separated a few days after their wedding and those who were not 
separated hardly saw each other since they worked long days in the labour groups 
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which were classified on the basis of sex and age. many couples remained married 
after the fall of the Khmer rouge.
it appears that forced marriage can be seen as a policy‑based crime: in 
conflict situations, forced marriages are often used for particular reasons. The 
main goal pertains to dominion: gaining control over people and regulating 
their sexual conduct. in cambodia and within the Lra, life was governed by 
a puritanical code and sex was only allowed within sanctioned wedlock. Seen 
from this perspective, the marriages were also used as a way to legitimise sex. as 
a consequence, adultery was prohibited: unilateral if not bilateral. in cambodia 
and Uganda, married couples were not allowed to have sex with others; in Sierra 
Leone, a bush wife was forbidden to have sexual relations with someone other 
than her captor husband. in cambodia and Uganda, moreover, procreation seems 
to have been an additional goal of the forced associations, whereas the Sierra 
Leonean rebels mainly used bush marriages as a means to establish a system of 
individual slavery.
in all cases described above, a union between two (or more) people was 
established against the will of at least one of the individuals involved. The union 
was established by force, or by threat of force or coercion, such as that caused by 
fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or abuse of power, 
against such person or another person, or by taking advantage of a coercive 
environment or such person’s or persons’ incapacity to give genuine consent.653 
This union resulted in a (prolonged) association that was, within the particular 
context in which it took place, regarded as conjugal or conjugal‑like, and it created 
certain (unilateral or bilateral) rights and/or obligations between the parties or 
between the parties and a third party.
653 Wording based on element two of the definition of rape in the icc eoc.
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The central question of this research revolves around criminalisation of forced 
marriage: should this practice be criminalised, and, if so, how? Should it be 
prohibited as a distinct, separate offence, or under the heading of (generic) 
existing crimes? Decisions regarding criminalisation are, for a large part, based 
on policy choices and political considerations, and are therefore dependent on 
the political hue of the incumbent government. for example, in the Netherlands, 
(criminal) law was traditionally used more or less exclusively as an instrument of 
‘codification’, that is to say as a means to record existing moral views. However, 
as a result of the development of Dutch society from a welfare state into a 
security state, coupled with the growing influence of populism, (criminal) law 
is increasingly used as an instrument of ‘modification’, i.e. as a means to change 
views and behaviour in society. This has led to a trend of increased willingness 
to penalise and thus to a proliferation of criminal offences.654 The same can be 
said for england, indeed, it has been stated that anglo‑american jurisdictions in 
general create offences in a casual and routine manner.655
Yet irrespective of the highly political nature of criminalisation, certain 
guidelines can be distilled from legal doctrine. The issue of criminalisation 
has exercised and still exercises many minds and the question of what justifies 
criminal prohibition has inspired lawyers and philosophers to fill reams upon 
reams of paper, exploring the conditions that must be satisfied before the state may 
654 De Hullu 2012, pp. 10–11; groenhuijsen 1987, pp. 11–12; and T. Koopmans, ‘De rol van de 
wetgever’, in: Honderd jaar rechtsleven. De nederlandse Juristen‑Vereniging, 1870–1970, 
Zwolle: W.e.J. Tjeenk Willink 1970, p. 4. See also cleiren 2012, p. 23.
655 D. Husak, ‘The criminal Law as Last resort’, (24) 2004 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 
p. 208. See also ashworth & Horder 2013, pp. 5–6. it was estimated that between may 1997 
and august 2006, the Blair government created 3,023 criminal offences: 1,169 introduced by 
primary legislation – which is debated in Parliament – and 1,854 by secondary legislation 
such as statutory instruments (N. morris, ‘Blair’s “frenzied law making”: a new offence for 
every day spent in office’, The Independent 16 august 2006, available at <www.independent.
co.uk/news/uk/politics/blairs‑frenzied‑law‑making‑‑a‑new‑offence‑for‑every‑day‑spent‑in‑o
ffice‑412072.html>). chalmers & Leverick 2013, p. 551 counted the number of offences created 
in 1997–1998 and reached a total of 1,235 offences that are applicable to england. on the basis 
of this exercise, they estimate that the number of offences created between 1997 and 2006 is 
considerably higher than 3,023.
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proscribe certain behaviour, thereby subjecting the culpable offender to criminal 
liability and (subsequently) punishment. Throughout the years, different theories 
of criminalisation have been articulated. There are clear similarities between 
these theories, which, for a large part, build on each other. as De Hullu – one 
of the leading Dutch criminal law scholars – noted, what most theories have in 
common is that they require that the necessity and added value of criminalisation 
must be demonstrated, either from a practical or from an ideological or legal 
theoretical point of view.656 These theories have all been summarised, discussed 
and criticised in many writings.657 Therefore, instead of offering yet another 
summarising overview of all different criminalisation theories, this chapter aims 
to provide a brief synthesis of the most important (contemporary) english and 
Dutch penalisation theories by presenting a set of principles that are common 
to the majority of theories.658 The result is a frame of reference containing a 
656 De Hullu 2012, pp. 15 and 17.
657 for an overview of Dutch theories, see e.g. cleiren 2012, pp. 10–12; De Hullu 2012, pp. 13–24; 
Haveman 1998, pp. 11–41; and remmelink 1996, pp. 26–43.
658 many different (sub) criteria for criminalisation have been formulated in literature. in this 
chapter, only six are discussed (harm, wrong, proportionality, subsidiarity, effectiveness 
and legality). other criteria include the ‘absolute negative criteria’ formulated by Hulsman: 
criminalisation should not take place 1. when the primary goal is to change moral views 
concerning certain behaviour; 2. when the primary goal is to create possibilities to help 
(potential) convicted persons; 3. when this would cause problems for the capacity of the law 
enforcement apparatus; 4. when criminalisation is a spurious solution to the problem, i.e. 
when it does not reasonably contribute to solving the problem (Hulsman 1972, pp. 90–91). 
The ‘relative criteria’ for criminalisation formulated by Hulsman: criminalisation ought to be 
questioned when the particular act concerns conduct that 1. chiefly occurs in socially weak 
groups or groups that are subject to discrimination; 2. is generally not reported to the police; 
3. has a very high prevalence; 4. is displayed by a very large number of people; 5. generally only 
happens in emergency situations; 6. is not easily defined accurately; 7. usually takes place in 
the privacy of an individual’s house; or 8. is regarded as permissible by a significant part of 
the population (Hulsman 1972, pp. 91–92). Haveman created a framework for criminalisation 
debates which focuses on four questions: 1. is there a problematic situation that requires a 
response? 2. do the authorities have a role to play in this? 3. are there adequate non‑criminal 
responses? 4. is the criminal law an adequate response? (4a. it is possible to isolate certain 
behaviour from the problematic situation; 4b. this behaviour is illegal and blameworthy; 4c. 
this behaviour can be legally defined; 4d. criminalisation is proportional; 4e. criminalisation 
helps achieve one of the aims of criminal law; 4f. criminalisation is necessary in view of legal 
protection, see Haveman 1998, pp. 43, 73–81 and 416–417). Principles of criminalisation listed 
by ashworth & Horder include individual autonomy, welfare, harm, public wrongs, and the 
minimalist approach encompassing respect for human rights, the right not to be punished, 
last resort, and not criminalising where this would be counterproductive (ashworth & Horder 
2013, pp. 22–43). Husak’s criteria of harm, wrongfulness, desert, the state’s burden of proof 
to justify a penal offence, substantial state interest, direct advancement of the government’s 
purpose, and prevention of over‑inclusiveness) on criminalisation (Husak 2008, pp. 55 and 
120–122). finally, the principles of criminalisation listed by Simester and Von Hirsch, inter 
alia harm, wrong, and mediating considerations concerning privacy, regulatory alternatives, 
fair warning, fair labelling, and practical constraints (Simester & Von Hirsch 2011, pp. 3–88 
and 189–211). This list is not exhaustive; there are more criteria. for a literature overview, see 
the previous footnote. it should be noted that fair labelling is an important criminalisation 
criterion in anglo‑american literature. But because the crux of the principle of fair labelling 
is, to a large extent, already covered by the principles of legality and subsidiarity (which are 
dealt with in this book), fair labelling is not addressed as such in this research.
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non‑exhaustive set of criteria that can be used when answering the question 
of whether the criminal law should be used to regulate certain conduct. The 
principles discussed in this chapter are based on the ‘traditional moral criminal 
law’, on the so‑called core criminal offences, and not on purely regulatory or strict 
liability offences. Traditionally, criminal law dealt only with the most morally 
reprehensible of crimes, so‑called mala in se crimes such as murder, rape and theft. 
During the past few decades, however, the criminal law is being used increasingly 
often as a form of governance: a means to regulate activities. minor ‘offences’ 
are brought within the ambit of criminal law; acts that cannot, in the traditional 
meaning of the word, be said to cause severe harm or to constitute a public wrong. 
This is especially the case in england, which, unlike the Netherlands, does not 
have a non‑criminal (e.g. administrative) system of sanctioning.659, 660
The principles discussed below were distilled from the writings of inter alia 
mill, feinberg, Simester, Von Hirsch, Husak, ashworth, Horder, Duff, Hulsman, 
Van Bemmelen, De roos,661 corstens, Haveman and De Hullu.
Broadly speaking, the criteria can be divided into three categories. first, a 
duo of prerequisites for criminalisation, referred to as primary criteria: harm and 
wrong are indispensible requirements for legitimate criminalisation; they offer 
an in‑principle justification for penalisation.662 Secondly, there are criteria that 
militate against criminalisation, so called limiting or moderating principles: 
proportionality, subsidiarity (external as well as internal) and a set of practical 
constraints, such as issues relating to enforceability, i.e. efficiency, efficacy, 
policing and evidentiary matters. The third part of this chapter deals with legality 
(in the meaning of lex certa or maximum certainty). This principle forms part of 
some Dutch theories of criminalisation, but it is not used as such in this book. 
instead, it is argued in paragraph 4 that this tertiary criterion comes into play 
after the criminalisation decision has been made.
Before discussing the criminalisation criteria, two remarks must be made. 
first, it should be noted that theories on criminalisation generally depart from 
the presumption that there is no criminal legislation that deals with the conduct 
in question. Yet in many cases, such conduct will already be (partly) subsumed 
659 See also ashworth & Horder 2013, pp. 2–4; and Simester & Von Hirsch 2011, pp. 212–232.
660 This is not to say that there have been no proposals to criminalise minor harms in the 
Netherlands, see for example a proposal launched by several politicians to criminalise ‘hissing’ 
at women in the streets as a form of sexual intimidation: P. van den Dool, ‘Na Pvda wil nu 
ook VVD boete voor sissen naar vrouwen’, nRC 10 august 2012, available at <www.nrc.nl/
nieuws/2012/08/10/na‑pvda‑wil‑nu‑ook‑vvd‑boete‑voor‑sissen‑naar‑vrouwen/>, last accessed 
December 2013.
661 The criteria for criminalisation formulated by De roos were taken as the starting point for 
this chapter. according to De roos, the legislator is authorised to criminalise behaviour if 
this behaviour is (1) harmful and (2) cannot be tolerated in the context of individual freedom. 
Whether the legislator should use this competence is determined by the principles of 
(3) subsidiarity, (4) proportionality, (5) legality and (6) practical applicability and effectiveness 
(De roos 1987, pp. 53–78).
662 Simester & Von Hirsch 2011, p. 32.
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under existing (broad) offences. The theories are therefore not in line with the 
legal reality: they are based on a legal fiction. This means that the theories and 
their distinct criteria cannot necessarily be used as a perfect template in all 
criminalisation debates, as will be demonstrated in chapter 10 with a view to 
the criminalisation of forced marriage. Secondly, the criteria for criminalisation 
discussed in this chapter were derived from criminalisation theories that were 
developed in the context of national legal systems. The question of whether 
(and to which extent) these criteria also apply to criminalisation on the level of 
international criminal law will be addressed in chapter 6.
2. PrimarY criTeria: THreSHoLD PriNciPLeS
2.1. a DUaL‑eLemeNT THr eSHoLD
considerations regarding a) harmfulness and b) wrongfulness feature, with 
varying emphasis, in all contemporary theories of criminalisation.663 Duff and 
moore, for example, ground their penalisation doctrines principally on the concept 
of wrongfulness (a school of thought referred to as legal moralism), whereas inter 
alia feinberg and De roos underline the importance of harmfulness.664 others, 
such as Simester, Von Hirsch, Husak, Van Bemmelen and ashworth and Horder 
argue in favour of a two‑element approach and state that justified criminalisation 
requires that conduct not only be harmful, but that it is also wrongful.665
as a justification for criminalisation, harm and wrong are in fact two sides 
of the same coin, which will be demonstrated below. conduct can be harmful 
without being wrongful (e.g. causing a person considerable emotional distress 
for example by ending a relationship; and some forms of honest competition 
such as drastically lowering the prices of merchandise as a result of which other 
entrepreneurs go out of business) and wrongful without being harmful (e.g. 
offending someone behind their back is wrongful but not necessarily harmful 
to that person, provided the offensive conduct does not amount to defamation or 
racism).666 Yet justified criminalisation requires conduct to be harmful as well as 
wrongful: the harm principle forms a rational test in the debate on the limits of 
the criminal law, functioning as a gate keeper that forms a buffer against absolute 
moralism. The wrongfulness requirement forms a barrier against criminalisation 
663 Von Hirsch 2014, pp. 246–247.
664 See Duff 2014, pp. 217–235; m.S. moore, Placing Blame: A General Theory of the Criminal Law, 
oxford: oUP 2010, pp. 33–35; feinberg 1984, pp. 34–36; and De roos 1987, pp. 53–78 (mill 
also emphasises the importance of harmfulness, see Simester & Von Hirsch 2011, p. 21).
665 Von Hirsch 2014, pp. 248–251; and Simester & Von Hirsch 2011, p. 21; Husak 2008, pp. 55; 
65–67; Van Bemmelen 1973, p. 10; and ashworth & Horder 2013, pp. 28–30.
666 ashworth & Horder 2013, p. 29; and Simester & Von Hirsch 2011, pp. 22–30.
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of conduct that only causes remote harm.667 Harm and wrong can therefore be 
considered to be the threshold criteria for criminalisation.
2 .2 . Har m
mill is said to be the auctor intellectualis of the harm principle. in his 1859 
publication On Liberty, he presents harm as a negative668 constraint: ‘the only 
purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a 
civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, 
either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant.’669 feinberg, on the other hand, 
presents harm as a positive ground for penalisation, stating that preventing harm 
to persons is always a good reason in support of criminalisation provided that 
there is no equally effective alternative to penal legislation.670 feinberg defines 
harm as a setback of interests: when an interest – that is a ‘thing in which one 
has a stake,’671 so a claim or an entitlement – is left in a worse state than it was in 
beforehand. Harm therefore causes a negative effect upon a person’s well‑being 
by an impairment of some resource, either personal (physical), proprietary or 
otherwise.672 Simester and Von Hirsch define ‘resource’ as ‘an asset or capability 
of the person that subsists over a longer term; is independent of consciousness (i.e. 
not purely a subjective state); and is capable of contributing to the quality of the 
person’s existence.’673
Harm causes a change, ‘an adverse effect, upon something substantial’.674 
To paraphrase Ten Voorde, this unlawful change was caused by someone (the 
perpetrator) who had a certain degree of control over the ways in which and the 
extent to which this change was brought about.675 The kinds of harm that generally 
fall within the ambit of the criminal law are harms to an individual’s ‘personal or 
physical sources’, i.e. physical and mental harm and harm to personal property: 
kicking someone in the head, threatening someone with death, and setting 
fire to someone’s car are all acts that cause types of harms which would justify 
667 Von Hirsch 2014, pp. 250–251; Herring 2009, p. 11; and De roos 1987, p. 53.
668 meaning that in the absence of harm, the state is not authorised to intervene by prohibiting 
conduct.
669 J.S. mill, On Liberty, London: J.W. Parker and Son 1859, p. 22.
670 feinberg thus seems to include the subsidiarity principle (see infra paragraph 3.2) within the 
harm principle: ‘it is always a good reason in support of penal legislation that it would be 
effective in preventing (eliminating, reducing) harm to persons other than the actor (the one 
prohibited from acting) and there is no other means that is equally effective at no greater cost 
to other values’ (feinberg 1984, p. 26; emphasis added). See also Simester & Von Hirsch 2011, 
p. 35.
671 feinberg 1984, p. 34.
672 feinberg 1984, pp. 33–34; and Simester & Von Hirsch 2011, pp. 35–37.
673 Von Hirsch 2014, p. 249; and Simester & Von Hirsch 2011, p. 37.
674 Simester & Von Hirsch 2011, p. 36.
675 Ten Voorde 2012, p. 68.
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criminalisation. But the concept of change implies that harm in the context of 
criminal law is broader than harm to a person’s life, body or property.676 Harm 
without an obvious victim can also amount to a criminal harm. good examples 
are evading taxes and polluting the environment, two acts which cause harm to 
society. Then there is an entire category of behaviour that has been criminalised 
because it causes risk of harm, such as gun possession and driving while under 
the influence.677
The notion of using criminal law solely to prevent harm to others encompasses 
the tolerance principle. This principle, which emphasises individual freedom, 
holds that only those types of harmful behaviour that cannot be tolerated from the 
perspective of individual freedom ought to be criminalised. in De roos’ view, the 
state derives its authority to punish from the harm and tolerance principles: only 
when conduct causes harm that cannot be tolerated would the state be authorised 
to criminalise this conduct. This limiting principle also incorporates the idea of 
anti‑paternalism: after all, paternalism, by its very nature, is intolerant.678 Liberal 
theory and the principle of individual autonomy require that the state grants 
individuals the freedom to make their own decisions, and that it refrains from 
taking decisions (e.g. to criminalise certain conduct) in their best interest.679
The harm principle680 requires the extent, gravity and likelihood of the harm 
involved in the conduct to be weighed against the implications of the enforcement 
of criminal law, such as loss of liberty and violations of other fundamental rights. 
The balancing quality of the harm principle is reflected in what is referred to as the 
standard harms analysis; a test that is used to determine whether certain harmful 
behaviour should be criminalised.681 feinberg lists the following rules of thumb:
a. the greater the gravity of a possible harm, the less probable its occurrence 
need be to justify prohibition of the conduct that threatens to produce it;
b. the greater the probability of harm, the less grave the harm need be to justify 
coercion;
c. the greater the magnitude of the risk of harm, itself compounded out of gravity 
and probability, the less reasonable it is to accept the risk;
d. the more valuable (useful) the dangerous conduct, both to the actor and to 
others, the more reasonable it is to take the risk of harmful consequences, and 
676 Ten Voorde 2012, p. 68.
677 Simester & Von Hirsch distinguish three types of harms: direct, primary harms; remote, 
primary harms; and secondary, reactive harms (Simester & Von Hirsch 2011, p.  44). This 
research deals with the first category: direct harms.
678 De roos 1987, pp. 58–59.
679 ashworth & Horder 2013, p. 25.
680 in addition to the harm principle, the so‑called offence principle refers to conduct that 
is not necessarily harmful, but that causes affront (such as insults and exhibitionism). The 
offence principle is not discussed in this book, because it is not relevant in the context of the 
criminalisation of forced marriage. for a detailed discussion of the offense principle, see 
J. feinberg, Offense to Others, oxford: oUP 1985.
681 Simester & Von Hirsch 2011, pp. 45 and 55; and feinberg 1984, p. 216.
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for extremely valuable conduct it is reasonable to run risks up to the point of 
clear and present danger;
e. the more reasonable the risk of harm (the danger), the weaker is the case for 
prohibiting the conduct that creates it.682
from these rules of thumb, Simester and Von Hirsch distil the following steps:
Step 1: consider the gravity of the eventual harm, and its likelihood. The greater 
the gravity and likelihood, the stronger the case for criminalisation.
Step 2: Weigh against the foregoing, the social value of the conduct, and the degree 
of intrusion upon actors’ choices that criminalisation would involve. The 
more valuable the conduct is, or the more prohibition would limit liberty, 
the stronger the countervailing case would be.
Step 3: observe certain side‑constraints that would preclude criminalisation. 
The prohibition should not, for example, infringe rights of privacy or free 
expression.683
When these criteria are met, a strong, though not a conclusive, case for 
criminalisation can be made. conduct that is harmful can be criminalised, 
but the harm principle does not imply that such conduct must be criminalised: 
justified criminalisation requires that prohibited conduct is also wrongful.684
2 .3. WroNg
The mere fact that conduct causes harm does not necessarily mean that it ought 
to be criminalised. criminal law prohibits behaviour that is deemed (morally) 
wrong, reprehensible, and this requires the person who culpably perpetrates it to 
be punished and censured. a form of wrongdoing or wrongfulness is therefore 
a starting condition, an indispensible requirement for criminalisation: only 
conduct that is wrong for some reason ought to be criminalised.685 conduct that 
involves culpably harming another person (battery) can be regarded as wrong, 
as can creating unwarranted risks of injury (driving under the influence) and 
breaking important communal obligations (tax evasion).686 Wrongness is a 
complex principle: there are no fixed criteria for determining whether an act is 
682 feinberg 1984, p. 216.
683 Simester & Von Hirsch 2011, p. 55. other side‑constraints are discussed below in paragraph 3.3.
684 Herring states that the harm principle is best used as a test to determine what conduct should 
not be criminalised (Herring 2009, p. 11).
685 Simester & Von Hirsch 2011, pp. 20–21 and 23: ‘establishing that an action is wrong (…) is 
indispensible to justifying its prohibition.’ Haveman 1998, pp.  74–75: wrongfulness and 
culpability are conditions for criminality. and Husak 2008, pp. 93–94.
686 Some acts, such as murder, therefore, are wrong because of the harm they cause. other acts, 
such as blackmail and racism, are considered wrong independent of the harm they cause 
(Simester & Von Hirsch 2011, pp. 20–21).
Forceandmarriage.indd   125 20-5-2014   10:42:04
126 intersentia




wrong. indeed in many instances this is mainly based on intuitive considerations, 
but in general, it can be said that violating a person’s interests, causing immediate 
harm to a person’s resources, counts as a wrong. The wrong arises out of the harm 
that was done. 687+688 or, as stated by Seher: ‘a wrong is the deliberate, reckless or 
negligent violation of the interests of other persons (or the state)’.689 The word 
‘violation’ implies that the act was carried out without (the required) permission 
of the person whose rights/interests were harmed.
a further specification of the wrongfulness requirement is found in what is 
referred to as the public element. as stated, criminal law conveys public censure; 
conviction for a criminal offence can be seen as a reaction of society as a whole 
to certain conduct that is deemed wrongful. This implies that the criminal law 
should only be invoked to respond to wrongs that are of concern to the community 
as a whole.690 as Duff states: ‘a public wrong is thus a wrong against the polity 
as a whole, not just against the individual victim: given our identification with 
the victim as a fellow citizen, and our shared commitment to the values that the 
rapist violates, we must see the victim’s wrong as also being our wrong.’691 as a 
consequence, the community is responsible for punishing these types of wrongs.
The divide between public and private wrongs brings to the fore the principle 
of privacy. in general, it can be said that people’s private spheres of life deserve 
to be protected from state intervention, unless the behaviour in question would 
constitute a serious wrong. for example, what two (or more) consenting adults, 
whether they be of the opposite or the same sex, do in the privacy of their 
bedroom, is none of the state’s business.692 This might change if the lovers take 
their amorous activities elsewhere – say a shopping mall or a train station. once 
the behaviour enters the public sphere, it might turn into a public wrong. an 
example of an act that is wrong independent of the place where it is committed is 
domestic violence.693
687 Von Hirsch 2014, p. 252; Seher 2014, pp. 260–262; and Simester & Von Hirsch 2011, pp. 44–46.
688 it is more difficult to determine the wrongfulness of conduct that causes remote harm or 
offence. This falls outside the scope of this research. for a detailed account, see Simester & Von 
Hirsch 2011, pp. 46–56 and 91–100.
689 Seher 2014, p. 260. a wrong, therefore, is a culpable violation of another’s interests.
690 ashworth & Horder 2013, p. 30.
691 r.a. Duff, Answering for Crime: Responsibility and Liability in the Criminal Law, oxford: Hart 
Publishing 2007, p. 142.
692 only in very extreme cases of (sexual) sadism would state intervention by means of criminal 
law stand to reason. See for example the case of the so‑called cannibal of rotenburg, armin 
meiwes, who videotaped the killing of his victim, who had volunteered to be killed and 
eaten by meiwes (Bundesgerichtshof 22 april 2005, 2 Str 310/04). See also the case of former 
Belgium judge aurousseau who was found guilty of assault on his wife, who had given him full 
permission to puncture her breasts with needles, brand her and stitch up her vagina (antwerp 
court of appeal 30 September 1997, Rechtskundig weekblad 1997–98, pp. 749–750; Belgium 
court of cassation 6 January 1998, Bulletin des arrêts de la Cour de cassation 1998, 11; and 
ectHr 17 february 2005, appl. No. 42758/98 (K.A. and A.D. v. Belgium)).
693 Herring 2009, pp. 19 and 22. See also Simester & Von Hirsch 2011, pp. 190–192.
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an element of wrong (in the sense of wrongdoing) is thus a necessary 
requirement for criminalisation. Yet it is not a sufficiently limiting condition, 
many acts that amount to torts, for example, qualify as ‘wrong’, but this does not 
mean they should be criminalised. criminalisation is justified when an instance 
of wrongdoing ‘directly or indirectly affects people’s lives, such that its regulation 
would tend to prevent harms’.694 But, paraphrasing feinberg, harm and wrong are 
two good reasons in favour of criminalisation; they are not decisive factors. How 
to determine whether or not to criminalise wrongful harming? This is discussed 
in the following paragraph.
3. SecoNDarY criTeria: moDeraTiNg 
PriNciPLeS
De Hullu stresses the dynamic character of substantive criminal law695 and does 
not choose a set of clearly defined criteria that can be applied to criminalisation 
matters. He emphasises that the interpretation of such criteria is dependent on 
particular circumstances and prevailing views during a certain period of time. 
De Hullu therefore proposes a more pragmatic, casuistic approach, which comes 
down to balancing the arguments in favour of and against criminalisation in each 
case.696 The framework presented in this chapter will follow this approach. Harm 
and wrong, as described above, are the threshold criteria for criminalisation. 
When the conclusion is that certain wrongful conduct causes harm, this in itself 
is a prima facie reason for criminalisation. But this is not a conclusive outcome. in 
practice, criminalisation decisions are based on lists of pro and contra arguments. 
The principles sketched below can be used to uncover these arguments and they 
can offer some guidance and structure in weighing the different interests. The 
criteria discussed in this paragraph stem from a minimalist approach to the use 
of criminal law; that is to say the idea that the criminal law should not be used 
lightly, and that the legislator should adhere to the maxim in dubio pro libertate 
as opposed to in dubio pro lege.697
694 Simester & Von Hirsch 2011, p. 29 (emphasis added).
695 The ectHr also stresses this, see inter alia the classic judgement ectHr 22 November 1995, 
appl. No. 20166/92 (S.W. v. The United Kingdom), paras. 36 and 43 on the evolution of the 
criminal law with regard to the criminality of marital rape. See also ectHr 17  September 
2009, appl. No. 10249/03 (Scoppola v. Italy, no. 2), paras. 99–109.
696 De Hullu 2012, pp. 5 and 19. See also cleiren 2012, p. 9.
697 for a detailed explanation of the minimalist approach, see ashworth & Horder 2013, pp. 22–35 
and 52. See also Jareborg 2005, p. 531.
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The principles of proportionality and subsidiarity are used in several criminal law 
doctrines to assess the necessity of conduct. for example, defences of justification 
demand that the requirements of subsidiarity and proportionality are fulfilled: 
self‑defence is justified if violence was used to repel an imminent and unlawful 
attack, provided that there was no other mode of escape (subsidiarity) and the 
amount of force that was used was reasonable (proportionality).
Proportionality implies that a reaction to an act should not be more 
severe than is necessary in relation to that act: it should be proportional. 
Jareborg distinguishes between prospective proportionality and retrospective 
proportionality.698 retrospective proportionality concerns the relation between 
the severity of the crime and the severity of the penalty, which means that the 
punishment of a certain crime should be in proportion to the severity of the crime 
itself; the punishment should fit the crime.699 Prospective proportionality concerns 
the relation between the severity of the crime and the severity of the reaction of 
the state in response to it: does the incident warrant use of the most coercive state 
instrument, i.e. criminal law? are the harm and wrong severe enough to warrant 
criminalisation? This question, which requires a balancing of the benefits of 
criminalisation (inter alia norm confirmation, censure and protection of victims) 
and the burdens and costs it incurs (such as the infringement of the human rights 
of the offender, but also material costs for the criminal justice system), ought to 
play a key role in criminalisation debates.700 in the context of criminalisation, 
therefore, the focus is on the prospective proportionality principle.
The role of the proportionality principle is not limited to the stage during 
which the criminalisation decision is made. once this decision has been made, 
the proportionality principle will assist the legislator in deciding and justifying 
how to classify an act within the system of criminal law – that is whether it is 
classified as an offence or a misdemeanour.701 in addition, the proportionality 
principle arises when determining the (maximum) legal penalty for a crime, in 
the sense that the sanction that is attached to the offence is in proportion to the 
severity of the crime.702
698 Jareborg 2005, p. 532.
699 De roos 1987, pp. 70–71. 
700 Simester & Von Hirsch 2011, p. 22; Haveman 1998, pp. 50 and 81; and Hulsman 1972, p. 89. 
See also the remarks of then minister of Justice modderman during the 1886 Parliamentary 
discussions regarding the Dutch criminal code, who stated that the criminal law must only 
be invoked when it is proportional (H.J. Smidt, Geschiedenis van het Wetboek van Strafrecht 
deel I, Haarlem 1891, p. 16).
701 ashworth & Horder 2013, p.  20: ‘(p)roportionality should have a central role (…) at the 
legislative stage of grading offences in the criminal law.’ See also De roos 1987, p. 72.
702 See with regard to the proportionality of mandatory minimum penalties groenhuijsen & 
Kooijmans 2013, pp. 33–36 and 46–47.
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criminal law can have an enormous impact on the lives of individuals and can 
ultimately result in depriving an offender of his liberty. Therefore, it is generally 
acknowledged that criminal law should not be used lightly: when other, less 
intrusive forms of intervention, such as administrative or civil (tort) law,703 can be 
used as an effective way to prevent harm, they must be applied instead of criminal 
sanctions. criminalisation should only be resorted to when it is an appropriate 
and effective method that is preferable to other (non‑)legal mechanisms. This 
so‑called subsidiarity criterion is one of the leading arguments for or against 
criminalisation. it demands an exploration of the alternatives to criminal law: are 
there effective alternative means of controlling the unwanted conduct that are less 
intrusive, less stigmatising than criminal law?704 This exercise requires that the 
(dis)advantages of using criminal law are balanced against the (dis)advantages of 
other means of (state) intervention.705
alongside its many drawbacks, criminal law also has certain specific 
advantages, mainly from the perspective of the victim and the society: the state 
bears the costs for the criminal justice system706 – i.e. the enforcement, 
investigation, prosecution and punishment – and coordinates it, meaning that the 
victim is generally not the party that is required to start proceedings.707 Therefore, 
state intervention (for example through use of the criminal law) may be required 
if the identity of the perpetrator is unknown, or the victim does not have enough 
evidence to prove the perpetrator’s guilt, or the victim does not have the financial 
funds to start (civil/administrative) proceedings against the perpetrator. State 
intervention would also be appropriate in those cases in which the harm that was 
703 civil law, for example, has the advantage that it does not result in a criminal record, public 
censure, or imprisonment. it lacks the condemnatory character that criminal law possesses; 
see infra (Simester & Von Hirsch 2011, p. 193). in addition, the execution of civil judgements 
can prove to be difficult. This is different in the context of criminal law, where the Public 
Prosecution Service is responsible for the execution of criminal judgements (article 553 Dutch 
code of criminal Procedure. See also S. meijer, Openbaar ministerie en tenuitvoerlegging, 
Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers 2012).
704 ashworth & Horder 2013, pp. 33–34.
705 Simester & Von Hirsch 2011, pp. 22 and 42.
706 although in some countries, such as in germany and in england (see inter alia the Costs 
in Criminal Cases (General) (Amendment) Regulations 2012), convicted defendants can be 
ordered to bear part of the costs of the criminal proceedings that were initiated against them 
(see P.J.P. Tak, Kostenveroordeling in strafzaken, Nijmegen, July 2012). in January 2014, the 
Dutch minster of Security and Justice drafted a first concept of a bill that makes it possible 
for judges to order a defendant to pay (part of) the costs of the criminal trial (see <www.
rijksoverheid.nl/nieuws/2014/01/13/opstelten‑en‑teeven‑dader‑betaalt‑eigen‑bijdrage.html>, 
last accessed february 2014).
707 Simester & Von Hirsch 2011, pp.  197–198; and g.J.m. corstens, Civielrechtelijke, 
administratiefrechtelijke of strafrechtelijke rechtshandhaving, (Handelingen Nederlandse 
Juristenvereniging 1984‑i), Zwolle: Tjeenk Willink 1984, pp. 51–53.
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done is difficult to determine and/or is not suitable for compensation (e.g. because 
it comprises a severe violation of personal autonomy and/or causes public feelings 
of insecurity), or when there is no victim, for example because the conduct merely 
caused a risk of substantial harm.708
Because a criminal law response can result in a serious infringement of 
fundamental human rights and is generally accompanied by stigmatising effects, 
many authors (mainly from a civil law background709) have argued that criminal 
law must remain the last resort, the ultimum remedium or ultima ratio.710 Yet there 
are cases in which criminal law is preferable to other forms of state intervention. 
The criminal law systematically condemns certain acts and persons who culpably 
perpetrate those acts. By doing so, it communicates to the public that certain 
acts are reprehensible. other fields of law generally lack this condemnatory, 
censuring quality.711 in this sense, the harm principle can function as a positive 
reason to criminalise: certain acts, such as murder, rape and theft, require the 
condemnatory response of criminal law, even if these acts could also be regulated 
by tort or tax law.712 criminal law officially acknowledges wrongdoing, denounces 
it, reinforces the violated norm and offers more protection against it than, for 
example, civil law. criminal law has a strong symbolic and expressive value, 
which can be a reason for criminalisation, although criminal legislation that is 
not enforced but merely exists for its symbolic value is best avoided.713 criminal 
law, therefore, is not per definition an instrument of last resort. Simester and Von 
Hirsch explicitly reject the idea that criminal law should always be used as a last 
resort. in their view, all acts that are mala in se – acts that are pre‑legally wrong, 
such as murder and rape – should be prohibited by use of the criminal law, because 
civil law or tax law, whatever their deterrent effect, do not establish, emphasise 
and communicate the normative status of crimes such as murder. This means, in 
other words, that some acts require criminalisation, irrespective of the suitability/
708 B.c.J. van Velthoven, ‘een onmogelijke opgave: criteria voor strafbaarstelling vanuit 
economisch perspectief ’, in: c.P.m. cleiren et al. (eds.), Criteria voor strafbaarstelling in een 
nieuwe dynamiek. Symbolische legitimiteit versus maatschappelijke en sociaalwetenschappelijke 
realiteit, The Hague: Boom Lemma 2012, p. 59; and Simester & Von Hirsch 2011, p. 17, footnote 
35 and p. 198.
709 The ultimum remedium, or ultima ratio notion is not widely endorsed in the anglo‑american 
world, see Simester & Von Hirsch 2011, pp.  197–198; D. Husak, ‘applying Ultima Ratio: 
a  Skeptical analysis’, (2) 2005 Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law, pp.  535–546, at p.  535; 
and D. Husak, ‘The criminal Law as Last resort’, (24) 2004 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 
pp. 207–235, at. 208.
710 e.g. Haveman 1998, pp. 46–49; De roos 1987, p. 60; Hulsman 1972, pp. 90–91; and H.J. Smidt, 
Geschiedenis van het Wetboek van Strafrecht deel I, Haarlem 1891, p. 16.
711 Simester & Von Hirsch 2011, pp.  11–12 and 197–198. The Dutch competitive Trading act 
(administrative law) authorises the authority for consumers and markets to fine companies 
tens of millions of euros (see article 57(1) competitive Trading act). Still, this is arguably less 
condemnatory in nature than a fine imposed by a criminal court.
712 Simester & Von Hirsch 2011, p. 197.
713 Haveman 1998, pp. 48 and 81; and De roos 1987, p. 79.
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availability of alternative mechanisms.714 Haveman and De Hullu have also held 
that, in certain cases, the symbolic and expressive effect of criminalisation as well 
as legal protection of and legal certainty for the norm violator – two aspects that 
are inherent in criminal law as opposed to other fields of law – can plead in favour 
of invoking the criminal law as a remedy.715
3.2.2. Internal subsidiarity
The type of subsidiarity discussed above could be termed ‘external subsidiarity’: it 
focuses on alternatives outside the field of the criminal law. Yet it may be argued 
that subsidiarity also has an internal component that comprises an assessment of 
alternatives within the criminal law. once it has been determined that there are no 
suitable (less intrusive) alternatives to the criminal law and that criminalisation 
would be justified (i.e. proportional and necessary), it is important to look at the 
existing body of criminal law. Does the criminal law itself contain any options 
for criminalisation? That is to say, before creating specific criminal legislation, 
the government should verify whether or not this particular behaviour is already 
covered by existing criminal offences. if the behaviour is already covered, then 
the ‘internal subsidiarity principle’ provides a (strong) case against separate 
criminalisation. This side of subsidiarity therefore comes to the fore after the 
criminalisation decision has been made and mainly deals with the question of 
how particular conduct should be criminalised. in this sense, it can be seen as a 
tertiary criterion, like legality.
3.3. effecTiVeNeSS
a fifth criterion that is helpful in deciding whether or not an act should be 
criminalised is the principle of effectiveness, as put forth by inter alia Simester and 
Von Hirsch, De roos, and in part by Hulsman. This criterion covers a plethora of 
utilitarian arguments.
first of all, when considering the option of drafting a new provision for a 
distinct crime, the legislator must keep in mind that the definition of the crime 
should be sufficiently clear. The requirement of clarity is dealt with in paragraph 4 
as part of the principle of legality and discussed from the perspective of the citizen. 
However, not only citizens, but also the authorities benefit from comprehensible 
714 Simester & Von Hirsch 2011, pp. 18, footnote 36 and 197–198. However, there are academics 
who plead in favour of restorative justice as an alternative (or supplement) to criminal law, 
see e.g. K. Daly, ‘Sexual assault and restorative Justice’, in H. Strang and J. Braithwaite (eds.), 
Restorative justice and family violence, cambridge: cUP 2002, pp. 62–88.
715 Haveman 1998, p. 48; and J. de Hullu, ‘Boekbesprekingen’ (review of the book Strafbaarstelling 
van economische delicten: een crimineel‑politieke studie by Th. a. de roos), Recht en kritiek (14) 
1988, p. 93).
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provisions. after all, the authorities have to apply the provisions and the elements 
of a crime should not lead to insurmountable difficulties during the investigation, 
prosecution and trial stages. This is a different form of clarity to lex certa (see 
infra); it implies that the definition of an offence should be applicable in practice 
and should not result in evidentiary problems with regard to the different elements 
of the crime.716
closely related to the issue of prosecutability is the second variable that 
concerns the effectiveness of a provision: the chance of detection of the crime. 
is there a large or a small risk of detection?717 and, linked to this question: does 
the criminal justice system have the capacity to actually enforce the criminal 
prohibition?718
Thirdly, the general preventive effect that emanates from a criminal provision 
plays a role in deciding whether behaviour should be criminalised.719 in general, 
it is assumed that every criminal provision possesses a deterrent effect and in that 
way contributes to the norm‑forming function of criminal law. Norm‑forming 
means that by punishing a violation of a norm, the legislator confirms the 
existence of this norm and points out to civilians the importance of complying 
with this norm.720 and the mere fact of including certain conduct in the criminal 
code is said to discourage people – at least to a certain extent – from committing 
those acts.721 Therefore, it should be considered whether criminalisation would 
contribute to general prevention of the conduct in question. However, as ashworth 
and Horder state: ‘it cannot be assumed that creating a new crime or increasing 
the maximum punishment will lead – in a kind of hydraulic relationship – to a 
reduction in the incidence of that conduct’.722
4. LegaLiTY: LEx CERTA (maXimUm 
cerTaiNTY)
The legality principle, which in england is also referred to as ‘rule of law’,723 
prescribes that no one may be held liable and punished for violating a criminal 
law that did not exist at the time it was violated. in the civil law tradition, the 
legality principle is generally said to comprise four norms: nullum crimen sine 
lege scripta, praevia, certa and stricta: a person can only be held liable for an act 
716 De roos 1987, pp. 76–77.
717 Jareborg 2005, p. 529. 
718 De roos 1987, pp.  77–78. See also Hulsman 1972, pp.  90–91. according to Hulsman, 
criminalisation should not take place when it would exceed the capacity of the criminal justice 
system.
719 De roos 1987, p. 78.
720 Bosker 1997, p. 34.
721 De roos 1987, p. 78.
722 ashworth & Horder 2013, p. 16.
723 ashworth & Horder 2013, p. 56.
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that was codified as a criminal offence (lex scripta) and that had entered into 
force at the time it was committed (lex praevia also known as the prohibition 
of creating ex post facto laws and the derivative rule of non‑retroactivity of 
criminal law).724 This act must be defined with sufficient clarity (lex certa, or the 
requirement of specificity) and the definition of the criminal offence must not be 
interpreted too extensively, for example by analogy (lex stricta).725 it is regarded as 
axiomatic that the definition of any (new) criminal offence should be in line with 
the requirements posed by the principle of legality.726 in this regard, the lex certa 
principle is especially relevant.
The lex certa principle, traditionally associated with the civil law tradition 
but growing increasingly important in common law countries, stipulates that in 
criminal law, the definitions of crimes must be described as clearly and precisely as 
possible because citizens must be able to understand what kind of behaviour will 
lead to criminal liability.727 This ban on vagueness is also known as the principle of 
specificity, the criterion of maximum certainty (in england) and the criterion of 
fair warning (in the US).728 inevitably, however, the law will have certain lacunae: 
not all forms of criminal behaviour can be exhaustively codified, since the result 
of such an endeavour would be a vast criminal code containing an impenetrable 
morass of articles. and that would surely not contribute to the clarity of the 
law. on the contrary, an excessive increase in legislation, a phenomenon that 
groenhuijsen calls the hypertrophy of laws, would obfuscate the intelligibility of 
the law and would consequently strike at the very roots of the legality principle.729
This exposes a hardy and paradoxical perennial: on the one hand the legality 
principle demands accurate definitions of crimes and consequently a certain 
degree of specificity; on the other hand it requires that definitions are not too 
highly specified, because over‑specified laws would be detrimental to the clarity 
of the law and lead to uncertainty. This implies that the use of some vague terms 
724 according to the ectHr, article  7(1)  ecHr guarantees ‘not only the principle of 
non‑retrospectiveness of more stringent criminal laws but also, and implicitly, the principle 
of retrospectiveness of the more lenient criminal law.’ See ectHr 17 September 2009, appl. 
No. 10249/03, para. 109 (Scoppola v. Italy (No. 2)). So if the law relevant to the offence of the 
accused has been amended, the accused should benefit from the less severe law (lex mitior), see 
also The Prosecutor v. Dragan nikolić, case No. iT‑94–2‑a, Judgement on Sentencing appeal, 
4 february 2005, para. 1(d).
725 The ectHr has stated that ‘criminal law must not be extensively construed to the detriment 
of an accused, for instance by analogy’ e.g. ectHr 12 July 2007, appl. No. 74613/01, para. 100 
(Jorgic v. Germany).
726 See also article 1 Dutch criminal code and article 16 Dutch constitution.
727 in addition to this principled legal protection side, the lex certa principle also has a more 
practical law enforcement component, see paragraph 3.3. on lex certa in general, see J.S. Nan, 
Het lex certa‑beginsel, The Hague: Sdu Uitgevers 2011.
728 Jescheck 2004, p. 41; and Simester & Von Hirsch 2011, pp. 198–199 respectively.
729 groenhuijsen 1987, p. 15. See also ashworth & Horder 2013, p. 65.
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is inevitable.730 The golden mean is provided by the european court of Human 
rights (ectHr). in accordance with the case law of the Strasbourg court, 
legal certainty, and thereby the lex certa principle, is guaranteed if a provision 
is accessible and foreseeable. The most important factor that contributes to the 
foreseeability of a legal rule is the availability of accessible case law in which a 
(vague) element of the definition of a crime is applied and explained.731 in other 
words, a certain degree of generality/vagueness is compensated for by a further 
specification of the element(s) of a crime in case law. furthermore, the ectHr has 
held that laws may still satisfy the foreseeability requirement if an individual has 
to take appropriate legal advice to be able to understand the law in question.732
The lex certa principle should be taken into consideration after the legislator 
has decided to criminalise certain conduct, in the sense that it should be possible 
to define this new crime in accurate, clear terms.733 if this is not the case, the 
question should be asked whether it would be possible for judges to explain 
the elements of the definition in case law, thereby mitigating the vagueness, or 
whether legal advice could offer clarity.734 if the answer to these questions is also 
negative, then it may be concluded that criminalisation would be detrimental 
to the legality principle and might therefore not be opportune. This last option, 
however, is mainly theoretical: in the vast majority of cases it will be possible to 
define a crime without crossing the boundaries of permissible vagueness.
5. coNcLUDiNg remarKS
The criteria discussed in this chapter are compatible with a minimalist approach to 
criminalisation and were derived from a plethora of different theories stemming 
from Dutch as well as english legal doctrine. overall, the theories have many 
similarities, especially with regard to the requirement that only harmful wrongs 
ought to be criminalised and that, in general, criminal law should be used only if 
there are no equally effective non‑criminal alternatives. The majority of theories 
affirm the presumption against penalisation: because of the severity of criminal 
law and the vast implications it can have for an individual’s life, the legislator 
730 according to the ectHr: ‘many laws are inevitably couched in terms which, to a greater or 
lesser extent, are vague and whose interpretation and application are questions of practice’, 
ectHr 26 april 1979, appl. No. 6538/74 (The Sunday Times v. Great Britain), para. 49.
731 ectHr 17 September 2009, appl. No. 10249/03 (Scoppola v. Italy, no. 2), paras. 99–109; ectHr 
12  february 2008, appl. No.  21906/04 (Kafkaris v. Cyprus), paras.  40–42; ectHr 26  april 
1979, appl. No.  6538/74 (The Sunday Times v. Great Britain); and groenhuijsen & Kristen 
2001, pp. 338–339.
732 ectHr 17 September 2009, appl. No. 10249/03 (Scoppola v. Italy, no. 2), para. 102.
733 Haveman 1998, p. 73; De roos 1987, pp. 73–74; and Hulsman 1972, p. 92 (when it is difficult to 
accurately define particular conduct, this forms a contra‑indication against criminalisation in 
Hulsman’s view).
734 De roos 1987, pp. 73–74.
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ought to be reticent when it comes to criminalisation, the maxim he ought to 
adhere to is in dubio pro libertate as opposed to in dubio pro lege.
a total of six general criteria were distilled from the best‑established and most 
reputed Dutch and english criminalisation theories. first, two threshold criteria 
must be fulfilled: criminal law is reserved for wrongful conduct that causes some 
(risk of) harm. The harm principle, which provides for a balancing of interests, 
facilitates informed decision making regarding the harmfulness and criminality 
of conduct. reaching an informed decision necessitates a clear understanding 
of why certain behaviour takes place (etiology) and this requires mapping the 
background of the behaviour. The conduct, its prevalence and its consequences 
must be identified and defined, and any available (extra) legal remedies must be 
critically assessed.735 if at all possible, the harmfulness should be demonstrated 
by empirical evidence.736 along with its harmfulness, the wrongfulness of 
conduct ought to be determined. Wrongfulness is a concept with strong moral 
connotations and is associated with a high level of intuitivism.737 acts can be 
wrong because of the harm they cause (such as assault), or independent of the 
harm they cause (such as racism).
once the dual test of harm and wrongfulness has been satisfied, a set of 
three secondary criteria should be taken into consideration. first, the principle 
of proportionality can be used to assess the severity of the harm and wrong, 
and balance this against the benefits and disadvantages of the criminal law. are 
the harm and wrong so severe that they warrant the use of the criminal law? 
Secondly, the legislator should examine the necessity of penalisation by applying 
the principle of subsidiarity. He should verify whether there are alternatives 
to criminalisation (external subsidiarity), and, if this is not the case, whether 
the criminal law already contains offences that address the conduct (internal 
subsidiarity). Thirdly, the legislator should include the more practical principles 
of effectiveness and efficiency in his deliberation. a new provision that separately 
criminalises specific behaviour should not result in investigative or prosecutorial 
problems. When contemplating the criminalisation of conduct, a legislator 
should take into consideration De roos’ argument that a criminal provision 
must offer a sufficient foundation for professionals involved in the investigation, 
prosecution and trial stages, and must not cause insurmountable evidentiary 
735 cleiren 2012, p. 17; Simester & Von Hirsch, p. 36; De roos 1987, p. 56; and Haveman 1998, 
p. 52.
736 J.P van der Leun, ‘Strafbaarstelling en evidence vanuit criminologisch perspectief ’, in: 
c.P.m. cleiren et al. (eds.), Criteria voor strafbaarstelling in een nieuwe dynamiek. Symbolische 
legitimiteit versus maatschappelijke en sociaalwetenschappelijke realiteit, The Hague: Boom 
Lemma 2012, pp. 25–37, who points out the difficulties inherent in using empirical research 
to shoulder criteria for criminalisation, inter alia because research results are often used on a 
very selective basis.
737 This is especially so for traditional core crimes such murder, rape and theft, but is less the case 
for regulatory criminal law.
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problems.738 if the crime turns out to be unprosecutable, this would be injurious 
to the deterrent effect of the offence. These pragmatic considerations, however, are 
only supplementary arguments, that is to say the other, principled criteria (such 
as subsidiarity) carry more weight. This means that the pragmatic arguments 
should not be decisive, they should not tip the scales, but they should be included 
in the decision‑making process nonetheless. Proportionality, subsidiarity and 
effectiveness function as mediating considerations: they may provide reasons not 
to criminalise, even when the threshold criteria of harm and wrongfulness are 
satisfied. finally, once the legislator has decided to criminalise conduct, it goes 
without saying that the (definition of the) new offence must be in line with the 
legality principle.
These six criteria form a theory of criminalisation that can assist the legislator 
in making a decision with regard to criminalisation. as stated, the principles 
discussed in this chapter offer no panacea, but they do facilitate a (partly) 
principled framework in which a balanced and informed decision regarding 
criminalisation can be made.739 in this sense, as benchmarks, they offer protection 
from criminalisation being used as an arbitrary tool or a procrustean solution. 
more specifically for the Netherlands, criteria for criminalisation can also be used 
to safeguard the consistency in the taxonomy and systematic scheme of criminal 
legislation.740 in the end, however, criminalisation decisions are based on lists of 
pro and contra arguments. Therefore, as De Hullu states, the best approach to 
criminalisation is a more pragmatic, casuistic approach, which comes down to 
balancing the arguments in favour of and against criminalisation in each case.741 
The principles described above can be used to uncover and systemise these 
arguments.
constructing this framework for criminalisation was necessary in order to 
answer the main question of this research. This framework will be applied to the 
practice of forced marriage in chapter 10. first, the criminalisation framework 
for the level of international criminal law will be constructed in the next chapter.
738 De roos 1987, p. 76
739 cleiren 2012, p. 12.
740 cleiren 2012, p. 15.
741 De Hullu 2012, p. 19.









in this chapter, a framework is constructed that will assist in answering the central 
research question: should forced marriage be criminalised under international 
criminal law, more specifically under the rome Statute and, if so, how?742 The 
structure of the chapter resembles a funnel: starting with international criminal 
law in the broadest sense, the focus is narrowed down to the core international 
crimes (i.e. crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide) and then further 
specified to particular acts listed in the provisions of the core crimes. The 
first part of this chapter focuses on the doctrinal foundations of international 
criminalisation: what circumstances raise conduct to the level of an international 
crime in the first place? as a relatively new field of law, international criminal 
law does not have the same number of crystallised theories regarding the 
criminalisation process that domestic legal systems have and over the years, 
conduct was mostly criminalised on a spasmodic ad hoc basis.743 it has even been 
argued that there is – or at least was – no common doctrinal foundation that 
constitutes the legal basis for international criminalisation.744 Nonetheless, several 
authors have made an effort to formulate such a doctrinal basis and these theories 
will be studied and form the point of departure for the evaluative framework. 
Next, the taxonomy of international criminalisation and the structure of the core 
crimes will be highlighted in order to demonstrate the differences between the 
core crimes.
after the required knowledge about international criminalisation has been 
acquired, a road map pertaining to the question of how criminal conduct ought 
to be criminalised is constructed. This framework focuses on the possibilities of 
criminalising conduct as a crime against humanity, a war crime and an act of 
genocide.745 Because of the focus on three different core crimes, the framework 
presented in this chapter consists of three parts. each crime has its own checklist 
of criteria that must be fulfilled in order for conduct to be criminalised as such a 
crime, yet some overlap between the criteria does exist. in order to find criteria for 
742 Part of this chapter was published in 2013, see Haenen 2013(i), pp. 796–822.
743 Saul 2008, p. 210.
744 Bassiouni 1983, p. 28.
745 The crime of aggression falls outside the scope of this book (see the general introduction).
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criminalisation, for each of the three core crimes, two steps are taken. first, the 
drafting history of the rome Statute is studied and subsequently, the taxonomy 
of the core crimes is analysed with the aim of assessing under which conditions a 
particular act could fit within the systematic structure of these crimes.746
for the purpose of determining which requirements have to be satisfied in 
order for conduct to be criminalised as a crime against humanity and war crime, 
the example of sexual slavery will be used. Sexual slavery has a long history, both 
in conflict situations and in times of peace, and occurs on a massive scale and 
in a myriad of countries. Nonetheless, it was not recognised as an international 
crime until 1998, when, after much negotiation,747 it was included in the rome 
Statute as a crime against humanity748 and a war crime749 and subsequently 
defined for the first time in the icc’s elements of crimes.750 These negotiations 
offer a wealth of information: the core issue of the debates was the question of 
whether sexual slavery merited distinct recognition in light of the existing crime 
of enslavement. The arguments, both pro and contra, can assist in constructing 
a road map for criminalisation. for this purpose, the summary records of the 42 
plenary meetings held during the 1998 rome conference on the establishment 
of an international criminal court will be studied. another important source 
is formed by articles and books written by delegation members to the rome 
conference. These authors are able to give a firsthand account on what was said 
not only during the meetings, but also in the corridors. This inside information 
is important, as many formal as well as informal working groups and negotiating 
bodies convened during the rome conference, discussing different issues, and 
not all meetings were officially recorded.751 in the case study of sexual slavery, 
reference will also be made to other crimes, such as enforced disappearance of 
persons,752 which were not included in previous major instruments pertaining to 
international criminal law, such as the Statutes of the icTY and icTr. Special 
regard will be given to the reasons that underlay the inclusion of these offences in 
the rome Statute.
The chapter concludes with a paragraph in which the criteria constituting the 
different road maps for criminalisation are presented.
746 See also article  31 of the Vienna convention on the Law of Treaties, which stipulates that 
treaties ought to be interpreted using the grammatical, systematic and teleological methods. 
747 Several Ngos (especially the Women’s caucus for gender Justice in the international criminal 
court) were responsible for lobbying prior to and during the sessions of the Preparatory 
committee (1996–1998), see Women’s caucus recommendations 1997 and oosterveld 2004, 
pp. 613–614, esp. footnote 32.
748 article 7(1)(g) rome Statute.
749 article 8(2)(b)xxii and 8(2)(e)vi rome Statute.
750 oosterveld 2004, pp. 606–607.
751 Lee 1999, p. 22.
752 enforced disappearance of persons was included as a crime against humanity (article 7(1)(i) 
rome Statute).
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2. DocTriNaL foUNDaTioNS of 
iNTerNaTioNaL (aND SUPraNaTioNaL) 
crimiNaLiSaTioN
2.1. THe aDVaNcemeNT of THe cor e crimeS: 
a SHorT oVerVieW
international criminalisation of individual conduct is a recent phenomenon that 
only really started evolving from the 1990s onwards.753 Before the establishment 
of the icTY and icTr, international law had a mainly repressive function in 
criminal matters: criminal aspects of international law aimed at allowing states 
to better regulate the joint repression of certain (mainly transnational) offences, 
such as human trafficking and counterfeiting.754 The first real developments with 
regard to international criminal law in the strict sense – that is the substantive 
law concerning the crimes for which international law imposes direct individual 
criminal liability, also known as ‘core crimes’755 – took place after the Second World 
War, with the Nazi atrocities that were committed during this conflict acting as 
the catalyst for the crystallisation of these crimes.756 The end of the war resulted 
in the drafting of three important legal instruments: the London charter which 
established the Nuremberg international military Tribunal (imT), the Tokyo 
charter creating the international military Tribunal for the far east (imTfe), 
and control council Law No. 10, which provided the legal basis for the war 
crime trials in the occupied zones. Both the London charter as well as the Tokyo 
charter contained provisions criminalising war crimes, crimes against humanity 
and aggression (referred to as ‘crimes against peace’). This list of international 
crimes also features in control council Law No. 10.757 in 1947, the UN general 
assembly established and authorised the international Law commission (iLc) 
to prepare a draft code of offences against the peace and security of mankind.758 
The trauma of the Second World War also set the stage for further developments 
on the international level and resulted in the promulgation of a set of pivotal 
conventions: the 1948 genocide convention and the four geneva conventions of 
1949.759 This state of flux was temporarily hampered by the outbreak of the cold 
War, but after the end of this conflict, the core crimes developed considerable 
753 See cryer 2005, pp. 9–72.
754 This is international law largo sensu, see the general introduction for the distinction between 
international criminal law largo sensu and stricto sensu.
755 milanović 2011, p. 28.
756 Bassiouni 1999, p.  253 and cryer 2008, pp.  119–120. The first initiatives regarding 
criminalisation of core international crimes date back to the 1919 report of the commission 
on the responsibility of the authors of the War and on the enforcement of Penalties and to the 
1919 Treaty of Versailles after the first World War (see cryer 2005, pp. 32–35).
757 Werle 2009, p. 15.
758 The iLc was established on 21 November 1947, by UNga res. 174(i).
759 Supplemented by the 1977 additional Protocols i and ii. in 2005, a third additional protocol 
was adopted.
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momentum in the 1990s with the creation of the icTY and icTr.760 Both ad hoc 
tribunals were given jurisdiction over crimes against humanity, war crimes and 
genocide. in 1998, almost a century (if not centuries) after the idea of a permanent 
international criminal court first caught hold, the UN Diplomatic conference of 
Plenipotentiaries on the establishment of an international criminal court was 
held in rome. The rome Statute, which was negotiated during this conference, 
gives the icc jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes 
and the crime of aggression.761
overall, the evolutionary process of international criminalisation lacks 
any form of systematisation or method and is best characterised as a series of 
ad hoc responses to specific events.762 as stated, the genocide convention – and 
even the term ‘genocide’ – was a direct result of the atrocities committed during 
the Second World War, which also influenced the content of the 1949 geneva 
conventions. The Vietnam War, in turn, influenced additional Protocol i.763 
consequently, there exists no coherent, generally agreed‑upon set of principles 
that may be used to justify criminalisation: international crimes are in part based 
on ‘intuitive‑moralistic’ and legal‑political considerations.764
as international criminal law is a developing field of law and since it is 
not inconceivable that in the future more offences will be brought within the 
jurisdiction of the icc,765 the added value of uncovering the doctrinal foundations 
of this process is self‑evident.766 Several authors have made an effort to reveal 
such a doctrinal basis. Three of these theories are discussed in the following 
paragraph.767 The scholars referred to below focus on international criminal law 
in the broad sense (i.e. not just the core crimes, but also transnational and treaty 
crimes for which international law does not impose individual criminal liability), 
with the exception of may, who discusses the criminalisation of crimes against 
humanity in particular.768
760 Bassiouni 2008, p. 131.
761 The icc will have jurisdiction over the crime of aggression once the states parties have 
activated the jurisdiction, which will take place after 1 January 2017 (see resolution 6 of the 
review conference, 13th plenary meeting, 11 June 2010).
762 cryer 2008, pp. 119–120; and Bassiouni 1999, p. 253. for an account of the inconsistencies in 
international criminal law, see ratner 1998, pp. 237–256.
763 cryer 2008, p. 120.
764 Saul 2008, pp. 210 and 216, and i. Tallgren, ‘The sensibility and sense of international criminal 
law’, European Journal of International Law (13) 2002, p. 564.
765 See resolution e attached to the final act of the UN Diplomatic conference of 
Plenipotentiaries on the establishment of an international criminal court (17 July 1998, UN 
Doc. a/coNf.183/10), which provided for the possibility of including crimes of terrorism and 
drug crimes in the rome Statute.
766 may 2005, pp. 21 and 64–68, also acknowledges – indeed stresses – the importance of uncovering 
the theoretical foundations of international criminalisation (see infra paragraph 2.2).
767 for a fourth theory on international criminalisation, see W. Lee, ‘international crimes 
and universal jurisdiction’, in: L. may & Z. Hoskins (eds.), International criminal law and 
philosophy, cambridge: cUP 2010, pp. 15–38.
768 These theories concern the international criminalisation of crimes sui generis (such as slavery 
and piracy) or categories of crimes (such as crimes against humanity and war crimes). The 
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2.2 . aN iNDUcTiVe, a DeScriPTiVe aND 
a Nor maTiVe aPProacH: BaSSioUNi, 
caSSeSe aND maY
in 1983, Bassiouni was one of the first scholars who set forth a doctrinal basis 
for the international criminalisation policy, using an empirical approach. for 
this purpose, he studied all relevant sources of international law, identified 
20 international crimes769 and derived from these offences two alternative 
common elements. He concluded that in order for conduct to be classified as 
an international crime, it must have either an international or a transnational 
element.770 The former concerns conduct that constitutes an offence against the 
world community (delicto ius gentium), the latter element relates to conduct that 
affects the interests of more than one state.771 He subsequently argued that the 
fundamental nature of international crimes is that ‘they affect the interests of 
the world community as a whole because they threaten the peace and security 
of mankind and because they shock the conscience of mankind’.772 Thirty 
years later, Bassiouni repeated this exercise and identified a total number of 27 
international crimes.773, 774 from these offences he derived common features that 
he translated into five criteria that in his opinion are applicable to the policy of 
international criminalisation. Bassiouni concluded that each of the 27 crimes had 
been internationally criminalised because the conduct either:
theories therefore do not concern the labelling of specific acts (such as murder or rape) as 
crimes against humanity (with the exception of may’s normative theory).
769 These 20 crimes are international crimes in the broad sense: aggression, war crimes, unlawful 
use of weapons, crimes against humanity, genocide, apartheid, slavery and slave‑related 
practices, torture, unlawful medical experimentation, piracy, hijacking, kidnapping of 
diplomats, taking of civilian hostages, unlawful use of the mail, drug offences, falsification 
and counterfeiting, theft of archaeological and national treasures, bribery of public officials, 
interference with submarine cables, and international traffic in obscene publications 
(Bassiouni 1983, p. 28).
770 Yarnold distinguishes a third element that may raise certain conduct to the level of an 
international crime: international necessity, i.e. conduct that is criminalised by the 
international community for the primary purpose of effective control. as examples, she lists 
the international crimes of hijacking, unlawful use of mails, drug offences, falsification and 
counterfeiting and interference with submarine cables (B.m. Yarnold, ‘Doctrinal basis for the 
international criminalization process’, Temple International & Comparative Law Journal (8) 
1994, pp. 99–100, 102–104, 106 and 115).
771 Bassiouni 1983, pp. 27–29.
772 m.c. Bassiouni (ed.), International Criminal Law. Volume 1: Crimes, ardsley, NY: 
Transnational Publishers 1999, p. 42.
773 See Bassiouni 2013, pp. 144–146. for this purpose, Bassiouni first identified all conventions 
that in one way or another penalise (or oblige states to penalise) certain behaviour. from these 
281 conventions, he distilled 27 international crimes (Bassiouni 2013, pp. 144–145). The seven 
‘new’ international crimes Bassiouni identified were: mercanism, nuclear terrorism, organised 
crime, use of explosives, financing of terrorism, unlawful acts against certain internationally 
protected elements of the environment, unlawful acts against the safety of maritime navigation 
and the safety of platforms on the high seas.
774 in 1999, Bassiouni identified a total of 25 international crimes (Bassiouni 1999, p. 253).
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1. (…) affects a significant international interest, in particular, if it constitutes a 
threat to international peace and security;
2. (…) constitutes an egregious conduct deemed offensive to the commonly 
shared values of the world community, including what has historically been 
referred to as conduct shocking to the conscience of humanity;
3. (…) has transnational implications in that it involves or affects more than one 
state in its planning, preparation, or commission, either through the diversity 
of nationality of its perpetrators or victims, or because the means employed 
transcend national boundaries;
4. (…) is harmful to an internationally protected person or interest; or
5. (…) violates an internationally protected interest but it does not rise to the 
level required by (1) or (2), however, because of its nature, it can best be 
prevented and suppressed by international criminalisation.’775
a second scholar who studied the international criminalisation process was 
cassese. instead of departing from the distinct classes of international or 
transnational crimes, cassese adopted a more descriptive approach and formulated 
a comparable, albeit narrower definition of international criminalisation.776 He 
stated that an international crime results from the cumulative presence of the 
following elements: (1) an international crime violates international customary 
rules, either unwritten or codified in treaties; (2) these rules protect values 
that are considered important by the whole international community, they are 
binding and enshrined in a gamut of international instruments; (3) there exists 
a universal interest in repressing these crimes, which, in principle, results in 
universal jurisdiction;777 and finally (4) the perpetrators of international crimes 
do not enjoy functional immunity, which means that de facto or de iure state 
officials can be held accountable for committing international crimes.778
Yet another different approach to the international criminalisation process 
is taken by may. Whereas cassese and Bassiouni give a more descriptive answer 
to the question ‘what are international crimes?’, summing up the criteria that are 
used in the process of identifying these crimes, may approaches international 
criminalisation and especially the legitimacy of international prosecutions 
775 Bassiouni 2008, p. 133.
776 Pursuant to cassese’s narrower definition, piracy, trafficking in drugs, arms and humans, 
money laundering, slave trade and apartheid are not international crimes (cassese 2008, 
pp.  12–13). These offences do amount to international crimes under Bassiouni’s alternative 
criteria.
777 cassese 2008, p. 11.
778 cassese points out that some senior state officials may nevertheless enjoy personal immunity 
(cassese 2008, p. 12). However, in a recent decision of icc Pre‑Trial chamber i in the case 
against the President of Sudan, omar al Bashir, the Pre‑Trial chamber ruled that personal 
immunity of former or sitting heads of state cannot be invoked to oppose a prosecution by an 
international court (see Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, case No. icc‑02/05–
01/09, Decision pursuant to article 87(7) of the rome Statute on the failure by the republic of 
malawi to comply with the cooperation requests issued by the court with respect to the arrest 
and surrender of omar Hassan ahmad al Bashir, 12 December 2011, para. 36).
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for crimes against humanity from a normative point of view. may stresses 
the importance of uncovering the theoretical foundations of international 
criminalisation, so that a clear basis for identifying international crimes can 
be developed.779 He contends that three basic moral principles legitimise 
criminalisation in general – that is on both the national as well as the international 
level: the principles of legality, harm780 and proportionality.781 if a criminal rule 
does not adhere to these three basic notions, it is not morally legitimate and its 
enforcement cannot be justified.782
However, may argues that international criminalisation and prosecutions 
require further moral justifications. in his view, these justifications are provided 
by two additional normative principles of international criminal law: the security 
principle and the international harm principle. The security principle makes 
prosecution before international criminal courts and tribunals possible: when a 
state deprives its own citizens of physical security or subsistence, or when it fails to 
protect its citizens from violations of physical security or subsistence, a state loses 
its claim to sovereignty and the international community can intervene in the 
state’s internal affairs.783 This intervention can take the form of prosecution of that 
state’s subjects before international criminal bodies: by harming or not protecting 
its people from harm, a state also loses its right to exclusive adjudication.784
The security principle alone is not enough to justify international 
criminalisation and prosecution.785 The required additional justification is found 
in what may calls the international harm principle. To put it briefly, this principle 
implies that crimes which are group‑based – because they are either perpetrated 
by a group (which, often, includes state involvement) or victimise a group – 
violate a strong interest of the international community and in some cases even 
humanity as a whole. and because this group‑based harm damages humanity, 
the conduct is raised to the status of an international crime.786 The group‑based 
nature of the victim – that is when crimes harm a large group of victims – makes 
a crime widespread. The group‑based nature of the perpetrator, on the other 
hand, makes a crime systematic.787 in this way, the international harm principle 
recognises that international crimes (and crimes against humanity in particular) 
are those crimes that are either widespread or systematic and so egregious that they 
779 may 2005, pp. 21 and 64–68.
780 according to may 2005, p. 66, it is legitimate to criminalise an act when it causes (at least a 
certain amount of) harm  – defined as a ‘setback of interests’ – and when criminalisation is 
aimed at the prevention of this harm (see also chapter 4 paragraph 2).
781 The principle of proportionality requires that the punishment fits the crime (may 2005, p. 67). 
See also chapter 4 paragraph 3.1.
782 may 2005, pp. 65–67.
783 may 2005, pp. 68–69.
784 may 2005, pp. 72, 75 and 80. 
785 may 2005, p. 70.
786 may 2005, pp. 80–95.
787 may 2005, pp. 81–82 and 84–90.
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harm humanity.788 Summarising may’s argument: international criminalisation 
and prosecution are legitimate when the conduct in question violates a security 
interest of the victim and somehow harms an interest of the world community.789
The three theories described above form a doctrinal basis for the international 
criminalisation process. They advance criteria that may be used to justify the 
creation of crimes under international (criminal) law. although the approaches 
taken by the authors differ, the outcomes of their studies are similar: there are 
certain universal values that the international community holds in such high 
regard that violations of these values warrant international criminalisation. 
crimes against humanity, for example, were criminalised because they constitute 
a threat to international peace and security and because they shock the conscience 
of mankind – they therefore rise to the level required by Bassiouni’s first and 
second criteria applicable to the policy of international criminalisation.790 crimes 
against humanity shock the conscience of mankind because they are contrary to 
universal norms. The notion of ‘shocking the conscience of mankind’, therefore, 
is linked to the universality of certain values.791 may’s normative approach also 
clearly reflects this value‑based justification for international criminalisation: 
when an act violates a strong interest of the international community or humanity 
as a whole and thereby harms humanity, the conduct is raised to the status of an 
international crime.792 cassese includes in his characterisation of international 
crimes violations of international customary rules that protect values that are 
considered binding and important by the whole international community.793 all 
three theories thus put emphasis on the violation of universal values.
The concept of universal values has had to endure a fair amount of opposition. 
Some have argued, for example, that international criminal law is a Western 
edifice that is imposed on other societies.794 The fact, however, that every state 
in the world has ratified the geneva conventions795 provides evidence to the 
788 may 2005, pp. 80 and 82.
789 may 2005, p. 107.
790 as do the other three core crimes, see rome Statute, Preamble (2) and (3): ‘mindful that 
during this century millions of children, women and men have been victims of unimaginable 
atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of humanity’ and ‘recognising that such grave 
crimes threaten the peace, security and well‑being of the world.’
791 cryer et al. 2010, p. 71, gaeta 2009, p. 66 and Bassiouni 2008, p. 133.
792 may 2005, pp. 80–95.
793 cassese 2008, p. 11.
794 See cryer et al. 2010, p. 38. See also remarks made by the Libyan delegation during the 6th 
plenary meeting held during the rome conference: ‘Western values and legal systems should 
not be the only source of international instruments. other systems were followed by a large 
proportion of the world’s population’, Summary record of the 6th plenary meeting held during 
the rome conference (17 June 1998), UN Doc. a/coNf.183/Sr.6, 20 November 1998, para. 83. 
795 The same cannot be said with regard to Protocol i additional to the geneva conventions 
which concerns the protection of victims of international armed conflicts: this Protocol is 
less broadly ratified (see cryer et al. 2010, p. 53). Note, however, that the US have ratified the 
geneva conventions, but are not party to the rome Statute.
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contrary and so does the repeated and unanimous condemnation of genocide, war 
crimes, aggression and crimes against humanity by the UN general assembly.796 
as was pointed out by Sadat, chinese, islamic as well as Hindu traditions 
‘underscore the universal values enshrined in the prohibition of (…) crimes that 
shock the conscience of mankind’.797 and it is, in the words of gaeta, ‘on account 
of the values they protect that these crimes (i.e. the core crimes; iH) are truly 
international; it is because of the importance of these values that the international 
community directly criminalizes them’.798
3. TaXoNomY of iNTerNaTioNaL 
crimiNaLiSaTioN: THe core crimeS of 
THe rome STaTUTe
3.1. LegiSLaTiVe HiSTorY of THe icc iN a 
NUTSHeLL: THe aBSeNce of a LegaL meTHoD
Before going into the criminalisation process of the core crimes, it is important 
to first give a short overview of the legislative history of the icc. as stated, in 
1947, the UN general assembly created the iLc and authorised it to prepare a 
draft code of offences against the peace and security of mankind. During the 
next 45 years, the iLc, stymied by the cold War, submitted several draft statutes. 
The final version was presented to the general assembly in 1994. The general 
assembly then established and charged an ad Hoc committee, which met twice 
in 1995, to review the work done by the iLc. one year later, the general assembly 
established a Preparatory committee and charged it with drafting a statute for a 
planned conference of states on the establishment of an international criminal 
court.799 The Preparatory committee submitted the final version of its text in 
1996. The text of this statute, referred to as the Draft icc Statute, was revised 
several times during the following two years and eventually formed the basis 
for the negotiations during the rome conference. on 17 July 1998, after several 
weeks of negotiations, the final version of the rome Statute was adopted and a 
Preparatory commission was appointed and authorised to prepare draft texts for 
inter alia the icc’s elements of crimes and rules of Procedure and evidence. The 
final recommendations made by the Preparatory commission were approved by 
the assembly of States Parties in September 2002.800
796 cryer et al. 2010, p. 38.
797 Sadat 2007, p.  229. Saul 2008, p.  211 also opines that consensus has emerged on core 
international crimes, irrespective of cultural differences between states.
798 gaeta 2009, p. 66.
799 Bassiouni 2005(i), p. 36.
800 Werle 2009, pp.  19–23. See assembly of States Parties, Elements of Crimes, adopted by the 
assembly of States Parties, first session, New York, 3–10 September 2002, official records 
9 September 2002, icc‑aSP/1/3.
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as stated, the criminalisation process of the core crimes is characterised by 
a lack of systematisation and a legal method. This is not very surprising, as the 
legislative process on the international level differs from that on the national level. 
The adoption of domestic legislation by a state is usually preceded by a lengthy 
procedure of preparatory work by legislative experts, input from Bar associations, 
professional groups and non‑legal consultants, debates in the Upper and Lower 
Houses of Parliament, resulting in revisions which are then followed by more 
debates.
in contrast, generally only few experts are involved in the process of drawing 
up a treaty, the participation of lawyers in drafting international legislation being 
the exception rather than the rule. on the international level, diplomats are the 
ones who conduct treaty negotiations and these diplomats are not necessarily 
experts in the subject at hand.801 However, during the 1998 rome conference, there 
was a relatively large amount of (indirect) input from (international) criminal law 
experts: the delegates, most of whom were not experts in (international) criminal 
law, were able to draw upon the preparatory work done by committees such as 
the iLc, the 1995 ad Hoc committee and the 1996 Preparatory committee.802 
moreover, the experienced former members of these committees coordinated 
most of the working groups during the negotiations in rome. Nevertheless, the 
delegates often had to opt for consensus – presumably at the cost of a consistent 
legal method – which, in view of the difficulties of reconciling different legal 
systems, seems to have been the only option for the creation of a widely accepted 
statute.803
3.2 . coDifYiNg ‘NeW’ crimeS DUriNg THe rome 
coNfer eNce: THe imPorTaNce of maTeriaL 
DiSTiNcTiVeNeSS
acts that had already been recognised as crimes against humanity in the statutes 
of other international criminal courts and tribunals, such as the imT, icTY and 
icTr, were included in the rome Statute because these particular offences were 
considered to reflect customary international law. When it came to including 
‘new’ acts as crimes against humanity, i.e. acts which were not included in 
previous major instruments pertaining to international criminal law, such as the 
enforced disappearance of persons, the drafters of the rome Statute considered it 
important to avoid as much overlap as possible between different inhumane acts, 
801 Bassiouni 2005(i), p. 91.
802 Bassiouni 2005(i), pp. 66–67 and 72.
803 Bassiouni 2005(i), p. 92.
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so as to maintain clarity and prevent superfluous crimes.804, 805 This is evidenced, 
inter alia, by the negotiations on the inclusion of sexual slavery, both as a war 
crime and as a crime against humanity. With the horror of the sexual atrocities 
committed during the conflicts in rwanda and the former Yugoslavia still fresh 
in mind, the 1997 Preparatory committee decided to include in the Draft Statute 
a separate category of gender crimes in the provisions of crimes against humanity 
and war crimes.806 Sexual offences were, at least in part, already covered by 
existing offences such as the war crimes of torture and inhuman treatment and 
the crimes against humanity of torture and enslavement, but the Preparatory 
committee considered it important to give explicit recognition to sexual crimes. 
This decision was inspired by developments taking place on the international level 
with regard to women and human rights807 and influenced by the case law of the 
icTr and icTY which, due to the lack of an extensive catalogue of separate sexual 
crimes, had to deal with instances of sexual violence by classifying them as other 
crimes such as torture and enslavement. Therefore, the Preparatory committee 
included a selection of sexual crimes in the definitions of war crimes and crimes 
against humanity.808 one of these sexual crimes was sexual slavery. initially, this 
particular offence was only included in the war crimes provision809 and not also as 
a crime against humanity.810 During the rome conference, however, it was agreed 
that this crime also warranted recognition as a crime against humanity.
from the outset, the codification of sexual slavery in the rome Statute 
enjoyed much support among delegates, mainly due to the fact that a number 
of important documents and reports listed sexual slavery as a crime that is 
frequently committed in conflict situations.811 This argument was also used to 
advocate the inclusion of the crimes of apartheid and enforced disappearance 
of persons in the provision of crimes against humanity.812 although, like sexual 
slavery, these crimes did not appear in the charter of the imT, the charter of 
the imTfe, control council Law No. 10, or in the Statutes of the icTY and 
icTr, it was agreed that codifying these crimes in the rome Statute was justified 
804 it should be noted that some overlap already existed between crimes recognised under 
customary international law, such as between the crimes against humanity of murder and 
extermination. See oosterveld 2004, p. 623.
805 overlap between crimes was considered to be less of an issue in the context of war crimes (see 
also paragraph 4.2 infra and footnote 874 in particular).
806 robinson 2001, pp. 185–186.
807 Such as the 1995 fourth World conference on Women, resulting in the Beijing Declaration 
and Platform for action (15 September 1995, UN Doc. a/coNf.177/20).
808 Von Hebel & robinson 1999, p. 117.
809 Bassiouni 2005(ii), pp. 44–55. 
810 in the category of sexual crimes, the 1998 draft statute listed ‘rape or other sexual abuse (of 
comparable gravity), or enforced prostitution’ as crimes against humanity, Bassiouni 2005(ii), 
p. 45.
811 Inter alia UN commission on Human rights: contemporary forms of slavery 1998; and 
oosterveld 2004, pp. 608 and 614–615.
812 See for example Summary record of the 3rd plenary meeting held during the rome conference 
(16 June 1998), UN Doc. a/coNf.183/Sr.3, 20 November 1998, para. 74.
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seeing as both offences had already previously been explicitly identified as crimes 
against humanity in international instruments813 and it was recognised that they 
are undoubtedly inhumane acts that resemble other crimes against humanity in 
character and gravity.814
 irrespective of the high level of support in favour of the codification of 
sexual slavery, two important issues arose during the negotiations concerning 
this crime: the questions regarding the differences between sexual slavery and 
the broader crime of enslavement on the one hand,815 and the differences between 
sexual slavery and enforced prostitution on the other hand. Some delegates were 
concerned that sexual slavery, being a form of enslavement, was completely 
subsumed under this latter crime and would therefore become superfluous, 
especially as the sexual elements of sexual slavery could be addressed by charging 
rape cumulatively with enslavement. after all, sexual slavery is slavery, and if the 
former is a form of the latter, then deleting sexual slavery would reduce overlap 
of crimes in the Statute and many delegates aimed at avoiding repetition or 
overlap.816 other delegates countered this by stating that overlap already existed 
between crimes recognised under customary international law and brought up the 
crimes against humanity of murder and extermination. They argued that it was 
necessary to include ‘an accurate and specific listing of the kinds of serious crimes 
that occur in today’s world’,817 sexual slavery being an example of these types of 
offences. in the context of this debate, the Women’s caucus for gender Justice in 
the international criminal court explicitly referred to forced marriages that took 
place in rwanda, stating that this practice can have both sexual and non‑sexual 
aspects that require the charging of both enslavement and sexual slavery.818 in the 
end, delegates agreed that the two crimes that were traditionally used to prosecute 
instances of sexual slavery (i.e. rape and enslavement) did not cover the spectrum 
813 cryer et al. 2010, pp. 262–264; Witschel & rückert 2001, pp. 99 and 104; and robinson 1999, 
p. 55; and Von Hebel & robinson 1999, p. 102.
814 for example, the icTY held that enforced disappearance could constitute an other inhumane 
act, so long as it is ‘carried out in a systematic manner and on a large scale’ (Kupreškić et al. 
Trial Judgement, para. 566).
815 The issue regarding the extent of the overlap between enslavement and sexual slavery arose 
from a proposal of the Holy See submitted to the 1997 Preparatory committee to delete 
from the war crimes provision the crimes of sexual slavery, enforced prostitution and forced 
pregnancy and replace them by a general subsection on enslavement (see Proposal submitted 
by the Holy See, Preparatory committee on the establishment of an international criminal 
court, UN Doc. a/ac.249/1997/Wg. 1/DP. 12, 9 December 1997; and oosterveld 2004, p. 615). 
This proposal was mainly aimed at the deletion of the crime of forced pregnancy, because the 
Vatican (along with a few catholic and arab countries) was concerned that this crime might 
oblige national systems to allow women who were forcibly impregnated to abort the fetus, and 
would in that way in fact create a right to abortion (see Von Hebel & robinson 1999, p. 100; and 
Steains 1999, pp. 366–367).
816 oosterveld 2004, pp. 622–623.
817 oosterveld 2004, p. 623.
818 Women’s caucus recommendations 1997, para. Wc.5.6–7 and oosterveld 2004, p. 624.
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of harms caused by sexual slavery.819 rape, it was recognised, does not properly 
describe the loss of liberty, whereas enslavement does not properly describe the 
sexual nature of the crime,820 and it was decided to list both enslavement and 
sexual slavery as distinct crimes against humanity.821
The second controversial issue revolved around the overlap between sexual 
slavery and enforced prostitution. The leading question during the debates 
on this issue was whether sexual slavery should replace the crime of enforced 
prostitution. Supporters of this proposal argued that enforced prostitution is 
an outdated term which suggests a certain level of voluntarism on the side of 
the victim, or which carries the assumption of (monetary) compensation. in 
addition, it was put forward that labelling certain conduct ‘enforced prostitution’ 
is stigmatising and discriminatory for the victim, and reflects the male (in most 
cases the perpetrator’s) view, instead of focusing on the victim’s perspective.822 
The supporters concluded that sexual slavery encompasses enforced prostitution 
and better reflects the reality of the crime. opponents, i.e. those who opined 
that both crimes deserved to be included in the rome Statute, argued that 
enforced prostitution has its own unique elements, especially when committed in 
peacetime, which make it distinct from sexual slavery.823 The Special rapporteur 
on systematic rape, sexual slavery and slavery‑like practices held that, even 
though sexual slavery encompasses enforced prostitution in most, if not in all, 
cases, the latter still remains a valid alternative tool for prosecution.824 eventually, 
opinion on this matter remained (and arguably still is) divided and because it was 
not clear whether scenarios were possible in which an act of enforced prostitution 
would not also constitute sexual slavery, it was decided to include both crimes in 
the corpus of positive international criminal law.825
The importance of the distinctiveness of crimes was not only discussed with 
regard to sexual slavery. as a result of the guiding principle that overlap should 
be avoided, a proposal to include a crime of mass starvation in the list of crimes 
against humanity did not receive sufficient support because delegates opined 
819 See e.g. Kunarac et al. Trial and appeal Judgement. in this precedent‑setting case, the icTY 
considered the crime of enslavement for sexual purposes (nota that enslavement was included 
in the icTY Statute; sexual slavery was not).
820 Scharf 2005, p. 93.
821 The separate listing of sexual slavery and enslavement was (and is) also supported by many 
academics. askin, for example, argues that the term ‘sexual slavery’ more accurately describes 
the nature of the crime (see K.D. askin, ‘Women and international Humanitarian Law’, in: 
K.D. askin & D.m. Koenig (eds.), Women and international human rights law. Part I, ardsley, 
NY: Transnational Publishers 1999, p. 83). for a different view, see P. Viseur Sellers, ‘Wartime 
female slavery: enslavement?’, Cornell International Law Journal (44) 2011, pp. 115–144.
822 oosterveld 2004, pp. 618–619.
823 oosterveld 2004, pp. 620–621.
824 The crime of enforced prostitution ‘remains a potential, albeit limited alternative tool for 
future prosecutions of sexual violence in armed conflict situations’ (UN commission on 
Human rights: contemporary forms of slavery 1998, paras. 33 and 32, respectively).
825 oosterveld 2004, p. 622 and Jain 2008, p. 1029.
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that this conduct would most likely fall under the existing crimes of murder and 
extermination.826
3.3. coDifYiNg ‘NeW’ crimeS afTer THe rome 
coNfer eNce: ameNDiNg THe rome STaTUTe
3.3.1. Article 121 Rome Statute: amendments
The rome Statute is not carved in stone: article 121 provides for the possibility 
of amendment. This is important, seeing as the icc only has jurisdiction over 
crimes listed in the rome Statute.827 The icc’s jurisdiction over a particular 
offence, therefore, can only be activated by including that offence in the Statute 
through amendment. in accordance with article 121 rome Statute, a state party 
can propose an amendment to the Statute; the assembly of states parties then 
deals with this proposal.828 in case consensus cannot be reached, a two‑thirds 
majority is required in order for the amendment to be accepted. amendments 
to the core crimes provisions (i.e. articles 5, 6, 7 and 8 rome Statute) only 
become applicable to states parties that have accepted them. This means the 
court is not able to exercise its jurisdiction regarding a crime covered by the 
amendment when it was committed on the territory of or by a national of a state 
which did not accept the amendment.829 Pursuant to article 121(5) rome Statute, 
‘amendment to articles 5, 6, 7 and 8 of this Statute shall enter into force for those 
States Parties which have accepted the amendment one year after the deposit of 
their instruments of ratification or acceptance.’ adding new crimes to the rome 
Statute is not something that happens on a daily basis, but neither is it unheard 
of. The 2010 review conference in Kampala, for example, resulted in three war 
crimes being added to article 8(2)(e) of the rome Statute.830 it is vital, therefore, 
826 in addition, it was argued that a crime of mass starvation did not have the special recognition 
in international instruments that other crimes such as apartheid and enforced disappearance 
did have. for apartheid, see e.g. convention on the Non‑applicability of Statutory Limitations 
to War crimes and crimes against Humanity, Nov. 26, 1968, 754 U.N.T.S. 73; international 
convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the crime of Apartheid, nov. 30, 1973, 
A/RES/3068(xxVIII); Protocol additional to the geneva conventions of 12  august 1949, 
and relating to the Protection of Victims of international armed conflicts (Protocol i), Jun. 
8, 1977,  1125 U.N.T.S. 3. With regard to enforced disappearance, see The inter‑american 
convention on forced Disappearance of Persons, mar. 28, 1996, o.a.S.T.S. 68, 33 iLm 1429. 
See Von Hebel & robinson 1999, p. 103.
827 article 22(1) rome Statute.
828 The assembly can deal with the proposed amendment directly or convene a review conference 
(article 123(2) rome Statute).
829 r. clark, ‘article 121 amendments’, in: o. Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court, munich: c.H. Beck 2008, margin no. 5. This is in conformity 
with article 40(4) Vienna convention on the Law of Treaties.
830 The war crimes of 1) employing poison or poisoned weapons; 2) employing asphyxiating, 
poisonous or other gases, and all analogous liquids, materials or devices; and 3) employing 
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whilst reading the rest of this chapter to keep in mind that the rome Statute is a 
treaty; a contract between states that can be amended at their behest.
it is self‑evident that any new crimes must conform to the legality principle, 
as discussed below.831
3.3.2. Principle of legality
one of the most important, if not the most important, principles of criminal law 
is the principle of legality or nullum crimen sine lege (no crime without law). This 
axiom, which prescribes that no one may be held liable and punished for violating 
a criminal law that did not exist at the time it was committed, is part of customary 
international law and is laid down in inter alia the UDHr, the iccPr, the ecHr, 
the african charter on Human and Peoples’ rights, the american convention 
on Human rights, and the rome Statute.832
During the past decades, a noteworthy shift has taken place in international 
criminal law from the doctrine of substantive justice to the doctrine of strict 
legality, mainly due to the anchoring of the nullum crimen principle in important 
human rights instruments. The concept of substantive justice entails that the 
need to protect society requires that any conduct that is harmful to or dangerous 
for society is punished, irrespective of whether or not this act has already been 
legally criminalised at the moment it was committed. This type of justification 
of the application of ex post facto law was used at the Nuremberg imT.833 The 
current prevailing notion, however, leans more and more towards strict legality, a 
doctrine entailing that the need to protect individuals’ human rights implies that 
no one may be held criminally liable for acts that were not criminalised when they 
were committed.834
bullets which expand or flatten easily in the human body, such as bullets with a hard envelope 
which does not entirely cover the core or is pierced with incisions (see resolution 5 of the 
review conference, 12th plenary meeting, 10 June 2010).
831 See also chapters 4 and 6.
832 article  11(2) UDHr, article  15 iccPr, article  7 ecHr, article  7(2) african charter on 
Human and Peoples’ rights, article 9 american convention on Human rights, and articles 
22–24 rome Statute.
833 See cassese et al. 2013, p. 25.
834 cassese et al. 2013, pp. 25–27. in human rights instruments exceptions to the strict nullum 
crimen principle were included as a result of the criticism on the legality of the Nuremberg 
and Tokyo trials. These exceptions were meant to emphasise the legality of these tribunals 
(Boot 2002, p.  613). See article  7(2) ecHr: ‘This article shall not prejudice the trial and 
punishment of any person for any act or omission which, at the time when it was committed, 
was criminal according to the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations.’ See 
also article 15(2) iccPr.
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The four norms of the legality principle (lex scripta, praevia, certa and stricta) 
which guided the drafters of the rome Statute,835 are expressly836 reflected by the 
rome Statute in articles 22 and 24.837 The former article stipulates that:
1. a person shall not be criminally responsible under this Statute unless the 
conduct in question constitutes, at the time it takes place, a crime within the 
jurisdiction of the court.
2. The definition of a crime shall be strictly construed and shall not be extended 
by analogy. in case of ambiguity, the definition shall be interpreted in favour 
of the person being investigated, prosecuted or convicted.
3. This article shall not affect the characterization of any conduct as criminal 
under international law independently of this Statute.
The phrase ‘a crime within the jurisdiction of the court’ refers to the core 
crimes enumerated in article 5, which are defined in articles 6 through 8, and 
encompasses the lex scripta principle.838 in other words, no one can be criminally 
responsible under the rome Statute for crimes that are not listed in article 5(1).839 
The third paragraph makes clear that the effects of the legality principles are 
limited to the Statute, which is also emphasised by the words ‘under this Statute’ 
in paragraph one.840 The requirement of a written criminal provision is peculiar 
to international criminal law, as traditionally, this field of law was to a large 
extent based on unwritten norms of custom.841 However, article  22(1) rome 
Statute clearly prevents the icc from exercising jurisdiction over crimes that are 
not codified in the Statute. The lex scripta demand therefore does apply to the 
rome Statute. article 22(2) rome Statute requires that the icc strictly interprets 
the definitions of crimes as stipulated in the Statute and forbids extensions by 
835 members of the 1996 Preparatory committee agreed that ‘that the crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the court should be defined with the clarity, precision and specificity required 
for criminal law in accordance with the principle of legality (nullum crimen sine lege)’, Report 
of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court (Volume 
I), UN gaor, 51st Session, Session Supplement No. 22a (a/51/22), 1996, para. 52.
836 it should be noted that the principle of legality is interpreted in a more tolerant and broad sense 
under general international law and indeed by the icTY and icTr. in the context of the rome 
Statute, on the other hand, the principle of legality is applied in a stricter sense (Broomhall 
2008, margin no. 15; and c. Kress, ‘Nulla poena nullum crimen sine lege’, in Max Planck 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law, margin no. 17). See also chapter 6.
837 article 23 stipulates the nulla poena sine lege principle: ‘(a) person convicted by the court may 
be punished only in accordance with this Statute.’
838 Boot 2002, p. 375; and K. ambos, ‘general principles of criminal law in the rome Statute’, 
Criminal Law Forum (10) 1999, p. 4.
839 Werle 2009, p. 38. 
840 Lamb 2002, p. 753.
841 See supra on the Nuremberg trials and the concept of substantive justice.
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analogy.842 as noted by Boot, these two corollaries of the principle of legality 
restrict the icc to acting as la bouche de la loi.843 in the words of Haveman:
‘However heinous the judiciary may consider the behaviour in question to be, as 
long as the assembly of state parties have not brought this behaviour under the 
jurisdiction of the court, the court shall have to refrain from punishing individuals 
for having committed such behaviour.’844
article 24 rome Statute embodies the rule of non‑retroactivity ratione personae:
1. No person shall be criminally responsible under this Statute for conduct prior 
to the entry into force of the Statute.
2. in the event of a change in the law applicable to a given case prior to a 
final judgement, the law more favourable to the person being investigated, 
prosecuted or convicted shall apply.
in the rome Statute, the principle of legality is linked to the subject matter 
jurisdiction of the court and consequently to the consent of the states parties: 
the court has jurisdiction only over the crimes that are delineated in the rome 
Statute, i.e. the crimes the states parties agreed upon.845 This is not surprising, 
considering that, in general, states would rather not give up sovereignty by 
ceding jurisdiction to another country, or in this case, an international court.846 
consequently, it is likewise not surprising that during the negotiations in rome, 
the prevailing arguments with regard to legality pertained to the consent of states 
– seeking to protect their sovereignty – to the court’s exercise of jurisdiction 
over a particular crime, and that human rights concerns, i.e. the protection of 
individuals against arbitrary punishment, were more or less subordinate to the 
states’ demands of legal certainty regarding the court’s jurisdiction.847
The four norms comprising the legality principle have been affirmed by the 
icc Pre‑Trial chamber in the Decision on the confirmation of the charges in the 
case against the congolese Thomas Lubanga Dyilo. in response to the Defence’s 
argument that Lubanga could not foresee that the use of child soldiers was 
842 The lex stricta principle applies only to the definitions of crimes as set out in articles 6–8 rome 
Statute; it does not apply to the eoc (Broomhall 2008, margin no. 39). However, the eoc must 
be interpreted consistently with the rome Statute; interpreting them extensively would not 
be consistent with the rome Statute (see article 9(3) rome Statute and general introduction 
eoc).
843 Boot 2002, pp. 395 and 613. cassese 2008, p. 17: ‘a court or tribunal may not apply a customary 
rule criminalising conduct that does not fall within one of the categories of crimes over which 
it has jurisdiction under its Statute.’
844 Haveman 2003, p. 61.
845 Boot 2002, pp. 616–617.
846 Boot 2002, p. 617.
847 cryer et al. 2010, p. 20; and Boot 2002, pp. 362 and 617–618.
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criminal in nature, the icc’s Pre‑Trial chamber i, rejecting this argument, held 
that,
‘there is no infringement of the principle of legality if the chamber exercises its 
power to decide whether Thomas Lubanga Dyilo ought to be committed for trial 
on the basis of written (lex scripta) pre‑existing criminal norms approved by the 
States Parties to the rome Statute (lex praevia), defining prohibited conduct and 
setting out the related sentence (lex certa), which cannot be interpreted by analogy 
in malam partem (lex stricta).’848
The lex certa principle plays an important role during the process of defining 
crimes, as is evidenced by the legislative history of the icc eoc. The requirement 
of specificity was discussed during the meetings of the Preparatory commission, 
established after the rome conference to draft the icc’s elements of crimes 
and rules of Procedure and evidence. During the debates on the elements of the 
crimes of enslavement and sexual slavery, for example, several delegates expressed 
concerns regarding the clarity of the definition of sexual slavery. The United 
States was concerned that merely reproducing the definition of enslavement as 
encompassed in the rome Statute in article 7(2)(c)849 would be too imprecise to 
satisfy the legality principle and therefore suggested the element be accompanied 
by a non‑exhaustive, illustrative list of examples of how the right of ownership 
can be exercised. as a result, the definition of enslavement (which was copied 
verbatim from the rome Statute) was expanded by a number of indicia of 
ownership: ‘such as by purchasing, selling, lending or bartering such a person or 
persons, or by imposing on them a similar deprivation of liberty’.850
The importance of the legality principle to criminal law in general makes 
it relevant to criminalisation and consequently to the question of how certain 
conduct should be criminalised. The icc’s jurisdiction is limited to the crimes 
enumerated in the rome Statute and the court, therefore, cannot take recourse 
to customary international law to fill any gaps in the Statute.851 When certain 
conduct falls outside the scope of the rome Statute, it will have to be incorporated 
(by means of amendment) into this document for the icc to exercise jurisdiction 
over it. each new criminal provision in the rome Statute will have to be in 
848 Lubanga Decision on the confirmation of the charges, para. 303. 
849 ‘“enslavement” means the exercise of any or all of the powers attaching to the right of 
ownership over a person and includes the exercise of such power in the course of trafficking in 
persons, in particular women and children.’
850 article 7(1)(g)‑2 icc eoc. 
851 However, article  21(1)(b) rome Statute lists ‘the principles and rules of international law’ 
as one of the sources of law the court can apply. The court can therefore use customary 
international law, but only to interpret or clarify existing crimes and not to create new offences 
(Lamb 2002, p. 750).
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accordance with the principle of legality and consequently live up to the demands 
of specificity and non‑retroactivity.852
3.4. THe STrUcTUr e of THe cor e crimeS
in 1997, the Preparatory committee had agreed that the prospective international 
criminal court ought to deal only with crimes that are of the most serious concern 
to the international community as a whole, and it was decided that the crimes 
which were to be included in the rome Statute should be crimes already established 
under customary international law.853, 854 as remarked by a european delegate, 
the icc was not created ‘as a panacea for all ills’.855 This notion of subsidiarity is 
reflected by the preamble of the rome Statute, and more specifically with regard 
to crimes against humanity by the icc eoc in the introductory provision to this 
core crime:
‘Since article 7 pertains to international criminal law, its provisions, consistent 
with article 22, must be strictly construed, taking into account that crimes against 
humanity as defined in article 7 are among the most serious crimes of concern to 
the international community as a whole, warrant and entail individual criminal 
responsibility, and require conduct which is impermissible under generally 
applicable international law, as recognized by the principal legal systems of the 
world.’
consequently, in order for conduct to fall within the jurisdiction of the icc, it 
will have to constitute one (or more) of the core crimes.856 only conduct that can 
be classified as a crime against humanity, war crime, genocide or aggression can 
give rise to individual criminal responsibility under international criminal law.
852 it should be noted that the majority of crimes are not defined in the rome Statute: they are 
defined in the non‑binding elements of crimes document. 
853 although in the end crimes which were not (yet) part of customary international law were 
also included in the Statute (see cryer 2008, p. 118; oosterveld 2004, p. 615; Von Hebel 2001, 
p. 5). certain listed crimes expand customary international law, in the sense that they are (or 
at least were at the time of codification in the Statute) broader than customary international 
law, examples are sexual slavery, forced pregnancy and apartheid, see cassese 2002, p. 376 and 
cassese et al. 2013, p. 107. Some delegates also explicitly stated that they believed the rome 
Statute could advance international law (oosterveld 2004, pp. 623 and 625). in other words: 
there was no consensus among delegates with regard to the customary nature of crimes to be 
included in the Statute (see also milanović 2011, p. 32, footnote 25).
854 Note that not all crimes under customary international law are included in the rome Statute, 
see cassese et al. 2013, p. 29 and article 10 rome Statute.
855 robinson 2001, p. 70. See also oosterveld 2004, pp. 622–623.
856 See article 22(1) rome Statute and paragraph 4.1 infra.
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in order to create a framework that governs the criminalisation of offences 
under international criminal law, it is important to examine what the rationale 
was behind criminalising the core crimes in the first place.
The desire to ensure that in conflict situations at least some elementary 
principles and values are respected gave rise to the criminalisation of the category 
of offences with the longest history of the four core crimes: war crimes.857 closely 
linked with the proscription of war crimes is the criminalisation of aggression, 
a crime which is characterised by the UN general assembly as ‘the most serious 
and dangerous form of the illegal use of force, being fraught, in the conditions 
created by the existence of all types of weapons of mass destruction, with the 
possible threat of a world conflict and all its catastrophic consequences.’858 The 
rationale behind international criminalisation of genocide and crimes against 
humanity stems from the notion that states do not own the lives of their citizens 
and that they should respect their citizens’ fundamental rights. This recognition 
was a large step forward in the protection of fundamental rights, as a state’s 
treatment of its citizens used to be considered a matter of internal affairs in which 
no interference of other states was allowed.859
Pursuant to article 5 rome Statute, the icc has jurisdiction over four crimes. 
The layout of the core crimes is quite similar: each of these crimes contains 
sub‑paragraphs enumerating a broad range of in total more than 70 prohibited 
acts (‘any of the following acts’860), which constitute an international crime if they 
are committed with the required intent and the so‑called chapeau elements. The 
first paragraph of the crimes against humanity provision may be used to illustrate 
the structure of the core crimes: it contains a list of inhumane acts and a chapeau 
which sets out the conditions under which the commission of these acts amounts 
to a crime against humanity:
1. for the purpose of this Statute, ‘crime against humanity’ means any of the 
following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack 
directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack:
(a) murder;
857 gaeta 2009, p. 66.
858 UNga res. 3314 (1975) gaor 29th Session Supp 31, 142. aggression was internationally 
criminalised because it constitutes a crime against international peace and by criminalising 
this conduct, the international community expressed its solemn renunciation of unauthorised 
war‑making (B.B. ferencz, ‘enabling the international criminal court to Punish aggression’, 
Washington University Global Studies Law Review (6) 2007, p. 566). aggression was first tried 
before the Nuremberg international military Tribunal under the name of ‘crimes against 
peace’ and in the view of this Tribunal ‘(t)o initiate a war of aggression (…) is not only an 
international crime; it is the supreme international crime differing only from other war 
crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole.’ See Nuremberg 
international military Tribunal Judgement and Sentences, reprinted in the American Journal 
of International Law (41) 1947, p. 186.
859 gaeta 2009, pp. 66–68. 
860 articles 6, 7(1), 8(2)(b) and (c) and 8bis(2) rome Statute. See Werle 2009, p. 25.
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(d) Deportation or forcible transfer of population;
(e) imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation 
of fundamental rules of international law;
(f) Torture;
(g) rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced 
sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity;
(h) Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, 
national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3, or 
other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under 
international law, in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph 
or any crime within the jurisdiction of the court;
(i) enforced disappearance of persons;
(j) The crime of apartheid;
(k) other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great 
suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.
The chapeau or threshold requirements describe the circumstances under which 
specific conduct amounts to an international crime. The category of crimes 
against humanity entails a contextual threshold: it is required that the listed 
prohibited acts (such as murder or rape) are committed as part of a widespread 
or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of 
the attack. The crime of genocide requires a specific mental state: article 6 rome 
Statute requires that the individual prohibited acts are committed with a specific 
intent (dolus specialis), namely with the specific intent of destroying, in whole or 
in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such. for war crimes the 
most essential common element is a nexus with an armed conflict, either national 
or international.
4. crimiNaLiSaTioN aND crimeS agaiNST 
HUmaNiTY
4.1. iNTroDUcTioN: oPTioNS for crimiNaLiSaTioN
The theories on international criminalisation advanced by Bassiouni, cassese 
and may demonstrate that only the most serious crimes warrant international 
criminalisation. This coincides with the intent of the drafters of the rome Statute 
and is also affirmed by the text of this Statute and its eoc. more specifically, it is 
reflected by the definition of crimes against humanity: crimes against humanity 
are among the most serious crimes of concern to the international community 
as a whole. in the words of cassese, the common features of crimes against 
humanity are as follows:
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 ‘(i) these crimes are particularly odious offences in that they constitute a serious 
attack on human dignity or a grave humiliation or degradation of one or more 
human beings; (ii) they are not isolated or sporadic events, but are part either of a 
governmental policy (although the perpetrators need not identify themselves with 
this policy) or of a widespread practice of atrocities tolerated or condoned by a 
government or a de facto authority.’861
Pursuant to article 7 of the rome Statute the condicio sine qua non for penalising 
conduct as a crime against humanity is that the conduct amounts to an inhumane 
act.862 if an act cannot be qualified as ‘inhumane’ it will not amount to a crime 
against humanity, meaning the conduct cannot be criminalised as such. There 
are two ways in which certain conduct can constitute a crime against humanity.
first, it is possible that the conduct in question is in fact already penalised 
as a crime against humanity, because it is subsumed under the inhumane acts 
enumerated in article 7 rome Statute. This was the case, according to the icc 
Pre‑Trial chamber, for the forced marriages that took place in the Democratic 
republic of congo. in the decision on the confirmation of the charges in the case 
against Katanga, the icc Pre‑Trial chamber stated that forced marriage is a form 
of sexual slavery that is completely subsumed under the latter offence and can 
therefore not be qualified as a distinct crime under the heading ‘other inhumane 
acts’.863 The same goes for the forced marriages that took place during the civil 
war in Sierra Leone: in the Taylor judgement, the ScSL Trial chamber considered 
that forced marriage is not a new crime, not a distinct inhumane act, but that it 
is in fact subsumed under the crime of sexual slavery.864 another example of an 
act that is considered to be subsumed under a listed inhumane act is the crime of 
mass starvation: as was mentioned above, during the negotiations in rome on the 
Statute of the icc, delegates considered that this conduct would most likely be 
covered by the crimes of murder and extermination.865
Secondly, it is possible that particular conduct is not covered by already listed 
inhumane acts, but nevertheless amounts to an inhumane act and is therefore 
criminalised through the catch‑all clause ‘other inhumane acts’, which is part of 
the definition of crimes against humanity. This was the case, for example, with 
forced nudity: the icTr Trial chamber in the Akayesu judgement found that 
forced nudity, which is not listed as an inhumane act in the icTr Statute as such, 
861 cassese, gaeta & Jones 2002, p. 360.
862 This was also recognised during the negotiations on the inclusion in the rome Statute of inter 
alia sexual slavery, enforced disappearance of persons and apartheid. See robinson 1999, p. 55; 
Von Hebel & robinson, 1999, p. 102. See also cryer et al. 2010, p. 230.
863 Katanga and ngudjolo Chui Decision on the confirmation of charges, para.  431. See also 
chapter 8.
864 Taylor Trial Judgement, paras. 422–430. for a discussion of this judgement, see chapter 8.
865 See Von Hebel & robinson 1999, p. 103.
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can amount to an ‘other inhumane act’.866 and contrary to what was stated above 
with regard to the Taylor trial judgement, in its earlier case law, the ScSL has 
held that the forced marriages which took place during the civil war in Sierra 
Leone ought to be qualified as ‘other inhumane acts’, because they are distinct 
from listed acts such as sexual slavery.867 Therefore, when the conduct in question 
contains at least one distinct element which is not included in the definition of 
existing inhumane acts, those acts will not adequately cover the distinguishing 
characteristics of this conduct and consequently will not completely subsume that 
act.868 if this is the case, then the question should be asked as to whether or not 
the particular conduct could be qualified as an ‘other inhumane act’. Several acts 
which initially were not listed as specific inhumane acts were qualified as ‘other 
inhumane acts’ in the case law of the international criminal courts and tribunals 
and were later codified as specific inhumane acts, for instance in the rome Statute 
and the ScSL Statute. examples include sexual violence, forcible transfer of 
population, enforced prostitution, and the enforced disappearance of persons.869 
This implies that acts that are currently not codified as crimes against humanity 
in the rome Statute, but are qualified as ‘other inhumane acts’ by the icc, could, 
theoretically, in the future be included in the list of inhumane acts under article 7 
rome Statute. especially if this particular crime with unique characteristics has 
certain prevalence in conflict situations and is likely to reoccur, it stands to reason 
to consider including it in the crimes against humanity provision.
if a particular act does not amount to an ‘other inhumane act’, either because 
it cannot be classified as ‘inhumane’ or because it did not cause serious suffering 
or injury,870 it will fall outside the ambit of crimes against humanity and can 
therefore not be criminalised as such. This paragraph analyses each of these 
possibilities of criminalising conduct as a crime against humanity.
866 Akayesu Trial Judgement, paras. 598, 688. The icTY and icTr also qualified sexual violence, 
forced disappearance and forced prostitution as ‘other inhumane acts’. These crimes were not 
included as distinct crimes against humanity in the statutes of the icTr and icTY, but have 
now been included in the rome Statute as such. See cryer et al. 2010, p. 265.
867 afrc appeal Judgement, paras. 197–202. This conclusion was followed by the co‑investigating 
Judges at the eccc, who have indicted the accused in one of the cases on charges of ‘the other 
inhumane act of forced marriage’. See case 002 closing order, paras. 1442–1447. See chapter 
8.
868 This is also in line with the more strict interpretation of the legality principle.
869 afrc Prosecution appeal Brief, para.  606. These acts are now listed as crimes against 
humanity in the rome Statute. See article 7(1)(d) – 7(1)(g), 7(1)(i) rome Statute. These crimes, 
with the exception of enforced disappearance of persons, are also included in the ScSL Statute.
870 as required by the first element of the crime of ‘other inhumane acts’ (see article  7(1)(k) 
elements of crimes). The iLc, commenting on its 1991 Draft code, also held that an inhumane 
act ‘must in fact cause injury to a human being in terms of physical or mental integrity, health 
or human dignity’, as quoted in the Kayishema Trial Judgement, para. 150.
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4.2 . maTeriaL DiSTiNcTiVeNeSS: THe coNDUcT iS 
SUBSUmeD UNDer SPecific iNHUmaNe acTS 
LiSTeD iN arTicLe 7(1) rome STaTUTe
from a practical point of view, the most logical step is to first verify whether 
the conduct in question is perhaps already subsumed under existing inhumane 
acts (internal subsidiarity). if perpetrators of particular conduct can be 
adequately prosecuted using existing law, creating a new crime would arguably 
be redundant.871 The negotiations on the inclusion of certain acts, such as sexual 
slavery and enforced disappearance of persons, as distinct crimes against 
humanity in the rome Statute clearly demonstrate that while overlap between 
crimes is allowed, a ‘new’ crime against humanity should (ideally) be materially 
distinct, in the sense that it has at least one element that is not included in already 
listed crimes.872 in other words, the act should require proof of a fact that is not 
required by other crimes.873, 874
The requirement that a new crime contains at least one unique element that is 
not encompassed in existing crimes is also mentioned in literature with regard to 
international criminal law in the broad sense. Saul argues, for example, that the 
fact that existing international or transnational crimes already prohibit the same 
conduct under a different nomenclature constitutes a pragmatic, but compelling 
objection to separately criminalising that conduct.875 When, on the other hand, 
the conduct in question has unique and distinguishing characteristics which are 
871 See also mattler 2004, p.  23. obviously, there might be good arguments to create a new 
prohibition irrespective of overlap, see chapter 6.
872 oosterveld 2004, p. 638, footnote 149. The argument that a crime must have a unique element 
was also raised by the Holy See in relation to the crime of enforced pregnancy. The Holy See 
argued, together with several catholic and arab countries, that the elements of this crime 
were already covered in the Draft rome Statute by the offences of rape and unlawful detention, 
which made inclusion of a specific crime of enforced pregnancy unnecessary in their view. See 
Steains 1999, p. 367. Delegates from Bosnia and Herzegovina, however, argued that a specific 
criminalisation of this offence was needed because it has a different criminal purpose (i.e. 
making and keeping a woman pregnant, for example to change the ethnic composition of a 
population) than other forms of sexual assaults. See Discussion Paper: Delegation of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina (crime of enforced pregnancy), rome conference Preparatory Works, 15 april 
1998 (see Von Hebel & robinson 1999, p. 100; and Steains 1999, pp. 366–367).
873 Čelebići appeal Judgement, para. 412.
874 Note that considerations of uniqueness and overlap played a less important role with regard 
to war crimes. even when there was overlap between crimes, they were included nevertheless, 
because drafters wanted to include in the rome Statute as many rules of customary 
international law pertaining to armed conflict as possible and in this process, relied on many 
sources. Therefore, there is considerable duplication (cryer et al. 2010, p. 289). for example, 
the war crime of intentionally directing attacks against UN personnel is superfluous because 
existing war crimes already protect UN personnel. However, delegates decided to include this 
specific war crime, because the crime has great symbolic value: it demonstrates that the world 
community attaches great value to the work done by UN personnel and that attacks on these 
people are seen as serious crimes (Von Hebel & robinson 1999, p. 110). See also paragraph 5 
infra.
875 Saul 2008, p. 245.
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not adequately reflected in existing criminal prohibitions, this constitutes an 
indication that it may be warranted to separately criminalise this conduct.876 more 
generally, restricting the proliferation of superfluous or duplicate international 
criminal offences will contribute to the overall systematic integrity and coherence 
of international criminal law.877
a similar type of reasoning is reflected by the umbrella category of ‘other 
inhumane acts’ (discussed in detail below). This catch‑all clause was included in 
the provision of crimes against humanity (for the first time in the London charter 
of the imT) to prevent inhumane acts that are not explicitly enumerated as crimes 
against humanity from falling outside the scope of international criminal law.878 
This means that in order to qualify as an ‘other inhumane act’, the conduct must 
not already be covered by one of the acts specified as crimes against humanity in a 
particular statute.879 This conclusion is confirmed by the case law of the icTY and 
icTr and also follows from logical grammatical interpretation: the clause deals 
with other inhumane acts.880 in the words of icc Pre‑Trial chamber ii:
‘The chamber understands that other inhumane acts is a residual category within 
the system of article 7(1) of the Statute. Therefore, if a conduct could be charged as 
another specific crime under this provision, its charging as other inhumane acts 
is impermissible.’881
as was stated above, for behaviour to be classified as a crime against humanity, 
it must amount to an inhumane act. Several of these inhumane acts are already 
specifically listed in article  7 rome Statute. The drafters of the rome Statute, 
as well as legal doctrine and criminal procedure, greatly value the substantive 
distinctiveness of a crime. When certain conduct is not materially distinct from a 
listed inhumane act, this forms a compelling pragmatic argument not to reshape 
this particular conduct into a new crime, under a new label. Therefore, when 
evaluating whether certain conduct could be criminalised as a crime against 
humanity, the first question that must be addressed is whether the act has at 
876 Saul 2008, p. 247.
877 Saul 2008, p. 210.
878 The icTY Trial chamber declared that the charge of ‘other inhumane acts’ is generic and 
encompasses a series of criminal activities that are not explicitly listed (see Blaškič Trial 
Judgement, para. 237).
879 See e.g. the preliminary observations of the Prosecution in the Stakić case with regard to the 
classification of forcible transfer as an inhumane act. The prosecutor submitted that forcible 
transfer is an inhumane act which ‘is not a lesser offence included in the crime of deportation.’ 
The Trial chamber disagreed and held that forcible transfer was in fact included in the crime 
of deportation (Stakić Trial Judgement, paras. 716 and 722). The appeals chamber reversed 
this judgement and held that forcible transfer as an ‘other inhumane act’ and deportation are 
in fact conceptually different (Stakić appeal Judgement, para. 321).
880 Jain 2008, p. 1028, referring to Kayishema Trial Judgement, para. 150. See also Vasiljević Trial 
Judgement, para. 234.
881 Muthaura, Kenyatta and Ali Decision on the confirmation of charges, para. 269.
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least one materially distinct element not included in existing crimes. This can 
be done by verifying whether the conduct is already subsumed under existing 
inhumane acts. When evaluating whether certain conduct falls within the ambit 
of the crimes listed in article  7 rome Statute, it is important to give heed to 
the lex stricta norm enshrined in article  22 rome Statute that stipulates that 
provisions must be strictly construed.882 if the conclusion is that the conduct has 
distinguishing characteristics that are not adequately reflected in the existing 
legal criminal instruments, the next step is answering the question of whether 
that particular conduct can nevertheless be classified as ‘inhumane’. This question 
can be answered by assessing whether this conduct can be qualified as an ‘other 
inhumane act’.
4 .3. THe coNDUcT coNSTiTUTeS aN ‘oTHer 
iNHUmaNe acT’
The requirements an act must satisfy in order to be qualified as ‘inhumane’ 
follow from the umbrella clause ‘other inhumane acts’. as stated, this particular 
provision was included in the provision of crimes against humanity to prevent 
inhumane acts that are not explicitly enumerated as crimes against humanity 
from falling outside the scope of international criminal law. in this sense, the 
clause allows courts flexibility in determining the cases before them, which 
prevents the crimes against humanity provision from becoming too rigid.883 This 
particular provision, which is part of customary international law,884 is included 
in the provisions of crimes against humanity of the imT charter, the imTfe 
charter, and in the Statutes of the icTY, icTr, ScSL and eccc.885 in none of 
these documents, however, was the clause defined, rendering it imprecise and 
unspecified. The rome Statute and its concomitant eoc brought change to this 
indefiniteness.886 Drawing from the case law of the ad hoc Tribunals, and the 
iLc’s 1996 Draft code of crimes against the Peace and Security of mankind, the 
eoc offer clarifications on the scope of the category of inhumane acts by means 
of a set of specified requirements which must be fulfilled for an act to fall within 
the category of ‘other inhumane acts’:
882 This is also emphasised by the icc’s elements of crime introductory paragraph to crimes 
against humanity. 
883 Kupreškić et al. Trial Judgement, para. 623.
884 Perišić Trial Judgement, para. 110; Stakić appeal Judgement, para. 315; and case 002 Decision 
on appeals by Nuon chea and ieng Thirith against the closing order, para. 157.
885 as was noted by the icTY appeals chamber, several human rights treaties, such as the iccPr 
(article 7), the ecHr (article 3), the inter‑american convention on Human rights (article 5) 
and the african charter on Human and People’s rights (article 5), also prohibit inhuman 
and degrading treatment: Stakić appeal Judgement, footnote 649, referred to in Perišić Trial 
Judgement, footnote 220.
886 article 7(1)(k) rome Statute refers to ‘(o)ther inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally 
causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.’
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1. The perpetrator inflicted great suffering, or serious injury to body or to 
mental or physical health, by means of an inhumane act.
2. Such act was of a character similar to any other act referred to in article 7, 
paragraph 1, of the Statute.
3. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established the 
character of the act.
4. The conduct was committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack 
directed against a civilian population.
5. The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the conduct 
to be part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian 
population.887
a footnote clarifies that the term ‘character’ in the second element refers to the 
nature and gravity of the act. This element also incorporates a standard of eiusdem 
generis, which is a mode of interpretation that is very similar to, if not a form of, 
analogy.888 By constructing a provision with the use of eiusdem generis, which is 
Latin for ‘of the same kind’, a crime is defined with reference to a specified (list 
of other) crime(s). Thus, in the case of ‘other inhumane acts’, reference is made 
to actions of the same kind – nature and gravity – as those specifically listed as 
inhumane acts in article 7(1) rome Statute.889 This eiusdem generis principle can 
also be found in the rome Statute provision pertaining to sexual violence (‘any 
other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity’).890
The elements of the crime of ‘other inhumane acts’ – i.e. the requirements that an 
inhumane act of a character similar to any of the listed acts in the crimes against 
humanity provision caused great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental 
or physical health on the part of the victim – are tightly interwoven. They are 
discussed below with a specific focus on the requirement that an act is inhumane.
4.3.1. Great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health
The definition of ‘other inhumane acts’ requires that an act caused a certain 
amount of suffering on the part of the victim, more specifically, it requires 
‘great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health’.891 it 
is complicated to set a specific baseline for determining the level of suffering or 
pain that must have been caused, but the suffering element of ‘other inhumane 
acts’ can be informed by the interpretation of the war crime of willfully causing 
887 article 7(1)(k) icc eoc.
888 cassese 2008, p. 49.
889 The eiudem generis standard is an accepted rule of interpretation in international criminal 
law and is not regarded as a violation of the ban on analogy (case 002 Decision on appeals by 
Nuon chea and ieng Thirith against the closing order, para. 161). See also cassese 2008, p. 49.
890 See article 7(1)(g) rome Statute.
891 article 7(1)(k) rome Statute.
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great suffering or serious injury to body or health under article  8(2)(a)(iii) of 
the rome Statute, which arises from the grave breach provisions of the geneva 
conventions.892 This offence has been defined in the case law of the icTY as an act 
that causes serious mental or physical suffering or injury.893 in line with the case 
law of the icTr, the icTY has held that ‘serious harm need not cause permanent 
and irremediable harm, but it must involve harm that goes beyond temporary 
unhappiness, embarrassment or humiliation. it must be harm that results in 
a grave and long‑term disadvantage to a person’s ability to lead a normal and 
constructive life.’894
in the end, the assessment of the gravity of greatness or seriousness of the 
suffering implies a value judgement.895 in making this relative appraisal, the court 
must take into consideration all the factual circumstances of the case, such as the 
context in which the act was committed, the nature of the act, the duration and/
or any repetition of the act, the physical, mental and moral effects the act had on 
the victim, and the individual circumstances of the victim, including age, health 
and sex.896
4.3.2. Determining the scope of ‘inhumane’ acts
Before the promulgation of the rome Statute and the eoc, the ad hoc Tribunals 
also dealt with ‘other inhumane acts’ by means of an eiusdem generis standard, 
requiring, for example, that conduct be ‘of seriousness comparable to other acts 
enumerated (as crimes against humanity)’.897 This requirement was also recognised 
by the iLc established to create a draft code of offences against the Peace and 
Security of mankind. in its commentary to the 1996 Draft code, the iLc noted 
that the category other inhumane acts ‘is intended to include only additional 
acts that are similar in gravity to those listed in the preceding sub‑paragraphs.’898 
When determining the seriousness of the conduct, the ad hoc Tribunals take into 
consideration all the factual circumstances, such as the context in which the act 
was committed, the nature of the act, the individual circumstances of the victim 
and the effects the act had on the victim.899
892 cryer et al. 2010, p. 291.
893 Čelebići Trial Judgement, para. 511.
894 Krstić Trial Judgement, para. 513.
895 See also the general introduction (para. 4) to the elements of crimes.
896 Đorđević Trial Judgement, para. 1611. K. Dörmann, ‘article 8(2): meaning of “war crimes”’, 
in: o. Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 
munich: c.H. Beck 2008, margin no. 22. See also Katanga and ngudjolo Chui Decision on the 
confirmation of charges, para. 449.
897 niyitegeka Trial Judgement, para. 465. in accordance with the case law of the icTY, the act or 
omission must be ‘of similar seriousness to the other crimes enumerated under article 5 (the 
article which in which crimes against humanity are defined; iH)’, see inter alia Đorđević Trial 
Judgement, para. 1610, and Krajišnik appeal Judgement, para. 331.
898 quoted in Tadić Trial Judgement, para. 729.
899 Đorđević Trial Judgement, para. 1611.
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as stated, the eiusdem generis canon of statutory construction makes the 
category of other inhumane acts dependent on other acts already specified as 
‘inhumane’.900 although the elements of ‘other inhumane acts’ as set forth in 
the icc eoc provide some guidance by prescribing the eiusdem generis rule of 
interpretation, they do not provide an indication of the legal standards which 
the court should use to identify the prohibited other inhumane acts.901 in other 
words, the definition still leaves open the question of whether parameters exist 
which a court could use when defining the actual conduct constituting an ‘other 
inhumane act’. it is here that the case law of the icTY provides guidance. in its 
case law, the icTY has recognised that the rome Statute offers a clearer definition 
of ‘other inhumane acts’ and a more specific threshold than does any other Statute, 
and has on several occasions referred to the rome Statute and eoc.902 However, 
the icTY has also recognised that the eiusdem generis rule of interpretation is 
not much help in interpreting the expression ‘inhumane acts’: it refers to actions 
similar to those specifically provided for, but it offers no guidelines or yardstick 
which help in identifying possible inhumane acts.903
in the eyes of the icTY Trial chamber, applying the eiusdem generis rule for 
the purpose of comparing and assessing the gravity of the prohibited act is the 
second step of a two‑pronged test: first, the legal parameters for determining the 
content of the category of ‘inhumane acts’ must be identified.904 The icTY Trial 
chambers have on several occasions set out to find such a standard. The first case 
in which the icTY addressed this issue in‑depth was in Kupreškić et al. in this 
case, the Trial chamber held that human rights law forms the standard by which 
the inhumanity of an act can be judged. referring to the UDHr, the iccPr, the 
iceScr, the ecHr, the inter‑american convention on Human rights and the 
convention against Torture, the Trial chamber argued that the provisions of the 
most important international human rights instruments may be used ‘to identify 
a set of basic rights appertaining to human beings, the infringement of which 
may amount, depending on the accompanying circumstances, to a crime against 
humanity.’905
in a judgement published three years after the Kupreškić et al. judgement, 
Trial chamber ii of the icTY greatly nuanced the unbridled use of human rights 
to identify parameters for the interpretation of ‘other inhumane acts’. in its 
judgement in the Stakić case, Trial chamber ii explicitly stated that it disagreed 
with the approach taken by the Trial chamber in Kupreškić et al. and cited the 
report of the Secretary‑general which states that the legality principle requires 
the icTY to ‘apply rules of international humanitarian law which are beyond 
900 Jyrkkiö 2011, p. 196.
901 Kupreškić et al. Trial Judgement, para. 565.
902 Kupreškić et al. Trial Judgement, para. 565; and Kayishema Trial Judgement, para. 150.
903 Kupreškić et al. Trial Judgement, para. 564.
904 Kupreškić et al. Trial Judgement, para. 566.
905 Kupreškić et al. Trial Judgement, para. 566.
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doubt part of customary law’. Since human rights do not necessarily amount to 
norms of international criminal law, the chamber did not want to use human 
rights instruments automatically as a basis for such legal criminal norms.906
in principle, the icc can use human rights law as a source for determining 
the scope of the clause ‘other inhumane acts’. This claim is substantiated by four 
arguments.
first, the material jurisdiction of the icc is not limited to the rules of 
international humanitarian law. Pursuant to article 21 of the rome Statute, the 
court’s first source of law is the rome Statute together with the eoc and the 
rules of Procedure and evidence. The second source of law consists of applicable 
treaties and the principles and rules of international law, including the established 
principles of the international law of conflict. as a third source, the court can 
apply general principles of law that it derives from national laws and legal systems 
of the world. in accordance with the third paragraph of this article, the court 
must apply and interpret the law in a way that is consistent with internationally 
recognised human rights.907
Secondly, ‘crimes against humanity are to a great extent predicated upon 
international human rights law,’908 and therefore it can be argued that the violation 
of human rights may be indicative of the seriousness and moral wrongness of 
certain conduct.909
Thirdly, the view that human rights law can be used for determining what 
acts constitute inhumane acts is further supported by earlier Draft codes of 
offences against the Peace and Security of mankind prepared by the international 
Law commission. in its 1991 Draft code, the commission did not use the term 
‘crimes against humanity’ to refer to the acts that were later listed as such in the 
1996 Draft Statute and are now enumerated in the rome Statute.910 instead, the 
commission referred to these inhumane acts under the article header ‘systematic 
or mass violations of human rights’.911 on occasion, the icTY referred to this 1991 
Draft code and the congruence between mass violations of human rights and 
crimes against humanity.912
fourthly, it can be argued that the changes in the chapeau requirements of 
crimes against humanity also support using human rights law when determining 
906 Stakić Trial Judgement, para. 721. ‘Not all human rights violations amount to crimes, and not 
all crimes amount to crimes against humanity’ (robinson 2001, p. 70).
907 The icc Pre‑Trial chamber has held that ‘inhumane acts are to be considered as serious 
violations of (…) the basic rights pertaining to human beings, drawn from the norms of 
international human rights law, which are of a similar nature and gravity to the acts referred 
to in article 7(1) of the Statute’, (Katanga and ngudjolo Chui Decision on the confirmation of 
charges, para. 448).
908 cassese 2008, p. 99, as referred to in anderson 2010, p. 52.
909 Saul 2008, p. 233.
910 Jyrkkiö 2011, p. 192.
911 Draft report of the Commission on the work of its forty‑third session, Draft Code of Crimes 
against the Peace and Security of Mankind, UN Doc. a/cN.4/L.464/add.4, see article 21.
912 Kunarac et al. Trial Judgement, para. 537.
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what acts are ‘inhumane’. at its inception, crimes against humanity required a 
nexus with an armed conflict. consequently, the standard that was applied to 
judge the inhumanity of an act used to be rooted in international humanitarian 
law, the body of law which deals with crimes committed in conflict situations.913 
However, this nexus requirement was later departed from and as a consequence, 
the standard against which the inhumanity of an act can be judged is no longer 
restricted to international humanitarian law.914 The eccc Pre‑Trial chamber 
also considered the question of how to determine what constitutes inhumane 
conduct and in this context referred to serious violations of international 
humanitarian law and serious violations of fundamental human rights protected 
under international law.915
it would seem, however, that not every human rights violation constitutes 
an inhumane act.916 although all listed crimes against humanity constitute a 
violation of human rights, the reverse is not the case and there is valid reason 
for advocating a restrictive approach for the use of human rights in the context 
of crimes against humanity. as stated, the category of crimes against humanity 
pertains to the most serious crimes of concern to the international community 
as a whole: only the most atrocious acts committed as part of a widespread or 
systematic attack directed against a civilian population will rise to the level 
of this international crime. in accordance with the theories of international 
criminalisation discussed above in paragraph 2.2, crimes against humanity have 
been internationally criminalised because they violate universal values. The acts 
that are currently listed in the rome Statute as inhumane acts protect the right 
to life (murder, extermination and enforced disappearance of persons), bodily 
integrity (torture, rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, 
enforced sterilisation, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable 
gravity), and liberty (enslavement, deportation or forcible transfer of population, 
imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of 
fundamental rules of international law).917 Pursuant to the definition of ‘other 
inhumane acts’, only those acts that are of a character (meaning nature and 
gravity) similar to any other act referred to in article 7 rome Statute can qualify 
913 Jyrkkiö 2011, p. 190. See article 6(c) imT charter and article 5 icTY Statute. control council 
Law No. 10, however, did not require a nexus with an armed conflict (cryer et al. 2010, p. 234).
914 cryer et al. 2010, pp.  234–235; and see Tadić Decision on Jurisdiction, para.  140. See also 
Jyrkkiö 2011, pp. 190–191.
915 case 002 Decision on appeals by Nuon chea and ieng Thirith against the closing order, 
para. 164. as examples of fundamental human rights, the Pre‑Trial chamber lists the right to 
life, to be free from torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, to liberty 
and security, to be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the 
human person when deprived of liberty and to a fair trial. See para. 118.
916 as an illustration, article 24 UDHr stipulates that ‘everyone has the right to (…) periodic 
holidays with pay.’ it is difficult to imagine a violation of this right alone amounting to an 
inhumane act.
917 The crimes of persecution and apartheid require a link with any of the enumerated inhumane 
acts, see elements of crimes article 7(1)(h)(4) and article 7(1)(j)(1)‑(2).
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as ‘other inhumane acts’. in this sense, the eiusdem generis standard limits the 
extent of the catch‑all clause. Therefore, human rights law can be used as a source 
for determining the scope of other inhumane acts, but only those human rights 
violations that are of a character similar to listed inhumane acts in article 7(1) of 
the rome Statute (which will especially be the case when they involve violations 
of the right to life, physical integrity and liberty), and that result in great suffering 
on the part of the victim, or serious injury to their body or to their mental or 
physical health, will qualify as other inhumane acts. as noted by the icTr Trial 
chamber in Kayishema, this will have to be determined on a case‑by‑case basis, 
taking into consideration all the factual circumstances.918 Standards derived from 
human rights law can assist in this exercise, especially those human rights norms 
that prohibit inhumane treatment.919, 920
if the conclusion is that a certain act qualifies as an ‘other inhumane act’, then the 
next step may be adding this act to the list of inhumane acts as a distinct crime 
against humanity. as explained (paragraph 4.1), this happened with many acts 
which initially were not listed as specific inhumane acts: they were qualified as 
‘other inhumane acts’ in the case law of the international criminal tribunals and 
were later codified as specific inhumane acts, for instance in the rome Statute and 
the ScSL Statute.
5. crimiNaLiSaTioN aND War crimeS
5.1. iNTroDUcTioN aND oPTioNS for 
crimiNaLiSaTioN
War crimes are serious violations of the laws and customs of war that give rise 
to individual criminal responsibility. conduct in armed conflict is regulated by 
international humanitarian law, which encompasses inter alia the 1907 Hague 
regulations respecting the Laws and customs of War on Land (annex to Hague 
convention iV) and the four 1949 geneva conventions with their additional 
Protocols.921
Traditionally, a distinction is made in international humanitarian law 
between war crimes committed in international armed conflicts and war crimes 
committed in non‑international armed conflicts. This bifurcated structure was 
maintained in the rome Statute: article 8(2)(a) and (b) deal with international 
918 Kayishema Trial Judgement, para. 151.
919 Such as article 5 UDHr; article 7 iccPr; article 3 ecHr; article 5 american convention on 
Human rights; article 5 african charter on Human and Peoples’ rights.
920 See also article 21(3) rome Statute: ‘The application and interpretation of law pursuant to this 
article must be consistent with internationally recognized human rights’.
921 cryer et al. 2010, pp. 267 and 269; and Boas, Bischoff & reid 2009, pp. 214–219.
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conflicts; article  8(2)(c)‑(e) deal with internal conflicts. The category of war 
crimes committed in international armed conflicts encompasses the so‑called 
grave breaches of the geneva conventions – the different grave breaches were 
reproduced verbatim in the rome Statute – and a list of ‘other serious violations 
of the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict, within the 
established framework of international law’. This latter category consists of a mix 
of serious violations of international humanitarian law codified in additional 
Protocol i to the geneva conventions and various other sources.922 The category 
of war crimes committed in internal armed conflicts encompasses serious 
violations of article 3 common to the four geneva conventions and a list of ‘other 
serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed conflicts not of an 
international character, within the established framework of international law’. 
This latter category contains inter alia violations of the Hague regulations and 
additional Protocol ii to the geneva conventions.
although all war crimes are violations of international humanitarian law, not 
all violations of international humanitarian law give rise to individual criminal 
responsibility and amount to war crimes: only the most serious violations of 
international humanitarian law constitute war crimes under international 
criminal law.923 a test for identifying violations of international humanitarian 
law that amount to war crimes was set out by the icTY appeals chamber in 
the Tadić case. The four‑pronged test reads as follows: first, the conduct must 
constitute a violation of a rule of international humanitarian law. Secondly, this 
rule must be part of customary international law or applicable treaty law. Thirdly, 
the violation must be serious, which means the breached rule protects important 
values and the breach of the rule resulted in grave consequences for the victim. 
finally, the violations of the rule must, under customary or conventional law, give 
rise to individual criminal responsibility.924 When these requirements are met, 
the violation of international humanitarian law constitutes a war crime.
The Tadić criteria, developed in the specific context of the icTY, inspired the 
drafters of the rome Statute and were used both by the 1995 ad Hoc committee 
as well as by the delegates during the rome conference in the process of selecting 
war crimes for the Statute.925 indeed, a similar set of criteria can be distilled from 
the negotiations of the rome Statute. The 1995 ad Hoc committee, which was 
established by the UN general assembly to review the work done by the iLc, made 
a selection of war crimes from several sources of international humanitarian law. 
This selection process was influenced by considerations regarding the concepts of 
‘seriousness’ (how to determine which violations of international humanitarian 
law are considered serious enough to warrant inclusion as a war crime in the rome 
922 cryer et al. 2010, p. 275; and Von Hebel & robinson 1999, p. 106.
923 cryer et al. 2010, p. 271; cassese 2008, p. 85; and Tadić Decision on Jurisdiction, para. 94.
924 Tadić Decision on Jurisdiction, para. 94.
925 cryer et al. 2010, p. 272. See e.g. Summary record of the 2nd plenary meeting held during the 
rome conference (15 June 1998), UN Doc. a/coNf.183/Sr.2, 20 November 1998, para. 44.
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Statute?) and ‘individual criminal responsibility’ (which violations of international 
humanitarian law give rise to individual criminal responsibility under customary 
international law?).926 These issues were echoed in the negotiations that took place 
during the rome conference with regard to certain crimes. The adjective ‘serious’, 
however, did not play a prominent role during any stage of the creation of the 
rome Statute. in general, delegates agreed relatively easily on the seriousness of 
violations of international humanitarian law and only on a few occasions were 
proposed norms not included because they were deemed not serious enough (see 
infra).927 The second question, namely whether a particular violation of a rule of 
international humanitarian law gives rise to individual criminal responsibility 
under customary international law, did lead to some discussion in rome. This 
is evidenced by the negotiations on the inclusion of the use of child soldiers in 
the list of war crimes.928 This particular crime was not included as a war crime 
in the Draft Statute of the iLc, but was added in the 1996 Draft Statute prepared 
by the Preparatory committee.929 During the negotiations which took place in 
rome, the United States delegates expressed the view that the use of children in 
hostilities was at that time not a crime under customary international law and 
that it was in fact more a human rights norm than a criminal law provision.930 
The majority disagreed931 and argued that the prohibition on child soldiering was 
not only regulated in many human rights instruments, including the convention 
for the rights of the child and the african charter on rights and Welfare of the 
child, but also in international humanitarian law, namely in the two additional 
Protocols to the geneva conventions.932 The majority argued that inclusion of 
this crime as a war crime was justified because the prohibition was virtually 
universally accepted and because the use of child soldiers is a serious violation of 
a rule of international humanitarian law which protects important values933 and 
warrants disapprobation and criminalisation.934
926 Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 
gaor 50th Session Supplement No. 22 (a/50/22), 1995, paras.  72–76; and Von Hebel & 
robinson 1999, p. 104.
927 Von Hebel & robinson 1999, p. 104.
928 This crime in fact encompasses two distinct crimes: the war crime of conscripting or enlisting 
children into armed forces and the war crime of using children to participate actively in 
hostilities.
929 Bassiouni 2005(ii), p. 91; and m. Bothe, ‘War crimes’, in: a. cassese, P. gaeta & J.r.W.D. Jones 
(eds.), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: a commentary (Vol. I), oxford: 
oUP 2002, p. 416.
930 Von Hebel & robinson 1999, p.  117; and Summary record of the 4th meeting held during 
the rome conference (17  June 1998), UN Doc. a/coNf.183/c.1/Sr.4, 20  November 1998, 
para. 54.
931 Summary record of the 4th meeting held during the rome conference (17 June 1998), UN Doc. 
a/coNf.183/c.1/Sr.4, 20 November 1998, para. 39.
932 See article 77(2) additional Protocol i and article 4(3)(c) additional Protocol ii.
933 Note the similarity to the Tadić test.
934 cryer et al. 2010, pp. 309–310; cottier 2008, margin no. 227; and Von Hebel & robinson 1999, 
p. 117.
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it follows from the (drafting history of the) rome Statute that, in order for 
conduct to be criminalised as a war crime in the rome Statute, that conduct 
must constitute a serious violation of a rule of international humanitarian law 
which is part of customary international law and which gives rise to individual 
criminal responsibility under international criminal law.935 There are two ways 
in which an act can be criminalised as a war crime: first, it is possible that this 
act is subsumed under a war crime that is listed in the rome Statute (e.g. torture, 
inhuman treatment or outrages upon personal dignity). Secondly, it is possible 
that this act is not covered by any listed war crime. if this is the case, the question 
may be asked whether this act ought to be included in the rome Statute as a ‘new’, 
distinct war crime, which would necessitate amendment of the rome Statute.936 
This results in the following overview:
1. The conduct is subsumed under serious violations of customary 
international law that are listed in the rome Statute. in other words, it is 
termed a war crime in the rome Statute; or
2. The conduct amounts to a war crime which is not codified in the rome 
Statute:
a. The conduct is considered to be a breach of a rule of customary 
international humanitarian law;
b. The violation can be qualified as ‘serious’; and
c. The breach gives rise to individual criminal responsibility under 
customary international law.
it is generally acknowledged that the case law of the ad hoc tribunals ought not 
to be transferred mechanically to the sphere of the icc.937 Nevertheless, there 
are several reasons for basing the set of sub‑criteria under step 2 on the Tadić 
test for identifying war crimes. first, these criteria assisted the drafters of the 
rome Statute in making a selection of war crimes to be included in the statute. 
in addition, the relevance of this particular test is also evidenced by the fact that 
it was applied by the ScSL when determining whether the use of child soldiers 
was a crime under customary international law.938 moreover, several authors have 
affirmed that, irrespective of the differences between the rome Statute and the 
icTY Statute,939 the Tadić criteria can be used to identify war crimes which have 
935 See e.g. article 8(2)(b) concerning ‘other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable 
in international armed conflict, within the established framework of international law’.
936 Jurisdiction of the icc over a particular offence can only be activated by inclusion in the rome 
Statute (article 22(1) rome Statute and paragraph 3.3 supra).
937 g. Werle, ‘individual criminal responsibility in article  25 icc Statute’, Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 2007–5, pp. 961–962; and Katanga and ngudjolo Chui Decision 
on the confirmation of charges, para. 508 (see infra).
938 cDf Decision on Lack of Jurisdiction child recruitment, paras. 25–53.
939 The lists of war crimes in the statutes of the icTY and icTr are not exhaustive; whereas the list 
in the rome Statute, currently containing 53 offences, is. These 53 offences include the three 
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not (yet) been codified in the rome Statute.940 if criterion 2 is fulfilled, this means 
that the conduct in question is criminalised as a war crime under customary 
international law. However, because it is not included in the rome Statute, this 
war crime, irrespective of its customary status, falls outside the jurisdiction of the 
icc. To be charged before and adjudicated by the icc, the war crime will have to 
be included in the rome Statute.
in the following paragraphs, the different steps will be elaborated, but first 
the importance of customary international law in the context of the rome Statute 
will have to be assessed.
5.2 . Pr eLimiNarY r emarK: qUaLifYiNg THe 
imPorTaNce of cUSTomarY iNTer NaTioNaL 
LaW
The test set out above corresponds with the initial goal of the drafters of the 
rome Statute, that is: including in the rome Statute only those crimes that are 
recognised as such under customary international law. This was necessary in 
order to reach consensus and have as many states as possible adopt the rome 
Statute. States had only two options: opt in or opt out – making reservations 
to provisions of the Statute was not allowed.941 Therefore, limiting the scope of 
the Statute to customary international law was believed to contribute to general 
agreement among delegates.942 for that reason, the status of a crime under 
customary international law was of great importance during the negotiation and 
drafting process of the rome Statute. Now the Statute has been promulgated, this 
is no longer the case. The rome Statute is a treaty and is binding only to the states 
war crimes that were added to article 8(2)(e) as a result of the 2010 review conference (see 
resolution 5 of the review conference, 12th plenary meeting, 10 June 2010).
940 cryer et al. 2010, p. 275; and Shaw 2008, p. 436.
941 See article 120 rome Statute. However, see also article 124 rome Statute (‘a State, on becoming 
a party to this Statute, may declare that, for a period of seven years after the entry into force of 
this Statute for the State concerned, it does not accept the jurisdiction of the court with respect 
to the category of crimes referred to in article 8 when a crime is alleged to have been committed 
by its nationals or on its territory’).
942 in the end, however, at some points at least, the rome Statute turned out to be broader than 
customary international law. Not all war crimes codified in the rome Statute, for example, 
are considered to be part of customary international law. according to cassese, this follows 
from the sentence ‘within the established framework of international law’, which is part of 
the chapeau of article 8(2)(b) and 8(2)(e). cassese stated that this means that for each case 
concerning article 8(2)(b) and 8(2)(e) crimes, the court will have to verify whether or not 
the indicted war crime is also part of customary international law (cassese 2008, p. 95). This 
will not, however be an issue when the accused are subjects of states parties to the rome 
Statute: for those parties, the rome Statute is binding, irrespective of its (non)conformity with 
customary international law. (cottier 2008 margin nos. 19–20 and 33). The war crimes listed 
in article 8(2)(a) en 8(2)(c) are grave breaches and serious violations of common article 3 and 
those are regarded as being part of customary international law.
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party to it.943 in accordance with article 121 rome Statute it can be amended in 
any way, as long as at least a two‑thirds majority of states parties agree to adopt 
the amendment. as regards those states parties that do not wish to adopt the 
amendment, the court will not exercise jurisdiction regarding the amended 
crime when it is committed by nationals of those states parties or on those parties’ 
territories (article 121(5) rome Statute). This underlines that the rome Statute, 
as stated by Werle, is an independent system of criminal law in itself.944 This was 
affirmed by the icc Pre‑Trial chamber i in the Decision on the confirmation 
of charges against Katanga. The chamber discussed the validity of the liability 
theory of co‑perpetration of a crime through another person. in the Stakić case, 
the icTY appeals chamber had rejected this mode of liability by stating that it 
did not form part of customary international law. The icc Pre‑Trial chamber 
held that this did not preclude the validity of this mode of liability under the 
rome Statute by stating that:
‘under article 21(l)(a) of the Statute, the first source of applicable law is the Statute. 
Principles and rules of international law constitute a secondary source applicable 
only when the statutory material fails to prescribe a legal solution. Therefore, and 
since the rome Statute expressly provides for this specific mode of liability, the 
question as to whether customary law admits or discards the “joint commission 
through another person” is not relevant for this court. This is a good example of 
the need not to transfer the ad hoc tribunals’ case law mechanically to the system 
of the court.’945
So the icTY Tadić test described in the previous paragraph and elaborated on in 
the following paragraphs (that particular conduct is considered to be a serious 
violation of a rule of customary international humanitarian law that gives rise to 
individual criminal responsibility under customary international law) would be 
the ideal situation, but contains no hard requirements. This test is not condicio 
sine qua non for conduct to be included in the rome Statute as a war crime. as 
long as a two‑thirds majority of states parties agree, virtually any act could be 
included as a war crime – or crime against humanity, or act of genocide – in 
the rome Statute. Nevertheless, an act that is recognised as a (war) crime under 
customary international law will greatly add to the authority of that prohibition 
and will increase the likelihood that all states parties to the rome Statute accept 
943 Note that the icc will also be able to exercise jurisdiction if a non‑state party accepts its 
jurisdiction, and if a situation was referred to the Prosecutor by the United Nations Security 
council. in those cases the court may exercise its jurisdiction irrespective of the nationality 
of the accused or the location of the crime (see e.g. Security council resolution referring the 
situation in Libya to the icc Prosecutor, S/reS/1970 (2011), 26 february 2011). See articles 12 
and 13 rome Statute.
944 g. Werle, ‘individual criminal responsibility in article  25 icc Statute’, Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 2007–5, pp. 961–962.
945 Katanga and ngudjolo Chui Decision on the confirmation of charges, para. 508.
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the amendment. in this sense, the status of a crime under customary international 
law is of importance.
5.3. THe crime iS maTeriaLLY DiSTiNcT from 
SerioUS VioLaTioNS of cUSTomarY 
iNTer NaTioNaL LaW LiSTeD iN THe rome 
STaTUTe
all war crimes listed in the rome Statute are regarded as serious violations of 
rules of international humanitarian law. Therefore, when asking the question 
of whether certain conduct constitutes a serious violation of international 
humanitarian law, the first logical step is to verify whether this conduct is included 
in serious violations of customary international law listed in article  8 rome 
Statute. This is done by comparing the elements of the respective crimes. During 
the comparative exercise, the lex stricta norm must be taken into consideration: 
pursuant to article  22(2) rome Statute, definitions of crimes must be strictly 
construed and may not be extended by analogy. if it turns out that the conduct 
in question is subsumed under one of the crimes listed in article 8 rome Statute, 
it means that the conduct is already criminalised. The conduct could be caught, 
for example, by a specific war crime (such as wilful killing), or by one of the more 
general war crimes provisions (such as ‘outrages upon personal dignity’). When 
the conduct is covered by one or more of the listed war crimes, yet is nevertheless 
materially distinct from these crimes, the question may be asked whether that 
conduct could be added to the list of war crimes as a specific war crime. The 
following three criteria assist in addressing this issue.
5.4. THe coNDUcT amoUNTS To a War crime 
WHicH iS NoT coDifieD iN THe rome STaTUTe
5.4.1. The conduct is a breach of a rule of customary international humanitarian 
law
international humanitarian law is the field of law that regulates the conduct of 
hostilities, also referred to as the ius in bello.946 international humanitarian law 
seeks to protect the parties to a conflict and contains rules on the treatment of 
prisoners of war, civilians, combatants hors de combat, but also on the means 
and methods of warfare. This particular branch of law dates back to the second 
half of the nineteenth century, to the work of the Swiss banker Henry Dunant, 
946 as opposed to the ius ad bellum which refers to the field of law that governs the resort to war 
(Shaw 2008, p. 1167).
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who founded the red cross. Dunant had witnessed the horrors of the aftermath 
of the 1859 battle of Solferino and was determined to improve the care for 
wounded soldiers in times of war. as a result of his effort, in 1864, the first geneva 
convention for the amelioration of the condition of the Wounded in the field 
was adopted.947 in the following decades, especially just before and right after the 
fin de siècle, more treaties followed which codified the laws of war, most notably 
the 1907 Hague conventions.948 after the Second World War, four new geneva 
conventions followed and in the 1970s, their two additional Protocols were 
promulgated.
as regards the question of whether a rule of international humanitarian law 
is part of customary international law, the following can be remarked. The 1907 
Hague regulations respecting the Laws and customs of War on Land (annex to 
Hague convention iV) and the four 1949 geneva conventions are regarded as 
part of customary international law. The same cannot be unequivocally said of 
the two additional Protocols. although the majority of the delegates involved in 
the drafting process of the rome Statute were of the opinion that both protocols 
are part of customary international law, several other delegates believed that 
only parts of these protocols can be seen as customary law.949 most relevant to 
this issue are two studies undertaken by the international committee of the red 
cross (icrc) in 2005 and 2011. in these reports, the icrc drew on empirical 
data on state practice and opinions collected from almost 50 countries to identify 
the rules of international humanitarian law that are currently part of customary 
international law.950 These studies can serve as a guide. indeed, the studies are 
also used by international courts and tribunals in determining the customary law 
status of prohibitions.951
after it has been verified that conduct is laid down in one of the rules of 
customary international humanitarian law, the seriousness of a violation of that 
rule must be assessed.
5.4.2. The violation can be qualified as ‘serious’
The appeals chamber in the Tadić case held that a violation of a rule of 
international humanitarian law can be qualified as ‘serious’ when (i) the violated 
rule protects important values and (ii) the breach of the rule results in grave 
947 This treaty formed the basis of the current first geneva convention.
948 Shaw 2008, p. 1168.
949 cryer et al. 2010, pp. 267 and 269; and Von Hebel & robinson 1999, p. 104. The provisions of 
the additional Protocols that are not considered part of customary international law are still 
binding law for the states that are party to these treaties (Shaw 2008, pp. 1168 and 1170).
950 J.m. Heckaerts & L. Doswald‑Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law. Volume I 
and II, cambridge: cUP 2005; and f. Kalshoven & L. Zegveld, Constraints on the waging of 
war: an introduction to international humanitarian law, cambridge: cUP 2011.
951 meron 2005, p. 833. e.g. Hadžihasanović appeal of Decision on acquittal, 11 march 2005, 
paras. 29–30; and rUf Trial Judgement, para. 216.
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consequences for the victim.952 as an example of a violation of a rule of customary 
international humanitarian law that does not fulfil the seriousness requirement, 
the appeals chamber referred to the theft of a loaf of bread in an occupied village 
by a combatant.953
The Tadić test was applied by the ScSL in the context of the crime of child 
soldiering. To determine whether a rule of international humanitarian law protects 
important values, the appeals chamber examined additional Protocol ii and 
concluded that the protection of children is one of the fundamental guarantees 
contained in this document. in addition, the appeals chamber referred to a UN 
Security council resolution in which the recruitment and use of child soldiers 
was condemned and labelled an ‘inhumane and abhorrent practice.’954
To determine whether the breach of the rule of international humanitarian 
law resulted in grave consequences for the victim, recourse can be had to the 
Krstić case. as explained in paragraph  4.3.1 supra, the icTY Trial chamber 
held that ‘serious harm need not cause permanent and irremediable harm, but it 
must involve harm that goes beyond temporary unhappiness, embarrassment or 
humiliation. it must be harm that results in a grave and long‑term disadvantage 
to a person’s ability to lead a normal and constructive life.’955 The ScSL appeals 
chamber has held that recourse can be taken to Ngo reports as these documents 
can provide information on the consequences of the violation of the rule of 
international humanitarian law for the victim.956
5.4.3. The breach gives rise to individual criminal responsibility under customary 
international law
The question of whether the violation of a particular norm gives rise to individual 
criminal responsibility under customary international law has been discussed in 
several fora. The factors set out in doctrine and case law mentioned below can 
assist in answering this question.
The issue of how to determine whether the violation of a norm entails 
individual criminal responsibility under customary international law was 
addressed in the context of the Tadić case. When faced with an appeal lodged 
by the defence against a judgement rendered by the Trial chamber in which the 
defence’s motion challenging the jurisdiction of the Tribunal was denied, the 
952 See also Kunarac et al. appeal Judgement, para. 66.
953 This particular rule of customary international humanitarian law is enshrined in article 46(1) 
of the Hague regulations, see Tadić Decision on Jurisdiction, para. 94(iii). another example is 
the prohibition of ‘unjustifiable delay in the repatriation of prisoners of war or civilians’. even 
though this norm is classified as a grave breach in additional Protocol i, it was not considered 
to be serious enough to justify inclusion as a war crime in the rome Statute (Von Hebel & 
robinson 1999, p. 104).
954 cDf Decision on Lack of Jurisdiction child recruitment, para. 28.
955 Krstić Trial Judgement, para. 513.
956 cDf Decision on Lack of Jurisdiction child recruitment, para. 29.
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icTY appeals chamber had to address the international criminality of atrocities 
committed in internal armed conflicts. in this regard, the appeals chamber 
referred to the factors the Nuremberg Tribunal listed when determining whether a 
prohibition incurs individual criminal responsibility. if a rule of warfare is clearly 
and unequivocally recognised in international law and there is state practice 
which indicates an intention to criminalise violations of this rule, individuals 
can be held criminally responsible for such violations. The Nuremberg Tribunal 
considered that state practice indicating an intention to criminalise a prohibition 
includes punishment of violations by national courts and military tribunals and 
statements by government officials and international organisations.957 The icTY 
appeals chamber then proceeded to apply these criteria to serious breaches of 
customary rules and principles applicable to internal conflicts. Specifically with 
regard to international humanitarian law, the icTY appeals chamber held that 
evidence of state practice indicating an intention to criminalise a prohibition can 
be derived from ‘official pronouncements of States, military manuals and judicial 
decisions.’958 Summing up examples of prosecutions for violations of rules of 
international humanitarian law committed in internal conflicts, listing national 
laws and military manuals criminalising violations of norms codified in the 
geneva conventions, and bringing to mind two Security council resolutions, 
the appeals chamber concluded that violations of rules of international 
humanitarian law concerning non‑international armed conflicts undoubtedly 
entail individual criminal responsibility.959
The matter of how to determine whether a violation of international 
humanitarian law amounts to a war crime has also been addressed in doctrine. 
meron, for example, listed several factors that can indicate that international 
law creates individual criminal responsibility for the violations of a rule of 
international humanitarian law. These factors include considerations such as 
whether the prohibition addresses individuals and whether it is unequivocal 
in character. other relevant factors in determining whether an act entails 
individual criminal responsibility are the gravity of the act and the interests of 
the international community.960
cassese, finally, also addressed the issue and to this end, distinguished three 
situations. first, the fact that a violation has been criminalised can be evidenced 
by legal precedent, i.e. when a breach of international humanitarian law has 
been consistently classified as a war crime by national or international courts. 
Secondly, a violation is criminalised when it is classified as a war crime in a statute 
of an international tribunal (this possibility was discussed in paragraph  5.3), 
although this does not mean the violation also amounts to a war crime outside of 
957 Tadić Decision on Jurisdiction, para. 128.
958 Tadić Decision on Jurisdiction, para. 99.
959 Tadić Decision on Jurisdiction, paras. 129–134.
960 meron 1995, p. 562 (meron’s article focuses on the international criminalisation of atrocities 
committed in internal conflicts).
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the context of the statute. a third possibility is that neither case law nor statutes 
of international tribunals make mention of the violation. cassese analysed case 
law of international courts and tribunals (inter alia Tadić) and concluded that in 
those cases, the following sources can be examined:
‘(i) military manuals; (ii) the national legislation of states belonging to the major 
legal systems of the world; or, if these elements are lacking, (iii) the general 
principles of criminal justice common to nations of the world, as set out in 
international instruments, acts, resolutions and the like; and (iv) the legislation 
and judicial practice of the state to which the accused belongs or on whose territory 
the crime has allegedly been committed.’961
if all criteria are fulfilled – so if particular conduct constitutes a serious breach of 
a rule of customary international humanitarian law that gives rise the individual 
criminal responsibility under customary international law and if this conduct is 
materially distinct from listed war crimes – there may be a legitimate reason to 
include this conduct in the rome Statute’s list of war crimes.
6. crimiNaLiSaTioN aND geNociDe
6.1. iNTroDUcTioN
The purpose of the prohibition of genocide is to protect specific groups from 
(attempted) extermination.962 The act of genocide was first defined in the 1948 
genocide convention. The genocide provision contains an exhaustive list of 
specified acts which amount to genocide when they are committed with the 
required genocidal intent. The definition of genocide laid down in the genocide 
convention is considered to be part of customary international law, and, what is 
more, has reached the status of ius cogens.963 The definition of genocide included 
in the rome Statute was taken verbatim from the 1948 genocide convention, 
rendering the discussions before and during the rome conference relatively 
simple. any proposals to amend the definition were rejected on the basis that 
alternations would devaluate the customary law status of the definition.964
961 cassese 2008, p. 85.
962 Akayesu Trial Judgement, para. 469.
963 Inter alia cassese, gaeta & Jones 2002, pp.  337–338. See also Akayesu Trial Judgement, 
para. 495, Krstić Trial Judgement, para. 541; and advisory opinion of the international court 
of Justice on reservations to the convention on the Prevention and the Punishment of the 
crime of genocide, 1951 icJ 1, 28 may 1951.
964 Von Hebel & robinson 1999, pp. 89–90 and 123.
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article  6 rome Statute exhaustively lists the acts that amount to genocide 
when they are committed with genocidal intent, that is with intent to destroy, in 
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring 
about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
These five acts have in common that they can all result in the (partial) destruction 
of a group of people – which is also reflected by the specific intent listed in the 
chapeau (intent to destroy) and the term ‘genocide’ itself, which is a combination 
of the ancient greek genos (race, tribe) and the Latin suffix cida (one who kills/
cuts).965 What is unique about the genocide definition is that it lists broad, inclusive 
categories of acts. The expansive nature of the definition allowed the icTr to 
bring rape within the scope of genocidal acts.966 it has been argued, however, that 
the genocidal acts are so broad that they ‘fail to adequately specify the actions 
which are prohibited.’967 for example, imposing measures intended to prevent 
births within a group may encompass such acts as forced sterilisation, sexual 
mutilation, enforced pregnancy, prohibiting marriages, forced abortion and 
(indirectly) forced marriages (see chapter 10). may include acts such as depriving 
groups of people from food, shelter or medication.968
6.2 . eXPaNDiNg THe DefiNiTioN of geNociDe?
in the previous paragraphs, with regard to the other two core crimes – crimes 
against humanity and war crimes – the question was raised as to under which 
circumstances particular conduct could be included as a separate crime in the 
provisions pertaining to these crimes. can the same question be posed in relation 
to the crime of genocide? is it possible to amend the definition of genocide, to 
expand it by adding additional genocidal acts? and if so, are there any criteria that 
could guide this decision‑making process? in order to answer these questions, it 
is important to first delve into the history of the criminalisation of genocide.
965 The term ‘genocide’ was coined by raphaël Lemkin, see r. Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied 
Europe: Laws of Occupation – Analysis of Government – Proposals for Redress, Washington, 
D.c.: carnegie endowment for international Peace 1944, p. 79.
966 Akayesu Trial Judgement, para. 731.
967 m. Lippman, ‘genocide’, in: m.c. Bassiouni (ed.), International criminal law. Volume I: 
Sources, subjects and contents, Leiden: martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2008, p. 418.
968 See Akayesu Trial Judgement paras. 502–507; and Boas, Bischoff & reid 2009, pp. 183–188.
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as stated, the current definition of genocide under customary international 
law was drafted in the 1940s in reaction to the Second World War: the drafters 
explicitly used to atrocities committed upon the Jews during the Holocaust as 
guidance in developing the definition of genocide.969 it could be argued, therefore, 
that the definition of genocide is no longer up‑to‑date970 and was, perhaps, from the 
outset too restrictive, in the sense that it was based on the Holocaust. Nevertheless, 
this definition has become part of customary international law. However, like 
all law, the definition of genocide is not set in stone and there is no reason to 
believe this definition might not change over time.971 indeed, over the years, 
there have been proposals concerning reform of the genocide convention. There 
have, for example, been suggestions to change the specific intent requirement, to 
include more protected groups (such as gender) and to include additional acts of 
genocide, such as the expulsion of indigenous populations from territories.972 Yet 
these proposals have not resulted in any amendments, which is, perhaps, due to a 
lack of political will.973
The definition of genocide in the rome Statute could be amended 
independently of customary law (see paragraph 3.3), and could even – theoretically 
at least – act as a catalyst for the amendment of the definition under customary 
law. But how to assess which acts are eligible for inclusion in the list of genocidal 
acts? There are no hard criteria that could assist in this matter. But looking at 
the negotiation history of the genocide convention and studying the crime of 
genocide from a grammatical and a teleological perspective, two standards rise to 
the surface; one concerning the type of acts that can be classified as genocide, and 
the other concerning the gravity of such acts.
as regards the type of acts that (may) amount to genocidal acts, it is important 
to emphasise that genocide, ultimately, concerns the (attempted) destruction 
of groups of people. indeed, the very term conveys this. as was stated by the 
UN general assembly in resolution 96(i): ‘(g)enocide is a denial of the right 
969 See the travaux préparatoires of the genocide convention (e.g. Basic Principles of a convention 
on genocide (Submitted by the Delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist republics on 5 april 
1948)’, UN Doc. e/ac.25/7, 7 april 1948). See also D.S. Bettwy, ‘The genocide convention and 
Unprotected groups: is the Scope of Protection expanding under customary international 
Law?’, notre Dame Journal of International & Comparative Law 2011, p. 168.
970 cf. De Brouwer 2005, p. 83: ‘with the passage of time treaties may need to be amended according 
to new insights or developments in society.’ for a discussion of the weaknesses of the current 
definition of genocide, relating inter alia to the types of protected groups, see Bassiouni 2013, 
p. 154.
971 indeed, definitions of genocide in several national laws demonstrate this: several states have 
incorporated a broader set of genocidal acts in their domestic laws criminalising genocide, see 
e.g. article 607 Spanish Penal code, which specifically includes sexual assault in the list of 
genocidal acts. See De Brouwer 2005, pp. 83–84, footnote 246 for more examples.
972 See inter alia Study of the question of the Prevention and Punishment of the crime of 
genocide, UN eScor, 31st Session, 120, UN Doc. e/cN.4/sub.2/416, 1978.
973 See also c. o’Sullivan, ‘Dying for the bonds of marriage’, 22 Hastings Women’s Law Journal 
2011, p.  290: ‘The international community has been reluctant to alter the definition of 
genocide’.
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of existence of entire human groups, as homicide is the denial of the right to 
live of individual human beings.’974 consequently, ‘genocidal acts’ are limited to 
those acts that could (ultimately) result in the destruction of (a part of) a group 
of people. ‘Ultimately’ implies that acts resulting in a slow death/destruction also 
fall within the scope of the crime of genocide. Thus, it follows from inter alia 
the negotiation history of the genocide convention that acts linked to so‑called 
biological genocide, i.e. restrictions on birth such as sterilisation and forced 
abortion,975 and intentional HiV/aiDS infection976 may also qualify as genocide.
Secondly, as regards the gravity of genocidal acts, the following can be 
remarked. in general, it is said that there is no hierarchy between the core crimes, 
but genocide is usually seen as the gravest crime, the crime of crimes.977 in the 
words of icTY Prosecutor ostberg ‘in the interests of international justice, 
genocide should not be diluted or belittled by too broad an interpretation. indeed, 
it should be reserved only for acts of exceptional gravity and magnitude which 
shock the conscience of humankind and which, therefore, justify the appellation 
of genocide as the “ultimate crime”.’978 This implies that only the very worst of 
acts could qualify as genocide, i.e. those acts resulting in the destruction of a 
particular group of people.979 That genocidal acts are limited to the gravest of 
acts may also be deduced from the fact that cultural genocide was excluded from 
the definition. The very first draft of the genocide convention contained three 
categories of genocide: physical, biological and cultural genocide. in the end, 
acts of cultural genocide – which refer to destruction ‘by brutal means of the 
specific characteristics of a human group, that is to say, its moral and sociological 
characteristics’980 – were not included in the genocide convention, for several 
reasons, one of them being that cultural genocide was not on a par with physical 
and biological genocide when it comes to gravity.
Therefore, this author argues that any additional genocidal acts should be 
added to the definition of genocide in the rome Statute on the basis of an eiusdem 
generis standard: only those acts that are comparable in gravity and in nature to 
enumerated genocidal acts are eligible for inclusion in the definition of genocide.
974 g.a. res. 96 (i), UN Doc. a/64/add.1 (11 December 1946).
975 The Secretary‑general, Draft Convention on the Crime of Genocide, 25, delivered to the 
Economic and Social Council, UN Doc. e/447 (June 26, 1947).
976 See e.g. De Brouwer 2005, p. 81 and S.L. russel‑Brown, ‘rape as an act of genocide’, Berkeley 
Journal of International Law 2003, p. 354.
977 Akayesu Trial Judgement, para. 470. See also Schabas 2000.
978 Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić, case No. iT‑95–18‑i, opening Statement of 
eric ostberg, Prosecutor of the icTY (Transcript), 27 June 1996, p. 25.
979 g.a. res. 96 (i), UN Doc. a/64/add.1 (11 December 1946).
980 examples of cultural genocide are prohibiting the use of the language of a group, destroying 
or preventing the use of libraries, museums, places of worship or other cultural institutions 
of a group (see ad Hoc committee on genocide report to the economic and Social council 
on the meetings of the committee Held at Lake Success, New York, from 5 april to 10 may 
1948, 7 UN eScor Supp. (No. 6) at 1, UN Doc. E/794 (1948), p. 14). See also Schabas 2000, 
pp. 178–205.
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The history of international criminal law is, like that of the egregious acts and 
conflicts that necessitated its creation, a turbulent one. created and amended in 
reaction to atrocities committed during various conflicts and continuously put 
to the test by man’s ingenuity when it comes to inflicting harm upon others, the 
special part of international criminal law has traditionally not been founded on 
elaborate, crystallised theories. as a result of the ad hoc character of bringing 
conduct within the ambit of international criminal law, the weaving process of 
international criminalisation bears more resemblance to a patchwork quilt than 
to a tightly woven coherent carpet.981 Several authors have tried to retroactively 
derive criteria from this history marked by lack of systematisation in order to 
uncover a doctrinal basis for international criminalisation that can be applied in 
the future. in addition to these theories, the legislative history of the rome Statute 
offers insights in the motivations for including specific crimes in the rome Statute 
and reasons for not (separately) criminalising certain other acts. The decisions to 
include certain specific acts in the provisions of crimes against humanity and war 
crimes in the rome Statute were the result of negotiations between delegations of 
more than 160 countries and were in the end based on consensus, rather than a 
set of strict criteria pertaining to criminalisation. often, it seems, practical rather 
than principled arguments were decisive.982 These practical considerations, such 
as the requirement that a new crime is not completely subsumed under existing 
crimes, in the sense that it is distinct from these crimes, are reflected in the road 
maps constructed in this chapter.
as has been stated several times, the icc only has jurisdiction over those 
crimes codified in the rome Statute. Therefore, the question of how particular 
conduct could be criminalised in the rome Statute in fact demands an answer 
to the question if and how this conduct can be included in the Statute. in order 
to address this issue, a distinction must be made between the core crimes: does 
particular conduct constitute a crime against humanity, a war crime and/or an 
act of genocide?
To answer these questions, two steps need to be taken. The first step is to 
verify whether the conduct in question is perhaps included in criminal acts that 
are already listed in the rome Statute. The requirement that crimes are legally 
distinct from each other is especially important with regard to crimes against 
humanity, as is evidenced by the aspiration of the majority of the drafters of 
the rome Statute to include in the provision of crimes against humanity as few 
duplicitous acts as possible. although less stringent, the argument against duplicity 
also applies to war crimes. even though the drafters of the rome Statute set out 
to include as many war crimes under customary international law as possible – as 
981 compare ratner 1998, p. 250.
982 although certain crimes, such as forced pregnancy, did lead to highly principled discussions.
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a consequence of which many of the serious violations listed in article 8 rome 
Statute overlap – it would hardly be desirable to incorporate new war crimes in the 
rome Statute when they are already completely covered by existing war crimes. 
it would appear that the same logic applies to the crime of genocide. Limiting the 
number of duplicitous and thus possibly superfluous crimes contributes to the 
overall coherence and applicability of the rome Statute and prevents this statute 
from turning into an unoperationalisable and impenetrable morass of offences. if 
the conduct in question is included in any of the listed crimes, the conclusion will 
therefore be that the act is criminal and falls within the jurisdiction of the icc 
under the nomenclature of existing offences.
if it has been established that the conduct under consideration does not fall 
within the scope of any of the specific crimes listed in the rome Statute, or if this 
conduct is caught by an umbrella clause, the second step raises the question of 
whether this conduct could be included as a distinct crime against humanity, 
war crime or genocidal act in the rome Statute. crimes against humanity require 
an act to constitute an inhumane act, war crimes require a serious violation 
of international humanitarian law, and genocide requires an act that could 
potentially result in the destruction of (part of) a group of people.
Schematically, this results in the following overview.
Crimes against humanity
1. is the act subsumed under or materially distinct from listed crimes 
against humanity (is it an other inhumane act)?
2. Does this act cause great suffering? and
3. is the act similar in nature and gravity to listed crimes against humanity 
(eiusdem generis)?
War crimes
1. is the conduct subsumed under serious violations of customary 
international law that are listed in the rome Statute? or
2. Does the conduct amount to a war crime which is not codified in the 
rome Statute:
a. is the conduct considered to be a breach of a rule of customary 
international humanitarian law; and
b. can the violation be qualified as ‘serious’; and
c. Does the breach give rise to individual criminal responsibility under 
customary international law?
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1a. is this act subsumed under listed genocidal acts? or
2a. is the act of such a nature that it may (ultimately) result in the destruction 
of (part of) a group of people? and
2b. is the gravity of this act comparable to the listed genocidal acts (eiusdem 
generis)?
if the questions listed above are answered positively, there exist valid reasons to 
include the act in question as a ‘new’ crime against humanity (e.g. as an ‘other 
inhumane act’), war crime or act of genocide in the rome Statute. especially when 
this particular act has certain prevalence in conflict situations and is likely to 
reoccur, it stands to reason to consider including it in the rome Statute. amending 
the rome Statute, however, is something that cannot be done overnight: it will 
take time and effort.







comPARIng nAtIonAl And 
InteRnAtIonAl cRImInAlIsAtIon
1. iNTroDUcTioN
in the previous two chapters, criteria for criminalisation on the level of national 
and international law were discussed. as announced in the general introduction 
to this book, the procedure to uncover these principles differs markedly between 
the two levels. National criminal law has the benefit of being able to draw from 
a rich tradition of doctrinal discussions concerning the issue of criminalisation. 
for international criminal law, this is not (yet) the case; rather, acts have been 
criminalised on an ad hoc basis throughout the years.983 Whereas the framework 
for criminalisation on the level of national law contains a number of clear 
principles, the same cannot be said for international criminalisation. Due to the 
specific nature of international criminal law – created, mainly, by diplomats and 
based on consensus – and the regime of the rome Statute – limiting the icc’s 
jurisdiction to the crimes listed in the Statute – the criminalisation framework 
presented in chapter 5 looks more like a road map of criminalisation than a 
schematic collection of principles.
in this chapter, the two ‘frameworks’ for criminalisation are compared to 
each other. This is done by applying the national criteria listed in chapter 4 to the 
international level. This comparison opens up the possibility of cross‑pollination 
between the two levels: some principles that were uncovered as relevant to 
criminalisation in national law may also be applicable to international law 
and vice versa. Such a comparison may prove to be fruitful for criminalisation 
(doctrine) discussions.
983 This is not to say, of course, that in national jurisdictions such as the Netherlands, conduct 
is only ever criminalised after thorough examination and consideration of criminalisation 
theories. indeed, the news of the day, especially when coupled with the prospect of upcoming 
elections, may very well result in what may be labelled ‘ad hoc’ criminalisation in national law.
Forceandmarriage.indd   185 20-5-2014   10:42:08
186 intersentia




2. Harm aND WroNg: a HigHer THreSHoLD
international criminal law is a special sort of law: it only deals with the worst 
crimes imaginable. crimes against humanity are inhumane acts that cause victims 
great suffering. War crimes are serious violations of the laws applicable in armed 
conflict. genocide, the crime of crimes, is aimed at the destruction of a group of 
people. in other words, it does not get more serious than that. as a consequence, 
the harm and wrong principles – which are also condiciones sine quibus non for 
criminalisation in international law – have higher thresholds in international 
criminal law than on the level of national criminal law. minor harms and minor 
wrongs will not, and should not, be codified in the rome Statute.
in addition to the harm principle that is invoked in national criminalisation 
debates, there also exists a so‑called international harm principle. This principle 
was discussed in chapter 5 as part of may’s normative account of international 
criminalisation. may uses the ‘international harm principle’ as a moral justification 
for the legitimacy of international criminalisation of and prosecutions for crimes 
against humanity. This principle implies that group‑based crimes violate a strong 
interest of the international community and in some cases even humanity as a 
whole. as a result, this conduct is raised to the status of an international crime. 
The international harm principle therefore mainly concerns the chapeau elements 
of crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide.
3. ProPorTioNaLiTY aND eXTerNaL 
SUBSiDiariTY: SiDe‑LiNeD
Proportionality and external subsidiarity carry less weight in criminalisation 
decisions in international criminal law than on the national level. They are 
by‑passed by the high harm and wrong threshold, or, perhaps more accurately: 
proportionality and subsidiarity are inherent in the requirements of severe harm 
and wrong.
This requires some illumination. The quest for criteria for criminalisation 
presented in chapter 5 is split into three parts: one part concerns crimes against 
humanity, one concerns war crimes and the last part focuses on genocide. The 
reason for discussing each crime separately is that each core crime has its own 
criminalisation checklist: the crimes against humanity provision requires an 
inhumane act that causes serious suffering and that is comparable to listed 
crimes against humanity; war crimes require a serious breach of a rule of 
customary international humanitarian law that gives rise to individual criminal 
responsibility under customary international law; and genocide requires an 
act that could cause the destruction of (part of) a group of people and that was 
committed with specific intent. So each core crime has its own list of characteristics 
that must be fulfilled in order for an act to be criminalised as such. one of the 
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characteristics that all core crimes share is a requirement of grave harm. This high 
harm threshold essentially disables the proportionality principle. it is reiterated 
that the prospective proportionality principle serves the goal of assessing whether 
the harm and wrong caused by a certain act are severe enough to justify the 
criminalisation of that act. Pursuant to the characteristics of the core crimes, only 
very severe forms of harm will fall within the ambit of international criminal law. 
only the most severe acts can qualify as crimes against humanity, war crimes 
and genocide. in other words: when an act qualifies as one of the core crimes, it 
will be deemed so severe, so serious that the use of international criminal law will 
be justified. Prospective proportionality will therefore not be directly relevant to 
what may be termed ‘intra‑core crime criminalisation’ – that is criminalisation of 
conduct within the three distinct regimes of crimes against humanity, war crimes 
and genocide.984, 985
The principle of external subsidiarity is side‑lined in a similar manner: any 
act that falls within the ambit of the core crimes codified in the rome Statute can 
be considered to be so reprehensible that it requires the condemnatory response 
of international criminal law. in addition, there are no real alternatives to 
international criminal law (yet). on the level of national law, there are alternatives 
such as tax law, tort law and administrative law. But there is no international 
tort law, for example, that could (or should) deal with crimes against humanity. 
currently, the only alternative to international criminal law is restorative justice, 
e.g. in the form of a truth and reconciliation commission. especially in situations 
of mass victimisation, restorative justice may be a suitable tool to provide 
reparation,986 but in general it can be argued that international crimes are so grave 
that they (also) require the condemnatory response of criminal law. especially the 
so‑called ‘big fish’ are best dealt with through criminal law. restorative justice 
approaches do not form an impediment to criminalisation of conduct on the 
international level.
4. iNTerNaL SUBSiDiariTY: eqUaLLY 
imPorTaNT
as was explained in chapter 4, the principle of subsidiarity has two different 
components: one refers to alternatives other than criminal law, the other 
to alternatives within the field of criminal law (i.e. alternatives to separate 
984 When it comes to adding new core crimes to the rome Statute, prospective proportionality 
will (ideally) play a role.
985 obviously, retrospective proportionality will be of importance during the sentencing stage: 
the punishment must fit the crime.
986 See e.g. r. Letschert, r. Haveman, a. de Brouwer & a. Pemberton, Victimological Approaches 
to International Crimes: Africa, cambridge/antwerp/Portland: intersentia 2011, pp.  59–63 
and 145 ff.
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criminalisation). on the level of international criminal law, external subsidiarity 
carries little weight; internal subsidiarity, on the other hand, has proven to be 
particularly relevant in the form of what has been termed ‘material distinctiveness’ 
in chapter 5.
The criterion of material distinctiveness surfaced during the analysis of the 
drafting history of the rome Statute. When discussing the crime of sexual slavery, 
delegates debated the differences between sexual slavery and enslavement on the 
one hand and sexual slavery and enforced prostitution on the other hand. material 
distinctiveness between different crimes arose as a means to avoid repetition or 
overlap in the rome Statute. in this way, the requirement that criminal offences 
are materially distinct from each other contributes to the internal coherence and 
consistency of the rome Statute; an aim that is also relevant to national criminal 
law. This requirement is subsumed under the internal subsidiarity criterion. more 
specifically: material distinctiveness is the test that is used to apply the internal 
subsidiarity criterion.
The law ought to be clear and it should be consistent. civilians should be able 
to understand which acts are criminal and which acts are not, so that they may 
adjust their behaviour accordingly. one way to keep the law clear and consistent 
is to limit the body of crimes. as an illustration: it is estimated that in total there 
are more than 10,000 different criminal offences in england and this number 
is growing steadily: between 2010 and 2011 634 criminal offences were created 
in england.987, 988 There are no figures concerning the number of (new) criminal 
offences created in the Netherlands, but in this jurisdiction there seems to be 
a comparable increased willingness to penalise, which might cause a similar 
proliferation of criminal offences. obviously, the number of criminal offences 
does not necessarily convey any information about the extent of criminalisation 
in a given jurisdiction: one country may, for example, have ten different offences 
relating to theft; another country may have only one broad offence of theft and yet 
the latter may very well criminalise more larcenous acts than the former.989 an 
explosion of criminal offences may, however, be detrimental to the clarity of the 
law: it could cause the criminal law to turn into a dense and obscure collection of 
crimes. in order to keep the law as clear and consistent as possible and to combat 
the proliferation of offences, one of the first questions that needs to be answered 
987 ashworth & Horder 2013, p. 20. chalmers & Leverick 2013, pp. 548 and 551 believe that the 
total number of criminal offences in existence is considerably higher than 10,000, but do not 
provide any figures in this regard.
988 chalmers & Leverick 2013, p.  551. chalmers & Leverick counted the number of criminal 
offences created between 1997–1998 and 2010–2011; they did not count the number of criminal 
offences that were repealed in these periods. Therefore, there exists no reliable data with regard 
to this matter for the period 2010–2011, but according to the ministry of Justice, basing its 
estimates on the Police National Legal Database, approximately 155 offences were repealed 
between may 2010 and may 2011. 
989 chalmers & Leverick 2013, p. 546.
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in a criminalisation debate is whether or not the act is already covered by existing 
crimes.
This is where the internal component of the subsidiarity principle comes into 
play. after determining what kind of harm the conduct causes and in which ways 
it can be qualified as wrongful, the next step ought to be checking how the act 
differs from existing crimes. What unique harms and wrongs that are not yet 
subsumed under or covered by existing crimes does the act in question cause? 
Tadros argues that when we identify criminal wrongs:
‘we ought to be searching for what is intrinsically wrong about a certain form of 
conduct. a mere tendency to have a particular negative effect is insufficient to 
mark out a distinct wrong that is worthy of recognition by the creation of a new 
criminal offense.’990
increasingly often, governments create new legislation for conduct that is already 
subsumed under existing criminal offences because they believe it is necessary to 
send out a clear signal that this conduct is unacceptable.991 indeed, this point is 
addressed in the criminal offences gateway guidance, a mechanism introduced 
in 2010 to assess government proposals to create or change criminal offences 
enforceable in england and Wales. This instrument considers the necessity of the 
creation of a new offence with the help of a lengthy list of factors. one of these 
factors concerns the question of ‘whether the behaviour is already caught by the 
existing criminal law’.992
5. effecTiVeNeSS: No DeaL BreaKer
in criminalisation debates in national jurisdictions, considerations regarding 
the effectiveness of a criminal offence can carry some weight. it is considered 
to be important that an offence is prosecutable and enforceable – and with good 
990 V. Tadros, ‘The Distinctiveness of Domestic abuse: a freedom Based account’, Louisiana Law 
Review (65) 2005, p. 1003.
991 See for the Netherlands e.g. Parliamentary Papers II (Lower House) 2010/2011, 32 840, no. 3, 
p.  7 (explanatory memorandum): ‘a tendency has developed to create separate criminal 
offences for conduct that is already captured by broad provisions’ (my translation). also, see 
the Parliamentary Papers I and II 2012/2013, 33 478, concerning the separate criminalisation 
of the act of financing terrorism. See for england the proposal to hold managers and hospital 
trusts criminally liable if they manipulate figures on waiting times or death rates (r. Winnett, 
‘New criminal offence to stop NHS hospitals “fiddling” figures to be introduced’, The 
Telegraph 15  march 2013, available at <www.telegraph.co.uk/health/healthnews/9934211/
New‑criminal‑offence‑to‑stop‑NHS‑hospitals‑fiddling‑figures‑to‑be‑introduced.html>, last 
accessed December 2013).
992 Ministry of Justice, Criminal Offences Gateway Guidance (2011), available at <www.justice.gov.
uk/downloads/legislation/criminal‑offences‑gateway‑guidance.pdf> last accessed December 
2013.
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reason – although practical objections will never constitute absolute injunctions. 
The offence of rape, for example, is generally considered to be difficult to prove, 
but this would never be a decisive argument against criminalising it. international 
criminal law deals with different forms of criminal behaviour than national 
criminal law: it deals with mass victimisation and mass criminality.993 in those 
cases where a particular crime against humanity, war crime or act of genocide 
would be difficult to prove, this would not constitute a relevant argument 
against criminalisation of that act. effectiveness and other practical constraints, 
therefore, are not relevant factors for assessing the proposal to create a new crime 
against humanity, war crime or act of genocide. it is important, obviously, that 
new crimes are defined as clearly as possibly: this requirement based on the lex 
certa principle (see infra) will also influence the effectiveness of (the prosecution 
of) a criminal offence.
considerations regarding effectiveness and the icc’s capacity may, however, 
come to the fore when it comes to codifying a new core crime in the rome Statute. 
The ‘effectiveness’ of the court was a buzzword during the rome conference.994 
When the Preparatory committee discussed the inclusion of drug trafficking as a 
separate core crime in the rome Statute, some delegates believed that this would 
undermine the court’s functioning in light of the court’s limited resources 
and the magnitude of the problem of drug trafficking coupled with the complex 
investigations that it would require.995 at the rome conference, drug trafficking 
was not included in the Statute because no acceptable definition could be agreed 
upon.996 Some delegates also believed that the incorporation of treaty crimes such 
as drug trafficking would overburden the court.997 expanding the jurisdiction of 
the icc by including more core crimes in the rome Statute would unquestionably 
increase the workload of the court, which would probably have implications for 
its effectiveness and efficiency.
993 a single inhumane act (e.g. a murder or rape) may also constitute a crime against humanity, 
but only against the background and as part of a widespread or systematic attack against 
a civilian population. See nahimana et al. appeal Judgement, para.  924; Blaškić appeal 
Judgement, para. 101; and chapter 8.
994 The word ‘effective’ was recorded 366 times in the Summary records of the plenary meetings 
and of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole, UN Doc. a/coNf.183/13 (Vol. ii).
995 J. Windle, ‘afghanistan, Narcotics and the international criminal court: from Port of Spain 
to Kabul, via rome’, European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 2012 (20), 
pp. 297–314.
996 See annex i(e) to the rome Statute.
997 See also Summary Records of the Meetings of the Committee of the Whole, 6th meeting, 18 June 
1998, UN Doc. a/coNf.183/13 (Vol. ii), para. 99; and Summary Records of the Meetings of 
the Committee of the Whole, 25th meeting, 8  July 1998, UN Doc. a/coNf.183/13 (Vol. ii) 
para.  32 (both available at <http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/rome/proceedings/e/rome%20
Proceedings_v2_e.pdf>; last accessed December 2013).
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6. LegaLiTY: eqUaLLY imPorTaNT
The principle of legality is interpreted in a more liberal sense under general 
international law and indeed by the icTY and icTr. in the context of the rome 
Statute, on the other hand, the principle of legality is applied more strictly.998 as 
was discussed in chapter 5, the legality principle is entrenched in articles 22–24 
rome Statute and its four sub‑norms have been affirmed by the icc Pre‑Trial 
chamber. Legality and especially the lex certa sub‑norm will consequently 
also play an important part during the process of codifying new crimes. When 
formulated as a new, distinct crime against humanity, war crime or act of 
genocide, the offence must be defined and demarcated as precisely as possible so 
that criminal liability for violating the crime is foreseeable. The lex certa principle, 
therefore, is as important for international criminalisation as it is for national 
criminalisation – at least for the purpose of this book.
it is worth noting that the majority of individual criminal offences are not 
defined in the rome Statute: their different elements are delineated and described 
in the elements of crimes document. Pursuant to article 9 rome Statute, the eoc 
assist the court in the interpretation of the different crimes against humanity, 
war crimes and acts of genocide. The court can therefore, theoretically, deviate 
from the definitions codified in the eoc. This could be seen as detracting from 
the importance of the lex certa (and the lex scripta) principle, but the eoc are 
authoritative and it is to be expected that the court will not lightly depart from 
them.
7. coNcLUDiNg remarKS
after applying the criteria of national criminalisation to the level of international 
criminal law, it appears that these criteria are not so ‘national’ after all. There 
are many similarities. The core crimes in the rome Statute have their own 
requirements for criminalisation, their own criminalisation frameworks, but 
all ‘national’ criteria are also, to some extent, present on the international level. 
Harm, wrong, internal subsidiarity and legality are indispensible criteria on 
both levels; the higher harm and wrong threshold of international criminal law 
encompasses the principles of proportionality and external subsidiarity.
as was explained in chapter 4, the approach to criminalisation taken in this 
book is one of minimalism. The concept of minimalism has two implications. 
first, there ought to be very persuasive reasons for using the criminal law to 
prohibit certain conduct, because in many cases, criminal law must be regarded 
as the ultimum remedium. There exists, in the author’s opinion, a presumption 
998 Broomhall 2008, margin no. 15.
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against criminalisation.999 Secondly (and linked to the first observation), the 
volume of criminal law, i.e. the number of criminal provisions, should preferably 
not snowball and get out of control. many acts that cause serious harm have 
already been criminalised. Before the decision is made to create a new criminal 
offence, the legislator ought to give heed to the internal subsidiarity principle by 
assessing the tools that are already available: is the conduct in question caught by 
existing criminal offences or are the harms and wrongs caused by the conduct 
so specific, so unique that they are not covered and might require a criminal 
prohibition of their own? if the act is subsumed under existing criminal offences, 
then care must be taken that new criminal offences are not created just for the 
sake of it. There must be compelling reasons to criminalise conduct that is already 
completely caught by existing offences. Sending out a message that the conduct 
in question is unacceptable (symbolic function of criminalisation) could be a 
reason, but this should be assessed on a case‑by‑case basis.
The criminalisation frameworks constructed in the previous chapters will be 
applied to the practice of forced marriage in Part iV of this book, but first the 
relevant legal frameworks will be analysed.
999 This presumption against criminalization mainly applies to minor harms and wrongs, not to 
mala in se such as murder and rape (see also chapter 4 paragraph 3.2.1).
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dutch And englIsh lAw 
And FoRced mARRIAge
1. iNTroDUcTioN
in this chapter, the Dutch and english legal frameworks relevant to forced 
marriages are discussed, starting with the former. forced marriages have been 
on the Dutch political agenda since 2005 and the wish to tackle this issue has 
resulted in several legal amendments.1000 in 2009, the Dutch government drafted 
a broad set of measures for the purpose of combating the problems associated 
with protracted integration and emancipation of family migrants. These 
measures include changes in the civil and criminal law pertaining to polygamy, 
forced marriage, marriages between cousins and raising the minimum age for 
marriage in private international law.1001 forced marriage was also included in 
the Public Prosecution Service instruction on domestic violence and honour 
related violence, in the sense that the Public Prosecution Service (PPS) will have 
to act pursuant to this instruction if forced marriage or abandonment are in 
any way connected with honour‑related offences.1002 in 2012, after looking into 
the possibilities of creating a separate offence of forced marriage, the Dutch 
government decided against separate criminalisation and instead presented a 
two‑year action plan concerning the prevention of forced marriages, containing 
a set of preventative measures, mainly aiming at providing information, raising 
awareness and training professionals.1003
This chapter first describes the civil law remedies in detail. Next, other 
remedies that can be used to tackle forced marriages are briefly examined, 
1000 See e.g. De Koning & Bartels 2005, p. 6.
1001 See Parliamentary Papers II (Lower House) 2009/2010, 32 175, no. 1.
1002 Aanwijzing huiselijk geweld en eergerelateerd geweld (2010a010), government gazette 2010, 
no. 6462. Note that the PPS is developing a new instruction concerning violence in dependency 
relationships (see Letter of the State Secretary of Health Welfare and Sport to the President of 
the Lower House, 15 July 2013).
1003 Parliamentary Papers II (Lower House) 2011/12, 32 175, no. 35 (Prevention of forced marriages 
2012–2014). See also inter alia the motion of mP Dibi, requesting the government to 
criminalise forced marriage (Parliamentary Papers II (Lower House) 2006/07, 30 388, no. 11).
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including remedies that have their basis in administrative law.1004 The focus is 
then directed towards criminal law: which crimes are relevant in cases of forced 
marriage and what amendments did the government propose in response to the 
call for the creation of a distinct offence of forced marriage?
The second part of this chapter describes the english legal framework in the 
context of the practice of forced marriage. english courts have quite a long history 
when it comes to dealing with cases of forced marriage,1005 but the phenomenon 
entered the political limelight only relatively recently. in the late 1990s, several 
high profile cases attracted media attention and outraged the British public, 
causing two members of Parliament to place the issue of forced marriage on 
the political agenda.1006 in 2005, the government consulted on the possibility of 
separately criminalising the practice of forced marriage, but, considering that the 
arguments against the creation of a specific offence outweighed the arguments in 
favour, the government decided not to criminalise the practice. instead, a civil law 
approach was favoured and in 2007 legislative action was taken with the creation 
of the forced marriage (civil Protection) act, but the debate on criminalisation 
of forced marriage kept resurfacing.1007 after a consultation late 2011, the 
government decided to create a specific criminal offence of forced marriage, 
arguing that this would send a strong message that the practice is unacceptable 
and will not be tolerated.1008 The UK government subsequently signed the council 
of europe convention on preventing and combating violence against women and 
domestic violence, which requires parties to criminalise several forms of violence 
against women, including forced marriage.1009 in may 2013, the anti‑social 
Behaviour, crime and Policing Bill (aBcP Bill) was introduced in the House 
of commons.1010 This Bill proposes to create two offences concerning forced 
1004 immigration law and the compulsory education act 1969 could also be used in case of a 
(threatened) forced marriage. The compulsory education act 1969 could be useful especially 
if a forced marriage is coupled with abandonment abroad: violations of the compulsory 
education act 1969 (which requires parents to make sure their children attend school) 
are qualified as misdemeanours, punishable with a maximum of one month detention. 
immigration laws can be used to terminate the stay in the Netherlands of previously admitted 
aliens who have been convicted of a criminal offence, depending on the time spent in the 
Netherlands and the length of their sentence (see Parliamentary Papers II (Lower House) 
2009/2010, 32 175, no. 2). These options will not be discussed in further detail because these 
instruments are not specifically aimed at tackling forced marriages (and the compulsory 
education act 1969 only concerns minors). The same could be said for divorce and annulment. 
However, the rules concerning annulment in particular are interesting and relevant because 
they offer guidance in defining coercion in the context of the solemnisation of marriages. This 
is of importance for the legal comparison with england, as will be demonstrated in chapter 9. 
1005 See e.g. Scott (Falsely Called Sebright) v. Sebright (1886) 12 PD 31; and Hussein (otherwise Blitz) 
v. Hussein (1938) P 159.
1006 gill & anitha 2011, p. 140.
1007 See Heaton, mccallum & Jogi 2009, p. v.
1008 Home office, Forced marriage – a consultation. Summary of responses, June 2012, p. 7.
1009 See <www.conventions.coe.int> and chapter 1.
1010 it is expected that the new legislation will be promulgated in 2014 (<www.lawgazette.co.uk/
news/forced‑marriage‑be‑criminalised> last accessed January 2014).
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marriage and proposes to criminalise the breach of a so‑called forced marriage 
Protection order, which is a civil measure. These measures will be discussed in 
detail below, but the second part of this chapter will first describe the english law 
on marriage, the measures available in the forced marriage (civil Protection) 
act 2007 and other remedies that can be used to tackle forced marriages. Where 
applicable, reference will be made to the amendments proposed by the aBcP Bill.
2. THe DUTcH LegaL LaNDScaPe
2.1. ciViL LaW: THe LegaL r eqUir emeNTS for 
mar riage
Title 5 of the first Book of the Dutch civil code (civc) deals with the institution 
of marriage. marriage is not defined in the civc but in literature it has been 
described as the legally recognised joining together of two persons (of the opposite 
or of the same sex) for the purpose of a (long‑)lasting community.1011 The marriage 
is officially entered into when the spouses exchange the legally prescribed vows: 
they must declare in the presence of the registrar and two to four witnesses that 
they accept each other as spouses and that they will faithfully fulfil all duties which 
the law connects to their marital status.1012 accordingly, the only type of marriage 
that is recognised under Dutch law is the civil marriage; religious weddings are 
legally invalid (article 1:30(2) civc). indeed, a religious ceremony can only take 
place after the spouses have made apparent to the server of the ceremony that the 
civil marriage has been solemnised (article 1:68 civc). Performing a religious 
marriage ceremony before a civil marriage has been solemnised is even qualified 
as a misdemeanour (article 449 criminal code). Because a religious marriage 
has no legal basis under civil law, civil law remedies (discussed below) offer no 
relief to forced religious marriages: interruption, annulment and divorce do not 
apply in case of religious marriages.
freedom of marriage is not enshrined in the Dutch constitution. But marriage 
is a legal act that requires the consent of both parties: the parties must have the 
will to enter into marriage and they must declare this intention, which is done by 
exchanging vows in the presence of a registrar and a number of witnesses. The 
consent requirement, however, is not positively laid down in the law. instead, it 
is formulated negatively: someone who suffers from a mental disorder – whether 
chronically or temporarily1013 – of such a kind or to such an extent that this person 
is incapable of determining his will or of grasping the full significance of the 
1011 Vlaardingerbroek et al. 2011, p. 104. asser/De Boer 2010, margin no. 105.
1012 article  1:67(1) civc. These duties are listed in article  1:81–92a civc and include mutual 
fidelity, assistance and support and providing each other with what is necessary.
1013 e.g. induced by alcohol or drugs (asser/De Boer 2010, margin no. 113).
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marriage vows is not allowed to enter into a marriage (article 1:32 civc).1014 if a 
marriage is nevertheless contracted in such a case, it is voidable.1015
During the parliamentary debate on the first book of the civc in the 1960s, 
some members of Parliament suggested a provision be included in the code which 
would stipulate that the free consent of both spouses is required for a marriage.1016 
This provision would ensure that consent to a marriage formed under pressure by 
parents or others could not be qualified as ‘free’ and would thus open the possibility 
of annulment. The then minister of Justice decided against inclusion of such a 
free consent clause, arguing that this could result in the annulment of marriages 
on the basis of every subjective lack of freedom. Someone might, for example, 
petition for annulment on the ground that he entered into the marriage because 
he believed himself to be bound by a promise and the law explicitly states that a 
promise of marriage does not constitute a ground for legal action (article 1:49(1) 
Dutch civil code (civc)), not even after a certificate of formal notice of marriage 
has been issued by the registrar. in addition, it was thought that such an ‘easy way 
out’ would encourage people to enter into marriage rashly.1017
finally, a few words on registered partnerships.1018 in Dutch civil law, marriage 
and registered partnership are equated: the two associations are equal with regard 
to the legally prescribed conditions for entering into the unions and the rights 
and obligations that exist between the partners (article 1:80b civc).1019 There are 
only a few differences. most importantly, a registered partnership, as opposed to 
a marriage, does not create a family relationship between a man and his child, 
which means the male partner needs to formally acknowledge any children in 
order to establish legal paternity (article  1:199(a) civc).1020 Secondly, judicial 
intervention is not required for the termination of a partnership (article 1:80c 
1014 a mental disorder in itself therefore does not form an impediment to marriage 
(P. Vlaarderingbroek, Burgerlijk Wetboek 1, art. 32, groene Serie Personen‑ en familierecht, 
comment no. 2). a person who is placed under guardianship on the grounds of a mental 
disorder will also need to acquire the consent of the court or his curator (article 1:38 civc).
1015 See e.g. District court Utrecht 13  april 2011, ecLi:NL:rBUTr:2011:Bq0539: the court 
annulled a marriage on the grounds that the woman suffered from advanced dementia and 
because of this, was not capable of determining her will at the time the marriage was entered 
into. See also District court Utrecht 24 November 2010, ecLi:NL:rBUTr:2010:Bo6170.
1016 Notably, the previous Dutch civil code (which was in force until 1970) did include a provision 
that referred to the ‘free consent of the prospective spouses’ (in article 85, see asser/De Boer 
2010, margin no. 113).
1017 c.J. van Zeben, W.g. Belinfante & o.W. van ewijk, Parlementaire geschiedenis van het 
nieuwe Burgerlijk Wetboek, Boek 1 Personen‑ en Familierecht, Deventer: Kluwer 1969, p. 131; 
Vlaardingerbroek et al. 2011, p. 122; and asser/De Boer 2010, margin no. 113.
1018 in Dutch law, these partnerships are referred to as registered (geregistreerd) partnerships; in 
english law, they are referred to as civil partnerships.
1019 in criminal law, marriages and partnerships are also equated (see article 90octies criminal 
code).
1020 a Bill introduced in the Lower House on 29 January 2013 proposes to eliminate this particular 
distinction between marriage and civil partnerships (Parliamentary Papers II (Lower House) 
2012/2013, 33 526, no. 2).
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civc).1021 finally, a religious ceremony can take place before a partnership is 
officially registered (article 1:80a civc). This implies that most of what is said 
below applies mutatis mutandis to forced registered partnerships and where 
applicable, the relevant sections in the civc are listed in footnotes. However, by 
their nature, any forced associations will most commonly be forced marriages.1022, 
1023
Dutch civil law offers several possibilities in case of a (threatened or intended) 
forced marriage: interruption, annulment and divorce. These remedies are 
discussed below.
2.1.1. Interruption of an intended marriage
The civc provides for the possibility of submitting formal objections to an 
intended marriage resulting in the interruption (stuiting) of that marriage, 
meaning it cannot take place until the interruption has been lifted or withdrawn 
(article  1:56 civc).1024 a marriage can be interrupted on the basis that the 
prospective spouses do not fulfil the requirements to enter into a marriage with 
each other, or on the grounds that the marriage would be a sham marriage. The 
legal requirements to enter into marriage are listed in article 1:31–42 civc and 
are as follows: minimum age of 18 years, soundness of mind, monogamy, and 
consent of a third party (such as parents, guardian(s) or the court) is required 
in case of a minor or someone who is placed under guardianship.1025 further, 
a marriage cannot be contracted between persons who, either by birth or 
otherwise, have a certain legal familial relationship with each other.1026 When 
any of these requirements are not fulfilled, blood relatives in the direct line, 
brothers, sisters and guardians of one of the parties are authorised to interrupt 
the intended marriage (article 1:51 civc). if the PPS or the registrar knows of 
the impediments to the marriage stipulated in article 1:31, 32, 33, 41 and 42 civc, 
they are obliged to interrupt the marriage (article 1:53(1) and 1:57 civc). if one 
1021 annulment of a marriage does require judicial intervention.
1022 coercion to enter into a registered partnership is very well imaginable, but this would be more 
related to motives such as greed (e.g. concerning an inheritance) and less to traditional or 
cultural motivations. To the author’s knowledge, there are no known cases of forced registered 
partnerships. 
1023 marriage has a more traditional and symbolic value, whereas registered partnerships are 
mainly entered into on the basis of practical considerations (see K. Boele‑Woelki et al., 
Huwelijk of geregistreerd partnerschap? Een evaluatie van de Wet openstelling huwelijk en de 
Wet geregistreerd partnerschap, The Hague: WoDc 2006, pp. 82, 177 and 200).
1024 for the possibility of interrupting a registered partnership, see article 1:80a(5) civc.
1025 There are certain exceptions to the maximum age of 18 (article 1:31 civc); in some cases a 
pregnant 16‑year‑old girl would be allowed to marry. Note, however, that the marital coercion 
(civil law) Bill proposes to amend the civil law in such a way that minors are no longer allowed 
to marry (see infra paragraph 2.1.5).
1026 more specifically between persons who are relatives in the ascending or descending line or 
who are brothers, sisters or brothers and sisters. Note that the marital coercion (civil law) Bill 
proposes to widen the circle of prohibited degrees of relation (see infra paragraph 2.1.5).
Forceandmarriage.indd   199 20-5-2014   10:42:09
200 intersentia




of the parties is married or in a registered partnership with someone else, that 
other spouse is authorised to interrupt the marriage (article 1:52 civc). When a 
(forced) marriage involves minors or individuals with severe learning disabilities, 
interruption can be used as a means to prevent the marriage from taking place.
as was noted in chapter 1, there are cases in which a forced marriage and a 
sham marriage overlap. Sham marriages are used to gain access to the Netherlands 
and are not aimed at fulfilling the marital duties which the law attaches to the 
marital status. as such, they are considered contrary to Dutch public policy and 
this gives the PPS the authority to interrupt such marriages (article 1:53(3) civc). 
When an intended forced marriage is a ‘real’ marriage, that is to say when it is 
aimed at the fulfilment of marital duties, the PPS will not be able to prevent it 
from taking place by interrupting it. This is curious: a solemnised marriage can 
be annulled on the grounds that it was entered into as a result of an unlawful 
serious threat (see infra paragraph 2.1.2); but the PPS cannot interrupt an intended 
marriage on the same grounds. arguably, the PPS should be able to prevent such 
marriages from taking place, for example by interrupting them.1027
2.1.2. Annulment of marriage
according to Dutch family law, marriages are never legally void: unless a 
marriage is annulled, it is considered to be valid.1028 annulment is an ex tunc 
ruling, meaning that the consequence of an annulment is that the marriage 
never existed.1029 it is necessary, however, that there was a valid marriage in the 
first place, annulment is only possible if a valid marriage exists, i.e. a marriage 
solemnised by the exchange of legally prescribed vows in the presence of an 
authorised registrar. consequently, a union that is only solemnised by a cleric is 
not a legally valid marriage (a non‑existent marriage) and will therefore not have 
to be annulled – that is to say it cannot be annulled.1030 This can be problematic, 
seeing as many cultures regard a religious marriage as a real and valid marriage, 
which would mean the man and woman would be married in the eyes of their 
culture and/or religion. Pursuant to Dutch law, they would be free to marry 
someone else; pursuant to their culture and/or religion, they would not and such 
a marriage could even be regarded as adulterous, which in some countries, such 
as iran, is punishable by death.1031
1027 Note that the marital coercion (civil law) Bill proposes to make coercion a ground for 
interruption (see infra paragraph 2.1.5).
1028 Vlaardingerbroek et al. 2011, p. 130.
1029 annulment has the same effects as a divorce (which dissolves a marriage from the ruling date 
and therefore works ex nunc) with regard to children of the spouses, the bona fide spouse 
and bona fide third parties who acquired certain rights before the marriage was annulled 
(article 1:77 civc).
1030 Vlaardingerbroek et al. 2011, pp. 130–131. 
1031 Appendix to the Proceedings (Lower House) 2011/12, no. 3114; Parliamentary Papers II (Lower 
House) 2011/12, 32 175, no. 31; and S.W.e. rutten, ‘Het recht van de gescheiden vrouw om 
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if the marriage was contracted abroad, the legal validity of this union 
is judged by that country’s legal standards, meaning that a religious marriage 
contracted in a country in which it is regarded as a valid marriage, will also be 
recognised as valid – and therefore possibly voidable – in the Netherlands (see 
infra paragraph 2.1.4 on private international law).1032
The civc exhaustively lists the grounds on which a marriage can be 
annulled.1033 Three of those grounds can be relevant in the case of forced 
marriage: an unlawful serious threat, a mistake of identity or a mistake as regards 
the meaning of the marriage vows, or a sham marriage. The authority to request 
the annulment of a marriage on grounds of threat or mistake lapses once the 
spouses have lived together for six months since the threat ceased to exist or the 
mistake was discovered without such a request having been made in the meantime 
(article 1:71(3) civc).1034 in those cases, it is assumed that the spouse who erred or 
who was threatened has accepted the marriage.1035
The first ground for annulment enshrined in article  1:71 civc is referred 
to as an unlawful serious threat.1036 as stated, consent is a necessary element 
of marriage. When consent has been obtained by extreme means, it would be 
unjust to bind the unwilling spouse to the marital union and its concomitant 
duties. Therefore, in some very serious cases of vitiated consent, the law offers a 
way out: pursuant to article 1:71(1) civc, a spouse can request the annulment of 
his marriage when this marriage was contracted under influence of an unlawful 
serious threat. The parliamentary history of article  1:71(1) civc provides two 
requirements for the threat element: the threat must be unlawful within the 
meaning of article 6:162 civc – pertaining to tort – and the threat must have 
been such that it could not have been nullified by the person who was threatened 
unless with very disadvantageous results for that person.1037 apart from this, the 
legislator did not pay more attention to this ground for annulment, probably 
because, at the time – the late 1960s – it was not much of an issue.1038 case law 
concerning article  1:71(1) civc is sparse and from the handful of available 
judgements it becomes evident that courts have set high standards for the proof 
of the presence of an unlawful serious threat and are not easily satisfied that such 
verlost te worden uit het huwelijk’, NJcm‑Bulletin (33) 2008–6, pp. 755–769, esp. p. 760.
1032 Schmidt & rijken 2005, p. 35.
1033 These grounds also apply to the annulment of a registered partnership (article 1:80a(7) civc). 
See for a case concerning the annulment of a registered partnership District court The Hague 
21 february 2011, ecLi:NL:rBSgr:2011:BP7696. The decree of nullity was upheld in appeal 
(court of appeal The Hague, 8 february 2012, ecLi:NL:gHSgr:2012:BV4099).
1034 Note that the marital coercion (civil law) Bill proposes to extend this period from six months 
to three years (see infra paragraph 2.1.5).
1035 asser/De Boer 2010, margin no. 175.
1036 Note that the marital coercion (civil law) Bill proposes replace the ground of ‘unlawful serious 
threat’ by the broader ground that the marriage came about as a result of coercion (see infra 
paragraph 2.1.5).
1037 Vlaardingerbroek et al. 2011, p. 132.
1038 asser/De Boer 2010, margin no. 174.
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a threat existed.1039 Threat is a serious form of coercion. Those forms of coercion 
that do not amount to threats – i.e. the more subtle forms of pressure often used 
in cases of forced marriage, such as emotional blackmail and societal pressure – 
are not covered by the annulment ground of article 1:71(1) civc. Threatening 
someone with a gun,1040 threatening to commit suicide,1041 and kidnapping 
someone, bringing them to another county, locking them in a house and 
physically assaulting them1042 are examples of acts that would qualify as unlawful 
serious threats.
a 1998 Supreme court Judgement deals with the case of a young Dutch 
woman of Pakistani descent. She requested the annulment of her marriage with 
a Pakistani man on the grounds that she entered into it as a result of unlawful 
serious threats. She argues that when she was 20 years old, her father and five 
other family members severely pressurised her to sign a marriage agreement. Her 
father threatened to send her to Pakistan where she would be married off anyway: 
that she would be married was an established fact according to her father. This 
pressure brought her to go ahead with the marriage. after she had signed the 
marriage agreement, the family pressure did not subside as her father wanted her 
to cooperate in the procedure of requesting a residence permit for her husband 
so he could come to the Netherlands. Several months later, the woman moved to 
a women’s shelter. The court of appeal held that the circumstances under which 
the woman signed the marriage agreement did not amount to an unlawful serious 
threat. The court based its conclusion that the woman was sufficiently assertive 
to resist the pressure exerted by her family members on the combination of three 
facts: the woman’s education (higher tertiary education at a vocational school 
(hoger beroepsonderwijs)), the period of time she had lived in the Netherlands 
(since she was six years old) and the fact that she had fled her family home several 
months after signing the marriage agreement while the family pressure was 
still present. The Supreme court held that the appeals court’s conclusion that 
the woman, in light of the circumstances, was capable of resisting the pressure 
exerted on her – she was able to independently set out a course of action – was not 
incomprehensible.1043
it can be argued that, in spite of the Supreme court’s finding, the appeals 
court decision is dubious: it seems questionable to deduce from the facts listed 
above that the woman could have resisted the pressure. The circumstance that 
someone has a good education and has lived in the Netherlands for the better 
1039 acVZ 2005, p. 45.
1040 District court groningen 1 July 2008, ecLi:NL:rBgro:2008:Bf0508.
1041 District court The Hague 10 march 1987, nIPR 1987, 234. Several decades before, in 1950, the 
amsterdam appeals court had held that threats to commit suicide made by one of the spouses 
(in this case the wife) did not amount to an unlawful serious threat, meaning that it opined 
that moral pressure would not be serious enough (court of appeal amsterdam 28 June 1950, 
nJ 1950, 736 and Vlaardingerbroek et al. 2011, p. 132).
1042 District court arnhem 6 June 1991, nIPR 1991, 330.
1043 Supreme court 16 october 1998, nJ 1999, 6. The marriage could not be annuled, but the road 
to divorce was still open.
Forceandmarriage.indd   202 20-5-2014   10:42:10
intersentia 203




part of his life does not necessarily mean that this person is able to resist pressure 
exerted by close family members, especially parents, or, in this case, the father in 
particular. indeed, as argued by Van Den eeckhout, the court could also have 
reasoned that the pressure exerted by the father must have been very severe for a 
woman who is well educated and has lived in the Netherlands for the better part 
of her life to surrender to it.1044
The second ground for annulment enshrined in article 1:71 civc is that of 
mistake. Two forms of mistake are recognised. a spouse may request annulment 
of his marriage when at the time the marriage was contracted, he was mistaken 
about the person (error personae), that is to say mistaken as to the identity of the 
other spouse; mistakes with regard to the other spouse’s character, financial or 
social status or any personal matters will not qualify. a spouse may also request 
annulment when he was mistaken about the meaning of the marriage ceremony, 
i.e. when he did not know that the exchange of marriage vows made in front 
of the registrar would result in a marriage between him and the other spouse. 
This could be the case for example when the spouse in question does not speak 
Dutch or when his mental faculties were disturbed.1045 as was explained, forced 
marriages can also come about as a result of fraud/deception, for example when 
one or both parties are deceived; tricked into marriage as it were.1046 Deception 
in general is not a ground for annulment.1047 However, if the deception caused 
any of the mistakes described above, then it will be a ground for annulment. 
other forms of deception will not amount to mistake within the meaning of 
article 1:71(2) civc.1048
The third and final ground of annulment that can be relevant in forced 
marriage cases is enshrined in article 1:71a civc. as explained above, the PPS 
has the authority to interrupt a marriage when it is not aimed at the fulfilment of 
the marital duties which the law connects to a marriage, but aimed at enabling 
one of the spouses to acquire legal residence in the Netherlands. When such a 
marriage has already taken place, the PPS can request the court to annul this 
sham marriage.1049, 1050
1044 V. Van Den eeckhout, ‘Noot bij: Hr (1998–10–16)’, nemesis 2000, p. 14.
1045 District court alkmaar 20 february 1992, nJ 1993, 541. See also District court amsterdam 
6  June 1979, nJ 1980, 182: the court granted the annulment request of a man with severe 
learning disabilities.
1046 Schmidt & rijken 2005, pp. 29–30.
1047 Vlaardingerbroek et al. 2011, p. 133.
1048 See court of appeal ’s‑Hertogenbosch 13 october 1994, ecLi:NL:gHSHe:1994:ac3237 where 
a woman tried to have her marriage annulled because she did not realise that her husband 
married her for the sole reason of gaining admission to the Netherlands. The court held that 
this did not constitute mistake: she knew the identity of the man she married and she intended 
to marry him. 
1049 for examples of the annulment of a sham marriage see court of appeal The Hague 14 april 
2004, ecLi:NL:gHSgr:2004:ao8640. 
1050 a sham marriage contracted abroad does not have to be recognised as a valid marriage in the 
Netherlands (asser/De Boer 2010, margin no. 164). and if it has not been recognised, it is 
non‑existent pursuant to Dutch law and therefore not voidable. See private international law 
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2.1.3. Divorce and judicial separation
Divorce is another remedy that can be used to end a forced marriage.1051 Divorce, 
which requires the parties to instruct a lawyer to bring the case before the court, 
is possible on the ground that the marriage has broken down irretrievably 
(article 1:151 civc), meaning that the continuation of the association has become 
unbearable and that there exists no prospect of reconciliation. The ground is 
objective, meaning that the focus is on the existence of an irretrievable breakdown; 
in principle, the causes that resulted in this breakdown, or which of the spouses 
was responsible, are irrelevant. The criterion is very broad and is relatively easily 
fulfilled: when both of the spouses petition for divorce, the court will grant it. 
When one spouse requests a divorce, he will have to motivate and prove the 
existence of the irretrievable breakdown, unless the other spouse does not put 
forward a defence.1052 examples of reasons for an irretrievable breakdown include 
adultery, the fact that the spouses have lived apart for a considerable period of 
time, and the fixed opinion of one of the spouses that the marriage has, in his or 
her view, broken down. The defence of the respondent spouse that the marriage 
has not irretrievably broken down is generally rejected by the court.1053
in the case of a forced marriage, divorce has several advantages over 
annulment: it does not require proof of a threat or mistake at the time the 
marriage was contracted; nor does the authority to file for divorce lapse after a 
certain period of time.1054 on the other hand, divorce, as opposed to annulment, 
does not operate retroactively: a divorce takes effect from the day on which the 
divorce decree is registered in the registers of civil Status onwards (ex nunc). 
for the very reason that the consequence of an annulment is that the marriage 
never existed, victims of forced marriage might prefer annulment to divorce. 
Then again, the retroactive effect of annulment can have consequences in the 
spheres of property and immigration law. after an annulment, the partners no 
longer have any mutual financial rights or duties (because a community property 
regime was never created),1055 which could leave the victim of a forced marriage in 
a disadvantageous position, whereas in case of divorce, the court can determine 
that one of the spouses has a duty to pay maintenance.1056 if one of the spouses 
does not have Dutch nationality, and a residence permit was issued on the basis 
(paragraph 2.1.4): a sham marriage is contrary to Dutch public policy, which can be used as a 
bar to recognition (article 10:32 civc).
1051 Divorce is not possible in case of registered partnership (article  1:80c civc). registered 
partnerships have to be dissolved at the request of the registered partners. They can also be 
terminated with mutual consent of the partners (see article 1:80c civc).
1052 Vlaardingerbroek et al. 2011, pp. 156–157.
1053 Wortmann & Van Duijvendijk‑Brand 2012, pp. 159–160.
1054 acVZ 2005, p. 46.
1055 Wortmann & Van Duijvendijk‑Brand 2012, pp. 159–160.
1056 article 1:157(1) civc. in case of annulment, only the bona fide spouse, i.e. the spouse who did 
not know that there was some flaw in the establishment of the marriage, may be entitled to 
receive maintenance, see article 1:77(1) civc. 
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of the existence of the marriage, annulment of that marriage can result in the 
withdrawal of the permit.1057
as an alternative to divorce, one or both of the spouses may present to the 
court a petition for judicial separation on the ground that the marriage has 
broken down irretrievably (article 1:169 in conjunction with article 1:151 civc). 
Judicial separation (a mensa et thoro) ends the cohabitation between the spouses 
– although Dutch law no longer recognises a legal duty to cohabit – but it does not 
alter the legal effects of a marriage.1058
2.1.4. Private International Law
as was explained above, a forced marriage can have international dimensions: 
someone who has Dutch nationality may be forced to marry someone with 
another nationality, either abroad or in the Netherlands. Likewise, a foreigner 
may be forced to marry in the Netherlands. Up until 2012, the marriages 
(conflict of Laws) act1059 dealt with any issues arising from marriages with 
international dimensions. This act was repealed on 1 January 2012 and replaced 
with a new, tenth Book in the civc comprising all Dutch law pertaining to Private 
international Law.1060
as regards forced marriages, the following rules regarding the celebration 
and recognition of a marriage with international aspects are important. in 
accordance with article  10:28 civc, a marriage can be celebrated in the 
Netherlands (1) when each of the prospective spouses fulfils the requirements for 
entering into a marriage enumerated in article 1:31–42 civc (see paragraph 2.1) 
and when one of them either has Dutch nationality or is habitually resident in the 
Netherlands; or (2) when each of the intending spouses fulfils the requirements 
for entering into a marriage pursuant to the state of which they are nationals. 
article  10:29 civc then stipulates that a marriage cannot be celebrated in the 
Netherlands if it would be incompatible with Dutch public policy.1061 The article 
continues by listing a number of absolute grounds for refusal based largely on the 
catalogue of grounds listed in the 1978 Hague convention on celebration and 
recognition of the Validity of marriages: a marriage cannot be celebrated in the 
1057 cornelissens, Kuppens & ferwerda 2009, pp. 44–45.
1058 Wortmann & Van Duijvendijk‑Brand 2012, pp. 178–179.
1059 and the registered Partnerships (conflict of Laws) act.
1060 Title 3 of this Book deals with the institution of marriage and the first section of the title 
implements the 1978 Hague convention on celebration and recognition of the Validity 
of marriages. Title 4 deals with registered partnerships. The Hague marriage convention 
of 14 march 1978 regulates the celebration and the recognition of the validity of marriages 
between contracting states. This convention was signed by six countries: egypt, finland, 
Portugal, australia, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, and was ratified only by the three 
last‑mentioned countries (see <www.hcch.net> > conventions > convention of 14 march 1978 
on celebration and recognition of the Validity of marriages > status table).
1061 in accordance with article  10:6 civc which stipulates that foreign law is not applied if its 
application would be manifestly incompatible with Dutch public order.
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Netherlands when the prospective spouses have not yet reached the age of 15,1062 
when the spouses are related to one another (by blood or by adoption in the direct 
line or as brother and sister), when one or both of them are already married, when 
they are already registered partners, or, notably, when the free consent of one of 
the prospective spouses is lacking or when the mental faculties of one of them are 
disturbed to such an extent that they cannot determine their will or understand 
the meaning of the marriage vows. The free consent requirement may be relevant 
in case of an intended forced marriage. The requirement should be interpreted 
restrictively though: the parliamentary history reveals that it substantively 
corresponds with the provision of article 1:71(1) civc, meaning that free consent 
is only considered to be absent in case of an unlawful serious threat.1063
a marriage that was celebrated outside of the Netherlands and that is valid 
in the country in which it was contracted is also recognised as valid in the 
Netherlands. article 10:32 civc holds that recognition of a marriage contracted 
abroad is withheld if recognition would be manifestly contrary to Dutch public 
policy. The word ‘manifestly’ indicates that the public policy exception will not 
easily be accepted: the starting principle is that the different norms and values 
of the legal systems of the world must be respected.1064 only those foreign rules 
that are contrary to the fundamental principles of the Dutch legal order – i.e. 
those values that are inextricably linked with the Dutch legal community – will 
justify the use of the public policy exception.1065 This is in accordance with the 
principle of favor matrimonii that is at the heart of Private international Law 
concerning marriages: bars to the international establishment and recognition 
of marriages should be kept to a minimum.1066 Unlike article 10:29, article 10:32 
civc does not provide a list of cases in which the public policy exception must be 
applied. This has to do with the difference in the degree of connection with the 
Dutch public policy. article 10:29 civc contains such a list because it concerns 
the celebration of a marriage – with international aspects – in the Netherlands. 
accordingly, Dutch public policy is closely involved in those marriages, which 
makes it possible to list a set of cases in which the celebration of such marriages 
must be denied on the basis of said policy. However, when it comes to recognising 
marriages that have already been contracted abroad, the domain of article 10:32 
civc, Dutch public policy is less closely involved, especially when neither of the 
marriage parties has Dutch nationality. This means that withholding recognition 
1062 See infra paragraph 2.1.5 on the proposal to increase the legal age of marriage to 18 in Private 
international Law (Parliamentary Papers II (Lower House) 2009/10, 32 175, p. 3 (explanatory 
memorandum)).
1063 See Parliamentary Papers II (Lower House) 1987/1988, 20 507, no. 3 (explanatory memorandum 
to the marriages (conflict of Laws) act), p. 7 (article 10:29(c) civc is identical to article 3(1)(c) 
of the repealed marriages (conflict of Laws) act) and Vonken 2012, margin no. 2(c).
1064 Vonken 2012, margin no. 2(c).
1065 Vonken 2012, margin no. 2(c), 3 and 4(a).
1066 Parliamentary Papers II (Lower House) 2012/2013, 33 488, no. 3 (explanatory memorandum), 
p. 10.
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to a legal fait accompli on the basis that it is contrary to Dutch public policy will be 
more difficult than preventing a marriage that has yet to take place and is contrary 
to public policy. The grounds listed in article  10:29 civc, such as marriages 
involving children younger than 15 and marriages to which one or both parties 
did not freely consent, can all be a reason for withholding recognition to a foreign 
marriage, but they are not absolute grounds: whether or not recognition should 
be withheld will have to be determined in each specific case.1067
Summarising: lack of consent of either of the spouses is not an absolute bar to 
recognition of a foreign marriage as valid in the Netherlands. if the country where 
the marriage was contracted does not list consent to marriage as a requirement 
for validity, it will be regarded as valid in the Netherlands even though consent of 
either or both of the spouses was absent. However, a marriage that was the result 
of a serious threat would be contrary to public policy and would consequently 
not be recognised as valid, meaning that, as far as Dutch law is concerned, the 
marriage has never existed (which means annulment is not possible). This means 
that the recognition of a forced marriage can be barred.
2.1.5. Marital Coercion (civil law) Bill
in may 2012, a Bill concerning the reinforcement of marital freedom and the 
countering of marital coercion was drafted; it was revised in December 2012. 
This Bill further implements the state’s positive obligation to guarantee that 
the right to marry can be exercised in complete freedom. This obligation stems 
from a series of international human rights treaties that the Netherlands is party 
to, including the iccPr, iceScr, ceDaW and the convention on consent to 
marriage, minimum age for marriage, and registration of marriages.1068 The Bill 
proposes amendments in four areas of the law of marriage as codified in Books 1 
and 10 of the Dutch civil code.1069
first, it aims to raise the minimum age for marriage to 18 years in virtually all 
cases. The options currently available in article 1:31 civc for 16‑ and 17‑year‑olds 
to request the court for dispensation to marry – which, in practice, appears to 
1067 Parliamentary Papers II (Lower House) 1987/1988, 20 507, no. 3 (explanatory memorandum 
to the marriages (conflict of Laws) act), pp.  8–9. See for example District court almelo 
20 february 2002, nIPR 2002, 85, para. 11: the court held that the PPS could not invoke public 
policy in the case of a marriage between a Turkish man and a Turkish girl who was 14 at the 
time the marriage was contracted. Because a Turkish court had granted the girl permission 
to marry, the parents of the girl had consented, the girl, who turned 15 eight days after 
the marriage had taken place, had married out of free will, and because the marriage was 
contracted in Turkey, the District court almelo found no grounds to withhold recognition of 
the marriage.
1068 Parliamentary Papers II (Lower House) 2012/2013, 33 488, no. 3 (explanatory memorandum), 
p. 2.
1069 all measures also apply to registered partnerships, see Parliamentary Papers II (Lower House) 
2012/2013, 33 488, no. 3 (explanatory memorandum), p. 1.
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be used on a very limited basis only1070 – will be deleted. as a result, the age of 
18 becomes the minimum age for marriage,1071 and article  1:35 and 36 civc 
concerning the marriage of minors will be deleted. This measure is intended 
to afford minors the maximum level of protection that is associated with their 
age.1072
Secondly, the Bill aims to widen the circle of prohibited degrees of relation. 
research has indicated that in cases of marriage between extended family 
members, there is a higher chance that forms of force or pressure are exerted 
than in cases of marriage between non‑related parties,1073 and this, according to 
the government, justifies the proposed amendments. if the Bill enters into force, 
marriages between blood relatives in the collateral line up to the fourth degree 
(i.e. aunt‑nephew/niece, uncle‑nephew/niece and cousins) will be allowed only 
under the condition that the parties, at a time before the actual solemnisation of 
the marriage, have declared under oath and in the presence of a registrar that 
they both freely consent to the marriage (article 1:41a (new) civc). Because these 
degrees of kinship are not registered anywhere, parties will have to make an official 
declaration during the registration of their marriage (aangifte) that they are not 
blood relatives in the third or fourth degree of the collateral line as part of the 
preliminary formalities to their marriage (article 1:43(2) (new) civc). if parties 
have not made such a declaration and the registrar is aware of their kinship, he 
shall not cooperate with the solemnisation of the marriage (article  1:57 (new) 
civc). if a marriage is contracted and it later becomes known that the spouses 
are within the prohibited degrees of relationship and did not make the required 
declaration under oath or that they made a false declaration, the marriage will be 
voidable (e.g. on request of the PPS) on the ground that the spouses do not fulfil the 
requirements to enter into a marriage with each other, pursuant to article 1:69(1) 
civc.1074 according to the government, this conditional impediment provides 
parties who might be under pressure to marry with a more formal moment of 
1070 each year, approximately ten 16‑year‑old girls and 30 17‑year‑old girls receive dispensation to 
marry on the ground of pregnancy; in recent years, no 16‑year‑old boys and only a handful of 
17‑year‑old boys have married. each year, between five and ten requests for dispensation on 
other grounds than pregnancy are made: since 2007, none of these requests have been granted 
(Parliamentary Papers II (Lower House) 2012/2013, 33 488, no. 3 (explanatory memorandum), 
p. 7).
1071 There are no exceptions to this rule: even a 16‑ or 17‑year‑old girl who has been declared an 
adult in accordance with article 1:253ha civc because the court considers it desirable that 
she be able to exercise parental authority over her own child will not be able to marry before 
reaching the age of 18 (see Parliamentary Papers II (Lower House) 2012/2013, 33 488, no. 3 
(explanatory memorandum), p. 16); and Parliamentary Papers II (Lower House) 2012/2013, 33 
488, no. 2 (marital coercion (civil law) Bill), article 1 sub m and article iii sub B).
1072 Parliamentary Papers II (Lower House) 2012/2013, 33 488, no. 3 (explanatory memorandum), 
p. 10.
1073 Parliamentary Papers II (Lower House) 2012/2013, 33 488, no. 3 (explanatory memorandum), 
p. 8, referring to De Koning & Bartels 2005. See also chapters 1 and 2.
1074 Parliamentary Papers II (Lower House) 2012/2013, 33 488, no. 3 (explanatory memorandum), 
p. 8.
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reflection so that they may determine whether or not they want to marry each 
other. it is believed that requiring parties to make a declaration under oath will 
deter those parties who are in fact coerced from making a false statement.1075 Such 
a false statement made under oath would qualify as perjury (article 207 Dutch 
criminal code). it should be added that the government indicates that it expects 
the number of marriages between cousins to be very low.1076
Thirdly, the Bill proposes to broaden the grounds on which a marriage can be 
interrupted by adding the possibility of interruption if it appears that the marriage 
will be contracted under influence of coercion (article 1:50 (new) civc). The PPS 
will be given the power to interrupt the marriage if it has become sufficiently 
evident that the intending spouses, or one of them, would enter into the marriage 
under the influence of coercion, but only after the court has authorised the PPS 
to this extent (article 1:53(3) and (4) (new) civc). if the parties do not agree with 
the interruption, they can request that the PPS lift the interruption. if the PPS is 
not willing to do this, parties can present their case to a court.1077
fourthly, the Bill proposes to broaden the grounds on which a marriage is 
voidable in case of coercion.1078 The requirement that a marriage was entered 
into as a result of an unlawful serious threat is considered to be too strict: the 
government opines that forced marriages are contrary to Dutch public policy to 
such an extent that the degree of coercion or the extent to which the coerced 
spouse could have been expected to resist this pressure should not be decisive in 
determining whether or not the marriage should be annulled.1079 consequently, 
the ground of ‘unlawful serious threat’ will be replaced by the broader criterion 
that the marriage was entered into under coercion (article 1:71(1) (new) civc).
it is difficult to determine the distinction between coercion and influence, 
but some examples of situations that could be qualified by the court as coercion 
are mentioned in the explanatory memorandum to the Bill. isolating a person, 
especially a minor, from their social environment can be a strong indication of 
coercive circumstances: no longer allowing a youngster to attend school or higher 
education, threatening with disownment, and not allowing that person to go 
outside the house without an escort are three forms of isolation. especially when 
1075 Parliamentary Papers II (Lower House) 2012/2013, 33 488, no. 3 (explanatory memorandum), 
p. 9.
1076 Parliamentary Papers II (Lower House) 2012/2013, 33 488, no. 3 (explanatory memorandum), 
p. 17.
1077 Parliamentary Papers II (Lower House) 2012/2013, 33 488, no. 3 (explanatory memorandum), 
p. 19.
1078 annulment on the ground that a marriage was entered into under coercion (article 1:71 civc) 
should be distinguished from annulment on the ground that the spouses do not fulfil the 
requirements to enter into a marriage with each other (article 1:69(1) civc).
1079 Parliamentary Papers II (Lower House) 2010/11, 32 175, no. 17, p. 2; and Parliamentary Papers 
II (Lower House) 2012/2013, 33 488, no. 3 (explanatory memorandum), p. 4.
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the victims are young, this pressure can be very difficult to challenge. This implies 
that more subtle forms of coercion can also influence the freedom to marry.1080
in addition to broadening the grounds on which a marriage can be annulled, 
the Bill also proposed to broaden the circle of people who are authorised to petition 
for annulment. in addition to the spouses themselves, the PPS will be authorised 
to request the annulment of the marriage, but only after it has given the spouses 
the opportunity to give their opinion about its intention, so it may become clear 
why the (allegedly) coerced spouse did not petition for annulment in the first 
place (article 1:71(1) (new) civc).1081 When both spouses express their wish that 
the marriage remain valid, even though they recognise that they initially did not 
enter into it completely out of their free will, the PPS will most likely withdraw 
the annulment request.1082
further, the period after which the authority to request annulment on the 
grounds of coercion lapses1083 is extended from six months to three years: once the 
spouses have lived together for three years with the purpose of preserving their 
marriage in the absence of any coercion, an annulment request can no longer 
be made (article 1:71(3) (new) civc). This period of three years is considered to 
be more in line with the customary expiry periods in family law and will offer 
both the forced spouse(s) as well as the PPS the opportunity to take steps against 
the forced marriage. moreover, the sponsor of this Bill (the State Secretary of 
Security and Justice) considered a period of six months to be too short to evaluate 
the situation correctly since establishing the existence of coercion can be a 
time‑consuming exercise.1084
in addition to Book 1 of the civil code, the Bill also affects provisions of 
Private international Law, more specifically, it proposes to restrict both the 
possibility of celebrating a marriage between two foreigners in the Netherlands, 
and the possibility of recognising marriages celebrated abroad. as regards the 
first issue, a marriage between two foreigners will be contracted only if each of 
the parties fulfils the requirements to enter into marriage according to Dutch 
civil law (inter alia the minimum age of 18), irrespective of whether they would 
be allowed to marry according to their own state’s law (article 10:28 (new) civc). 
Because Dutch marriage law would be applicable to anyone wanting to celebrate a 
marriage in the Netherlands, article 10:29 civc, which stipulates that a marriage 
1080 Parliamentary Papers II (Lower House) 2012/2013, 33 488, no. 3 (explanatory memorandum), 
pp. 3–4.
1081 Parliamentary Papers II (Lower House) 2012/2013, 33 488, no. 3 (explanatory memorandum), 
p. 20.
1082 Parliamentary Papers II (Lower House) 2012/2013, 33 488, no. 3 (explanatory memorandum), 
p. 6.
1083 Note that the period after which the authority to request annulment on the grounds of mistake 
lapses, remains six months (article 1:71(3) new civc).
1084 Parliamentary Papers II (Lower House) 2012/2013, 33 488, no. 3 (explanatory memorandum), 
p. 20.
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cannot be celebrated in the Netherlands if that would be incompatible with Dutch 
public policy, will be deleted.
as regards the recognition of marriages celebrated abroad, the Bill proposes 
to include in the law a set of absolute grounds on which such a marriage cannot 
be recognised in the Netherlands. These grounds, which are intended to increase 
legal certainty and assist the courts,1085 are based in part on the catalogue of 
grounds listed in article 11 of the 1978 Hague convention on celebration and 
recognition of the Validity of marriages. a marriage cannot be recognised in the 
Netherlands if at the time of the solemnisation of the marriage at least one of the 
spouses had not yet reached the age of 18 (unless both spouses are 18 or older when 
they request recognition of their marriage), was not mentally capable of giving 
consent (unless this person is capable to do so when recognition is requested 
and he expressly agrees with the recognition of the marriage), or did not freely 
consent to the marriage (unless he expressly agrees with the recognition of the 
marriage).1086 Nor can a marriage be recognised if at the time of the celebration 
at least one of the spouses was already married to or in a registered partnership 
with a Dutch national, or with someone domiciled in the Netherlands (unless that 
previous marriage or registered partnership had been dissolved or annulled),1087 
or if the spouses are related to one another by blood or by adoption in the direct 
line or as brother and sister (article 10:32 amended civc).1088 This amendment 
therefore – at least in theory – gives parties to a forced marriage the opportunity 
to have their marriage recognised (or not). This does not solve the problem that 
the parties, if their marriage is not recognised in the Netherlands because of a 
lack of consent, might still be married according to the law of another state or 
states.
2.1.6. Analysis of the Bill
The Bill proposes a couple of valuable amendments, such as replacing the narrow 
annulment ground of ‘unlawful serious threat’ with the broader ground of 
coercion, and giving the PPS the possibility of interrupting an intended marriage 
in the case of suspected coercion. But several critical remarks can be made with 
regard to other amendments proposed by the Bill.
1085 Parliamentary Papers II (Lower House) 2012/2013, 33 488, no. 3 (explanatory memorandum), 
p. 11.
1086 Such marriages are recognised in the Netherlands once they have been included in the official 
registers by the registrar in The Hague (see article 1:25 civc).
1087 Note that bigamy is a criminal offence, punishable with a maximum prison sentence of four 
years (or six years if the bigamist concealed from his spouse the fact that he was already 
married) see article 237 criminal code.
1088 Note that, unless at least one of the spouses did not consent, a marriage between cousins 
celebrated abroad will still be recognised in the Netherlands when it is valid according to that 
state’s law.
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first, the effectiveness of the proposed formal requirement in the form of 
a declaration of free consent in case of a marriage between third/fourth degree 
relatives is questionable. This extra requirement is promoted as an extra check 
and balance, as a formal moment of reflection for spouses which allows them 
to determine whether or not they want to marry each other. and it is believed 
that requiring parties to make a declaration under oath will deter those parties 
who are in fact coerced from making a false statement. This ignores the reality 
of forced marriages. When a person is coerced to enter into a marriage against 
their will, an extra formal requirement preceding the actual marriage will not 
necessarily deter the coercer(s); it is reasonable to assume that they would merely 
force the coercee to make a false statement, in addition to forcing them to lie 
during the wedding ceremony.1089 and especially in those cases in which the 
pressure takes the form of (threats of) physical harm, the coercee would probably 
not be more inclined to seek help.1090 indeed, the State Secretary of Security and 
Justice who introduced the Bill in the Lower House contradicts himself when he 
states that the consent declaration provides intending spouses with an additional 
moment of reflection, which is necessary because ‘in cases of close consanguinity 
between intending spouses, the pressure exercised by (both sides of) the family 
can take on such large proportions that it can become very difficult to resist this 
pressure.’1091 The pressure on the coercee to make a false statement regarding his 
or her free consent to the marriage will be similarly difficult to resist. moreover, in 
its advice on the Bill, the council of State rightly remarked that the requirement 
of a declaration of consent to the marriage made under oath and in the presence 
of a registrar might actually act as an additional barrier to the coercee to seeking 
help. a spouse who was coerced to make a false declaration and was later coerced 
to enter into a marriage against his or her will might, for example, believe they 
would be prosecuted for perjury.1092 The council of State further refers to the 
possible discriminatory nature of creating an extra formal requirement for 
marriages between blood relatives in the collateral line up to the fourth degree.1093 
While there exist reasons to believe that in general, marriages between cousins 
and niece/nephew‑uncle/aunt might be coupled with certain pressure from 
family members, these types of marriages are certainly not the only ones with an 
increased risk of some form of coercion: research indicates that levirate marriages 
1089 in those cases, the coercers could be prosecuted for influencing the victim’s freedom to make 
an official statement pursuant to article 285a cric (see infra paragraph 2.3.1).
1090 also noted by the council of State, see Parliamentary Papers II (Lower House) 2012/2013, 33 
488, no. 4 (advice of the council of State), p. 3.
1091 council of State, see Parliamentary Papers II (Lower House) 2012/2013, 33 488, no. 4 (report of 
the State Secretary), p. 4 (my translation).
1092 even though the PPS would probably not decide to prosecute, and even if it would prosecute, 
the coercee could plead duress (Parliamentary Papers II (Lower House) 2012/2013, 33 488, no. 
4 (advice of the council of State), p. 3).
1093 Parliamentary Papers II (Lower House) 2012/2013, 33 488, no. 4 (advice of the council of 
State), p. 2.
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and marriages as a result of unplanned pregnancy can also be accompanied by a 
higher risk of pressure.1094
in addition, from a more practical perspective, it would seem that intending 
spouses – unless they have the same surname – would relatively easily be able to 
circumvent this conditional impediment since degrees of kinship in the collateral 
line in the third and fourth degree are not registered anywhere and will not be 
readily deducible from their birth certificates. This would make it very difficult 
for the registrar to verify their statement regarding any kinship.1095 in addition, 
the question might be asked whether registrars are able to recognise marital 
coercion. it might be a good idea to publish guidelines for registrars and have 
experts on this topic make a list of indicators of force, as was done for sham 
marriages.1096
Secondly, the Bill proposes to include in the law a set of absolute grounds, 
which will bar recognition of marriages celebrated abroad. it is remarkable that 
marriages between cousins and other blood relatives in the third and fourth 
degree are recognised unless there was an element of coercion at the time the 
marriage was celebrated. marriages between such relatives in the Netherlands 
can only take place on the condition that both spouses solemnly declare that they 
marry each other out of free will. it would perhaps be more consistent if marriages 
between cousins celebrated abroad would only be recognised when both spouses 
declare that they married each other out of free will.1097
Thirdly, as pointed out by the Board of Procurators general, the definition 
of ‘coercion’ (dwang) requires elaboration.1098 The Bill proposes to authorise the 
PPS to interrupt a marriage if it has become sufficiently clear that the intending 
spouses, or one of them, was entering into the marriage as a result of coercion. 
The term ‘sufficiently clear’ would also need elaboration.1099
2 .2 . coerciVe meaSUr eS: ciViL , crimiNaL aND 
aDmiNiSTr aTiVe ProTecTioN or DerS
Victims or potential victims of forced marriages might also benefit from orders 
prohibiting their (ex) spouse, or any family members or community members 
from contacting them and coming near them (since a forced marriage situation 
1094 cornelissens, Kuppens & ferwerda 2009, p. 10.
1095 also noted by the council of State, see Parliamentary Papers II (Lower House) 2012/2013, 33 
488, no. 4 (advice of the council of State), p. 3.
1096 Parliamentary Papers II (Lower House) 2012/2013, 33 488, no. 5 (report), p. 14.
1097 Parliamentary Papers II (Lower House) 2012/2013, 33 488, no. 5 (report), p. 13.
1098 for the definition of coercion in the context of article 284 cric, see paragraph 2.3 infra and 
chapter 10.
1099 Parliamentary Papers II (Lower House) 2012/2013, 33 488, no. 3 (advise of the Board of 
Procurators general), p. 3.
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will very often have characteristics of stalking; see paragraph  2.3.5).1100 if the 
victim and the coercer(s) live in the same house, a house ban will prohibit the 
coercer(s) from entering that house. These restraining1101 protection orders might 
offer relief in the case of a threatened forced marriage, but also when the forced 
marriage has already taken place or has been annulled or otherwise ended. There 
are three ways for an order to be made: via the interlocutory proceedings court at 
the instigation of the victim, via the criminal court, or via the mayor.
The victim of a forced marriage can instruct a lawyer to commence 
interlocutory proceedings and request a civil restraining order,1102 which 
can be especially relevant in case of stalking or behaviour similar to stalking. 
interlocutory proceedings are used in urgent matters where immediate judicial 
relief is required.1103 if the court is satisfied that there exists a real threat of 
unlawful conduct and a restraining order is needed urgently, it can prohibit the 
respondent from contacting the petitioner and/or other parties in any way during 
a certain period of time.1104 The court can also prohibit him from going near a 
certain street or area, such as the petitioner’s house. The bans may be subject to an 
incremental non‑compliance penalty (dwangsom) of a certain amount of money 
per breach.1105 in addition to imposing such an incremental penalty payment, the 
court can also, if requested by the petitioner, order that the person in question 
be committed (lijfsdwang) if he fails to comply with the judicial order.1106 This 
is a drastic coercive measure that may only be applied if the court is satisfied 
that other measures would produce insufficient results and the interest of the 
petitioner justifies the application of committal.1107
The civil law also offers several possibilities for a victim of domestic violence 
to request that the court awards him or her exclusive occupancy of the (marital) 
home.1108 further, in interlocutory proceedings, a victim of a (threatened) forced 
marriage, or third parties, could also request that someone hands over the 
passports of their child(ren).1109 This actually prevents parents from taking their 
1100 To the author’s knowledge, such measures have not (yet) been used specifically in case of 
(intended) forced marriages.
1101 in english law, the term ‘restraining order’ is used to refer to an order made by a criminal court 
to prevent a person from continuing to pursue a course of conduct towards another, with the 
aim of protecting a victim of crime from the defendant.
1102 article 254 and 255(1) ccivP.
1103 article 254(1) ccivP.
1104 article 6:162 civc (tort) in conjunction with article 3:296 civc (right to legal action to claim 
specific performance; on the basis of this article, the court can order a person to give, to do or 
not to do something).
1105 See e.g. court of appeal The Hague 19 July 2011, ecLi:NL:gHSgr:2011:Br2925; and District 
court Haarlem 24 December 2004, ecLi:NL:rBHaa:2004:ar8233.
1106 e.g. District court Leeuwarden 30 July 2008, ecLi:NL:rBLee:2008:BD9742.
1107 articles 585 and 587 ccivP.
1108 for married couples, see article 822 ccivP.
1109 court of appeal Leeuwarden 18  January 2011, ecLi:NL:gHLee:2011:BP4870: a case 
concerning parental authority. 
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children abroad to marry them off and/or abandon them.1110 Not handing over 
the passports when a civil servant demands them, is a misdemeanor (article 447b 
cric).
in case of (suspected) criminal behaviour – which, in forced marriage cases 
could be specific crimes such as coercion, threatening behaviour, stalking and 
rape – the criminal code (cric) and code of criminal Procedure (ccriP) offer 
four different ways in which restraining orders can be imposed.
first, a restraining order can be imposed as a special condition in the pre‑trial 
stage: the Prosecutor can decide to conditionally dismiss a case or can request 
the court to conditionally grant the suspect release from pre‑trial detention. if 
the order is breached, the suspect can be remanded again and/or prosecuted.1111 
Naturally, a court will only be able to conditionally grant a suspect release from 
pre‑trial custody when he is suspected of committing a crime that allows for 
pre‑trial custody. These offences are listed in article 67 ccriP.
Secondly, in accordance with article  509hh ccriP, the PPS can issue a 
behavioural order (gedragsaanwijzing), in the form of an area or contact ban,1112 
with the aim of terminating severe nuisance. The Prosecutor can issue such 
orders against persons who are suspected of a criminal offence and there is the 
fear that these suspects will cause serious burdensome behaviour for one or more 
persons.1113 orders may be imposed for a maximum of 90 days. This period can be 
extended, but only if the suspect is being prosecuted. intentionally acting contrary 
to a behavioural order (and thereby breaching it) is a criminal offence and may be 
punished with up to a year of imprisonment (article 184a cric). if the Prosecutor 
imposed a behavioural order on grounds of fear of serious burdensome behaviour 
against a person, the coercive measures of police custody and pre‑trial detention 
may be used.1114
Thirdly, in the sentencing stage, the court can make contact and street orders 
as special conditions attached to a (partly) suspended sentence. if the convicted 
person breaches the conditions, the court can order that (part of) the suspended 
sentence be executed.1115
1110 The act concerning the registration of citizens in the municipal Database of 3 July 2013 (Wet 
basisregistratie personen, Bulletin of Acts and Decrees 2013, no. 315) makes it impossible for 
parents to deregister their children from the municipal Personal records Database. it requires 
children older than 12 years to come to the municipality and deregister themselves. The 
government hopes that this measure will prevent abandonment.
1111 movisie, Juridische aspecten van huiselijk geweld, January 2009, p.  26. See article  167 in 
conjunction with 244(3) (conditional dismissal) and article  80 (conditional release form 
pre‑trail detention) ccriP.
1112 or in the form of a duty to report oneself to a police officer at designated times or to get relevant 
help or treatment.
1113 Two others grounds on the basis of which the Prosecutor can make a behavioural order are 
listed in article 509hh(1)(a) and (c).
1114 Sackers 2012, margin no. 7. See article 67(1)(b) ccriP.
1115 See for example District court Zutphen 25 January 2011, ecLi:NL:rBZUT:2011:BP1973.
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finally, since april 2012, criminal courts have the possibility to impose a 
separate, independent measure restricting the liberty of a person for up to two 
years in the case of a conviction. This restraining order, which can be declared 
immediately enforceable, can take the form of a contact or street ban, a duty to 
report, or a combination of these (article 38v cric). if there are serious reasons for 
presuming that the convicted person did not comply with the order, the PPS can 
order the arrest of that person. Breach of the order may result in imprisonment 
for up to six months (article 38w cric). criminal courts may impose restraining 
orders to prevent criminal offences or burdensome behaviour with respect to 
persons, which will be especially relevant in cases of convictions for coercion, 
threatening behaviour, intimidation or stalking.1116
if a (threatened) forced marriage is accompanied or was followed by (a threat 
of) domestic violence, the mayor – who will often mandate this authority to a 
deputy Public Prosecutor – can impose a house ban, meaning that the person on 
whom the ban is imposed will have to leave the house immediately, hand over 
any keys and will be prohibited from returning to the house and from contacting 
anyone who lives there. The ban, which may or may not have been imposed at the 
request of the victim, is valid for ten days and may be extended up to a maximum 
of four weeks.1117 This period can be used by the victim(s) of the (threatened) forced 
marriage to report any crimes to the police in order to start criminal proceedings, 
to petition for a contact or street ban in interlocutory proceedings, and/or initiate 
divorce proceedings.1118 a house ban is especially relevant in those situations 
where any (demonstrable) criminal offences have not (yet) been committed, but 
the victim does live in a risky and threatening situation.1119 Breach of a house ban 
is a criminal offence for which pre‑trial detention is allowed and it is punishable 
by a prison sentence of up to two years.1120 The police are largely dependent 
on victims to report any breaches of the ban, but the law gives the police the 
authority to enter any premises where the person on whom the ban was imposed 
is not allowed to be pursuant to that ban.1121
1116 articles 284, 285, 285a and 285b criminal code respectively. See Parliamentary Papers II 
(Lower House) 2010/11, 32 551, no. 3 (explanatory memorandum), p. 7.
1117 See Temporary House Ban act, especially articles 2, 3 and 9. See also article  172a 
municipalities act which authorises the mayor to order an individual to inter alia stay away 
from certain areas of the municipality in case of repeated disturbance of the peace.
1118 movisie, Juridische aspecten van huiselijk geweld, January 2009, pp. 25–26.
1119 B. Beke & J. rullens, Wet tijdelijk huisverbod. Een handreiking voor de burgemeester, p. 10.
1120 article 11 Temporary House Ban act and article 67(1)(c) ccriP.
1121 See article 4 Temporary House Ban act and B. Beke & J. rullens, Wet tijdelijk huisverbod. Een 
handreiking voor de burgemeester, p. 35.
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Dutch criminal law contains no separate offence of forced marriage, yet the 
criminal code offers a spectrum of offences that could be used in cases of forced 
marriage.1122 These crimes include several offences against personal liberty, such 
as human trafficking, abduction in the context of human trafficking (mensenroof), 
child abduction, and intentional or negligent false imprisonment.1123 other 
examples are different forms of assault (articles 300–304 cric), rape or other forms 
of sexual violence (articles 242–250 cric), theft (articles 310, 312 and 316 cric 
for example of a passport, a document that is state property1124), embezzlement 
(article 321 cric, e.g. of a passport), blackmail, harassment, aiding and abetting 
a criminal offence, murder, and giving a religious marriage precedence over a 
civil marriage (article 449 cric). These crimes may be committed in the course 
of forcing someone to enter into a conjugal association against their will, and 
they may also be committed within that marriage, but these crimes do not go 
to the heart of the matter of forced marriage and are therefore not discussed in 
detail here. The five crimes that are of particular relevance in the context of forced 
marriage are: influencing someone’s freedom to make an official statement, 
abduction of a woman/girl (schaking), coercion, threatening to commit serious 
criminal offences, and stalking. in case of suspicion of any of these crimes, 
pre‑trial detention is possible.1125 The five crimes are discussed below.
2.3.1. Influencing someone’s legal statement
article  285a cric criminalises the act of intentionally influencing a person’s 
freedom of making a statement truthfully or in good conscience before a judge 
or any public servant. The crime was created as a result of a bill concerning the 
protection of witnesses in criminal cases who are being threatened, but the crime 
encompasses more types of cases: it protects anyone who wants or has to make 
a statement that can have legal consequences before a judge or public servant.1126 
The influencing can take place through words and gestures, in writing or with 
the use of pictures. it is not necessary that the victim was actually influenced: the 
crime requires that the perpetrator’s behaviour was obviously meant to influence 
1122 at the time of writing, there is no case law on forced marriage from criminal courts: up 
until January 2014 the practice of forced marriage had not been subjected to the scrutiny 
of a Dutch criminal court. The council of State has dealt with a couple of cases concerning 
(alleged) forced marriages, but the council did not discuss the issue of force (council of State, 
administrative Disputes Division, 4  June 1991, ecLi:NL:rVS:1991:aJ7788; and council of 
State, administrative Disputes Division, 15 June 1993, ecLi:NL:rVS:1993:aJ8383).
1123 articles 273f, 278, 279, 282, 283 cric.
1124 See also article 447b cric.
1125 article 67(1)(a) and (b) ccriP.
1126 machielse 2010, comments on article 285a, margin no. 1; and Parliamentary Papers II (Lower 
House) 1991/92, 22 483, no. 3, p. 39 (explanatory memorandum).
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the victim’s freedom to make a statement (‘kennelijk om diens vrijheid (…) te 
beïnvloeden’). Like stalking (see infra paragraph 2.3.5), therefore, this criminal 
offence focuses on the intended effect of the perpetrator’s acts; not on the actual 
effect they had on the victim.1127 The offence is punishable with a prison sentence 
of up to four years.
it is remarkable that (government) documents and reports do not refer to 
this specific offence in the context of forced marriages as it may be of specific 
relevance to this practice. a marriage is entered into when the future spouses 
make a statement (in the form of legally prescribed vows) in the presence of a 
registrar and a registrar is a public servant.1128 The act of forcing someone to 
declare, against their will, that they will accept the other person as their spouse 
and that they will faithfully fulfil all duties which the law connects to the 
marital status (as prescribed by article 1:67(1) civc), can fall within the scope 
of this crime.1129 according to the parliamentary history, this particular crime 
protects the freedom of individuals to make statements and declarations without 
hindrance, and not so much the truth of these statements.1130 This in particular 
is of importance to forced marriages. The interest in prohibiting forced marriage 
is not so much the fact that people lie in an official statement,1131 but that an 
individual’s freedom to decide whether or not to marry is influenced. Yet this 
particular crime will not cover all instances of forced marriage: the definition 
refers to a statement that is made before a judge or any public servant, which 
means that religious marriages, for example, fall outside of its scope.
2.3.2. (Criminal) coercion
a second criminal offence that is closely related to the act of forced marriage 
is coercion. forcing someone to enter into a marriage – be it a civil marriage, 
a religious marriage or any other type of association – is punishable as a form 
of criminal coercion under article  284 cric. The maximum prison sentence 
for coercion is two years.1132 The crux of this provision is to warrant people’s 
physical and psychological freedom, and this includes protecting people from 
forced marriage.1133 He who, by using violence, threats of violence or another 
hostile act, unlawfully coerces someone to do something, to refrain from doing 
1127 Supreme court 27 may 2008, ecLi:NL:Hr:2008:Bc7910 (concerning article 285a cric).
1128 See article 84 cric for the the definition of ‘public servant’ in the context of the criminal 
code.
1129 See also Schmidt & rijken 2005, p. 43.
1130 Parliamentary Papers II (Lower House) 1991/1992, 22  483, no. 3, p.  39 (explanatory 
memorandum); and Supreme court 30 august 2005, ecLi:NL:Hr:2005:aT7093.
1131 This concern is addressed by a list of forgery offences, see articles 225–235 cric.
1132 Up until July 2013, the maximum penalty for criminal coercion was nine months. This was 
amended by the marital coercion (criminal law) act 2013.
1133 Parliamentary Papers II (Lower House) 2009/10, 32 175, no. 2 (Letter from the minister of 
Justice), p. 5. See also cornelissens, Kuppens & ferwerda 2009.
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something or to tolerate something, is guilty of the crime of coercion. in cases of 
forced marriage, specific emphasis will be put on the element ‘doing something’: 
entering into a marriage requires an active attitude of the spouses; they will have 
to exchange wedding vows in the presence of the registrar and witnesses. Pressure 
exerted during the stage leading up to the wedding will be aimed at forcing the 
prospective bride/groom to say ‘i do’. forcing an individual to tolerate something 
in the context of a forced marriage might refer to the wedding preparations.
courts have given a broad meaning to the word violence: physical violence, 
but also forms of psychological violence fall within the ambit of this element. 
for example, the Supreme court held that pressurising the victim by making her 
believe that there are spiritual forces present and that she might suffer from an 
epileptic fit or a heart attack, constitutes ‘violence’.1134 Hostile acts (feitelijkheden) 
are those acts that cannot be qualified as violence or threats.1135 The act must be 
of such a nature that it, given the specific circumstances of the case, can be used 
as a means of coercion, meaning that the victim is not able to offer resistance. 
Subtle forms of psychological pressure can amount to hostile acts and may 
therefore constitute criminal coercion.1136 examples of hostile acts from case law 
and mentioned in literature include accompanying the victim on a flight to the 
Netherlands in order to have him withdraw large amounts of money while his 
mother is kept hostage abroad, and threatening to publish the victim’s name and 
address on the internet accompanied by the announcement that he is interested 
in being contacted by gay men.1137
further, it is important that a causal link exists between the means of coercion 
and the consequence.1138 in certain cases of forced marriage, this cause‑and‑effect 
relationship may very well be either completely absent or very difficult to establish. 
if someone goes along with a marriage out of fear for consequences that no one has 
threatened them with, there will probably be no causal relationship. Parents may 
resort to arguments related to duty, personal affection, religion, social and family 
obligations and little pressure is needed when it is applied by parents or other 
important and dominant figures in an individual’s life. However, if no pressure 
whatsoever was exerted, but the person in question merely did not dare to say 
‘no’, for example out of reverence for his or her culture or parents, article 284 
cric will not be applicable as there was no criminal coercion. in other words, 
1134 Hr 21  february 1989,  nJ 1989/668; and Van maurik & Van der meij 2012, comments on 
article 284, margin no. 9b.
1135 Lindenberg 2007, pp. 208–218; and machielse 2012, comments on article 284, margin no. 4.
1136 machielse 2012, comments on article  284, margin no. 4; and machielse 2012, comments 
on article 242, margin no. 2. for an example of psychological pressure, see Supreme court 
13 September 2005, ecLi:NL:Hr:2005:aT5834.
1137 court of appeal amsterdam 19  November 2002,  ECLI:nL:GHAMS:2002:af3799; and 
District court alkmaar 30 July 2003, ECLI:nL:RBALK:2003:ai0650, respectively, referred to 
in Supreme court 21  february 1989,  nJ 1989, 668; and Van maurik & Van der meij 2012, 
comments on article 284, margin no. 9c.
1138 Lindenberg 2007, pp. 175–178; and machielse 2012, comments on article 284, margin no. 5.
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there will be no criminal coercion when no one intentionally contributed to this 
internalised pressure the victim felt. This may also be the case if the person who 
is being forced to marry has not told those who exert the pressure that he or she 
does not want to marry. in chapter 2, it was explained that victims may be afraid 
to speak their mind, even though no coercion whatsoever was exerted, and that 
they might feel they cannot refuse a marriage candidate selected by their parents, 
whereas they may in fact have the possibility to do so. Such a discrepancy between 
the perpetrator’s and victim’s perception may lead to difficulties with regard to 
proof of criminal coercion: the perpetrator must have had the intent to coerce, his 
behaviour must have been aimed at making the victim marry against his or her 
will (bijkomend oogmerk), the victim must have felt coerced and must not have 
been able to resist the pressure.1139 according to the legislator, forms of economic 
and socio‑cultural pressure will not necessarily amount to criminal coercion.1140 
Nor will exerting pressure on someone to marry merely by repeatedly talking to 
them without uttering threats.1141
How to determine whether the pressure that was exerted crosses the threshold 
of criminal coercion? it is important to look at the nature of the pressure as well as 
at the effect it had on the victim. if the pressure was of such a nature that it can be 
regarded as prima facie coercive, such as forcing someone to marry at gunpoint, 
there will be no problem. This might change, however, once the forms of pressure 
that were used were more subtle. Here, the effect the pressure had on the victim 
will be of importance. Someone may be said to have been coerced to marry in 
the sense of article 284 cric when this person was pressured into unwillingly 
entering into the marriage as a result of any kind of pressure beyond his or her 
control. This pressure must have inspired in the victim a genuine and reasonably 
held fear. as a result of this fear, the party consented to the marriage; they would 
not have given their consent absent this fear. The form of the pressure is irrelevant: 
it can be physical, emotional, social or financial. it must, however, have caused 
both a genuine and a reasonable (well‑founded) fear. fear is a subjective concept; 
it is a state of mind, which is based on the perspective of the person experiencing 
it. However, requiring that the fear be reasonably held, incorporates an objective 
element into the test.1142
The question of whether the threat inspired genuine and reasonably held fear 
in the subject will depend on the particular circumstances of the individual case. 
objective elements that may substantiate a reasonable fear of forced marriage 
1139 machielse 2012, comments on article 284, margin no. 4.
1140 Parliamentary Papers II (Lower House) 2010/2011, 32 840, no. 3, pp.  1 and 6 (explanatory 
memorandum).
1141 Schmidt & rijken 2005, p. 70.
1142 The definition of a reasonably held fear set forth in this paragraph is inspired by the way in 
which ‘well‑founded fear of persecution’ is defined in the context of human‑trafficking and 
refugee status (see UNHcr Handbook on Procedures and criteria for Determining refugee 
Status under the 1951 convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of refugees, 
Hcr/iP/4/eng/reV.1 reedited, geneva, January 1992, paras. 37–50).
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could include family history, for example a history of previous forced marriages 
having taken place in the family. The question of what happened to any siblings/
other family members who refused forced arranged marriages is relevant in this 
context: were they disowned, ostracised or assaulted, or did the family accept the 
refusal? other circumstances that could cause reasonable fear include being in a 
foreign country with no means to leave.
Subjective elements1143 to be taken into consideration include age, nationality, 
religion and cultural background. also, long‑term pressure and ingrained, 
socialised notions of shame will feed into a person’s subjective fear when it comes 
to forced marriage. a second element that is of importance, in addition to the 
reasonably held fear, is that the coercion was of such a nature that the victim, 
under the specific circumstances of the case, could not reasonably resist it.1144
2.3.3. Abduction of a women/girl (schaking)
it is a criminal offence to abduct a woman with the specific intent of having sexual 
intercourse with her (schaking). The provision distinguishes two categories: (1) 
where an underage girl is taken away by a man with her permission, but without 
her parents’ or guardians’ permission, and (2) where a woman (either underage or 
of age) is taken away by means of a ruse, force or threat of force. The first category 
is punished with a maximum prison sentence of six years; the second with nine 
years (article 281(1) cric). This offence is not prosecuted ex officio, but is subject 
to prosecution only on complaint: if the victim is a minor, she herself or someone 
whose permission she needs to marry can file a complaint; if the woman is of age, 
she or her husband can file such a complaint (article 281(3) cric). if the abductor 
has entered into a marriage with the abductee, he can be convicted only after the 
marriage has been annulled (article 281(4) cric). This means that the abductor 
cannot be convicted if the marriage has instead been terminated by divorce (!).
as the text of the provision makes clear, the crime is not gender neutral: only 
women can become victims of this offence and only men can commit it.1145 as 
stated, this particular crime focuses on the perpetrator’s intent of having sexual 
intercourse with the woman; proof that the perpetrator only had the intention 
1143 The idea that not the perception of the coercer (a), but that of the coercee (B) is decisive in 
determining whether or not a coerced B to do, omit or tolerate c is proffered, amongst others, 
by m.r. rhodes, ‘The nature of coercion’, The Journal of Value inquiry (34) 2000, pp. 372 and 
376.
1144 Parliamentary Papers II (Lower House) 2012/2013, 33 488, no. 6, pp. 6 and 14. This standard is 
also used as a requirement for the excuse of duress (psychische overmacht). But using duress 
as an excuse for causing harm and/or engaging in wrongdoing is a different proposition than 
using duress/coercion to impose criminal liability as is done with the offence of coercion. 
The standard for duress as an excuse is more restrictive. in other words: the excuse of duress 
(especially when applied to grave offences such as murder) will demand more resilience from 
a citizen than the offence of coercion. 
1145 machielse 2004, comments on article 281, margin no. 2.
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of marrying the woman is insufficient.1146 Nevertheless, the offence can still be 
used in some cases of forced marriage: schaking may be committed in preparation 
of forcing someone to enter into a marriage against that person’s will, as was 
recognised by the advocate‑general of the Supreme court in 1991.1147 further, 
it would appear that if the perpetrator abducts a woman with the specific intent 
of having sexual intercourse with her, but forced her to marry him before having 
intercourse with her, this abduction would classify as schaking.1148
2.3.4. Threatening to commit serious criminal offences
if, in the course of forcing someone to enter into a marriage against their will, 
serious threats are uttered, article 285 cric may prove useful. Pursuant to this 
provision, it is a criminal offence, punishable with a maximum prison sentence 
of two years, to threaten someone with certain offences, such as rape, indecent 
assault, a crime against a person’s life, hostage taking, aggravated assault or arson. 
if this threat was made in writing and under certain conditions, the maximum 
sentence is four years imprisonment (article 285(2) cric). This may be applicable 
when, for example, an uncle sends his niece an email saying that he will kill her 
if she doesn’t marry X. it is not necessary that the victim actually felt threatened, 
as long as the threat was of such a nature and was made under such conditions 
that it could have inspired a reasonable fear in the victim.1149 The threatened crime 
does not have to be aimed at the threatened person; it can also be aimed at third 
parties, such as a person’s children, friends or parents.1150
2.3.5. Stalking
The third crime that may be of significance in case of forced marriage is the 
offence of stalking. Both the process during which someone is forced into a 
marriage (situation 1) as well as a concluded forced marriage (situation 2) can 
amount to stalking. The focus here will be on the former: stalking as a means to 
force someone to marry. Stalking is defined as the unlawful systematic intentional 
intrusion upon a person’s privacy with the direct intent of forcing that person 
to do something, to refrain from doing something, or to tolerate something, or 
to instil fear in that person (article  285b cric). Harassing behaviour is at the 
1146 Van maurik & Van der meij 2012, comments on article 281, margin no. 8; and Supreme court 
27 february 1990 nJ 1991, 109: in this case a Turkish man had abducted a Turkish girl with the 
intent of getting her to marry him. Because it could not be proved that he had intended to have 
sexual intercourse with her, he could not be convicted of schaking.
1147 opinion advocate‑general meijers, Supreme court 2 July 1990, nJ 1991, 110.
1148 annotation advocate‑general mulder, Supreme court 2 July 1990, nJ 1991, 110.
1149 Van maurik & Van der meij 2012, comments on article 285, margin no. 8. See also Supreme 
court 25 January 2011, ecLi:NL:Hr:2011:Bo3400, BP1834, Bo4022, and BP1858.
1150 Van maurik & Van der meij 2012, comments on article 285, margin no. 8. See also Supreme 
court 25 January 2011, ecLi:NL:Hr:2011:Bo3400.
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basis of the offence. Stalking is generally used to prosecute those persons who 
try to force someone to start or restore a (romantic) relationship with them.1151 in 
most stalking cases, one or more persons are harassed by one stalker; in forced 
marriages, it will often be the other way around. Usually, several persons are 
involved in forcing someone to enter into a marriage and it is possible that the 
entire complex of their acts could be qualified as a systematic invasion of the 
victim’s privacy.1152 community members who keep a close watch on the victim, 
informing her parents of her movements, the victim’s brother following her going 
home from school to make sure she doesn’t speak with boys, and, most of all, the 
parents’ and relatives’ insistent talk of the intended marriage, trying to convince, 
persuade, pressurise the victim into going along with it. Yet, here there may also 
be a problem: parents may not always know their child does not want to marry, 
or even if they are aware that their child is not very keen, some may even feel that 
what they are doing is best for their child. Would parents still have the intent that 
is required for the offence of stalking in those situations? That would depend on 
the circumstances of the case: if the victim did not, on any occasion, inform her 
parents that she did not want to marry, then it will be very difficult to prove that 
they had the aim of forcing the victim to marry (see also supra on coercion). it 
could be argued that they might have (unknowingly) forced the victim to tolerate 
something, i.e. the marriage (arrangements), but if the parents had no intent of 
forcing their child to tolerate this, then this behaviour will not qualify as stalking. 
in order to assess whether the perpetrator systematically intruded upon a person’s 
privacy, courts use the following criteria: the nature, duration, frequency and 
intensity of the perpetrator’s behaviour, the circumstances in which the behaviour 
took place and the influence it had on the life of the victim.1153
Prosecution of the offence of stalking is subject to complaint by the victim 
(article 285b(2) cric): the victim can lodge a complaint during the period of three 
months after she became aware that the offence was committed (article  66(1) 
cric). This may be challenging, seeing as ‘stalking is a continuous offence and 
the point of commencement of this crime depends on the sum of the subsequent 
incidents’.1154 in practice, courts appear to be lenient: a complaint is considered to 
be lodged in time if there has been an act of stalking within three months prior to 
1151 Schmidt & rijken 2005, p. 44.
1152 machielse 2012, comments on article 285b Sr, margin no. 5. See chapter 10 on forced marriage 
and co‑perpetration.
1153 Supreme court 12 march 2013, ecLi:NL:Hr:2013:BZ3626, para. 2.3.
1154 District court Breda 14 June 2012, ecLi:NL:rBBre:2012:BW8443 (my translation).
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the lodging.1155 This means that the victim has to have lodged a complaint within 
three months after the final day of the indicted stalking period.1156
cumulative convictions are possible for criminal coercion (article  284 
cric), threats to commit serious criminal offences (article 285 cric), stalking 
(article 285b cric) and the crime of influencing a person’s statement, since there 
is no lex specialis relation between the four crimes.1157
3. THe DUTcH crimiNaLiSaTioN DeBaTe
3.1. mariTaL coercioN (crimiNaL LaW) acT
Since 2005, there have been calls for separate criminalisation of forced marriage. 
But so far, instead of amending substantive criminal law to include a specific crime 
of forced marriage, the government has responded to this practice by enforcing 
existing criminal prohibitions. in November 2009, the minister of Security and 
Justice stated he intended to take stronger action against forced marriages and 
for that purpose, he announced legislative action. in may 2012, in conjunction 
with the civil law Bill discussed above (paragraph 2.1.5), the marital coercion 
(criminal law) act was drafted, aiming at broadening the possibilities of dealing 
with forced marriages through criminal law.1158 in march 2013, the marital 
coercion (criminal law) act was promulgated in the Dutch Bulletin of acts and 
Decrees.1159 The act officially entered into force on 1 July 2013.
1155 Supreme court 2 November 2004, ecLi:NL:Hr:2004:aq4289; District court Breda 14 June 
2012, ecLi:NL:rBBre:2012:BW8443 (where the court held that the complaint period of three 
months will begin running on the final day on which the perpetrator performs a stalking act); 
and S. van der aa, Stalking in the netherlands: nature and prevalence of the problem and the 
effectiveness of anti‑stalking measures, antwerp/Portland: maklu 2010, p. 99.
1156 District court rotterdam 28 march 2012, ecLi:NL:rBroT:2012:BW0234.
1157 Supreme court 17 January 1984, nJ 1984, 479. NB the Supreme court has not yet addressed 
the question of whether there is a lex specialis relation between article  284 (as the more 
general provision) and article  285a and 285b cric (as the more specific provisions). 
for the relation between article  285 and 285b cric, see Supreme court 30  may 2006, 
ecLi:NL:Hr:2006:aW0476.
1158 Parliamentary Papers II (Lower House) 2010/2011, 32 840, no. 2 (Voorstel van Wet: Wijziging 
van het Wetboek van Strafrecht, het Wetboek van Strafvordering en het Wetboek van Strafrecht 
BES met het oog op de verruiming van de mogelijkheden tot strafrechtelijke aanpak van 
huwelijksdwang, polygamie en vrouwelijke genitale verminking). The act is named ‘countering 
marital coercion’, but is actually aimed at countering all forms of criminal coercion. initially, 
the Bill contained a few amendments specifically aimed at forced marriages (e.g. concerning 
the extraterritorial jurisdiction in cases of forced marriages), but the government felt these 
changes in the criminal law should also be applied to other forms of coercion, such as religious 
coercion and the practices that can take place within sects. Therefore, the amendments in the 
act were broadened and applied to all acts that fall within the scope of the offence of criminal 
coercion.
1159 act of 7 march 2013, Bulletin of Acts and Decrees 2013, no. 95.
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Before presenting the proposed measures in the explanatory memorandum, 
the minister of Security and Justice discussed the possibility of creating specific 
criminal legislation for forced marriage and summed up the arguments in favour 
of separate criminalisation. reasons for turning forced marriage into a distinct 
criminal offence include the need to send a clear message that forced marriage 
is not tolerated (establishing clear standards) and the possible deterrent effect of 
a separate offence. Specific legislation might also be needed if it turns out that 
the current maximum penalty of the general offence (in this case ‘coercion’) 
would not offer the possibility of adequately responding to this distinct form of 
coercion, or if there is a lacuna in the law as a result of which the general offence 
is not applicable in all cases, and a specific offence would offer more effective 
protection to victims.1160 The minister explained, however, that he believed that 
creating specific criminal legislation for forced marriage was neither necessary 
nor desirable as this would be contrary to the system of the Dutch criminal code, 
which is characterised by generic provisions.1161 He stated that the general offence 
of criminal coercion provides sufficient basis for criminal prosecution of forced 
marriage and a specific crime is not required for sending out a message: making 
clear that forced marriage is prohibited and raising awareness can be done by other 
means, including PPS instructions and the measures proposed in the marital 
coercion (criminal law) act. one of these measures pertains to increasing the 
maximum statutory penalty for coercion, which, in the eyes of the minister, offers 
courts the possibility to take into account the seriousness of particular cases of 
coercion and adequately sentence them.1162 These arguments were also put forward 
with regard to the criminalisation of female genital mutilation: instead of drafting 
specific provisions for this practice, it was criminalised as a form of assault. at the 
same time, a set of amendments were introduced in support of a more effective 
approach to female genital mutilation, such as an extension of the prescription 
period and the abolishment of the requirement of double criminality.1163 The act 
has amended the criminal law in four areas.
first, it has broadened the extraterritorial jurisdiction of Dutch criminal 
courts in relation to the crime of criminal coercion by giving them jurisdiction over 
aliens who are domiciled in the Netherlands (either at the time they committed 
the crime or afterwards), as well as over Dutch nationals who commit the crime of 
coercion abroad. for this purpose, the requirement of double criminality – which 
1160 Parliamentary Papers II (Lower House) 2010/2011, 32 840, no. 3, p.  6 (explanatory 
memorandum).
1161 in a written reply to questions posed by the Upper House, the minister repeated that in 
general, the legislator will think twice before creating a new criminal offence (lex specialis) 
for behaviour that is already caught by a broader, general criminal offence (lex generalis). 
Parliamentary Papers I (Upper House) 2011/2012, 32 840, c, p. 12.
1162 Note that the judiciary had not in any way indicated that the maximum penalty on coercion 
(nine months) was too low.
1163 Parliamentary Papers II (Lower House) 2010/2011, 32 840, no. 3, pp.  6–7 (explanatory 
memorandum).
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requires an act to be criminal both in the Netherlands and in the country where it 
was committed – was abolished. in addition, the passive personality principle has 
become applicable in cases of forced coercion, meaning that Dutch courts now 
have jurisdiction over those people who commit the crime of criminal coercion 
in relation to a Dutch citizen, for example those who force a Dutch citizen to enter 
into a marriage abroad.1164
Secondly, the act has extended the statute of limitations with regard to the 
offence of coercion: this means that if coercion was committed with respect to a 
minor, the dies a quo of the statutory prescription period of six years will be the 
day after the victim’s eighteenth birthday.1165
Thirdly, the act has increased the maximum penalty for the offence of coercion 
from nine months to two years.1166 The minister argued that a higher maximum 
penalty was necessary because the maximum of nine months imprisonment did 
not adequately reflect the gravity of certain particular forms of coercion, one 
of them marital coercion. other examples of grave coercion mentioned by the 
minister are the practices that take place in sects, the practice known as religious 
coercion1167 (geloofsdwang) and integration‑related coercion.1168 in determining 
the maximum penalty of criminal coercion, the minister looked at comparable 
criminal offences. The main source of inspiration was found in the crime of 
threatening behaviour (article 285 cric), that also has a maximum penalty of 
two years imprisonment and is also a so‑called pre‑trial detention offence.1169
fourthly, the act has added the offence of coercion to article 67(1)(b) ccriP, 
which means that certain coercive measures, such as pre‑trial detention, have 
become applicable in case of criminal coercion.1170 The minister stated that these 
coercive measures may be necessary for the benefit of the criminal investigation, 
1164 Parliamentary Papers II (Lower House) 2010/2011, 32 840, no. 3, pp.  7–9 (explanatory 
memorandum).
1165 This amendment is in line with prescription periods of other serious offences involving minors, 
such as sexual abuse, female genital mutilation and trafficking in children, see Parliamentary 
Papers II (Lower House) 2010/2011, 32 840, no. 3, p. 13 (explanatory memorandum).
1166 Parliamentary Papers II (Lower House) 2010/2011, 32 840, no. 3, p.  1 (explanatory 
memorandum).
1167 forcing someone to convert to a religion againt that person’s will, or forcing someone to remain 
in a religion against that person’s will (Parliamentary Papers II (Upper House) 2012/2013, 32 
840, c, p. 14 (memorandum of reply)).
1168 The aiVD, the general intelligence and Security Service of the Netherlands, reported that 
some salafi imams in the Netherlands systematically sabotage the integration of young people 
into Dutch society by trying to radicalise them. Where these imams exert severe psychological 
or even physical pressure on these individuals and force them to do something or refrain 
from doing something against their will, this will qualify as criminal coercion (see inter alia 
aiVD, Radicale dawa in verandering, de opkomst van islamitisch neoradicalisme in nederland, 
The Hague: aiVD 2007. See Parliamentary Papers II (Lower House) 2011/2012, 32 840, no. 6, 
p. 16; and Parliamentary Papers II (Upper House) 2012/2013, 32 840, c, p. 14 (memorandum of 
reply).
1169 Parliamentary Proceedings (Lower House) 2012/2013, 11, p. 51.
1170 Parliamentary Papers II (Lower House) 2010/2011, 32 840, no. 3, p.  14 (explanatory 
memorandum).
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in order to prevent escalation and/or to protect the victim. Turning the crime of 
criminal coercion into a pre‑trial detention offence also allows for several extra 
investigative powers to be used in the case of a suspected forced marriage, such 
as the authority to demand telecommunication data.1171 The minister pointed 
out that the coercive measures made possible by virtue of inclusion in article 67 
ccriP could also be of use in other cases of criminal coercion, such as those 
concerning practices within sects.1172
3.2 . aNaLYSiS of THe mariTaL coercioN (crimiNaL 
LaW) acT
as stated above, the marital coercion (criminal law) act amended the criminal 
law in four areas. one of these amendments concerns the broadening of the 
extraterritorial jurisdiction of Dutch criminal courts and the abolition of the 
requirement of double criminality for the offence of criminal coercion in general. 
it is important not to overestimate the effect (i.e. the number of (successful) 
prosecutions) of broadening the extraterritorial jurisdiction over forced marriages. 
Parliamentary discussions regarding the act are peppered with concerns about 
the evidentiary aspects of forced marriage cases. all parties agree that collecting 
substantial evidence to secure a successful prosecution will be difficult.1173 This 
is a legitimate concern. When a Dutch national is involved in the commission 
of a forced marriage in a foreign country, it will usually be more difficult to 
gather evidence than when that marriage takes place in the Netherlands. in many 
cases, Dutch police and prosecution services will for a large part be dependent 
on the authorities of a foreign country when gathering evidence. if these foreign 
authorities refuse to cooperate, the chances of a successful prosecution might be 
slim. especially in those cases where the alleged forced marriage took place in 
a country which does not regard this particular marriage as ‘forced’ or which 
has different ideas about the criminal nature of forced marriages in general, the 
chances are that the authorities will not cooperate.1174 So, as rightly put forward 
by the Board of Procurators general, the council of State and several other 
organisations that advised the government, broadening the jurisdiction of Dutch 
criminal courts will not necessarily result in a higher number of successful 
1171 Parliamentary Papers II (Lower House) 2010/2011, 32 840, no. 3, p.  14 (explanatory 
memorandum).
1172 Parliamentary Papers II (Lower House) 2010/2011, 32 840, no. 3, p.  14 (explanatory 
memorandum). See also Parliamentary Papers II (Lower House) 2009/2010, 32 123 XViii, no. 
57, motion Van der Burg en Van Toorenburg); and Parliamentary Papers II (Lower House) 
2011/2012, 32 840, no. 6.
1173 See inter alia Parliamentary Proceedings (Lower House) 2012/2013, 11, p. 49.
1174 Parliamentary Papers II (Lower House) 2010/2011, 32 840, no. 3 (advice Board of Procurators 
general), p. 2; and Parliamentary Papers II (Lower House) 2010/2011, 32 840, no. 4, p. 6 (advice 
of the council of State and report of the minister).
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prosecutions.1175 The expected low rate of cases is not restricted to forced 
marriages that took place abroad: it is expected that the willingness to report 
forced marriages in the Netherlands will also remain low. coercion in general is 
a difficult offence to prosecute and this is reflected by the number of court cases: 
between 2000 and 2012, ten cases concerning criminal coercion went to court; 
seven of these cases resulted in a conviction.1176
4. THe eNgLiSH LegaL LaNDScaPe Before 
crimiNaLiSaTioN
4.1. ciViL LaW: THe LegaL r eqUir emeNTS for 
mar riage
The marriage acts 1949, 1983 and 1994, and the matrimonial causes act 1973 
(mca) deal with matters concerning marriage. marriage was traditionally 
defined as ‘the voluntary union for life of one man and one woman to the exclusion 
of all others’,1177 but the marriage (Same Sex couples) act 2013 has extended the 
possibility of marriage to same sex couples. english law recognises four main 
types of marriage ceremonies: civil marriages; marriages according to the rites of 
the church of england; quaker and Jewish marriages; and other non‑anglican 
religious marriages.1178 for a valid marriage to be celebrated, both parties must 
have the capacity to marry, meaning that they are 18 years or older or between 16 
and 18 with parental consent, are of sound mind, are not within the prohibited 
degrees of relationship of each other and are not already married to or in a civil 
partnership with someone else.1179
a valid marriage is preceded by a set of preliminary formalities. The specific 
preliminaries that are prescribed by law depend on the nature of the ceremony: the 
preliminaries which must take place before the celebration of a civil marriage also 
have to be used for all non‑anglican religious weddings; the church of england, 
on the other hand, has its own set of preliminary formalities.1180 irrespective of 
this distinction between anglican on the one hand, and civil and non‑anglican on 
the other, the aim of the preliminary formalities is the same: to ensure that notice 
of the intended marriage is given, which gives third parties – such as a person who 
1175 Parliamentary Papers II (Lower House) 2010/2011, 32 840, no. 4, pp. 7–8 (advice of the council 
of State and report of the minister).
1176 Parliamentary Proceedings (Lower House) 2012/2013, 11, p. 48.
1177 Hyde v. Hyde and Woodhouse (1866) Lr 1 PD 130, p. 133, referred to in Herring 2011, p. 43. 
1178 cretney’s Principles of family Law 2008, margin no. 1–031. See Part ii marriage act 1949 
(marriages according to the rites of the church of england).
1179 See Herring 2011, pp. 50–57 and article 1–3 marriage act 1949. Paragraphs 26 and 27 of the 
marriage (Same Sex couples) act 2013 amend article 11(c) mca so that the fact that a couple 
are not a man and a woman no longer makes a marriage void.
1180 cretney’s Principles of family Law 2008, margin no. 1–013.
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is already married to one of the intending spouses, or a parent whose consent has 
not (yet) been obtained – the opportunity to make objections to the marriage.1181 
in the case of a civil marriage or non‑anglican religious marriage, notice will 
have to be given to the superintendent registrar of the district where the parties 
live or where they have resided for at least seven days (article  27(1) marriage 
act 1949). once notice has been given, members of the public who object to the 
intended marriage can enter a caveat with the superintendent registrar against the 
issue of a marriage certificate, and any person whose consent is required for the 
marriage may forbid the issue of such a certificate (articles 29 and 30 marriage 
act 1949). The registrar then investigates the validity of the objections and also 
verifies for himself whether the parties in question are free to marry (articles 
28a and 29(2) marriage act 1949).1182 in order to prevent sham marriages, the 
superintendent registrar has a duty to report to the Home office immigration 
Department any intended marriages that give rise to suspicion, i.e. cases in which 
the intended marriage does not appear to be genuine.1183 When no objections have 
been made and no impediments have been found, the superintendent registrar 
will issue a certificate that authorises the solemnisation of the marriage.1184 in the 
case of a marriage according to the rites of the church of england, an intended 
marriage is usually announced in each party’s parish church during morning or 
evening service on three Sundays preceding the solemnisation, which allows for 
the discovery of any impediments to the marriage.1185
The marriage ceremony in itself is in effect an exchange of marriage vows: the 
parties must declare that they know of no lawful impediment to the marriage and 
that they take each other to be their lawful wedded husband or wife.1186 a civil 
marriage must be celebrated in the presence of a registrar and two witnesses and on 
approved premises (such as the registrar’s office).1187 The form of the ceremony of a 
non‑anglican religious marriage is left almost entirely to the religious authorities; 
1181 cretney’s Principles of family Law 2008, margin no. 1–012.
1182 cretney’s Principles of family Law 2008, margin no. 1–014–015.
1183 cretney’s Principles of family Law 2008, margin no. 1–017; and article 24 immigration and 
asylum act 1999 and reporting of Suspicious marriages and registration of Births Deaths 
and marriages (miscellaneous amendments) regulations 2000, S.i. 2000, no. 3164. See for an 
example of three people who were convicted for taking part in a sham marriage plot: <www.
ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/newsarticles/2012/march/65‑sham‑marriage‑polish> last 
accessed December 2013.
1184 cretney’s Principles of family Law 2008, margin no. 1–016.
1185 See articles 6 and 7 marriage act 1949. This procedure is known as banns and is used in 
approximately 90% of anglican weddings (cretney’s Principles of family Law 2008, margin 
no. 1–021). for a discussion of the two other preliminary procedures that are available to 
anglican marriages see cretney’s Principles of family Law 2008, margin no. 1–025–030 and 
article 5 marriage act 1949. 
1186 article 45 in conjunction with article 44(3) marriage act 1949: ‘i do solemnly declare that 
i know not of any lawful impediment why i, aB, may not be joined in matrimony to cD’ and 
‘i call upon these persons here present to witness that i, aB, do take thee, cD, to be my lawful 
wedded wife (or husband).’
1187 article  46a marriage act 1949; and cretney’s Principles of family Law 2008, margin no. 
1–034.
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the state only prescribes the preliminary formalities which must have been abided 
by (including, most importantly, the issue of a registrar’s marriage certificate) 
and the state licenses the premises where such marriages can take place (such as 
registered, designated Sikh temples and mosques)1188 and appoints those who can 
solemnise them (usually a minister of the religious group in question).1189 Such an 
authorised person is allowed to act instead of a registrar, meaning that religious 
marriages do not have to be celebrated in the presence of a registrar.1190 as regards 
the actual ceremony, there is only one important qualification, namely that at 
one point during the ceremony, the parties make the same statements that are 
prescribed for those marrying in a civil ceremony.1191 in the case of an anglican 
marriage, a clergyman celebrates the marriage in the presence of two witnesses 
according to the rites prescribed in the Book of common Prayer.1192 The presence 
of a registrar is not required.
Jews and quakers can marry according to their own marriage customs, as 
long as they adhere to the set of preliminaries required for civil marriages (i.e. 
obtain a registrar’s certificate or certificate and licence) and follow specific rules 
for registration (see Part iV marriage act 1949). The marriages do not need to be 
celebrated by an authorised person, in public or in a registered building.1193
The requirements and formalities described above form the basis of a valid 
marriage. a marriage is not valid but legally void when there is an element of 
public policy against the marriage.1194 The grounds are exhaustively set out in 
article  11 mca.1195 Pursuant to this provision, a marriage is void when the 
parties are within the prohibited degrees of relationship,1196 when either party 
1188 a religious ceremony that did not take place in a registered building is not recognised in 
english law; that couple would have to go through an additional civil ceremony (cretney’s 
Principles of family Law 2008, margin no. 1–040).
1189 articles 41 and 43 marriage act 1949.
1190 cretney’s Principles of family Law 2008, margin no. 1–041.
1191 articles 44(3) and 45a(2) marriage act 1949, and cretney’s Principles of family Law 2008, 
margin no. 1–040. The formula of the declaration may be substituted by any of the alternatives 
listed in article 44(3) marriage act 1949.
1192 article 22 marriage act 1949 and cretney’s Principles of family Law 2008, margin no. 1–037.
1193 article  43(3) marriage act 1949; and cretney’s Principles of family Law 2008, margin no. 
1–038.
1194 Herring 2011, p. 49. in a 2008 case, the court of appeal rendered a marriage void on the basis 
of public policy. This case concerned the marriage performed over the telephone between a 
woman in Bangladesh and a man with severe intellectual impairment. The court held that 
the man lacked capacity to understand the nature of the marriage and described the marriage 
as exploitative of both the woman and the man. Lack of capacity usually renders a marriage 
voidable rather than void (City of Westminster v. IC (by his Friend the Official Solicitor) and KC 
and nn (2008) 2 fLr 267, and Herring 2011, p. 57).
1195 for the grounds on which a marriage according to the rites of the church of england is void, 
see article 25 marriage act 1949.
1196 See marriage (Prohibited Degrees of relationship) act 1986: parent‑child (including adoptive 
child), grandparent‑grandchild, brother‑sister, uncle‑niece, aunt‑nephew. a marriage between 
cousins is allowed under english law (Herring 2011, p.  50). affinity restrictions pertain to 
step‑parent‑stepchild.
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is under the age of 16,1197 when the parties have intermarried in disregard of 
certain requirements as to the formation of marriage,1198 or when at the time of 
the marriage either party was already lawfully married or a civil partner.
4.2 . THe forceD mar riage (ciViL ProTecTioN) acT 
2007
in November 2008, the forced marriage (civil Protection) act 2007 (fmcPa) 
entered into force.1199 This act, which provides a civil remedy and which was 
inserted after Part 4 of the family Law act 1996 (fLa 1996),1200 was the result 
of a Private member’s Bill introduced in the House of Lords by Lord Lester of 
Herne Hill.1201 multi‑agency statutory guidance was implemented alongside 
the fmcPa, directing all persons and bodies in england and Wales on how to 
act when exercising public functions in relation to safeguarding children and 
vulnerable adults in cases of forced marriage.1202
The fmcPa defines a forced marriage as any religious or civil ceremony of 
marriage – whether or not legally binding – that a person is forced to enter into 
without his free and full consent.1203 The fmcPa stipulates that force includes 
physical violence, but also coercion by threats or other psychological means. This 
broad definition of ‘force’ recognises that the element of coercion underlying a 
forced marriage may consist of more complex factors than physical violence and 
can include a wide range of pressures. as stated, the coercion exerted in most 
forced marriages often consists in socio‑cultural expectations and emotional 
pressure.1204 a family may force a marriage using emotional blackmail (for 
example by telling someone their mother, grandfather, aunt or other family 
member will get very ill and die if they do not agree to go along with the planned 
marriage, or by threatening to commit suicide) or deception (such as by planning 
a trip abroad under the guise of a family holiday but with the actual motive of 
1197 This correlates with the criminal law policy that it is prohibited for a man to have sex with a girl 
younger than 16 (Herring 2011, p. 52). 
1198 as explained, the kind or formalities that are applicable depend on whether the marriage is 
performed in rites of the church of england or outside (Herring 2011, p. 52). a marriage is 
only void on the ground of breach of any of the formalities if the parties were aware of the 
breach and married willfully in breach of the requirement, see articles 25 and 49 marriage act 
1949 for an overview of such formalities (Herring 2011, p. 53).
1199 forced marriage (civil Protection) act 2007 (commencement No.1) order 2008, Si 2008/2779 
(c. 122).
1200 adding Part 4a to the family Law act, consisting of articles 63a‑63S.
1201 House of Lords Debate 16 November 2006, vol 687, col 19; and Heaton, mccallum & Jogi 2009, 
pp. v and vi.
1202 The Right to Choose: Multi‑Agency Statutory Guidance for Dealing with Forced Marriage, 
London: fmU, January 2010.
1203 article 63a(4) fLa 1996, in conjunction with article 63S.
1204 Proudman 2011, p. 30.
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forcing a marriage).1205 Telling someone they are no longer allowed to go to school 
or university if they do not agree to marry is another example of psychological 
pressure, as is threatening with disownment.1206 especially when the victims are 
young, this pressure can be very difficult to challenge.
in order to protect someone who is being forced into a marriage or who has 
already been forced into a marriage, the court – i.e. the High court or a designated 
county court – can make a forced marriage protection order (fmPo). This 
civil order, which can be used as a protective as well as a preventative measure, 
is comparable to an injunction.1207 The fmcPa entrusts the court with wide 
discretionary powers when it comes to making protection orders. Pursuant to 
article 63B fLa 1996, forced marriage protection orders can contain prohibitions, 
restrictions, requirements and other terms the court considers appropriate for the 
purpose of protection against a forced marriage. The terms of such orders can 
relate to anyone who is or may become involved in a forced marriage (such as by 
aiding, abetting, counselling, procuring, encouraging or assisting another person 
to (attempt to) force someone to enter into a marriage, or conspiring to do so) and 
can pertain to conduct both within as well as outside england and Wales.1208
The words ‘may become involved’ imply that fmPos cannot only be directed 
against specifically named respondents, but also against unnamed persons, 
which is a notable feature of the fmcPa.1209 a protection order can thus be 
directed against virtually anyone and relate to virtually anything. a court could 
for example use a protection order to stop a potential victim of forced marriage 
from being taken abroad by requiring respondents to hand in the passport of the 
potential victim (i.e. the person to be protected) to the court or to forfeit their own 
passports;1210 or it can require respondents to return the person to be protected 
to the jurisdiction of england and Wales. an order can also include a blanket 
provision, forbidding anyone from threatening or harassing the person to be 
protected, or from making any arrangements in relation to the marriage of that 
person.1211 These sections, which give the court a wide discretion with respect to 
determining the contents and the subjects of fmPos, were drafted so as to reflect 
1205 Heaton, mccallum & Jogi 2009, p. 5; and nS v. MI (2006) 1 fLr 444.
1206 Heaton, mccallum & Jogi 2009, p. 32.
1207 injunctions are court orders that require a party to do or refrain from doing specified acts and 
are often used in cases of stalking, domestic violence and harassment (martin 2010, pp. 19 and 
120).
1208 article 63B(2) and (1) fLa 1996.
1209 Heaton, mccallum & Jogi 2009, p. 35.
1210 in 2009, a man who was suspected of wanting to force his daughter into a marriage was 
ordered to forfeit his passport and was barred from taking his daughter abroad (see a. Bellard, 
‘Blackburn “forced marriage order” dad banned from going near family’ Lancashire Telegraph 
18  November 2009, available at <www.lancashiretelegraph.co.uk/news/blackburn/4744691.
Blackburn__forced_marriage_order__dad_banned_from_going_near_family> last accessed 
December 2013).
1211 Heaton, mccallum & Jogi 2009, p. 43; and L. mccallum, ‘forced marriage, Local authorities 
and applications without Leave: The New Provisions’ (30 october 2009) <www.familylawweek.
co.uk/site.aspx?i=ed42867> last accessed December 2013.
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and correspond with the nature of forced marriage.1212 as was recognised during 
the third reading of the forced marriage (civil Protection) Bill in the House of 
commons and explained in chaper 2, in the process of forcing someone to enter 
into a marriage or attempting to do this, many people may become involved. 
Pressure may come from a large selection of people, making it difficult both for 
the applicant (either the victim or a third party) as well as for the court to foresee 
which persons may become involved at a certain stage. Specifically naming all 
respondents in an order may therefore be an impossible task. article 63B allows 
the court to anticipate unforeseen circumstances.1213
The court can make a forced protection order on an application made either 
by the person who is to be protected by the order, by a relevant third party or 
by other third parties.1214 relevant third parties may apply for a protection 
order without first obtaining leave of the court, and, significantly, without the 
knowledge or consent of the person to be protected.1215 other third parties, such 
as friends, relatives, voluntary workers, neighbours and police officers, can also 
apply for a forced marriage protection order, but can only do so with leave of the 
court.1216 in addition to making orders on an application, the court also has the 
power to make a forced marriage protection order on its own initiative.1217
When the court considers it just and convenient to do so, it can make forced 
marriage protection orders ex parte, meaning without the respondents being 
served with any documents. This would happen, for example, in those cases in 
which a protection order is needed immediately: the court can then consider 
the application for an order straightaway and make the order without giving the 
respondents notice of the proceedings. at a later stage, the respondents will be 
given the opportunity to make representations about the protection order during 
an inter partes hearing.1218
1212 Heaton, mccallum & Jogi 2009, p. 32.
1213 See House of commons Debate 23 July 2007, vol. 463, col. 643.
1214 relevant third parties are those persons specified by order of the Lord chancellor, 
article 63c(1), (2) and (7) fLa 1996. examples of relevant third parties are local authorities, 
including inter alia county councils in england (The family Law act 1996 (forced marriage) 
(relevant Third Party) order 2009, Si 2009/2023). Note that the fmU is not designated as a 
relevant third party (Heaton, mccallum & Jogi 2009, p. 29; and fmcPa explanatory Notes, 
para. 29).
1215 Heaton, mccallum & Jogi 2009, p. 29; and L. mccallum, ‘forced marriage, Local authorities 
and applications without Leave: The New Provisions’ (30 october 2009) <www.familylawweek.
co.uk/site.aspx?i=ed42867> last accessed December 2013).
1216 fLa 1996, s 63c(3). The possibility for third parties and others to make applications is an 
innovative aspect of the fmcPa and goes beyond the possibilities in other acts (see gill & 
anitha 2011, p. 141).
1217 When the court considers that an order is required to protect someone, it can make such an 
order on its own initiative under the condition that the person who would be a respondent to 
any proceedings for a forced marriage protection order is a party to other family proceedings 
that are currently before the court. The person to be protected does not have to be a party 
to any existing family proceedings. article  63c(6)‑(7) fLa 1996 defines the term ‘family 
proceedings’, this definition is broader than that set out in Part 4 fLa 1996.
1218 article 63D(3) fLa 1996.
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4.3. ameNDmeNTS To THe fmcPa ProPoSeD BY THe 
aNTi‑SociaL BeHaVioUr, crime aND PoLiciNg 
BiLL 2013
initially, breaches of fmPos were qualified as contempt of court, punishable 
with a custodial sentence of up to two years imprisonment or a fine.1219 The 
anti‑Social Behaviour, crime and Policing Bill 2013 (aBcP Bill) proposes to 
insert a section in the fLa 1996 which makes the breach of an fmPo a criminal 
offence. This construction is known as a two‑step prohibition: an fmPo is a civil 
order, but breach of this order will become a criminal offence.1220 as a result of 
the criminalisation, the police will always be able to arrest for a suspected breach 
of an fmPo; courts no longer need to attach a power of arrest. article 63ca(1), 
which is to be inserted in the fLa 1996, proposed by the aBcP Bill 2013 describes 
the offences as follows: ‘a person who without reasonable excuse does anything 
that the person is prohibited from doing by a forced marriage protection order is 
guilty of an offence.’1221 a person found guilty of this offence is liable, on summary 
conviction (i.e. in a trial heard in the magistrates’ court), to imprisonment for 
a term not exceeding twelve months, or a fine, or both. in case of conviction 
on indictment (i.e. in a trial by jury heard in the crown court), the term of 
imprisonment may not exceed five years.1222
During the government consultation in 2012 on the possible criminalisation 
of forced marriage, several Ngos stated that they believed many victims may 
not want to pursue criminal proceedings against family members who forced or 
tried to force them into a marriage. mindful of this fact, the government will 
allow the person who applied for the fmPo to choose how a breach is dealt with: 
in the criminal courts (by calling the police), or in the civil court (by making an 
application to the court who issued the order to have the breach dealt with as civil 
contempt of court).1223 if the victim wishes to stick to the civil route, he or she 
can also apply for an arrest warrant for breach of an fmPo in the civil court.1224 
1219 article  14(1) contempt of court act 1981, in conjunction with article  63o fLa 1996. in 
february 2011, a London woman was found guilty of contempt of court and sentenced to eight 
months imprisonment. She had been issued with a forced marriage protection order to return 
her son, who was believed to be in Nigeria and at risk of being forced into a marriage, back to 
england and failed to do so ‘first person jailed for breaking forced marriage laws’, Solicitor 
First, 15 february 2011; and ‘edirin onogeta‑idogun mother jailed over “missing” son’, BBc 
News 14 february 2011 (<www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk‑england‑london‑12455820> last accessed 
December 2013).
1220 ashworth & Horder 2013, pp.  5 and 53: ‘the consequence of a breach of such an order (an 
anti‑social behaviour order, but also an fmPo; iH) is the commission of a strict liability 
offence’. See also Simester & Von Hirsch 2011, pp. 212–232.
1221 aBcP Bill (HL Bill 66) as amended by the committee, 12 December 2013.
1222 New article 63ca(5) fLa 1996.
1223 aBcP Bill, fact sheet: forced marriage (available at <https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/
system/uploads/attachment_data/file/201096/fact_sheet_bill_overview.pdf> last accessed 
December 2013). See also infra paragraph 5.2 on the two new offences of forced marriage.
1224 aBcP Bill, explanatory notes (Bill 7 55/3) 9 may 2013, para. 223. See article 63J(2) fLa 1996.
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Paragraphs 3 and 4 of the new section 63ca prevent double jeopardy: a person 
who has been convicted for breach of an fmPo cannot be punished for contempt 
of court in relation to this breach.1225
The fmcPa does not address the issue of the validity of (forced) marriages; 
this issue is regulated by the mca 1973.
4.4. aNNULmeNT of forceD mar riage
When a forced marriage has taken place, a victim can seek a decree of nullity 
under the mca within three years of the date of the marriage.1226 annulment 
does not have retroactive effect: a decree of nullity operates to annul the marriage 
only as regards any time after the decree has been made absolute, meaning that 
the marriage shall be treated as if it had existed up to the time of annulment.1227
The mca lists a set of grounds on which a marriage is voidable. With regard 
to forced marriages the most relevant of these eight grounds is enshrined in 
article  12(c) mca: a marriage is voidable on the ground that either party to 
the marriage did not validly consent to it, as a consequence of duress, mistake, 
unsoundness of mind or otherwise.1228 These four categories of circumstances 
that invalidate consent are discussed below.
4.4.1. Duress
The existence of duress, a concept which is not defined in the mca, depends 
on the question of whether the subject’s will was overborne by fear caused by a 
threat for which the party himself is not responsible.1229 The overborne will theory 
implies that the coercion that was exercised negated the psychological possibility 
of consent.1230 The court of appeal originally limited the nature of threats that 
could amount to duress to threats to life, limb or liberty.1231 However, in its 1984 
judgement in the case Hirani v. Hirani, the court of appeal adopted a more 
1225 aBcP Bill, explanatory Notes (Bill 7 55/3) 9 may 2013, para. 224.
1226 after the expiration of the period of three years from the date of the marriage, the court 
can grant leave for the institution of proceedings for the grant of a decree of nullity if the 
petitioner at some point during that period suffered from mental disorder within the meaning 
of the mental Health act 1983 and the court considers that it would be just to grant such leave 
(article  13(4) mca). for a definition of ‘mental disorder’, see article  1 mental Health act 
1983.
1227 article 16 mca.
1228 The marriage is void when either of the parties was younger than 16 at the time of the marriage 
(article 11(a)(ii) mca).
1229 See inter alia Hirani v. Hirani (1984) 4 fLr 232 (ca); Singh v. Singh (1971) 2 W.L.r. 963; 
Szechter v. Szechter (1971 2 WLr 170; and Buckland v. Buckland (1967) 2 W.L.r. 1506.
1230 Bradney 1994, p. 964.
1231 Buckland v. Buckland (1967) 2 W.L.r. 1506; Singh v. Singh (1971) 2 W.L.r. 963; Singh v. Kaur 
(1981) fam Law 152, ca.
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inclusive definition of ‘threat’, considering that any kind of threat will amount 
to duress, provided it has overborne the will of the subject. The case concerned 
the forced marriage of a 19‑year‑old Hindu woman, whose parents, upon whom 
she was financially dependent, had threatened to oust her from their home if 
she refused to marry the man they had selected for her. The woman gave in to 
this pressure, married the man of her parents’ choice, left him after six weeks 
and petitioned for a decree of nullity on the ground of duress. The judge in first 
instance held there was no duress because there had been no threat to life, limb or 
liberty, as required by earlier court of appeal case law.1232 The woman appealed 
and the court of appeal amended the duress test, considering that the question 
of whether duress, ‘whatever form it took’, was present depends on the question of 
‘whether the threats or pressure were such as to overbear the will of the individual 
and destroy the reality of consent.’1233 applying this subjective1234 test, the court 
found that this case was a clear example of pressure overbearing the will of the 
individual, vitiating any consent.1235 as noted by anitha and gill, in subsequent 
cases, courts have recognised that duress in the context of emotional pressure 
can take different forms, such as threats of suicide made by the coercer1236 and 
being made to feel responsible for someone’s death.1237 Duress can therefore 
include physical and psychological coercion, but also financial, sexual and 
1232 compare Singh v. Singh (1971) 2 W.L.r. 963, this case concerned a Sikh woman who had 
entered into a marriage arranged by her parents: she was told her husband‑to‑be was educated 
and handsome, but when she met him for the first time on the day of the wedding, she found 
he was neither and went through with the marriage only out of obedience to her parents’ 
wishes and out of deference to Sikh custom. She then sought annulment of the marriage on 
grounds of duress. The court held that there was no duress because there had been no threats 
of immediate danger to the woman’s life, limb or liberty. in Singh v. Kaur (1981) fam Law 152, 
ca a Sikh man sought annulment of his marriage on grounds of duress. He had entered into a 
marriage arranged by his parents after they told him that refusal would cause disgrace for his 
family and would mean that he would have to leave the family home and give up his place in 
the family business. as there had only been social and psychological pressure and as there had 
been no threats to the man’s life, limb or liberty, a decree of nullity on grounds of duress was 
not granted.
1233 Hirani v. Hirani (1984) 4 fLr 232 (ca).
1234 in Szechter v. Szechter (1971) 2 WLr 170; and Buckland v. Buckland (1967) 2 W.L.r. 1506, 
an objective test was used, requiring that the fear held by the petitioner was reasonably 
entertained. The subjective test which is currently applied by the courts was first formulated 
in Scott (Falsely Called Sebright) v. Sebright (1887) L.r. 12 P.D. 21, 24: ‘Whenever from natural 
weakness of intellect or from fear – whether reasonably entertained or not – either party is 
actually in a state of mental incompetence to resist pressure improperly brought to bear, there 
is no more consent than in the case of a person of stronger intellect and more robust courage 
yielding to a more serious danger.’ This test therefore does not require that the state of mind 
of the person claiming duress is measured against any objective standard of steadfastness (see 
also Harris‑Short & miles 2011, pp. 82–84; and compare Bradney 1994, p. 966).
1235 Hirani v. Hirani (1984) 4 fLr 232 (ca).
1236 Sohrab v. Khan (2002) ScLr 663; see Sundari anitha & aisha gill 2009, p. 170.
1237 Mahmud v. Mahmud (1994) SLT 599 (Scottish case).
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emotional pressure.1238 This is confirmed by the cPS in their Legal guidance on 
honour‑based violence and forced marriage:
‘Duress can take the form of overt behaviour, for example assault, or more 
subjective factors which may depend on the victims perception of the situation. 
This can include the applying of subtle pressures such as a sense of duty and 
emotional blackmail (e.g. threats to disown or ostracise the victim; accusations 
of bringing disgrace and dishonour onto the family or community); sexual or 
financial pressure.’1239
in other words, in the case of duress, a person’s will has been overborne as a result 
of which consent has not been freely given, which means the marriage can be 
qualified as ‘forced’.1240 This subjective analysis allows the court to consider all 
the peculiarities of the particular case, such as a person’s cultural background.
But what does ‘freely given’ mean? Will consent be considered to be given 
freely if someone is persuaded by relatives and reluctantly consents, or agrees 
to marry out of a sense of duty to their parents or out of deference to cultural 
customs and traditions? Three Scottish cases concerning forced marriage in 
which reference is made to the english cases discussed above shed some light on 
this matter and provide some guidance with respect to distinguishing between 
(parental) influence and duress. The facts of these cases, Mahmood v. Mahmood, 
Mahmud v. Mahmud and Singh v. Singh,1241 are comparable to Singh v. Singh, 
Singh v. Kaur and Hirani v. Hirani: the pressure that was applied was of a social 
and psychological nature; no threats to life, limb or liberty were uttered.
The case of Mahmood v. Mahmood concerned the arranged marriage of a 
21‑year‑old woman. She had protested against the marriage arranged by her 
parents, but finally entered into the marriage because her parents, upon whom 
the woman was financially reliant, had threatened to disown her, cut off all 
financial support and send her to live in Pakistan if she did not marry the man 
they had selected for her. in addition, the parents told their daughter that she 
would bring shame upon the family and the Pakistani community in edinburgh 
if she refused to marry. The woman took her parents’ threats seriously, as they had 
already disowned her elder sister and brother after they had refused to go along 
with their arranged marriages. Lord Sutherland held that the question of whether 
or not the threats made were of such a degree such as to overwhelm the person’s 
will, depends on the particularities of the individual case. He considered that 
parental influence is both legitimate and proper ‘when the parents consider that 
1238 The Right to Choose: Multi‑Agency Statutory Guidance for Dealing with Forced Marriage, 
London: fmU, January 2010, p. 4.
1239 cPS Legal guidance Honour‑Based Violence and forced marriage, p. 7.
1240 cPS Legal guidance Honour‑Based Violence and forced marriage, p. 7.
1241 The last‑mentioned is not to be confused with the 1971 english case of Singh v. Singh discussed 
above in footnote 1232.
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what they are advising is in the best interest of their child’.1242 in this particular 
case, however, Lord Sutherland held that the threats uttered by the young woman’s 
parents went beyond the limits of proper parental influence. Lord Sutherland took 
into consideration the woman’s age and cultural background when holding that 
especially the threat to cut off all financial support and send her to Pakistan were 
of such a nature that they could be regarded as matters which could overcome 
the woman’s will. it was also held that when determining whether the consent 
given was genuine, circumstances leading up to the threats should be explored, 
as should what transpired after the marriage ceremony. obiter, it was observed 
that fear of disapproval of parents or of the community will not be of a sufficient 
degree to amount to duress.1243
in Mahmud v. Mahmud, a muslim man of Pakistani origin sought the 
annulment of his arranged marriage to one of his cousins. mahmud had been under 
pressure from his parents and other family members for twelve years to enter into 
the marriage and was told that refusal would bring shame and degradation to his 
family. His family had blamed him for his father’s death, who had died of a stroke 
and whose last wish had been that mahmud would agree to the marriage. Then 
his mother’s health began declining and his family used this as another means 
to put pressure on him: he would need a wife who would take care of his mother. 
He eventually relented and married his cousin. at the time of this marriage, he 
was living with his girlfriend with whom he had a child and whom he intended 
to marry. Lord Prosser held that the key question in such cases was whether the 
consent to the marriage was free consent, which demonstrated an agreeing mind. 
if the consent has been compelled by force, it cannot be considered as such. in this 
particular case, Lord Prosser held that the sustained pressure (especially upon 
his conscience after his father’s death) had been so great as to amount to force, 
with the result that the man’s will was overborne and his consent vitiated.1244 His 
family members, with the aim of forcing mahmud to accept the marriage, had 
applied this pressure intentionally. in addition, Lord Prosser opined:
‘that the method by which a person’s consent was vitiated need not take any specific 
form, the crucial matter being the state of mind produced in the person giving the 
forced consent (…); and (…) that parents and other persons were entitled to apply 
pressure upon a person who was refusing to marry with a view to producing a 
change of mind: the marriage would be invalid only if the consent which had thus 
been induced could not sensibly be described as a genuine change of mind, but 
was rather to be categorised as an act contrary to the party’s own true intent.’1245
1242 Mahmood v. Mahmood (1993) SLT 589, p. 592.
1243 Mahmood v. Mahmood (1993) SLT 589, p. 592.
1244 Mahmud v. Mahmud (1994) SLT 599. See also chapter 3, paragraph 7.
1245 Mahmud v. Mahmud (1994) SLT 599, p. 599.
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obiter, Lord Prosser observed ‘that it would be less difficult to infer that the 
consent resulted from force when the consent was to a change in legal status and 
not to consummation and long term cohabitation.’1246 in other words, when a 
person consented to go through with the marriage ceremony, but does not agree 
to the inherent implications of marriage, such as consummation of the marriage 
and cohabitation, then it is possible that the consent to marry was not freely given, 
but given as a result of force.1247, 1248 He also reiterated the importance of taking 
into account a person’s cultural and social background, as was done in Mahmood 
v. Mahmood, but emphasised that it was not possible to make any generalisations 
with regard to a person’s susceptibility to moral pressure on the basis of sex or 
age.1249
in the third and most recent case, the presiding judge further nuanced 
the distinction between duress and parental influence and took a less inclusive 
approach with regard to threats that are sufficient to constitute duress. Singh v. 
Singh concerned an 18‑year‑old woman who went on holiday to india with her 
mother and then discovered that her mother wanted her to marry. She adamantly 
refused, but her mother was in possession of her passport and travel documents 
and threatened to destroy them and leave her behind in india if she refused to 
marry. in addition, her mother made it clear that rejecting the arranged marriage 
would bring great shame upon herself and her family. Her elder sister had 
previously refused an arranged marriage and had been ostracised by the family 
as a result. isolated and vulnerable, having no means to travel back to england, 
the woman gave in to the threats and married the man her family had selected.1250 
She subsequently refused to have sexual intercourse with him, lived with him 
for a week and then went back to england and resumed her relationship with 
her boyfriend. Judge macdonald held that the threats in this case were serious 
and amounted to immediate danger to the woman’s liberty: she was without 
support in a foreign country, not in possession of her passport and had no one 
to turn to for help. accordingly, her will was overborne and the marriage was 
contracted under duress.1251 in macdonald’s view, the same cannot be said for the 
1246 in this case, the man had never seen or corresponded with his wife prior to the marriage 
ceremony. on the day of the ceremony, the man went to the registration office in his ordinary 
working clothes and left immediately afterwards. He did not see his wife again (Mahmud v. 
Mahmud (1994) SLT 599, p. 599).
1247 However, this need not be the case. in sham marriages, for example, both parties will consent 
to the marriage with the sole purpose of changing their legal status, e.g. in order to enter 
another country.
1248 compare Singh v. Singh (1971) 2 W.L.r. 963: as described supra, the woman in this case had 
entered into the marriage out of a sense of duty towards her parents, but she immediately 
made it very clear that she did not wish to consummate the marriage or live with her husband. 
in Singh v. Singh (2005) SLT 749 the woman also refused to have sexual intercourse with her 
husband and left him after a week.
1249 Mahmud v. Mahmud (1994) SLT 599, pp. 601–602.
1250 Singh v. Singh (2005) SLT 749, pp. 750–751.
1251 Singh v. Singh (2005) SLT 749, pp. 756 and 757.
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threats uttered in Mahmud v. Mahmud: he doubted whether the parental pressure 
exerted in that case would be sufficient to constitute duress. in the opinion of 
Judge macdonald, there must be limits to the nature of the threats that the law 
regards as being capable of overbearing a person’s will. He opined that threats of 
immediate danger to life, limb or liberty, or equally serious threats, are required 
before it can be said that the party ‘is compelled by force to marry, or by some 
rational fear is terrified into compliance’.1252 accordingly, Judge macdonald 
considered that a threat by parents to, for example, break a promise to buy a new 
car, new clothing, or even a house, would not be serious enough.1253
in other words, it seems that duress requires some form of grave external 
pressure (such as fear of homelessness and ostracism) that was applied ‘upon a 
person who was refusing to marry with a view to producing a change of mind’.1254
4.4.2. Mistake, unsoundness of mind or otherwise
a second circumstance that can negate consent is mistake. The law recognises 
two kinds of mistake: mistake as to the other party’s identity, for example in case 
of impersonation or some other kind of fraud, and mistake as to the nature of 
the ceremony, e.g. because one party believed the ceremony was an engagement 
ceremony.1255
a marriage can also be rendered voidable if at the time of the marriage, 
either of the parties was of unsound mind. To determine whether someone 
has the capacity to marry, it is necessary to ask whether that person is capable 
of appreciating the nature of the contract of marriage, which means that this 
person must be mentally capable to understand the responsibilities attached to 
marriage.1256
finally, the mca recognises a category of circumstances other than duress, 
mistake or unsoundness of mind that negate consent. The words ‘or otherwise’ 
in article 12(c) mca imply that the itemisation in this section is not exhaustive. 
examples of other circumstances under which a party to the marriage did not 
validly consent to it are extreme intoxication1257 and fraud and misrepresentation. 
fraud or misrepresentation can also result in a mistake as to the identity of the 
other party or the nature of the ceremony, which will also render the marriage 
voidable, as discussed above.1258
1252 Note that this is the requirement for annulment of marriage on the ground of duress under 
Scottish law; english law does not require that someone was ‘terrified into compliance’.
1253 Singh v. Singh (2005) SLT 749, p. 756.
1254 Mahmud v. Mahmud (1994) SLT 599, p. 599.
1255 Herring 2011, p. 62.
1256 Estate of Park (1954) P 112, and Herring 2011, p. 62.
1257 although there is some discussion on the question of whether voluntary intoxication should 
render a marriage voidable (Herring 2011, p. 63).
1258 Harris‑Short & miles 2011, p. 90); and Herring 2011, p. 63.
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4.5. DiVorce aND JUDiciaL SePar aTioN
Petitioning for a divorce may also offer a possibility for victims of a forced 
marriage to end the association. Divorce, however, might for three reasons be a 
less appealing remedy for victims of such marriages than annulment.
first, a petition for divorce may be presented to the court only after the 
expiration of one year from the date of the marriage.1259 in other words: during 
the first year of the marriage, parties are barred from divorce, although they can 
separate de facto. in the case of a forced marriage, this could mean in practice that 
the victim(s) is/are locked in the marriage and is/are unable to dissolve it for the 
duration of a year.
Secondly, the law strictly limits the grounds for divorce, meaning that a 
decree of divorce is granted only under certain specific circumstances. a petition 
for divorce may be presented on the ground that the marriage has broken down 
irretrievably. However, the court will hold a marriage to have broken down 
irretrievably only when the petitioner has satisfied the court of one or more of the 
following facts:
a. that the respondent has committed adultery and the petitioner finds it 
intolerable to live with the respondent;
b. that the respondent has behaved in such a way that the petitioner cannot 
reasonably be expected to live with the respondent;
c. that the respondent has deserted the petitioner for a continuous period of at 
least two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition;
d. that the parties to the marriage have lived apart for a continuous period of 
at least two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition 
(hereafter in this act referred to as “two years’ separation”) and the respondent 
consents to a decree being granted;
e. that the parties to the marriage have lived apart for a continuous period of 
at least five years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition 
(hereafter in this act referred to as “five years’ separation”).1260
in the case of a forced marriage sub (b) would be most relevant: when X behaved 
in such a way that Y cannot reasonably be expected to live with X, for example 
because of domestic violence, divorce could be granted by the court (once one 
year has passed since the solemnisation of the marriage). However, not all forced 
marriages will result in domestic violence or other serious misbehaviour, especially 
not when both spouses can be considered victims of the coerced marriage. in 
those cases, options (c), (d) and (e) would remain, requiring the parties to have 
lived apart for at least two or five years, thus requiring the parties to remain in 
1259 article 3 mca. This restriction aims ‘to assert the state’s interest in upholding the stability and 
dignity of marriage’ (cretney’s Principles of family Law 2008, margin no. 10–009).
1260 article 1(2) mca.
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the forced marriage for a prolonged period of time.1261 for victims, this will not 
be the ideal solution. Particularly not option (d), which requires the other spouse 
to consent to a decree of divorce being granted: it is very well imaginable that, 
specifically in those cases where only one of the spouses can be regarded as a 
victim of the forced marriage, the other spouse will not consent to such a decree 
being granted, effectively blocking the victim’s possibility to exit the marriage 
and forcing him or her to wait for an additional three years.
However, as often seems to be the case, the strict law in the books on divorce 
differs from the more lenient law in action: divorces are rarely defended, and 
in the 1970s, a special procedure was introduced for undefended divorces.1262 
This special procedure, which has since become the norm, allows a divorce to 
be granted on the basis of affidavit evidence1263 only without the parties having 
to attend court. in practice, this means that ‘the petitioner’s solicitor lodges 
an affidavit in the form required to verify the particular ground alleged in the 
petition’ (e.g. that the respondent has behaved in such a way that the petitioner 
cannot reasonably be expected to live with the respondent).1264 This special 
procedure virtually precludes any inquiry into whether a marriage has indeed 
broken down irretrievably or into the genuineness of the facts alleged.1265 courts 
do not usually investigate statements made in undefended divorce petitions.1266
The third disadvantage of divorce relates to stigma and is particularly 
relevant to members of certain cultures and/or communities. in many South 
asian communities, for example, divorce is severely stigmatised and can have 
serious consequences, especially for women. annulment, on the other hand, is 
not automatically associated with such stigma. Yet, annulment cannot be seen 
as a panacea: the community might still blame the victim(s) for not making the 
marriage work.1267 Nevertheless, for some victims annulment might be a more 
satisfactory solution, albeit merely psychologically.
Yet, irrespective of these disadvantages, the remedy of divorce also has a 
positive aspect: by withholding the final (i.e. absolute) decree of divorce – a decree 
of divorce is in the first instance a decree nisi (‘unless’); after a period of six months 
1261 moreover, the court can dismiss a petition for divorce in five year separation cases on the 
ground that dissolution of the marriage would result in grave financial or other hardship to the 
other party and that it would in all circumstances be wrong to dissolve the marriage (article 5 
mca).
1262 cretney’s Principles of family Law 2008, margin no. 10–010–016; and rule 2.36 of the family 
Proceedings rules 1991.
1263 an affidavit is a voluntary declaration of facts written down and sworn to by the declarant 
(Black’s Law Dictionary 2006).
1264 cretney’s Principles of family Law 2008, margin no. 10–010.
1265 cretney’s Principles of family Law 2008, margin no. 10–016.
1266 cretney’s Principles of family Law 2008, margin no. 10–017.
1267 gupta & Sapnara 2011, p. 165; P v. R (Marriage: nullity: Forced Marriage) (2003) 1 fLr 661, 
para. 17; and Lucy carroll, ‘arranged marriages: Law, custom and the muslim girl in the U.K.’ 
Women Living Under Muslim Laws Dossier 20, July 1998, p. 1; and Proudman 2011, p. 20.
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it can be made absolute1268 – the court can make sure that, if applicable, the parties 
actually dissolve their religious marriage in accordance with the usages of the 
religion in question.1269 This forestalls undesirable situations in which two parties 
are divorced in the eyes of the law, but not in the eyes of their religion. certain 
religions, such as islam and Judaism, require the consent and/or collaboration 
of the husband and if the husband refuses to cooperate, the religious marriage 
cannot be dissolved, irrespective of whether the civil marriage has been dissolved. 
for example, according to Jewish law, divorce can only be obtained by a get given 
by the husband to the wife; pursuant to islamic law, divorce is automatic and 
unilateral for the husband (talaq), but a wife must acquire divorce via a sharia 
council, imam or scholar (khula).1270 article  10a mca stipulates that on the 
application of either party, the court may order that a decree of divorce is not to 
be made absolute until a declaration by both parties that they have taken steps 
such as are required to dissolve the marriage in accordance with the usages of the 
religion, is presented to the court. This section applies to those cases in which a 
decree of divorce has been granted but not made absolute and the parties to the 
marriage were married in accordance with Jewish or other prescribed religious 
usages and, in accordance with those usages, are required to cooperate if the 
marriage is to be dissolved in the eyes of the religion in question.1271 The provisions 
pertaining to the annulment of marriages do not contain such a possibility.
as an alternative to divorce, a spouse may present to the court a petition for 
judicial separation on the basis of any of the facts listed in the provision concerning 
the ground for divorce (i.e. adultery, serious misbehaviour, desertion, factual 
separation, see article 1(2) mca, quoted above). The difference with divorce is 
that the court will not have to consider whether the marriage has broken down 
irretrievably. The effect of a judicial separation is that the petitioner will no longer 
have to cohabit with his spouse.1272
4 .6. coerciVe meaSUr eS: r eSTr aiNiNg or DerS aND 
oTHer r emeDieS for DeaLiNg WiTH forceD 
mar riageS
in addition to forced marriage protection orders and decrees of nullity, a range of 
other remedies is available for (potential) victims of forced marriages. alongside 
fmPos, the fLa 1996 contains two other remedies that may be used in cases 
1268 article 1(5) mca. cretney’s Principles of family Law 2008, margin no. 10–012.
1269 chapter 9, paragraph 2.3.2 explains why english courts can also (to a certain extent) rule in 
some religious matters.
1270 S.W.e. rutten, ‘Het recht van de gescheiden vrouw om verlost te worden uit het huwelijk’, 
NJcm‑Bulletin (33) 2008–6, pp. 755–769.
1271 article 10a was inserted in the mca by the Divorce (religious marriages) act 2002.
1272 See articles 17 and 18 mca.
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of (threatened) forced marriage: non‑molestation orders and occupation orders 
made by the High court, a county court or a magistrates’ court. Under Part 4 of 
the fLa 1996, a person can seek a non‑molestation order against their (future) 
spouse, relatives, or anyone who lives in the same household. The court will grant 
such an order when there is evidence of molestation and the applicant needs 
protection. a non‑molestation order forbids the respondent from using violence 
or in any other way harassing the applicant. Breach of a non‑molestation order 
is a criminal offence, punishable with a fine or prison sentence.1273 The fLa 1996 
further allows for a person to seek an occupation order against their spouse, 
resulting in the removal of their spouse from the house.1274
another possibility for someone facing a forced marriage is to seek a 
restraining order under the Protection from Harassment act 1997 against anyone 
who knowingly harasses them. These restraining orders can be made by criminal 
courts when passing a sentence, or even after finding a defendant not guilty, if 
it holds that there has been harassment or conduct that causes fear of violence. 
restraining orders are similar to non‑molestation orders and the injunctions 
described above and can include a variety of conditions such as prohibiting the 
defendant from contacting the victim and visiting the victim’s home or work 
place.1275 The breach of a restraining order is a criminal offence and can result in 
a prison sentence of up to five years.1276
Domestic Violence Protection Notices and orders (DVPN/DVPo), introduced 
by the crime and Security act 2010 can also offer relief to victims of those cases of 
forced marriages that are linked to forms of (domestic) violence. a DVPN may be 
issued by a member of a police force not below the rank of superintendent when 
that officer has reasonable grounds for believing that a particular person has been 
violent towards, or has threatened violence towards, another person, and the issue 
of the DVPN is necessary to protect that person from that (threat of) violence.1277 
if a police officer has reason to believe that the person against whom a notice has 
been issued is in breach of the DVPN, he may arrest this person.1278 once a DVPN 
has been issued, a constable must apply for a domestic violence protection order 
(DVPo) by complaint to a magistrates’ court.1279 The court may make such an 
order even if the person for whose protection it is made does not consent to the 
1273 article 42a fLa 1996 and article 1 Domestic Violence, crime and Victims act 2004. as is 
the case with fmPos, the court can make non‑molestation orders on its own initiative if in 
any family proceedings to which the respondent is a party the court considers that the order 
should be made for the benefit of any other party to the proceedings or any relevant child 
(article 42(2)(b) fLa1996).
1274 article 33 fLa 1996. Heaton, mccallum & Jogi 2009, pp. 21–26.
1275 article  5 Protection from Harassment act 1997; article  12 Domestic Violence, crime and 
Victims act 2004 and <www.cps.gov.uk/publications/prosecution/domestic/domv_guide_
for_victims_and_witnesses_faqs.html> last accessed December 2013.
1276 article 5(5) Protection from Harassment act 1997. See also nS v. MI (2006) 1 fLr 444.
1277 article 24 crime and Security act 2010. 
1278 article 25(1) crime and Security act 2010.
1279 article 27 crime and Security act 2010.
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making of a DVPo.1280 a person who breaches a DVPo may be arrested without 
warrant and brought before the magistrates’ court which may remand him.1281
in criminal proceedings, a  court can remand the arrested defendant in 
custody or release him by granting bail, with or without conditions attached. 
When granting bail a court can, for example, prohibit the defendant from 
contacting a particular person or persons or going to a particular place. if this 
bail condition is breached, the police can arrest the defendant and the court can 
remand the defendant in custody.1282 orders prohibiting a person from contacting 
another person can also be imposed in the form of license conditions for offenders 
who have been convicted to a determinate or indeterminate sentence and who are 
being released on licence.1283
if the person who is at risk of being forced into a marriage, or who already has 
been forced to marry is below the age of 18, the children act 1989 offers several 
remedies. a child may be placed under police protection for up to 72 hours when 
there is reasonable cause to believe that this child is at risk of significant harm.1284 
When after 72 hours, the child is still considered to be at risk of significant 
harm, the police or social care services can apply to the court for an emergency 
protection order.1285 Pursuant to article  31 children act 1989, this protection 
order may be followed by a care order, placing the child in the care of a designated 
local authority. further, when a child is at risk of being forced into marriage or 
has already entered into a marriage1286 against its will, any interested party can 
ask the High court to exercise its inherent jurisdiction1287 and make the child a 
ward of court.1288 Wardship can be used alongside fmPos.1289 The High court 
can also invoke inherent jurisdiction to order injunctions to prevent a child from 
being taken abroad, ordering, for example, the surrender of the passport of a child 
or ordering that the child may not leave the jurisdiction without permission of the 
court. The High court has also invoked inherent jurisdiction to prevent adults 
at risk of being forced into marriage, in particular with regard to adults with a 
1280 article 28 crime and Security act 2010.
1281 article 29 crime and Security act 2010.
1282 See Part ii of the criminal Justice act 2003.
1283 a court that sentences an offender to a term of imprisonment of twelve months or more in 
respect of any offence may, when passing sentence, recommend to the Secretary of State 
particular conditions which in its view should be included in any licence granted to the 
offender on his release from prison (articles 2 and 3 criminal Justice (Sentencing) (Licence 
conditions) order 2005; article 238 and 250 criminal Justice act 2003).
1284 See article  46 children act 1989; and cPS Legal guidance Honour‑Based Violence and 
forced marriage, p. 26.
1285 article 44 children act 1989. 
1286 it is reiterated that marriages to which either of the parties is younger than 16 are void in 
accordance with article 11 mca.
1287 inherent jurisdiction is a common law doctrine stating that a superior court has jurisdiction 
to hear any matter that comes before it, unless its authority is expressly limited by a statute or 
rule (S. Sime, A practical approach to civil procedure, oxford: oUP 2007, p. 21).
1288 cPS Legal guidance Honour‑Based Violence and forced marriage, pp. 27–28.
1289 cPS Legal guidance Honour‑Based Violence and forced marriage, 29.
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(learning) disability that prevents them from making a free choice or giving real 
and genuine consent.1290 in M v. B the court used its inherent jurisdiction to make 
orders to prohibit the parents of S, a 23‑year‑old women suffering from learning 
disabilities, from entering S into a formal or informal marriage contract.1291
4 .7. PriVaTe iNTer NaTioNaL LaW
a large proportion of the forced marriages that take place in england, or that 
involve UK citizens have international characteristics: either because the 
marriage takes places overseas, or because a non‑British citizen comes to england 
to enter into a marriage.1292 The standard theories used to determine the validity 
of a marriage in england are lex loci celebrationis, i.e. the law of the place where 
the marriage was celebrated, and the dual domicile theory. The exact choice of 
rules depends on the issue involved: the formal validity of a marriage, in other 
words whether all requisite formalities were observed, is determined by the law 
of the place of celebration.1293 This means that a marriage celebrated in italy will 
be recognised as valid in england if all formalities required by italian law were 
fulfilled. english law will therefore also recognise the marriage of a person under 
the age of 16 celebrated overseas, if the country where the marriage took place 
permits marriage below that age.1294
The essential validity of a marriage, which concerns the parties’ capacity 
to marry – so their age, sex, soundness of mind, degree of relationship 
(consanguinity) and status – can be determined using several theories of conflict 
of laws, such as the dual domicile test, the intended matrimonial home test, 
and the so‑called most real and substantial connection test.1295 With regard to 
consent to marriage in particular, two different theories have been advocated: 
that of the dual domicile and that of the lex loci celebrationis. although courts 
have not given a conclusive answer as to which of these tests ought to be applied in 
cases concerning (lack of) consent, it would appear they favour the dual domicile 
test.1296 The Law commission, as well as rule 67 of Dicey and morris’ leading 
textbook on the conflict of laws also provide that as a general rule, capacity to 
marry, which includes consent, is governed by the law of each party’s ante‑nuptial 
1290 cPS Legal guidance Honour‑Based Violence and forced marriage, p. 28; and see nS v. MI 
(2006) 1 fLr 444, and Probert 2008, pp. 395–402.
1291 M v. B (2005) eWHc 1681 (fam), and Herring 2011, p. 69.
1292 article 14(1) mca concerns marriages governed by foreign law.
1293 Probert 2008, p. 396; and reed 2000, p. 392.
1294 Probert 2008, p. 402.
1295 reed 2000, p. 393.
1296 Probert 2008, pp. 399–401; and reed 2000, p. 394.
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domicile, more specifically the laws of the country of the spouse who claims not 
to have freely consented to the marriage.1297
even if a marriage would be valid according to rules of Private international 
Law, english courts still have the possibility to refuse recognition on the basis 
of public policy.1298 The public policy ground is criticised in literature because 
courts often fail to clarify the exact policy justification for refusing to recognise 
a marriage.1299 Nevertheless, forced marriages can be regarded as being contrary 
to english public policy.1300 Therefore, when two individuals, who married in 
a country where consent is not an essential requirement for the validity of a 
marriage, want this marriage to be recognised in england, the court can decide 
to refuse recognition on the basis that the marriage is contrary to english public 
policy if either of the spouses were forced to marry.1301
5. THe eNgLiSH crimiNaLiSaTioN DeBaTe
5.1. a PoLariSeD DeBaTe
as was explained above, debates on the criminalisation of forced marriages kept 
flaring up from the end of the 1990s onwards, resulting in a 2005 government 
consultation on this issue. The government decided not to take any criminal 
legislative action, maintaining the status quo. in 2011, the Home affairs Select 
committee published a report1302 in which it recommended the creation of a 
specific offence of forced marriage as this would ‘send out a very clear and positive 
message to communities within the UK and internationally’.1303 During a speech 
on immigration on 10 october 2011, Prime minister David cameron announced 
that the government intended to criminalise breaches of fmPos and would 
1297 L. collins (general ed.), Dicey, Morris & Collins on the conflict of laws (Vol. II), London: Sweet 
& maxwell 2006, para. 17r‑054; and. rule 68 states that ‘no marriage is (semble) valid if by the 
law of either party’s domicile he or she does not consent to marry the other’. Law commission 
Working Paper No. 89 (1985), paras. 3.36, 5.9 and 5.18.
1298 Probert 2008, p. 401. See also Vervoeke v. Smith (1983) 1 a.c 145, 164.
1299 Probert 2008, p. 401.
1300 See inter alia Probert 2008, pp. 396–401
1301 Sham marriages, to which both parties did validly consent, are valid and will be recognised as 
such in england (c.m.V. clarkson & J. Hill, The conflict of laws, oxford: oUP 2006, p. 295).
1302 Home affairs committee, Forced Marriage (Hc 2010–12, 880), p. 3.
1303 Home affairs committee, Forced Marriage (Hc 2010–12, 880), p. 18. Because the committee 
based its findings on evidence taken from a narrow group of activists, some researchers have 
questioned the (soundness of the) methodology and outcome of this report. Several Ngos 
took part in the round table discussion organised by the committee and the fmU, but in 
its report, the Home affairs Select committee focused on the oral evidence given by one 
Ngo (Karma Nirvana) and one solicitor, both from the North east and both in favour of 
criminalisation. No oral evidence was given by parties opposing criminalisation, nor were 
courts, local authorities, police, lawyers and other relevant parties canvassed. See Demos 2012, 
p. 54; Diversity Subcommission of the family Justice council 2012, para. 9; and gill 2011, p. 1. 
Forceandmarriage.indd   247 20-5-2014   10:42:13
248 intersentia




look into the options of criminalising the act of forced marriage itself.1304 in 
December 2011, the government launched a consultation, seeking views on how 
the criminalisation of breaches of the civil fmPos might be implemented and on 
whether forced marriage should be made a criminal offence.1305 as regards the 
latter issue, a small majority (54%) of the 297 respondents were in favour of the 
creation of a new offence; 37% were against and 9% were undecided.1306 as these 
figures indicate, the debate on the criminalisation of forced marriage has strongly 
polarised public opinion, dividing Ngos, charities, legal practitioners and 
academics.1307 especially among the Ngos and charity organisations that deal 
with violence against women, there is great disparity. an example illustrates this: 
in february 2012, the iranian Kurdish Women’s rights organisation (iKWro), a 
London‑based charity which advocates criminalisation of forced marriage, held a 
focus group with 15 iranian, afghan and Kurdish women ranging in age from 20 
to 60 years old. all were in favour of creating a specific criminal offence of forced 
marriage.1308 in march 2012, Southall Black Sisters, a London‑based charity which 
is opposed to criminalisation, held a focus group with ten 15 year‑old asian girls. 
all were against criminalisation.1309 What the majority of charity organisations 
do have in common, however, is that they all plead for a holistic approach: a 
robust and effective implementation of (existing) criminal law and monitoring of 
fmPos and breaches, combined with awareness raising campaigns, training for 
frontline professionals and education programmes at schools.1310
5.1.1. Arguments against criminalisation
The arguments put forward by opponents of criminalisation can be broadly 
divided into three categories: arguments pertaining to the negative impact that 
criminalisation would have on victims, the redundancy of a specific crime, and 
practical issues, such as evidentiary difficulties.
1304 D. cameron, ‘a transcript of Prime minister David cameron’s speech on 
immigration, given on 10  october 2011’, available at <www.number10.gov.uk/news/
prime‑ministers‑speech‑on‑immigration> (last accessed December 2013).
1305 respondents were members of the public (175), statutory agencies such as the police (40), 
Ngos (40), legal experts (20), representative bodies (15) and self‑identified victims (7), see 
Home office, Forced marriage – a consultation. Summary of responses, June 2012, p. 4.
1306 Home office, Forced marriage – a consultation. Summary of responses, June 2012, p. 5.
1307 The results of a 2011 consultation carried out by gill underline this dichotomy: of the 74 
respondents, 50% were against, 38% were in favour of and 12% were unsure of the creation of a 
specific criminal offence of forced marriage. The sample consisted of organisations concerned 
with domestic violence/violence against women (25), police and legal experts (17), individuals 
(9), public sector organisations/workers (6), voluntary sector organisations/workers (6), faith 
groups (5), local councils (5) and one educational organisation, see gill 2011, p. 8.
1308 iKWro 2012, p. 1.
1309 Note, however, that at the start of the meeting, all girls supported the idea of criminalising 
forced marriage. Southall Black Sisters 2012, para. 37. 
1310 Inter alia Southall Black Sisters 2012, para. 14; imKaaN 2012, p. 5; iKWro 2012, p. 9; and 
Diversity Subcommission of the family Justice council 2012, para. 20.
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most arguments relate to the expected negative consequences that the 
creation of a specific offence of forced marriage would have for victims. many 
organisations that work with victims of forced marriage believe that criminalising 
the practice would cause more problems than it would solve.1311 They argue that 
criminalisation would disempower victims and act as a deterrent for them to step 
forward because they would not want to see their relatives prosecuted.1312 This 
would drive the practice further underground, making it even more invisible than 
it already is.1313 The argument that victims would no longer report instances of 
forced marriage is especially relevant for minors, adults with learning disabilities, 
and for people from cultures in which shame and honour are important (such 
as South asian communities).1314 Those who do dare to report their plight to the 
police may be ostracised or disowned by their family and the wider community. in 
addition, some organisations fear an increase in violent reprisals against women 
who sought help from the authorities, especially after a failed prosecution (see 
infra).1315 as a result of the prospect of such reprisals, victims, even if they want to 
see the alleged perpetrators prosecuted, are often too afraid to testify.
furthermore, it is believed that criminalisation will decrease chances of 
reconciliation between victim and family.1316 Southall Black Sisters states that 
this is an advantage of the fmcPa: an fmPo, as a civil remedy, is less public.1317 
opponents further fear that criminalisation of forced marriage will lead parents 
to take their children overseas, marry them off and abandon them there in order 
to circumvent the law.1318
a second line of argumentation used by those against criminalisation of 
forced marriage centres around the question of whether a new criminal offence 
is needed. in this context, it is proffered that criminalising forced marriage as a 
1311 a.K. gill & K. Sapnara, ‘forced marriages blight lives, but criminalising them would not 
work’, The Guardian 9  april 2012, available at <www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/
apr/09/forced‑marriages‑criminalising?newsfeed=true> last accessed December 2013.
1312 imKaaN 2012, p. 6; Southall Black Sisters 2012, paras. 11 and 33–39. ashiana Network, an 
organisation that specialises in helping girls and young women from South asian, Turkish 
and iranian communities, held a consultation with residents across their three refuges (two 
specifically for women at risk of forced marriage). 19 of the 20 women said that if forced 
marriage were to be a criminal offence they would not report it (ashiana Network 2012, p. 9).
1313 Home office, Forced marriage – a consultation. Summary of responses, June 2012, pp. 9–10; 
imKaaN 2012, p. 10; and Southall Black Sisters 2012, para. 30.
1314 Home office, Forced marriage – a consultation. Summary of responses, June 2012, p.  10; 
fmU forced marriage and Forced Marriage and Learning Disabilities: Multi‑Agency Practice 
Guidelines, London: fmU, December 2010; and coram children’s Legal centre 2012, p. 5.
1315 Southall Black Sisters 2012, para. 7; Home office, Forced marriage – a consultation. Summary 
of responses, June 2012, pp. 9–10.
1316 gill 2011, p. 18: 49% of the 74 respondents was of the opinion that turning forced marriage into 
a specific criminal offence and the prospect of prosecution would make it harder for victims 
to be reconciled with their families. also imKaaN 2012, p. 6; and Southall Black Sisters 2012, 
paras. 45–50.
1317 Southall Black Sisters 2012, para. 48.
1318 Southall Black Sisters 2012, para.  31; and Diversity Subcommission of the family Justice 
council 2012, p. 14.
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separate criminal offence does not add much to the existing criminal law. Two 
reasons can be distinguished. first, crimes committed in the course of forcing 
someone to marry (e.g. assault and rape) already exist and are already used to 
prosecute instances of forced marriage.1319 Secondly, looking at the number of 
fmPos that have been issued during the past few years, the fmcPa is considered 
to be a valuable remedy.1320 Protection orders are lauded as useful remedies that 
capture the specific dynamics of a forced marriage – i.e. prolonged (physical/
emotional) pressure, manipulation, and direct and indirect coercion exerted 
by multiple perpetrators.1321 it is acknowledged, however, that the existing civil 
remedies and criminal law can and should be used more effectively: between 
2008 and December 2010, 257 fmPos were issued, but only five breaches were 
recorded.1322 This is mainly ascribed to a lack of understanding and awareness: 
both on the side of professionals and the general public. an inconsistent 
approach, lack of enforcement, and lack of engagement from schools and other 
institutions have to be addressed in order for existing legislation to be used to its 
full potential.1323
in addition, it has been argued that it would be difficult to bring the forms 
of coercion used in forced marriage cases within the ambit of criminal law.1324 
forced marriage, as it generally takes place in england, is rarely a one‑off situation 
where a person, out of the blue, is forced to marry at gunpoint.1325 often, consent 
obtained in these marriages is the result of intense and prolonged emotional 
pressure, or because victims agree out of a sense of duty. Bringing these pressures 
within the ambit of criminal law would ‘undermine fundamental principles of 
criminal law’.1326 even if it were possible to capture the reality of forced marriage 
in a criminal offence, those opposing criminalisation argue that this would be 
accompanied by a host of evidentiary difficulties, for example with regard to the 
intent of the perpetrator, but also in relation to the criminal standard of proof.1327 
Because of the blurred distinction between forced and arranged marriages, and 
because the coercion used in many cases consists in social expectations, those 
against criminalisation argue that in many cases it would be difficult to decide 
whether the threshold for forced marriage was reached.1328 further, emotional 
pressure will be difficult to establish as a result of the higher evidential threshold 
1319 Southall Black Sisters 2012, para. 25–26; and Diversity Subcommission of the family Justice 
council 2012, p. 23.
1320 Southall Black Sisters 2012, para. 9.
1321 imKaaN 2012, p. 2.
1322 imKaaN 2012, p. 5; and iKWro 2012, p. 3.
1323 Southall Black Sisters 2012, paras. 28, 75 and 106.
1324 Southall Black Sisters 2012, para. 42.
1325 imKaaN 2012, p. 2.
1326 Southall Black Sisters 2012, para. 53; the consultation reply does not explain what is meant by 
‘fundamental principles of criminal law’. 
1327 Southall Black Sisters 2012, para. 7; Home office, Forced marriage – a consultation. Summary 
of responses, June 2012, p. 5.
1328 Home office, Forced marriage – a consultation. Summary of responses, June 2012, pp. 9–10.
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of the standard of proof in criminal cases (proof beyond a reasonable doubt).1329 
in addition, those against invoking the criminal law believe that the difficulty 
in obtaining victim and witness evidence – because victims may be scared and 
unwilling to testify against their relatives – will also result in a low number of 
successful prosecutions.1330 Between 2008 and 2010, two of the total of five recorded 
breaches of fmPos were not prosecuted because there was not enough evidence 
and the victims were not prepared to cooperate.1331 in this context, reference is 
also made to female genital mutilation; this practice has been outlawed for several 
years, but, to date, there have been no prosecutions, turning the prohibition into 
a dead letter.1332 The failure of the cPS to secure convictions for forced marriage 
might cause victims to feel let down.1333
5.1.2. Arguments in favour of criminalisation
The arguments put forward by those in favour of criminalisation can be divided 
into two categories: arguments relating to the symbolic value and the positive 
impact criminalisation would have on victims, and the current lacuna in criminal 
law regarding forced marriages.
Those who welcome the separate criminalisation of forced marriage argue 
that this would act as a deterrent for potential perpetrators and send out a strong 
message with regard to the unacceptability of the practice. Specific criminal 
legislation could provide potential victims of forced marriage with a bargaining 
tool when it comes to convincing their parents that they have the right to decide 
if, when and whom they wish to marry, thus empowering them. at the same time, 
parents who are pressured by others – for example by members of the extended 
family – to marry their children off may use the criminality of forced marriage 
as a tool for negotiation, convincing their relatives that forced marriage is not an 
option.1334
in addition, it is argued, criminalisation could possibly relieve feelings of guilt 
on the part of the victims: many do not even know they have the right to decide 
if, when and whom to marry.1335 Specifically condemning coercive interference 
with decisions relating to marriage would send out the message that victims can 
1329 imKaaN 2012, p. 6; and coram children’s Legal centre 2012, p. 5.
1330 Southall Black Sisters 2012, para.  40; and Diversity Subcommission of the family Justice 
council 2012, p. 24.
1331 Diversity Subcommission of the family Justice council 2012, p. 13.
1332 although in September 2013, the cPS was preparing several cases concerning female genital 
mutilation (see ‘first female genital mutilation prosecution ‘close’, says cPS’, BBc News 
6 September 2013 <www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk‑23982767> last accessed December 2013).
1333 Southall Black Sisters 2012, para.  7; and Home office, Forced marriage – a consultation. 
Summary of responses, June 2012, p. 16.
1334 gill 2011, pp. 21–22.
1335 iKWro 2012, p. 11.
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challenge their parents’ actions and that they have the right to seek help and 
report forced marriages.1336
interestingly, where opponents argue that criminalisation would deter 
victims from reporting forced marriage, which would drive the practice even 
further underground, those who welcome the creation of a specific criminal 
offence argue the opposite: specific criminal legislation would, in their view, 
empower victims and encourage them to report incidents of forced marriage. 
in this context, reference is made to statistics provided by LoKK, a Danish 
organisation concerned with violence against women and children. Since forced 
marriage was criminalised in Denmark in 2008, LoKK has seen an increase in 
people coming forward to report instances of forced marriage.1337 in 2012, the 
Leeds‑based charity Karma Nirvana conducted a postcard campaign where they 
asked members of the public key questions on forced marriage. The vast majority 
of the more than 3,000 respondents believed that a criminal offence would not 
deter victims from reporting forced marriage.1338 Some of the self‑identified 
victims who responded to the 2011 government consultation confirmed this, 
stating that a specific criminal offence of forced marriage would have caused 
them to come forward sooner.1339
in addition, it is stated that criminalisation would positively impact victims 
in the sense that civil law places the burden of responsibility on the victim, 
whereas criminal law would place the onus of proof on the cPS.1340 Proponents 
of criminalisation do not believe that reluctance of victims to testify would be 
a problem: the cPS has extensive experience with domestic violence cases in 
which victims are often also too afraid to testify in court against suspects. When 
the cPS has enough evidence, the victim might not even need to testify.1341 in 
addition, several support and security measures can be taken in order to shield a 
victim, such as witness protection, video recorded statements and live links.1342 it 
is believed that criminalisation would serve a strong symbolic function by clearly 
and unambiguously sending the message that forced marriage is unacceptable 
and will not be tolerated.1343 criminalisation could bring about a change in 
1336 Demos 2012, p. 51 and iKWro 2012, p. 9.
1337 iKWro 2012, p. 9.
1338 Home office, Forced marriage – a consultation. Summary of responses, June 2012, p. 4; and c.r. 
Proudman, ‘in criminalising forced marriage the UK joins a europe‑wide movement’, The 
Independent (blog), 10  June 2012 (available at <http://blogs.independent.co.uk/2012/06/10/
in‑criminalising‑forced‑marriage‑the‑uk‑joins‑a‑europe‑wide‑movement> last accessed 
December 2013).
1339 Home office, Forced marriage – a consultation. Summary of responses, June 2012, p. 11.
1340 Demos 2012, p. 51; and gill 2011, p. 12.
1341 Home office, Forced marriage – a consultation. Summary of responses, June 2012.
1342 Home office, Forced marriage – a consultation. Summary of responses, June 2012, p. 19; and 
T. Kazi, ‘forced marriages Undermine the Values of islam’, Huffington Post Blog 13  april 
2012, available at <www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/tehmina‑kazi/forced ‑marriages‑undermines‑ 
islam_b_1420033.html> last accessed December 2013.
1343 Home office, Forced marriage – a consultation. Summary of responses, June 2012, p. 14; and 
centreLgS, Response to the Home Office Consultation Document – ‘Forced Marriage: A Wrong 
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attitude and public opinion: some – even professionals such as police officers and 
educators – still perceive forced marriage as a legitimate cultural practice.1344
The second category of arguments in favour of criminalisation concerns the 
legal lacuna when it comes to forced marriages. Traditionally, english criminal 
law does not recognise psychological coercion and therefore does not offer victims 
of such pressure access to criminal justice. Therefore, a crime of forced marriage 
with an inclusive definition of force would fill a lacuna in the law by providing 
protection to those who were coerced into a marriage as a result of emotional 
and psychological coercion.1345 others argue that creation of a specific criminal 
offence is necessary because existing criminal offences do not sufficiently reflect 
the severity of forced marriages which often result in continuous ill‑treatment.1346 
in addition to filling a hiatus in the existing criminal legislation, a specific crime 
of forced marriage is also needed because the fmcPa on its own is not sufficient 
to deal with the practice. Those who welcome the creation of a separate crime of 
forced marriage contend that in the majority of cases, the person who is protected 
by the fmPo is the one who will have to report any breaches of this order. iKWro 
identified several reasons why victims might not report breaches, for example 
because they do not realise that certain conduct constitutes a breach of the order, 
or because they believe that reporting a breach will hamper reconciliation with 
their family. Victims may also be threatened and/or afraid of bringing shame on 
the family.1347
5.1.3. Discussion of arguments
one of the issues those in favour and those against the creation of an offence of 
forced marriage are most divided on is the possible deterrent effect criminalisation 
may have on victims. gill’s consultation illustrates this dichotomy: 57% of her 
respondents believed that criminalising forced marriage would deter victims 
from reporting the practice; 43% believed this would not be the case.1348 iKWro 
has stated that ‘the impact of criminalisation of forced marriage on levels of 
reporting has been exaggerated’1349 by other Ngos and charities. in this regard 
they point towards evidence from LoKK Denmark which demonstrates that 
victims do not stop seeking help, on the contrary, more victims have stepped 
not a Right’ November 2005, p.  7 (available at <www.kent.ac.uk/clgs/documents/pdfs/
clgsforcedmarriageresponse.pdf> last accessed January 2014).
1344 iKWro 2012, p. 6.
1345 Proudman 2011, pp. 25–26.
1346 T. Kazi, ‘forced marriages Undermine the Values of islam’, Huffington Post Blog 13  april 
2012, available at <www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/tehmina‑kazi/forced ‑marriages‑undermines‑ 
islam_b_1420033.html> last accessed December 2013.
1347 iKWro 2012, p. 4.
1348 gill 2011, p. 9.
1349 iKWro 2012, p. 8.
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forward since forced marriage became a criminal offence in Denmark.1350 Those 
opposing criminalisation argue that victims of forced marriages might not go to 
the police because they do not want to see their relatives prosecuted and because 
they are afraid that going to the police will alienate them from their families and 
make reconciliation more difficult.1351
The actual impact of criminalisation on victims’ willingness to report forced 
marriages cannot currently be assessed; only after legislation criminalising forced 
marriage has been enacted and has been in place for some time will the true effects 
be known. However, it is obvious that seeking help in general (whether it is from the 
police or another party) can have severe consequences, especially in communities 
where high value is attached to family honour.1352 research indicates that victims 
who decide to do something about their situation and seek external help – either 
from the police, an Ngo, a teacher or another third party – are often alienated 
from their families, making reconciliation difficult.1353 This is underscored by the 
argument used by some proponents of criminalisation of forced marriage that a 
specific crime is needed because the current legal framework, more specifically 
the fmcPa, places responsibility for reporting breaches of fmPo on the victim, 
who may decide not to report any breaches, for example because they fear this 
would impede reconciliation with their family. However, for the exact same 
reasons, victims might not report forced marriage to the police if it became a 
specific criminal offence. This argument used by proponents of criminalisation 
therefore contradicts their own stance that criminalisation of forced marriage 
would not deter victims from reporting this crime.
Those against criminalisation contend that the fmcPa has a less severe 
negative impact on reconciliation between the victim and her family because it is a 
civil remedy and therefore less public.1354 it should be noted, however, that several 
breaches of fmPos have been reported in the national newspapers, naming and 
shaming the breachers.1355 arguably, this could also make reconciliation between 
the victims and perpetrators more difficult. Nevertheless, the fmcPa does have a 
clear advantage over the criminal law: pursuant to the fmcPa, protection orders 
1350 iKWro 2012, p. 9; and conversation with iKWro campaigns officer (14 may 2012).
1351 The argument that criminalisation might drive the practice underground should be nuanced: 
the practice is already hidden (Hc Public Bill committee Deb, 4th sitting, 20 June 2012, col 104; 
and Demos 2012, p. 50).
1352 See the story of Jasvinder Sanghera who, aged 16, was faced with the prospect of a forced 
marriage. She did not report her plight to the authorities, but refused to marry the man her 
parents had selected for her and ran away from home with her boyfriend, as a result of which 
she was disowned by her family (Sanghera 2007).
1353 Demos 2012, pp. 49–50
1354 Southall Black Sisters 2012, para. 48.
1355 e.g. ‘edirin onogeta‑idogun mother jailed over “missing” son’, BBc News 14 february 2011 
(<www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk‑england‑london‑12455820> last visited December 2013); and 
a. Bellard, ‘Blackburn “forced marriage order” dad banned from going near family’ Lancashire 
Telegraph 18 November 2009.
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can be made ex parte, which doesn’t require the presence or notification of the 
other party.1356
Proponents of criminalisation also contend that the creation of a specific 
criminal offence would provide potential victims with a useful and powerful 
bargaining tool. Those against criminalisation argue that this would only be 
true for those victims who already dare to stand up against their relatives; it 
is uncertain if it would empower those who currently do not dare to do so.1357 
further, opponents fear that criminalisation of forced marriage would cause 
parents to take their children overseas to marry them off in order to circumvent 
the law. for this reason, the government has decided to create an offence of luring 
someone abroad with the intention of forcing them into a marriage (see infra 
paragraph 5.2). What is more, taking someone abroad with the aim of forcing 
them into a marriage would also qualify as assisting or encouraging a crime 
under the Serious crimes act 2007.
Several remarks can also be made with regard to pro and contra arguments 
concerning the symbolic function of criminalisation. Proponents contend that 
creating a specific criminal offence would send out a clear message that forced 
marriages are unacceptable, which would raise awareness. obviously, this 
message can also be sent in a different way, as was done in the case of domestic 
violence. Domestic violence is not a crime in itself, but aspects of domestic 
violence have been criminalised. The UK government has sent a strong message 
across authorities, agencies and the general public that the UK has a zero tolerance 
approach to domestic violence. a similar approach, coupled with compulsory 
training for relevant professionals, could be used to tackle the practice of forced 
marriage.1358 in addition, although the law may have a symbolic value, legislation 
alone cannot change public opinion or shift attitudes.1359
moreover, enforcement is an important goal of (criminal) legislation and 
those opposing criminalisation believe it highly unlikely that many successful 
prosecutions would follow. Without successful prosecutions, opponents argue, 
the symbolic value of the prohibition will also be relatively small.1360 Both sides 
agree that front‑line professionals, such as police and educators, and the general 
public are not aware of the capacities of the existing legal framework.1361 in 2010, 
1356 Pursuant to new article 63ca(2) proposed by the aBcP Bill 2013, in the case of an fmPo 
made ex parte ‘a person can be guilty of an offence under this section (i.e. breaching an fmPo; 
iH) only in respect of conduct engaged in at a time when the person was aware of the existence 
of the order.’
1357 gill 2011, p. 22.
1358 imKaaN 2012, p. 8; Southall Black Sisters 2012, para. 25; and ashiana Network 2012, p. 15.
1359 Southall Black Sisters 2012, para. 29; and ashiana Network 2012, p. 17.
1360 Southall Black Sisters 2012, paras.  41 and 44; and Diversity Subcommission of the family 
Justice council 2012, para.  30. 45% of gill’s respondents believed that the potential of few 
prosecutions would have a negative effect; 47% believed this would not have a negative effect; 
8% were not sure (gill 2011, p. 26).
1361 gill 2011, p. 11.
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there were 116 applications for fmPos,1362 but this number is relatively low seeing 
as the fmU alone gave advice and support in 1735 instances of forced marriage 
in that year.1363 it is important to note, however, that these figures only reflect 
fmPos and do not take into account the cases of forced marriage that are 
dealt with via other remedies, such as by the family courts in care proceedings 
pursuant to the children act 1989.1364 Still, awareness in general is low, and those 
in favour of criminalisation agree that penalisation is not a panacea and endorse 
the opponents’ view that awareness raising campaigns and more and improved 
training for those who are likely to encounter instances of forced marriage are 
required.1365
5.2 . THr ee offeNceS of forceD mar riage: 
THe aNTi‑SociaL BeHaVioUr, crime aND 
PoLiciNg BiLL 2013
in June 2012, the government announced that forced marriage would become 
a criminal offence. The aBcP Bill introduced in the House of commons in 
may 2013 creates three new offences relating to forced marriage: the offence of 
breaching an fmPo (discussed above in paragraph 4.3), the offence of forcing 
someone to enter into a marriage and the offence of causing someone to leave the 
UK with the intention of a forced marriage taking place abroad.
Section 109(1) of the aBcP Bill 2013 defines the offence of forced marriage 
as follows:
a person commits an offence under the law of england and Wales if he or she –
(a) uses violence, threats or any other form of coercion for the purpose of causing 
another person to enter into a marriage, and
(b) believes, or ought reasonably to believe, that the conduct may cause the other 
person to enter into the marriage without free and full consent. 1366
This offence requires the perpetrator to have used coercion with the intention 
(‘purpose’) of causing someone to enter into a marriage.
1362 in total, 149 orders were made in 2010. Between November 2008 and february 2011, 
293 fmPos were issued (gill 2011, p. 6).
1363 equality and Human rights commission 2012, paras. 5 and 19. 
1364 equality and Human rights commission 2012, para. 16.
1365 for the purpose of this book, the example of england and english law serves as a source of 
inspiration with regard to the (separate) criminalisation of the practice of forced marriage. 
The question of whether or not it was necessary to create new legislation criminalising forced 
marriage in england is therefore not answered. This question is addressed and answered with 
regard to the Netherlands (see chapter 10).
1366 aBcP Bill (HL Bill 66) as amended by the committee, 12 December 2013.
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Section 109(2) of the aBcP Bill 2013 defines the third offence related to 
forced marriage as follows:
a person commits an offence under the law of england and Wales if he or she –
(a) practices any form of deception with the intention of causing another person 
to leave the United Kingdom, and
(b) intends the other person to be subjected to conduct outside the United 
Kingdom that is an offence under subsection (1) or would be an offence under 
that subsection if the victim were in england or Wales.1367
as the provisions make clear, the offences are committed irrespective of whether 
the forced marriage takes place. on summary conviction, the maximum penalty 
for both offences is twelve months imprisonment and/or a fine. on conviction on 
indictment the maximum penalty is seven years imprisonment and/or a fine.1368
in the context of these two offences, ‘marriage’ is defined in the same way as 
in the fmcPa: it refers to any religious or civil form of marriage, i.e. a ceremony 
of marriage that is recognised by the customs of the parties to it, whether or 
not binding according to english law.1369 But where the fmcPa uses the term 
‘force’ and explains that this includes coercion by threats or other psychological 
means, the aBcP Bill uses the terms ‘violence’, ‘threats’ and ‘coercion’, but does 
not define them. Using a grammatical interpretation of article 104(1) aBcP Bill 
2013 (‘violence, threats or any other form of coercion’, emphasis added), it may be 
expected that coercion is not limited to (threats of) physical violence, but that it 
also includes psychological coercion such as emotional blackmail. This appears 
to fill the lacuna (i.e. that english criminal law traditionally did not recognise 
psychological coercion) noted by some of the proponents of the criminalisation 
of forced marriage discussed in paragraph 5.1.2.
mindful of the warning of several consultation participants that some 
victims of forced marriage might not step forward because they would not want 
to see their relatives prosecuted, the government announced that the civil remedy 
(in the form of fmPos) will continue to exist alongside the two new criminal 
offences of forced marriage.1370 Victims will thus be given the choice between the 
criminal law track and the civil law track. Yet in cases of forced marriage where 
1367 aBcP Bill (HL Bill 66) as amended by the committee, 12 December 2013.
1368 Section 109(7) aBcP Bill (HL Bill 66) as amended by the committee, 12 December 2013. The 
government estimates that on an annual basis the two new offences will result in an estimated 
£1.18 million additional costs for the criminal justice system (aBcP Bill, explanatory notes 
(Bill 7 55/3) 9 may 2013, para. 381).
1369 Section 109(3) aBcP Bill 2013 (HL Bill 66) as amended by the committee, 12 December 2013; 
and aBcP Bill, explanatory notes (Bill 7 55/3) 9 may 2013, para. 232.
1370 aBcP Bill, fact sheet: forced marriage (available at <www.gov.uk/government/uploads/
system/uploads/attachment_data/file/201096/fact_sheet_bill_overview.pdf> last visited 
December 2013).
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very severe forms of coercion were used, it is doubtful that the victim will be given 
the opportunity to keep the case outside the criminal courts.
5.3. (NoN‑) SPecific crimiNaL offeNceS
in addition to the three specific crimes of forced marriage that are introduced by 
the aBcP Bill 2013, several other (non‑)specific criminal offences can be used 
in cases of forced marriage. These crimes include common assault, threatening 
behaviour, kidnapping, battery, conspiracy, (child) abduction, cruelty to persons 
under 16, theft, blackmail, false imprisonment, harassment, threats to kill, people 
trafficking, rape, aiding and abetting a criminal offence, and even murder.1371 
The crimes may be committed in the course of forcing someone to enter into 
a conjugal association against their will, and they may also be committed after 
the forced marriage has taken place. case law demonstrates that criminal law 
has indeed been used to deal with cases of forced marriage. in may 2009, for 
example, the manchester crown court convicted a mother for child sex offences 
and attempting to pervert the course of justice sentencing her to three years 
imprisonment for forcing her 14‑ and 15‑year‑old daughters to marry their 
cousins in Pakistan.1372 in July 2012, Burnley crown court jailed three people 
for committing offences related to forced marriage: in 2009 a young woman fled 
her home for fear of being forced to marry her cousin. She ran away to Newcastle 
where she married someone else. Her mother, brother and brother‑in‑law went to 
Newcastle, broke into her apartment and threatened her and her husband. They 
then took her to her brother‑in‑law’s house and tried to persuade her to divorce 
her husband and marry her cousin. after having kept her in the house for two 
days, they drugged her with lorazepam, and transported her back to her home 
town. The crown court found the mother, brother and brother‑in‑law guilty of 
false imprisonment, kidnap and two counts of administering a drug with intent 
of commiting an indictable offence, and sentenced them to four, five and three 
years imprisonment respectively.1373
1371 cPS Legal guidance Honour‑Based Violence and forced marriage, p. 8; The Right to Choose: 
Multi‑Agency Statutory Guidance for Dealing with Forced Marriage, London: fmU, January 
2010, p. 13; nS v. MI (2006) 1 fLr 444, para. 17; Summary of responses to the consultation on 
the criminalisation of forced marriage 2006, p. 6; and choice by right 2000, p. 9.
1372 Unreported, see Heaton, mccallum & Jogi 2009, p. 8.
1373 ‘family jailed in forced marriage row kidnap of Bradford woman’, BBc News 27 July 2012, 
available at <www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk‑england‑19019538> last accessed December 2013.
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Dutch law recognises only one type of marriage: civil marriage celebrated 
in accordance with the requirements set out in Book 1 of the civil code. The 
Dutch government has, on several occasions, stated that forced marriages are 
unacceptable and that free and full consent to marriage is a sacrosanct human 
right. Yet the Dutch civil code does not contain a free consent clause which 
stipulates that the free consent of both spouses is required for a valid marriage. 
The inclusion of such a provision was suggested during the parliamentary debate 
on the first book of the civil code in the 1960s. Lack of consent would make 
the marriage eligible for annulment. The then minister of Justice decided against 
inclusion of such a free consent clause, arguing that this would constitute a 
devaluation of the institution of marriage by offering people an ‘easy way out’ of 
a marriage. Secondly, it could result in the annulment of marriages on the basis 
of every subjective lack of freedom which would be detrimental to legal certainty. 
Thirdly, it was argued that including a provision concerning the requirement of 
free consent to marriage would be contrary to the system of civil law, which does 
not contain such a provision for any other legal act.
in 2013, half a century later, the State Secretary of Security and Justice 
stated that a general requirement that all spouses declare that they enter into 
the marriage of their own free will would not be necessary as he believed that 
it may be assumed that everyone in the Netherlands knows about and supports 
the right and freedom of choice in marriage.1374 This may be true, but it seems 
that including a free consent requirement for marriage in the civil code would 
reaffirm the right to freedom of choice in marriage. The argument used in the 
1960s that this would offer people an ‘easy way out’ and thereby devaluate the 
institution of marriage, seems to be outdated.
There are several civil law remedies that can be used in the case of a 
threatened forced marriage or if a forced marriage has already taken place. 
annulment currently has a high bar, requiring an ‘unlawful serious threat’, which 
means that a marriage that was the result of more subtle forms of coercion, such 
as psychological pressure, does not qualify for annulment. after promulgation 
of the marital coercion (civil law) Bill, marriages that were entered into as 
a result of any form of coercion will be eligible for annulment. This will offer 
victims of forced marriage better possibilities to dissolve the unwanted union. 
as argued above, in some cases, an annulment may be a better response than 
a divorce, because the consequence of an annulment is that the marriage never 
existed. a divorce decree does not have this ex tunc effect. Yet in other cases, a 
divorce will be a more obvious choice as it offers relief more quickly and does 
not require the party (parties) to prove that the marriage came about as a result 
of coercion. Judicial separation, the third option to dissolve a marriage, results 
1374 Parliamentary Papers II (Lower House) 2012/2013, 33 488, no. 6, p. 10.
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in a separation between the spouses, but has limited added value in the context 
of forced marriages. When it comes to preventing forced marriages, it appears 
that the registrar is a key figure. The registrar is the person who actually weds a 
couple and if he suspects that coercion is involved, for example because the bride 
or groom looks very frightened and/or cries a lot,1375 he is compelled by law to 
report this to the PPS (article 162(1)(c) cric).
The criminal code contains a number of offences that may be applicable to 
forced marriages. especially relevant in this regard are the offence of coercion 
(article 284 cric) and the offence of influencing someone’s statement (article 285a 
cric). in government documents, the offence of coercion is generally heralded 
as most applicable to forced marriages, but as was discussed above and will be 
further argued in chapter 10, the offence of influencing someone’s statement 
appears to be a blueprint for the act of forcing someone to enter into a marriage 
against that person’s will.
english law also offers a varied number of tools that can be used to tackle forced 
marriages. a forced marriage that has already taken place can be annulled within 
three years from the date of the marriage ceremony on the ground that a party to 
the marriage did not validly consent to it, as a consequence of duress. Pursuant 
to the case law, there is no valid consent when a person’s will has been overborne, 
that is to say, the relevant question in these cases is ‘whether the threats or 
pressure were such as to overbear the will of the individual and destroy the 
reality of consent.’1376 it has been recognised that duress in the context of consent 
to marriage can include physical and psychological coercion, but also financial, 
sexual and emotional pressure. Divorce can also be used to end a forced marriage, 
but is not preferable to annulment as a petition for divorce may be presented to 
the court only after the expiration of one year from the date of the marriage and 
the law strictly limits the grounds for divorce. a decree of divorce is granted only 
under certain specific circumstances; the fact that one or both of the spouses were 
forced to enter into the marriage against their will is not one of them. Pursuant to 
the matrimonial causes act, the petitioner would have to demonstrate that the 
marriage has broken down irretrievably by satisfying the court that his/her spouse 
has behaved in such a way that the petitioner cannot reasonably be expected to 
live with him/her. Someone who faces the risk of being forced into a marriage or 
who has already been forced to marry can also, depending on the circumstances, 
apply to the court for non‑molestation orders and occupation orders under the 
fLa 1996, restraining orders under the Protection from Harassment act 1997, or 
Domestic Violence Protection Notices and orders under the crime and Security 
act 2010.
1375 This is very subjective, obviously, but a registrar may be able to distinguish between tears of 
happiness and tears of desperation – in some cases at least.
1376 Hirani v. Hirani (1984) 4 fLr 232 (ca).
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The most notable legal tools at the government’s disposal are the fmcPa 
2007 and the criminal offences of forced marriage proposed by the aBcP 
Bill 2013. The fmcPa was implemented in 2008 and enables courts to make 
injunctions to protect people who are faced with a forced marriage or who have 
already been forced to enter into a marriage against their will. The content of 
these protection orders is entirely up to the discretion of the court: a protection 
order may for example prohibit the great uncle of the woman who has applied for 
the order to make arrangements for her wedding. Breach of an order is considered 
civil contempt of court. in 2011, the government announced that a breach of an 
fmPo would be made into a criminal offence, punishable with up to five years 
imprisonment. after an extensive consultation in 2012, the government concluded 
that the two‑step prohibition was not sufficient and that the practice of forced 
marriage requires the creation of a specific criminal offence. The aBcP Bill 2013 
makes it a criminal offence to use violence, threats or other forms of coercion 
for the purpose of causing another person to enter into a marriage without that 
person’s free and full consent. Practising any form of deception with the intention 
of causing someone to leave the UK and intending that person to be subjected to 
a forced marriage abroad is also a criminal offence.
The legal frameworks of the Netherlands and england described in this 
chapter are compared in chapter 9.
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InteRnAtIonAl cRImInAl lAw 
And FoRced mARRIAge
1. iNTroDUcTioN
None of the statutes of any of the international(ised) courts or tribunals specifically 
list the act of forced marriage as a crime against humanity, a war crime or an act 
of genocide. The offence was first explicated in the case law of the ScSL in 2004, 
when the Prosecutor of that court encountered the phenomenon of ‘bush wives’ 
during his investigations into the atrocities committed during the civil war in 
Sierra Leone. The Trial chamber granted the Prosecutor leave to add a new count 
of ‘other inhumane acts’ (article 2(i) ScSL Statute) pertaining to the offence of 
forced marriage to the indictments in two cases (against former afrc and rUf 
leaders), but dismissed the Prosecutor’s motion for leave to amend the indictment 
in the case against two former cDf leaders in a similar manner.1377 as a result, the 
Trial chamber could hear evidence supporting forced marriage as a (new) crime 
against humanity, which, for the first time in the history of international criminal 
law, opened the door for the prosecution of the crime of forced marriage as a crime 
against humanity. in subsequent ScSL judgements, the crime of forced marriage 
was defined, but this did not happen without problems or disagreements.
Paragraph 2 will discuss and evaluate in detail the proceedings before the 
ScSL Trial chambers and appeals chamber in the afrc, rUf and Taylor cases. 
The second part of this chapter focuses on the extraordinary chambers in the 
courts of cambodia (eccc). forced marriage is charged as an ‘other inhumane 
act’ in the case that is commonly referred to as case 002. When the proceedings 
in this case commenced, in 2007, there was no indication that this case would take 
longer than the average international criminal case to complete.1378 However, the 
proceedings continue to drag on and are marked by delay upon delay. at the time 
of writing (January 2014), there was not a single (trial) judgement in case 002. as 
1377 Toy‑cronin 2010, p. 576; ‘office of the Prosecutor welcomes arraignment of rUf and afrc 
indictees on charges related to forced marriage’, Press release, Special court for Sierra Leone, 
17 may 2004; and afrc Trial Judgement, annex a: Procedural History, paras. 1–13. 
1378 indeed, when the research for this book commenced in the second half of 2010, there was 
reason to believe that the eccc would issue a trial judgement in time for it to be included in 
this book.
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a result, there is no relevant case law to discuss and analyse. only the pre‑trial 
proceedings offer some insight into the offence of forced marriage within the legal 
framework of the eccc. They are briefly addressed in paragraph 3.
The legal framework of forced marriage in international criminal law is based 
on the case law of the ScSL and – to a lesser extent – the eccc.1379 This case law 
demonstrates that the legal framework for forced marriage under international 
criminal law is formed by several (categories of) crimes: the war crimes and 
crimes against humanity of enslavement and sexual slavery, the crime against 
humanity of other inhumane acts, and the war crime of outrages upon personal 
dignity. These crimes and their applicability to cases of forced marriage are 
studied in chapter 10. The current chapter focuses, as stated, on the case law of 
the ScSL and eccc.
2. THe caSe LaW of THe SPeciaL coUrT for 
Sierra LeoNe
2.1. TrYiNg THoSe WHo Bear gr eaTeST 
r eSPoNSiBiLiTY: THe SPeciaL coUrT for 
Sier r a LeoNe
after an official request by the President of Sierra Leone for assistance of the 
international community to try members of the rUf and their accomplices, 
the UN and the government of Sierra Leone concluded, on 16  January 2002, a 
bilateral agreement establishing an internationalised – or hybrid – court with 
a mandate to try those who bear greatest responsibility for serious violations of 
international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law committed during this 
conflict.1380 as a hybrid court, the ScSL is neither an organ of the UN Security 
council, nor part of the domestic legal system. it is best described as a mixed 
court, with both international and national elements; the Statute of the ScSL, for 
example, incorporates domestic Sierra Leonean law in addition to international 
law.1381 article 1(1) ScSL Statute limits the court’s jurisdiction to ‘those who bear 
greatest responsibility’ for crimes committed in Sierra Leone since November 
1996.
1379 for the (limited) icc, icTY and icTr case law pertaining to forced marriages, see chapter 3.
1380 UNSc res. 1315 (14 august 2000) UN Doc. S/reS/1315 and article 1(1) ScSL Statute. it is worth 
mentioning that the report of the Truth and reconciliation commission also touches upon the 
phenomenon of forced bush marriages, elaborating on the rebels’ practice of abducting young 
girls and women and forcing them to become their wives (Trc report 2004–2, pp. 16, 102 and 
250; Trc report 2004–3a, pp. 398, 479 and 503). in the eyes of the Trc, forced marriage is a 
form of sexual slavery and is in fact synonymous with sexual slavery (Trc report 2004–3B, 
pp. 131 and 163). See chapter 10 for a discussion on the differences and similarities between 
forced marriage and (sexual) slavery. See also Haenen 2013(ii), pp. 895–915.
1381 However, none of the accused were charged under Sierra Leonean law.
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in its short lifespan, the ScSL has delivered several landmark decisions, 
such as the first convictions in the history of international criminal law for 
sexual slavery and the conscription of child soldiers; and, notably, the first ever 
convictions for forced marriage.1382 The court has dealt with four cases: the case 
against the former President of Liberia, charles Taylor, and three cases concerning 
accused that were associated with the afrc, rUf and cDf. in the following 
sub‑paragraphs the proceedings before the ScSL Trial chambers and appeals 
chamber in the afrc, rUf and Taylor cases are discussed and evaluated. The 
cDf case is not considered because the act of forced marriage was not discussed 
in this case, even though several witnesses had testified that one of the accused 
had taken several captured girls and young women as his wives.1383, 1384
2 .2 . THe afrc caSe
2.2.1. The trial
on 7  march 2005, the trial against alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy Kamara 
and Santigie Borbor Kanu, three officials and senior members of the afrc, 
opened in freetown before Trial chamber ii. The chamber heard evidence on 
14 counts, three of which were relevant with regard to the bush marriages that 
had taken place: sexual slavery and any other form of sexual violence (count 7), 
other inhumane acts, including forced marriage (count 8), and the war crime of 
outrages upon personal dignity (count 9). The Trial chamber commenced the 
discussion of the counts pertaining to sexual violence by dismissing count 7 in its 
entirety, because it charged the accused with two separate offences in one count, 
1382 L. côté, ‘Special court for Sierra Leone’, in: a. cassese (ed.), Oxford Companion to 
International Criminal Justice, oxford: oUP 2009, pp. 516–517.
1383 See cDf Transcripts 2 November 2004, pp. 47–60, cDf Transcripts 10 march 2005, pp. 43–44; 
cDf Transcript, 31  may 2005, pp.  24 and 33–34; see also inter alia Human rights Watch 
2003a, pp. 46–48.
1384 The initial cDf indictment did not contain charges relating to sexual violence or forced 
marriage. The Prosecutor’s requests to amend the indictment to include inter alia the crime 
of forced marriage were dismissed by the Trial chamber on the grounds that granting leave 
for amendment at that stage of the trial would prejudice the rights of the accused to a fair 
and expeditious trial and cause undue delay as the defence would have to investigate the new 
counts (cDf Decision on leave to amend the indictment, paras. 6, 63 and 86). Leave to appeal 
this decision was denied (cDf Decision on Leave to appeal the decision on amending the 
indictment). questions regarding the topic of sexual violence and forced marriage during the 
trial were resolutely interrupted by the court (see e.g. cDf Transcript 2 November 2004, p. 50 
and cDf Transcript, 31 may 2005, pp. 24 and 33–34). The Prosecutor’s attempts to remedy 
these issues during the appeal were also fruitless (cDf appeal Judgement, paras. 426–427, 
435–436 and 450). 
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which violates the rule against duplicity.1385, 1386 The Trial chamber then proceeded 
with the discussion of count 8 (forced marriage as an ‘other inhumane act’).
The Trial chamber first examined the nature of the clause ‘other inhumane 
acts’ and held that it is a residual category. This implies that it should be restrictively 
interpreted as applying only to acts that are not otherwise subsumed under crimes 
listed in article 2 ScSL Statute (the crimes against humanity provision). The act 
of forced marriage, therefore, can only qualify as an ‘other inhumane act’ if it 
involves conduct that is not caught by listed crimes against humanity.
The Trial chamber had difficulty distinguishing the forced marriages that 
took place during the conflict from acts of sexual slavery, but the Prosecution 
submitted that the two offences ought to be distinguished: a forced marriage as 
an ‘inhumane act’ can include sexual violence or sexual slavery – and usually will 
involve sexual acts – but in addition to this, a forced marriage also has its own 
distinctive elements that are different from sexual acts, namely the conferral of 
the status of marriage on the victim. Similarly, a sex slave – or a victim of sexual 
violence in general for that matter – is not necessarily obliged to perform ‘all the 
tasks that are attached to a marriage’, such as cooking and cleaning.1387 in the view 
of the Prosecution, the factual elements of forced marriage include sexual slavery 
in a marital‑like union, the imposition of marital status by coercion or threat, 
forced labour, reduction to a servile status, the impossibility of escape or seeking 
assistance from relatives, and widespread stigmatisation and discrimination 
against bush wives, which complicates their return to their communities.1388 The 
Prosecution stated that forced marriage:
‘consists of words or other conduct intended to confer a status of marriage by force 
or coercion, such as that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological 
oppression or abuse of power against the victim or by taking advantage of a 
coercive environment, with the intention of conferring the status of marriage.’1389
1385 afrc Trial Judgement, paras.  92–95. The rationale behind the rule against duplicity is as 
follows: when an accused is charged with more than one offence under the same count, it 
becomes difficult for him to completely understand the nature and cause of the charges brought 
against him (this requirement is codified in article 17(4)(a) ScSL Statute) and to understand 
which of the crimes he should be defending himself against, which may prejudice a fair trial 
(afrc Trial Judgement paras.  92–94 and afrc rule 98 Decision, Separate concurring 
opinion of Justice Sebutinde, paras. 3–9). 
1386 in her dissent, Justice Doherty argued it would have been more appropriate to leave the sexual 
slavery charge intact by only severing ‘and any other form of sexual violence’ from this charge 
(afrc Trial Judgement, Dissenting opinion Justice Doherty, para. 12 and oosterveld 2009, 
p. 106). This suggestion was taken to heart by the rUf Trial chamber (see paragraph 2.3.1).
1387 afrc Trial Judgement, paras. 697 and 701–703. See also afrc rule 98 Decision, Separate 
concurring opinion of Justice Sebutinde, para. 14. However, research shows that many wives 
in fact did not have to perform any domestic duties, or had to do fewer domestic duties than 
non‑married girls (inter alia coulter 2009, p. 112). See also chapter 3.
1388 Summarised in the afrc Trial Judgement, Dissenting opinion Justice Doherty, para. 16.
1389 afrc Trial Judgement, para. 701.
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The Trial chamber, after examining the whole of the evidence in the case, found 
that the evidence of forced marriage adduced by the Prosecution did not establish 
the elements of an offence of forced marriage independent of the crime of sexual 
slavery under article  2(g) ScSL Statute.1390 The Trial chamber held that the 
Prosecution did not succeed in presenting evidence of a single forced marriage 
that did not amount to sexual slavery. in other words, the chamber found that the 
evidence completely corresponded with the crime of sexual slavery meaning that 
it cannot amount to a separate crime under the clause of ‘other inhumane acts’.
The Trial chamber defined sexual slavery as ‘the perpetrator’s exercising any 
or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership over one or more persons 
by imposing on them a deprivation of liberty, and causing them to engage in 
one or more acts of a sexual nature’.1391 The chamber considered that the forced 
marriages involved the abduction of women and their detention with afrc 
troops, where the individual rebels took these women as their wives. in the view 
of the chamber, the relationship between the perpetrator and the victim was one 
of ownership (element 1 of the crime of sexual slavery) and involved the exercise 
of control over the victim’s sexuality, movements and labour. for example, in 
addition to acts of a sexual nature (element 2 of the crime of sexual slavery) the 
bush wives were forced to wash, cook and clean for their husbands.1392
in the eyes of the Trial chamber, the use of the term ‘wife’ by the rebels was 
an indication of their intent to exercise ownership over the victims and not an 
indication of their intent to assume a conjugal relationship with the victims, with 
mutual rights and obligations.1393 in this regard the Trial chamber considers 
that ‘while the relationship of the rebels to their “wives” was generally one of 
exclusive ownership, the victim could be passed on or given to another rebel at 
the discretion of the perpetrator.’1394 The chamber deemed that there were in 
fact no ‘marriages’: the victims did not consider themselves to be married; they 
testified that they had been ‘taken as wives’, and there was no evidence that any 
of the women stayed on with their husbands after the conflict.1395 in light of 
these deliberations, the Trial chamber found by a majority, with Justice Doherty 
1390 afrc Trial Judgement, para. 704.
1391 afrc Trial Judgement, para. 708.
1392 although there were also exceptions to this rule, as some women were not forced to work 
around the house (see afrc Trial Judgement, para.  1093). and coulter found that the 
majority of wives, especially those married to rebels of higher rank, were not forced to perform 
domestic duties (coulter 2009, p. 112).
1393 See infra outrages upon personal dignity.
1394 afrc Trial Judgement, para. 711.
1395 afrc Trial Judgement, para. 712. Later, it became evident that some victims did in fact stay on 
with their rebel husbands, but at the time of the Trial Judgement there was no hard evidence 
that this was the case. However, experts had testified that some of the victims remained in the 
forced marriage after the conflict, for various reasons, including rejection by their family and 
community or a sense of obligation to raise the children born from the forced marriage (see 
afrc Trial Judgement, Dissenting opinion Justice Doherty, para. 45; afrc expert report 
Bangura, inter alia p. 20 and afrc expert report Thorsen, p. 16).
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dissenting (see paragraph 2.2.3), that the evidence of forced marriage adduced 
by the Prosecution was completely subsumed under the crime of sexual slavery 
and saw no lacuna in the law that would necessitate a separate crime of forced 
marriage as an ‘other inhumane act.’ The chamber further dismissed count 8 
(other inhumane acts) for redundancy by reasoning that forced marriage is 
subsumed under the crime of sexual slavery and this crime is addressed by count 
9. it should be reiterated that count 7, which charged the accused with sexual 
slavery and any other form of sexual violence, had been dismissed entirely as 
constituting duplicity.1396
The chamber then proceeded to discuss the evidence of sexual slavery as 
an outrage upon personal dignity. The Trial chamber found that the fact that 
women were forcibly abducted, put in detention with the rebels and made to 
travel together with the troops, that they were executed or severely punished 
when they tried to escape, that they were placed under full control and were 
distributed to rebels to be their wives, that they were labelled as ‘wife’ (which is 
in this context a label of possession), that they were physically punished if the 
exclusive relationship with their husbands was violated or if they misbehaved in 
the eyes of their husbands,1397 and that they were forced to work for the rebels, are 
all indicative of the deprivation of the abducted women’s liberty and the rebels’ 
exercise of ownership over them. combined with the fact that the rebels forced 
their wives to engage in acts of a sexual nature under circumstances that were 
so coercive that the victims were unable to give genuine consent, the chamber 
concluded that the actus reus and mens rea of the crime of sexual slavery were 
satisfied.1398 The Trial chamber considered that some women were accorded 
certain benefits as the wife of a rebel with a high rank and were, for example, not 
forced to cook or clean. However, this did not change the status of these women 
who remained in sexual slavery. Hence, these benefits were only relative and did 
not in any way undermine the seriousness of the acts committed against them.1399 
The Trial chamber thus found all three accused criminally responsible for sexual 
slavery as a form of outrages upon personal dignity, pursuant to article 3(e) ScSL 
Statute. Brima and Kanu were each sentenced to a single term of imprisonment of 
50 years, and Kamara to a single term of imprisonment of 45 years.1400
1396 afrc Trial Judgement, paras. 713–714 and 719.
1397 according to several witnesses, the marriages in the Koinadugu and Bombali districts were 
regulated by one of the rebels in charge (‘five‑five’, which was one of the aliases of the accused 
Kanu). He distributed the women among his men, issued a disciplinary order regulating the 
conduct of the women and punished adultery (afrc Trial Judgement, paras. 1122–1123 and 
1138–1139).
1398 afrc Trial Judgement, paras. 1105, 1114, 1126, 1130, 1141, 1159, 1165, 1169, 1183 and 1185.
1399 afrc Trial Judgement, paras. 1156, 1160 and 1184. See also afrc Trial Judgement, Dissenting 
opinion Justice Doherty, para. 41.
1400 The accused were also found guilty of, inter alia, the crimes against humanity of extermination, 
murder, rape and enslavement.
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appended to the Trial Judgement are a separate concurring and a partly 
dissenting opinion of two of the Trial chamber judges. Both opinions offer a 
further exploration of the issue of forced marriage and are discussed below.
2.2.2. The separate concurring opinion of Justice Sebutinde
Because she was of the opinion that the relatively novel offence of forced marriage, 
which had thus far not received much attention, merited deeper analysis, Justice 
Sebutinde wrote a separate concurring opinion in which she examined the 
phenomenon of forced marriage in the context of the Sierra Leone conflict and its 
characterisation as a crime under international law.1401 Sebutinde agreed with the 
Trial chamber that the forced marriages that occurred in the context of the civil 
war in Sierra Leone are a form of sexual violence and bear all the hallmarks of 
the crime against humanity of sexual slavery. This is because ‘the sexual element 
inherent in these acts tends to dominate the other elements therein such as forced 
labour and other forced conjugal duties.’1402 She therefore fully endorsed the Trial 
chamber’s finding in this matter and saw no reason for recognising a separate 
crime of forced marriage as an ‘other inhumane act’.1403
Sebutinde’s concurring opinion is interesting, because she used the report of 
the Prosecution expert to draw a distinction between early or arranged marriages 
in peace time and forced marriages during (armed) conflict. To characterise forced 
marriage during armed conflict as a crime under international Humanitarian 
Law, Sebutinde relies on the description of the relationship between the victim 
and her husband that was given by Prosecution expert witness Zainab Bangura. 
at the request of the Prosecution, Bangura wrote an expert report on forced 
marriages in the context of the civil war in Sierra Leone.1404 Bangura wrote that 
women had to endure terrible ordeals during the civil war, ranging from repeated 
rapes to beatings and mutilations. However, in her opinion, the most devastating 
effect of the war on women was the phenomenon ‘bush wife’.1405 She emphasises 
that the rebels’ use of the word ‘wife’ was strategic and deliberate. By labelling a 
girl ‘wife’, a rebel demonstrated the permanence of the association and his control 
over the victim, and made it clear that no other man could touch her.1406 as regards 
the role expected of these bush wives, Bangura noted that they were required to 
carry out all duties of a wife and more: a bush wife had to carry her husband’s 
1401 afrc Trial Judgement, Separate concurring opinion of Justice Sebutinde, paras. 1–2.
1402 afrc Trial Judgement, Separate concurring opinion of Justice Sebutinde, paras. 16 and 18; 
and afrc rule 98 Decision, Separate concurring opinion of Justice Sebutinde, para. 14.
1403 afrc Trial Judgement, Separate concurring opinion of Justice Sebutinde, paras. 16 and 18.
1404 for the purpose of Bangura’s report, over 100 (former) bush wives living in several districts 
in Sierra Leone were interviewed. in addition, parents of victims of forced marriages were 
questioned, as were numerous religious and traditional leaders (afrc expert report Bangura, 
pp. 7–8).
1405 See afrc expert report Bangura, p. 6.
1406 afrc expert report Bangura, p. 15.
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belongings while she journeyed through the country with him, cook, wash and 
clean for him, gratify his sexual wishes without question, show him loyalty and 
reward him with love and affection for his protection. regarding the element of 
sexual abuse, Justice Sebutinde stated that the Prosecution expert found that all 
the victims that were interviewed for the purpose of her expert report, admitted, 
without exception, that they had been repeatedly raped or sexually abused by 
their rebel husbands while in confinement.1407
on the basis of this report as well as on the basis of numerous witness 
testimonies, Judge Sebutinde was of the view that the elements of the act of forced 
marriage are satisfied by the elements of the crime of sexual slavery. However, 
Justice Doherty was diametrically opposed to this conclusion.
2.2.3. The partly dissenting opinion of Justice Doherty
Justice Doherty’s partly dissenting opinion relates to the Trial chamber’s findings 
on count 7 (sexual slavery and any other form of sexual violence) and count 8 
(‘other inhumane acts’).1408 important with respect to forced marriage are her 
remarks about count 8, as she argues that forced marriage should be distinguished 
from sexual slavery because it constitutes a crime against humanity in itself. 
Doherty pays much attention to the specific consequences of the forced marriages 
that took place during the Sierra Leonean conflict. She takes into consideration 
the long‑term stigmatisation and discrimination of the bush wives and the fact 
that many were rejected by their families and/or communities. The victims feared 
reprisals, due to the widespread belief that they were tainted and had acquired 
rebel behaviour and as a consequence, many women remained in their forced 
marriages.1409 Justice Doherty also takes into account the serious psychological 
and moral traumas the women endured, who in most cases were forced to live 
with men whom they feared and/or hated.1410 it is especially the stigmatisation 
as ‘bush wife’ that leads Doherty to the conclusion that forced marriages must 
be distinguished from sexual slavery. The label of ‘wife’ indicated a more or less 
exclusive relationship with one man and caused mental trauma, stigmatised the 
victim and stymied her reintegration into her community. Doherty asserts that a 
forced marriage does not necessarily involve acts of physical or sexual violence, 
but that the crime is primarily concerned with the mental and moral suffering of 
the victim.1411 in her opinion, the crucial element is ‘the imposition, by threat or 
1407 afrc Trial Judgement, Separate concurring opinion of Justice Sebutinde, paras. 13–15.
1408 Partly Dissenting opinion, para. 12.
1409 afrc Trial Judgement, Dissenting opinion Justice Doherty, paras. 33 and 45.
1410 afrc Trial Judgement, Dissenting opinion Justice Doherty, para. 48.
1411 afrc Trial Judgement, Dissenting opinion Justice Doherty, para.  70. See also T. Doherty, 
‘Developments in the prosecution of gender‑based crimes – the Special court for Sierra Leone 
experience’, American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & The Law (17) 2009, p. 332.
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physical force arising from the perpetrator’s words or other conduct, of a forced 
conjugal association by the perpetrator over the victim.’1412
Doherty continues by discussing several international treaties and domestic 
laws and concludes that a marriage is a relationship that is founded on the mutual 
consent of both spouses. in a forced marriage, the consent of one or both parties 
is absent, as a result of which the victim – or victims if both spouses were forced 
to marry – is forced into a conjugal relation which leads to a severe violation of 
the right to self‑determination. The next question that she addresses is whether 
a forced marriage inflicts great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental 
or physical health, and whether it is of a gravity similar to the acts listed under 
article  2(a) to (h) ScSL Statute. Doherty is satisfied that the circumstances as 
described above meet this threshold. on these accounts, Doherty found that the 
actus reus and the mens rea of the clause ‘other inhumane acts’ are satisfied, and 
stated that in her view, forced marriage constitutes a crime against humanity, 
distinct from sexual slavery.1413
2.2.4.  The appeal
The Trial Judgement – in which the Trial chamber had ruled that forced marriage 
constitutes sexual slavery – was appealed by the Prosecutor and the accused 
on different grounds. for the purpose of this book, the analysis is limited to 
the Prosecution’s seventh ground of appeal: the ground that concerns the Trial 
chamber’s dismissal of count 8 of the indictment, which charged the accused 
with the crime against humanity of ‘other inhumane acts’. The Prosecution 
argued that the Trial chamber erred by finding that the evidence adduced by 
the Prosecution did not establish the elements of a non‑sexual crime of forced 
marriage independent of the crime of sexual slavery under article  2(g) ScSL 
Statute.1414 in its appeal Brief, the Prosecution contended that forced marriage is 
distinct from sexual slavery, as the former is aimed at forcibly conferring the status 
of marriage, resulting in a forced conjugal association which is not predominantly 
sexual since it does not necessarily involve non‑consensual sex.1415 The Prosecutor 
asserted that forced marriage constitutes a human rights violation, even outside 
the context of an armed conflict or widespread or systematic attack against a 
civilian population. But when committed in an armed conflict or as part of such 
an attack, the gravity of forced marriage is enhanced. in that situation, the victim 
is held captive as the wife of one of the perpetrators of the attack, which causes 
great suffering to the victim, regardless of whether she is forced to have sex with 
her rebel husband or forced to perform domestic labour.1416 on these grounds, the 
1412 afrc Trial Judgement, Dissenting opinion Justice Doherty, paras. 52–53.
1413 afrc Trial Judgement, Dissenting opinion Justice Doherty, paras. 50–51, 57, 69 and 71.
1414 afrc Prosecution appeal Brief, paras. 584–587 and afrc appeal Judgement, para. 177.
1415 afrc Prosecution appeal Brief, paras. 614–616.
1416 afrc Prosecution appeal Brief, paras. 618–621.
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Prosecution submitted that the imposition of forced marital status is as grave as 
other crimes against humanity such as imprisonment and therefore amounts to 
an ‘other inhumane act’.1417
Based on the evidence in the record, the appeals chamber found that, 
while sexual slavery and forced marriage do have certain elements in common 
(non‑consensual sex and deprivation of liberty), there are also distinguishing 
factors, as a consequence of which the forced marriages that took place in the 
context of the civil war in Sierra Leone are not subsumed under the crime of 
sexual slavery. The appeals chamber based its conclusion that forced marriage is 
distinct from sexual slavery on two theses.
first, a forced marriage involves a coerced conjugal association, which results 
in great suffering, or serious physical or mental injury on the part of the victim.1418 
The appeals chamber concluded that the perpetrators intended to impose a 
conjugal association rather than exercise ownership over women and girls.1419 
The chamber based this conclusion on the fact that the women were coerced to 
perform a variety of conjugal duties including regular sexual intercourse, forced 
domestic labour and forced pregnancy. in return, the rebel husband was expected 
to give food, clothing and protection to his wife, acts that were not required when 
a woman was used for sexual purposes only.1420
The second reason why forced marriage should be distinguished from sexual 
slavery is that forced marriage implies a relationship of exclusivity between the 
perpetrator and his wife, whereas victims of sexual slavery are often subjected 
to multiple rapists.1421 in some cases, breach of this exclusive relationship was 
sanctioned with physical punishment.1422
The appeals chamber concluded that the act of forced marriage satisfies the 
elements of ‘other inhumane acts’. The first requirement (i.e. infliction of great 
suffering, or serious injury to body or mental or physical health, by means of 
an inhumane act) is fulfilled, seeing as the victims of forced marriages endured 
physical injury (repeated rape and sexual violence, forced labour, corporal 
punishment and deprivation of liberty) as well as psychological trauma (by being 
forced to watch the killing or torture of close family members before becoming 
wives of the rebels who committed these nefarious acts and by being labelled 
‘wife’ which caused stigma).1423 concerning the gravity of the conduct – the 
1417 afrc Prosecution appeal Brief, paras. 617 and 624; and afrc appeal Judgement, para. 178.
1418 afrc appeal Judgement, para. 190.
1419 Whereas the Trial chamber found the opposite when it stated that the use of the term ‘wife’ by 
the perpetrator indicates an intent to exercise ownership over the victim rather than an intent 
to assume a (quasi‑)marital status with the victim (afrc Trial Judgement, para. 711).
1420 afrc appeal Judgement, para.  190. in traditional Sierra Leonean marriages, a husband is 
required to provide his wife with food, clothing and shelter (coulter 2009, p. 79).
1421 The expert witness in the rUf Trial Judgement noted that numerous women were abducted 
and not assigned as bush wives. They remained under the control of the rUf fighters and were 
forced to have sex with various rebels (rUf Trial Judgement, para. 1409, footnote 2619).
1422 afrc appeal Judgement, paras. 192 and 195.
1423 afrc appeal Judgement, para. 199.
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second requirement of other inhumane acts – the appeals chamber was satisfied 
that forced marriages are of similar gravity to several listed crimes against 
humanity.1424
in other words, the appeals chamber recognised, for the first time in the 
history of international criminal law, that forced marriages can constitute a crime 
against humanity, charged as an ‘other inhumane act’, under international law. 
even though the appeals chamber was aware that convicting the accused of 
this crime would reflect their full culpability, it did not enter such convictions, 
irrespective of the fact that entering cumulative convictions for both ‘outrages 
upon personal dignity’ and ‘other inhumane acts’ on the same facts was possible 
(see paragraph  2.3.1 for cumulative convictions in the rUf case). The appeal 
chamber confined itself to holding that it was convinced that society’s disapproval 
of the forced marriages that took place in Sierra Leone was adequately reflected 
by recognising that this practice is criminal and that it constitutes an ‘other 
inhumane act’.1425
2.2.5. Appraisal of the AFRC judgements
Based on the same evidence, the Trial chamber and the appeals chamber reached 
entirely different conclusions with regard to the issue of forced marriage: whereas 
the former was of the opinion that the forced marriages that occurred during the 
armed conflict in Sierra Leone could be classified as sexual slavery, the latter went 
to great lengths to invalidate this conclusion and concluded that forced marriage 
is distinct from sexual slavery, because it involves a forced conjugal association 
and because it implies a relationship of exclusivity between the victim and the 
perpetrator. on the basis of those two distinctions, the appeals chamber held 
that forced marriage is not a predominately sexual crime and found ‘that no 
tribunal could reasonably have found that forced marriage was subsumed in the 
crime against humanity of sexual slavery.’1426
The appeals chamber’s statement that the exclusivity of the relationship is one 
of the factors that distinguish forced marriage from sexual slavery is remarkable 
when taking into consideration that the icTY in the Kunarac et al. case held that 
exclusivity can be indicative of slavery: witness D.B. testified that she was taken to 
a house in miljevina where ‘each soldier took one girl exclusively for himself.’1427 
The icTY Trial chamber stated that assertion of exclusivity is one of the factors 
that should be taken into consideration when determining whether enslavement 
1424 afrc appeal Judgement, para. 200.
1425 afrc appeal Judgement, para. 202.
1426 afrc appeal Judgement, para. 195.
1427 Kunarac et al. Trial Judgement, para. 225. reiterating: the icTY Statute does not contain the 
crime of sexual slavery.
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was committed.1428 moreover, ‘exclusivity’ is also a remarkable element because it 
does not do justice to the reality of many of the forced marriages in Sierra Leone: 
although many women were abused exclusively by their rebel husband, some 
were also given to other rebels.1429 This makes it difficult to comprehend exactly 
how the appeals chamber envisaged that exclusivity makes a forced marriage 
substantively different from (sexual) slavery.
as regards the second distinctive element of forced marriage: the appeals 
chamber held that the afrc rebels intended to impose a conjugal association 
instead of exercise ownership over women and girls. it seems that the appeals 
chamber believes that the two are mutually exclusive: yet is exercise of ownership 
not also possible within a conjugal association?1430
This brings to the fore the definition of forced marriage. The appeals chamber 
held that forced marriage involves:
‘a perpetrator compelling a person by force or threat of force, through the words 
or conduct of the perpetrator or those associated with him, into a forced conjugal 
association with another person resulting in great suffering, or serious physical or 
mental injury on the part of the victim.’1431
The only clarification the appeals chamber offers is that this forced conjugal 
association is exclusive in nature, but it does not define any of the other 
elements.1432 This leaves several questions unanswered: What exactly constitutes 
a ‘forced conjugal association’? is domestic labour (or, as the appeals chamber 
labels it: ‘conjugal duties’1433) required in this association? is the perpetrator’s mere 
declaration that the victim is his wife enough to satisfy the actus reus of the crime, 
or are further acts of force and violence, such as rape or forced labour necessary? 
in other words: is forced marriage a declarative act that does not require additional 
criminal acts? are there any temporal requirements such as the duration of the 
conjugal association?1434 is it relevant that the bush marriages were not regarded 
1428 Kunarac et al. Trial Judgement, para. 543. These factors were confirmed by the icTY appeals 
chamber (Kunarac et al. appeal Judgement, para. 119).
1429 Trc report 2004–3B, p.  164: ‘women’s so‑called “husbands” would offer them to fellow 
combatants for sexual purposes’.
1430 See also chapter 10, paragraph 3.3.2.3.
1431 afrc appeal Judgement, para. 195.
1432 Which is not surprising, since the appeals chamber evaluated forced marriage in the context 
of the elements of ‘other inhumane acts’ (oosterveld 2011, p. 65).
1433 afrc appeal Judgement, paras. 190–191.
1434 gong‑gershowitz 2009, p. 71. gong‑gershowitz also raises a question concerning the element 
of exclusivity: she wonders whether the relationship needs to be bilaterally exclusive, or 
whether ‘the exclusivity factor (is; iH) solely determined by reference to the victim.’ it would 
seem that the appeals chamber assumed the exclusivity to be reciprocal in nature: ‘forced 
marriage implies a relationship of exclusivity between the “husband” and “wife,” which could 
lead to disciplinary consequences for breach of this exclusive arrangement’ (afrc appeal 
Judgement, para. 195, emphasis added).
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as valid marriages outside of the bush context? as will be demonstrated below in 
paragraph 2.3, these definitional ambiguities led to difficulties in the rUf trial.
further, it appears that the appeals chamber struggled to determine the 
specific harm caused by a forced marriage. The appeals chamber argued that the 
act of forcing someone to enter into a conjugal association in itself causes great 
suffering and can therefore amount to an ‘other inhumane act’. But in order to 
substantiate this claim, the chamber referred to the fact that the victims endured 
physical injury (repeated rape and sexual violence, forced labour, corporal 
punishment and deprivation of liberty) as well as psychological trauma (by being 
forced to watch the killing or torture of close family members before becoming 
wives of the rebels who committed these nefarious acts and by being labelled 
‘wife’).1435 obviously, the chamber conflates the facts: a forced marriage in itself 
does not cause physical injury – it is the (sexual) violence that takes place within 
this forced marriage that causes this injury.
another point that is worth mentioning is that the appeals chamber, 
by classifying sexual intercourse and household tasks such as cooking and 
cleaning as conjugal duties,1436 instead of defining them as rape and forced 
labour respectively, reinforced stereotypes of women’s roles in international 
jurisprudence, allowing them to perpetuate.1437 finally, it deserves to be noted 
that the reason the appeals chamber gave for its decision not to enter convictions 
– a decision which is within the discretion of the appeals chamber – for forced 
marriages as an ‘other inhumane act’ is slightly curious. The appeals chamber 
did not enter new convictions because it held that society’s disapproval of the 
forced marriages that took place in Sierra Leone was adequately reflected by the 
appeals chamber’s recognition that this practice is criminal and constitutes an 
‘other inhumane act’. This may be so, but society (and victims) would arguably 
benefit more from an actual conviction.
2 .3. THe rUf caSe
2.3.1. Pre‑trial proceedings and the trial
The trial against foday Saybana Sankoh, Sam Bockarie, issa Hassan Sesay, morris 
Kallon and augustine gbao, five former leaders of the rUf, commenced on 
5 July 2004. The Trial chamber heard evidence on 18 counts, three of which are 
relevant in the context of forced marriage: the crimes against humanity of sexual 
slavery and any other form of sexual violence (count 7) and other inhumane acts, 
encompassing forced marriage (count 8), and the war crime of outrages upon 
1435 afrc appeal Judgement, para. 199.
1436 afrc appeals chamber, para. 190; and also rUf Trial chamber, para. 1293.
1437 See also gong‑gershowitz 2009, p. 60.
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personal dignity (count 9). The similarities with the afrc indictment are obvious 
and like the afrc Trial chamber, the rUf Trial chamber deemed count 7 to 
be bad for duplicity as it charged the two separate and distinct crimes of sexual 
slavery and any other form of sexual violence. However, instead of dismissing the 
count in its entirety, as was done in the afrc trial, the chamber considered the 
remedies available to it as outlined by the appeals chamber in the afrc case1438 
and concluded that the appropriate remedy was to strike out the charge of ‘any 
other form of sexual violence’ and hear evidence regarding sexual slavery only.1439
The Trial chamber stated that it would adopt the appeals chamber’s 
definition of forced marriage as set out in the afrc appeal Judgement and held 
that the imposition of a forced conjugal association forms the actus reus of this 
offence.1440 it was satisfied that in relation to count 8 (other inhumane acts) this 
requirement was fulfilled by the conduct described by multiple reliable witnesses 
that rUf rebels captured women and took them as their wives.1441 Trapped in 
unwanted wedlock, the victims were forced to serve their husbands, meaning they 
were compelled to be subject to their husbands’ sexual desires and wash, cook 
and clean for them.1442 on the basis of these factual findings, the Trial chamber 
also concluded that the perpetrators exercised powers attaching to the right of 
ownership over these women and thus committed the crime of sexual slavery.1443 
The chamber justified these cumulative convictions by stating that the offence of 
forced marriage is distinct from the offence of sexual slavery. The Trial chamber 
referred to the appeals chamber which has explicitly held that the former crime 
is not subsumed under the latter: the distinctive elements being ‘a forced conjugal 
association based on exclusivity between the perpetrator and victim’. and this 
forced conjugal association carries with it ‘a lasting social stigma which hampers 
(the victims’; iH) recovery and reintegration into society.’1444 for this reason, the 
Trial chamber found a conviction for both crimes permissible.1445 furthermore, 
the Trial chamber was satisfied that these forced marriages also constituted ‘a 
severe humiliation, degradation and violation of the dignity of the victims’ and 
thus constituted the war crime of outrages upon personal dignity.1446 in addition, 
the chamber held that forced marriages were committed with the specific intent 
1438 according to afrc appeal Judgement, para. 108, these remedies include, inter alia, ‘quashing 
the count, ordering that the indictment be amended, (…) and refusing to consider evidence of 
one of the two charges so as to eliminate the duplicity of count 7.’
1439 rUf Trial Judgement, paras.  457–458. as was suggested in the afrc Trial Judgement, 
Dissenting opinion Justice Doherty, para. 12.
1440 The afrc appeals chamber chose different words to describe the actus reus, viz. ‘to compel a 
person (…) to serve as a conjugal partner’ (afrc appeal Judgement, paras. 190 and 196).
1441 rUf Trial Judgement, para. 1295. 
1442 rUf Trial Judgement, paras. 1155, 1212 and 1293.
1443 rUf Trial Judgement, para. 1581.
1444 rUf Trial Judgement, para. 1296.
1445 rUf Trial Judgement, para. 2307.
1446 rUf Trial Judgement, paras. 1298, 1301 and 1474.
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of terrorising the Sierra Leonean civilian population and break family and social 
bonds, and therefore amounted to an act of terror.1447
concluding, the Trial chamber found the accused guilty of inter alia the 
war crimes of extermination, collective punishment, pillage, acts of terrorism 
and outrages upon personal dignity, and the crimes against humanity of murder, 
rape, sexual slavery, forced marriage (as an inhumane act) and enslavement.1448 
Sesay, Kallon and gbao were each sentenced to total terms of imprisonment of 52, 
40 and 25 years respectively.1449
2.3.2. The appeal
Both the Prosecution and the accused appealed the Trial chamber’s judgement, 
filing a considerable number of grounds for appeal.1450 regarding the offence of 
forced marriage, Sesay’s 39th ground for appeal is interesting. This ground argued 
that the Trial chamber should have assessed whether the forced marriages became 
consensual during the indictment period and that it had erred because it had 
not done so.1451 moreover, Sesay contended that the Trial chamber erred in law 
and fact several times with regard to the consideration of coercive circumstances 
and the absence of the victim’s consent to and within forced marriages.1452 The 
appeals chamber replied by stating that the absence of consent is not an element 
of forced marriage. referring to the appeal Judgements in the Kunarac et al. and 
Gacumbitsi cases, the appeal chamber stated that the Trial chamber is free to 
infer non‑consent from the background circumstances of a crime. in this case 
the victims were forced into conjugal relationships resulting in severe suffering 
as part of a widespread and systematic attack against a civilian population. These 
hostile and coercive circumstances serve to prove that genuine consent was 
impossible.1453
2.3.3. Appraisal of the RUF judgements
in the rUf case, the Trial chamber applied the definition of forced marriage given 
by the appeals chamber in the afrc case, and concluded that the actus reus 
of this crime consists of ‘the imposition of a forced conjugal association’.1454 But 
1447 rUf Trial Judgement, paras. 1349, 1352 and 1365.
1448 Sesay, Kallon and gbao were found guilty of committing forced marriages by participating 
in a joint criminal enterprise (rUf Trial Judgement, Disposition). on the doctrine of joint 
criminal enterprise, see L.D. Yanev, Joint Criminal Enterprise. A Flawed Legal Doctrine or a 
Cornerstone of International Criminal Law? (forthcoming).
1449 rUf Sentencing Judgement, Disposition.
1450 Sesay, Kallon and gbao each filed a total of 58, 75 and 42 grounds for appeal respectively. The 
Prosecution filed three grounds for appeal.
1451 rUf appeal Judgement, para. 728.
1452 rUf appeal Judgement, paras. 728–730.
1453 rUf appeal Judgement, paras. 733, 734 and 736.
1454 rUf Trial Judgement, para. 1295.
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because of the indeterminateness of this element, the Trial chamber experienced 
several difficulties when applying it. for example, as mentioned earlier, the Trial 
chamber entered cumulative convictions for inter alia sexual slavery and forced 
marriage. The test to determine the permissibility of cumulative convictions that 
was used by the Trial chamber was formulated in the Čelebići appeal Judgement: 
an accused may be convicted under different statutory provisions based on the 
same conduct to the extent that each provision requires proof of a materially 
distinct element that is not required by the other provision. if this is not the case, 
cumulative conviction is impermissible and instead, the more specific provision 
(lex specialis) should be applied.1455 When justifying the cumulative convictions, 
the Trial chamber held that the distinctive elements of forced marriage with 
regard to sexual slavery are (1) a forced conjugal association which is (2) based 
on exclusivity between the perpetrator and victim.1456 However, during the 
evaluation of the evidence and the discussion of the legal and factual findings, the 
Trial chamber failed to draw (such) a clear distinction between the two crimes 
and in fact conflated them, by using the same facts interchangeably to prove both 
charges.1457 for example, the Trial chamber alternatively used the label ‘wife’ 
to demonstrate an ‘exclusive relationship’ required for forced marriage, and to 
demonstrate ‘the exercise of powers attaching to the right of ownership’ required 
for sexual slavery.1458 at other times, the Trial chamber used evidence of the 
perpetrator’s exercise of control and ownership over his victim as support for 
finding that this conduct constituted forced marriage:
‘The chamber also finds that the perpetrators intended to exercise control and 
ownership over their victims who were unable to leave or escape for fear that 
they would be killed or sent to the front lines as combatants. accordingly, the 
chamber finds that young girls and women were intentionally forced into conjugal 
relationships with rebels.’1459
and by holding that a rebel commander known as ‘Superman’ ‘exercised the 
rights of ownership over Tf1–093 by virtue of this (forced; iH) exclusive conjugal 
1455 Čelebići appeal Judgement, paras. 412–413.
1456 The Trial chamber also adopted ‘assertion of exclusivity’ as identified by the icTY in Kunarac 
et al. as an indication of enslavement (rUf Trial Judgement, para. 160).
1457 gong‑gershowitz 2009, p. 73. compare oosterveld 2011, pp. 72–73, who calls this approach 
(i.e. analysing the evidence of sexual slavery and forced marriage together) intersectionality 
and argues that it allowed for a better recognition of the actual context in which the crimes took 
place. She does, however, acknowledge that this approach could be criticised for potentially 
blurring the lines between the two acts.
1458 gong‑gershowitz 2009, p. 75. See also rUf Trial Judgement, para. 1466: ‘The chamber finds 
that the use of the term “wife” by the rebels was deliberate and strategic, with the aim of 
enslaving and psychologically manipulating the women and with the purpose of treating them 
like possessions.’ Whereas the appeals chamber in the afrc case held that the use of the term 
“wife” was indicative of the perpetrator’s intent to confer a marital status on the victim.
1459 rUf Trial Judgement, para. 1467.
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relationship with the victim,’1460 the Trial chamber mixed up the different 
material elements of sexual slavery and forced marriage. Whereas the appeals 
chamber held that exclusivity distinguishes forced marriage from sexual slavery, 
the Trial chamber seems to share the view of the Kunarac et al. Trial chamber 
that it may be indicative of enslavement (see paragraph 2.2.5 on the appraisal of 
the afrc judgements).
in opaque prose, the Trial chamber probably meant to say that whereas 
forced marriage is not subsumed under sexual slavery, the reverse may be possible: 
where a forced marriage entails the perpetrator’s exercising powers attaching to 
the right of ownership over the victim (his ‘wife’), the act of (sexual) slavery is 
subsumed under the act of forced marriage. indeed, in several instances the Trial 
chamber found that forced marriage constituted sexual slavery and an ‘other 
inhumane act’.1461 This seems to indicate that the Trial chamber in fact opines 
that forced marriage could be a specific form of sexual slavery: sexual slavery 
plus as it were.1462 That is to say, forced marriage may subsume sexual slavery, but 
at the same time has one or more additional elements that make it broader than 
sexual slavery.
2 .4. THe TaYLor caSe
2.4.1. The trial
The former president of Liberia, charles Taylor, was arrested and handed over 
to the ScSL in 2006. Taylor was accused of supporting the afrc and rUf 
during the armed conflict in Sierra Leone by providing military training, 
personnel, financial support, and arms and ammunition.1463 He was charged 
with 17 different counts. most relevant with regard to forced marriage is count 
5: the crime against humanity of sexual slavery.1464 Unlike the afrc and rUf 
consolidated indictments, the Taylor indictment makes no mention of forced 
1460 rUf Trial Judgement, para. 1463. 
1461 rUf Trial Judgement, para. 1464.
1462 gong‑geshowitz 2009, p. 69, who introduced the term, also regards the appeals chamber’s 
analysis of forced marriage as ‘sexual slavery plus’: ‘(w)ithout the elements of sexual slavery, 
the crime of forced marriage as defined by the appeals chamber is, as a matter of fact, distinct 
only in the perpetrator’s use of the term “wife”’.
1463 Prosecution v. Charles Taylor, case No. ScSL‑03‑i, indictment, 7 march 2003.
1464 The initial and first amended indictments contained a count of ‘sexual slavery and any other 
form of sexual violence’, but on 14 may 2007 (probably in light of the afrc Trial Judgement), 
the Prosecution filed a motion for leave to amend the indictment and was granted leave to 
do so by Trial chamber ii. after the amendment, the words ‘and any other form of sexual 
violence’ were deleted from count 5 (see Prosecution v. Charles Taylor, case No. ScSL‑03–
01‑PT, Decision on the Prosecution motion requesting leave to amend indictment, 25  may 
2007).
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marriages, but focuses on the use of women as sex slaves.1465 Part of the evidence 
relating to charges of sexual slavery included extensive testimony by women and 
girls regarding bush marriages. Therefore, the Trial chamber decided to address 
the issue of forced marriage in the context of the charges in the indictment.1466
The Trial chamber departed from the conclusion in the afrc appeal and 
the rUf judgements and returned to the court’s initial (afrc Trial chamber) 
point of view: namely that forced marriage is not a new crime, that it is not a 
distinct inhumane act, but that it is in fact a specific form of (sexual) slavery, 
which it termed ‘conjugal slavery’.1467 at this point, it may be worth noting that 
the Trial chamber in the Taylor case was composed of the same judges as the 
Trial chamber in the afrc case. The Trial chamber considered that conjugal 
slavery does have certain specific characteristics, such as a forced conjugal 
association, exclusivity of the relationship and forced domestic labour, but it 
concluded that these characteristics do not require the conceptualisation of a 
new crime: rather they are descriptive components that fall within the scope of 
(sexual) enslavement. The Trial chamber made a comparison with specific forms 
of rape: gang rape is a distinctive form of rape with distinctive features, yet it 
still falls within the scope of the crime of rape. conjugal slavery is a distinctive 
form of (sexual) slavery, yet it still falls within the scope of the crime of (sexual) 
slavery.1468 The Trial chamber further considered the term ‘forced marriages’ 
to be a wrong and inappropriate label for the ordeal the victims of these forced 
conjugal associations went through. What happened to the victims should be 
regarded as a form of conjugal enslavement: the perpetrators exercised powers 
attaching to the right of ownership over their bush wives and imposed on them 
a deprivation of liberty. all forced acts that took place within these associations, 
sexual as well as non‑sexual, fall within the definition of enslavement.1469 indeed, 
in the chamber’s view, ‘the Prosecution erred in other indictments by charging 
“forced marriage” as a crime that falls within the scope of the crime against 
humanity of other inhumane acts.’1470
The chamber further considered sexual slavery, including the practice of bush 
marriages, to fall within the scope of the war crime of outrages upon personal 
dignity, because it is humiliating and degrading and constitutes a serious attack 
on human dignity.1471
1465 Taylor Second amended indictment, p. 5. However, in the opening Statement, the Prosecution 
did draw attention to the bush wife phenomenon, see Taylor Prosecution opening Statement, 
p. 304.
1466 Taylor Trial Judgement, para. 422. See e.g. Taylor Transcript, 29 January 2009, p. 23862; Taylor 
Transcript, 20 october 2008, pp. 18678 and 18685–18686; and Taylor Transcript 5 march 2008, 
p. 5327.
1467 Taylor Trial Judgement, para. 427.
1468 Taylor Trial Judgement, paras. 429–430.
1469 Taylor Trial Judgement, paras. 425–427.
1470 Taylor Trial Judgement, para. 424.
1471 Taylor Trial Judgement, para.  432. Sexual slavery is not listed as a war crime in the ScSL 
Statute. it is listed as such in the rome Statute.
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The appeals chamber only briefly addressed the forced marriages that took place 
during the civil war, seeing as none of the grounds of appeal were related to this 
practice:
‘The rUf/afrc leadership not only endorsed and perpetrated sexual violence and 
slavery, but also set up an organised system for the commission of these crimes. 
The rUf/afrc leadership promoted sexual violence and slavery by promulgating 
“operation Pay Yourself”, where fighters were encouraged to take anything they 
wanted from the civilians, including wives, who were perceived as chattel. many 
captured young women lived with rUf/afrc commanders, in conjugal servitude, 
and commanders perpetrated rapes. There was a recognised system of ownership 
and hierarchy among captured women in the rebel forces, demonstrated by the 
fact that commanders’ “wives” were accorded “special” treatment. rUf/afrc 
commanders also screened civilians captured by fighters, after which women and 
girls were allowed to be taken by fighters, who then said they had “married” the 
women.’1472
2.4.3. Appraisal of the Taylor judgements
in the Trial Judgement, only nine paragraphs are devoted to the bush marriage 
phenomenon (this is not remarkable seeing as forced marriage was not charged 
in the Taylor case), yet in just three pages, the Trial chamber manages to get 
down to the heart of the matter. The Trial chamber rightly emphasises that the 
bush marriages that took place during the civil war in Sierra Leone are unlawful 
marriages:
‘What happened to the girls and women abducted in Sierra Leone and forced into 
this conjugal association was not marriage in the universally understood sense 
of a consensual and sacrosanct union, and should rather, in the Trial chamber’s 
view, be considered a conjugal form of enslavement.’1473
Yet it is important to keep in mind that the bush marriages could have qualified as 
marriage in the universally understood sense of a sacrosanct union had they been 
recognised as such by the Sierra Leonean community. it goes without saying that 
the treatment of people within a ‘marriage in the universally understood sense of 
a consensual and sacrosanct union’ could also amount to enslavement.1474
1472 Taylor appeal Judgement, para. 266.
1473 Taylor Trial Judgement, para. 427.
1474 See chapter 10. See also Haenen 2013(ii), pp. 895–915.
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3. THe caSe LaW of THe eXTraorDiNarY 
cHamBerS iN THe coUrTS of camBoDia
3.1. TrYiNg THoSe WHo Wer e moST r eSPoNSiBLe: 
THe eccc
The creation of the eccc was the result of a long process of negotiations (starting 
in 1997) between the government of cambodia and the UN. in 2003, the two 
parties reached and signed an agreement concerning the prosecution of crimes 
committed during the period of Democratic Kampuchea (eccc agreement).1475 
The eccc are mandated to try senior leaders of Democratic Kampuchea and 
those who were most responsible for the crimes committed between 17 april 1975 
and 6  January 1979.1476 articles 3 through 8 eccc Law determine the subject 
matter jurisdiction of the Tribunal. Pursuant to these articles, the extraordinary 
chambers have the power to bring to trial all suspects who committed certain 
specified crimes under the 1956 cambodian Penal code, the crime of genocide 
as defined in the genocide convention, specified crimes against humanity, 
grave breaches of the geneva conventions, crimes set forth in the 1954 Hague 
convention for Protection of cultural Property in the event of armed conflict, 
and crimes committed against internationally protected persons pursuant to the 
1961 Vienna convention on Diplomatic relations.
investigations have been opened in four cases. case 001 concerns Kaing guek 
eav, also known as ‘Duch’. The case against Duch, deputy and later chairman of 
the Khmer rouge’s security prisons 21 and 24 (S‑21 and S‑24) primarily focused 
on the detention, torture and killings of cambodians in these security facilities. 
case 002 concerns the two most senior surviving leaders of the Khmer rouge 
regime and is discussed below. investigations with regard to cases 003 and 004 
are ongoing.1477 in these cases, another five persons may be charged; their identity 
is currently confidential.
3.2 . caSe 002: NUoN cHea aND KHieU SamPHaN
in what is generally referred to as case 002, the two most senior surviving leaders 
of the Khmer rouge regime are tried: former Deputy Secretary of the communist 
Party Nuon chea and former Head of State Khieu Samphan.1478 Nuon chea and 
1475 agreement between the United Nations and the royal government of cambodia concerning 
the prosecution under cambodian law of crimes committed during the period of Democratic 
Kampuchea, 6 June 2003.
1476 article 2 eccc Law.
1477 See <www.eccc.gov.kh/en>.
1478 initially, case 002 also included former minister of Social actions ieng Thirith and former 
minister of foreign affairs ieng Sary, but the proceedings against them were terminated as a 
result of Sary’s death in 2013 and Thirith’s unfitness to stand trial due to dementia.
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Khieu Samphan are charged with several counts of genocide, grave breaches of the 
geneva conventions, and crimes against humanity (including enslavement, rape 
and other inhumane acts).1479 according to the closing order in case 002, the 
cPK leaders, including the two accused, had a common purpose which consisted 
of implementing a ‘rapid socialist revolution in cambodia through a “great leap 
forward” and defend(ing; iH) the Party against internal and external enemies, by 
whatever means necessary.’1480 To achieve this common purpose, the cPK leaders 
designed and implemented several policies, one of them being the regulation of 
marriage.1481 regulating marriages all over cambodia enabled the cPK to control 
the sexuality of individuals and their interpersonal interaction. The forced 
marriages as ordered by the cPK leaders are charged as an ‘other inhumane act’. 
on 13 January 2011, the Pre‑Trial chamber confirmed the indictment and sent 
the case to the Trial chamber.
in april 2013, motivated by the advanced age of the accused and uncertainty 
regarding funding of the eccc, the Trial chamber decided to split the 
proceedings in case 002 in three smaller trials in order to reach a timely verdict. 
Trial 002/01 deals with forced movements and related crimes against humanity, 
and the executions of Khmer republic Soldiers committed at Tuol Po chrey in 
the aftermath of the evacuation of Phnom Penh. This trial also considers the roles 
of the accused in the Khmer rouge regime, such as their roles in the creation and 
implementation of the Khmer rouge policies, relevant to all charges set out in the 
indictment, including the act of forced marriage. Trial 002/02 deals with charges 
of genocide and several grave breaches of the geneva conventions, including 
torture, inhumane treatment and unlawful deportation of civilians. Trial 002/03 
concerns the remaining crimes charged in the closing order, i.e. twelve counts of 
crimes against humanity, including forced marriage.1482
at the start of the proceedings in case 002, in 2007, there was no indication 
that this case would take more than a decade to be concluded. as a result 
of the severance of case 002 into three separate trials, which will not be held 
concurrently, it is now expected that the entire case will take until 2021 to 
complete. Based on experiences with case 001, the Trial chamber estimated in 
2013 that a first‑instance verdict in case 002/01 would be issued in the first quarter 
of 2014 and an appeal Judgement 18 months thereafter (late 2015). This means 
that the proceedings in case 002/02 shall commence late 2015/early 2016 and 
the proceedings in case 002/03 ‘(approximately 2016–2017), with a first‑instance 
verdict following a trial (approximately 2019–2020) and decision on any appeal 
1479 case 002 closing order, para. 1613. Nuon chea and Khieu Samphan were also indicted for 
homicide, torture and religious persecution as violations of the 1956 cambodia Penal code, 
but in September 2011, the Trial chamber ruled out all charges under the 1956 Penal code of 
cambodia from the case 002 indictment (see case 002 Severance order).
1480 case 002 closing order, para. 156.
1481 case 002 closing order, para. 157.
1482 case 002, Decision on Severance of case 002 following Supreme court chamber Decision of 
8 february 2013, 26 april 2013 (annex 6).
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to follow (approximately 2020–2021)’.1483 Taking into consideration the advanced 
age of the accused, the chances of them both living to see the conclusion of all 
sub‑trials are slim. indeed, at the rate the proceedings are currently going, case 
002/01 may very well be the only trial to ever reach verdict. This would be a missed 
opportunity, seeing as the majority of alleged crimes would not be addressed. in 
order to expedite the proceedings, the Supreme court chamber ordered in July 
2013 that the evidentiary hearings in case 002/02 are to commence as soon as 
possible after the closing submissions in case 002/01, meaning that a second trial 
panel will begin to hear proceedings in case 002/02 while the Trial chamber is 
occupied with drafting the judgement in case 002/01.1484
The author is not in a position to criticise the Trial chamber’s decision to 
sever the proceedings in case 002, yet it seems as though the total length of the 
trial has been extended rather than reduced by severing the proceedings first 
into two different trials and subsequently, after the Supreme court chamber’s 
annulment of this order – a process which also caused delay – into three separate 
trials.
4. coNcLUDiNg remarKS
The ScSL was the first court that was faced with the daunting task of deciding 
whether the act of forced marriage should be subsumed under existing crimes 
against humanity or whether it constitutes a separate crime against humanity. 
Since no other international or international(ised) criminal court or tribunal had 
ever addressed this issue, the ScSL entered uncharted legal area. Understandably, 
the court faced several challenges, the main problem being the definition of the 
act of forced marriage, i.e. its actus reus and (to a lesser degree) mens rea. The legacy 
of the court is unprecedented and constitutes without question an enrichment 
of international criminal law, but nonetheless presents several difficulties and 
ambiguities: no clear definition of forced marriage is given, as a concomitant 
circumstance of which no clear and convincing distinction is made between 
sexual slavery and forced marriage: the ScSL often conflated the two offences. 
The Trial chamber in the afrc case held that the Prosecution did not succeed in 
presenting evidence of a single marriage which did not amount to sexual slavery. 
This is correct: virtually all bush marriages in Sierra Leone resulted in sexual 
slavery. But the question is whether the bush marriages that took place during the 
Sierra Leonean conflict were more than sexual slavery. Numerous authors have 
answered this question with a straightforward yes, having pleaded in favour of 
recognising forced marriage as a distinct crime and have consequently applauded 
1483 case 002, Decision on Severance of case 002 following Supreme court chamber Decision of 
8 february 2013, 26 april 2013 (annex 6), p. 72, footnote 272.
1484 case 002, Decision on immediate appeals against Trial chamber’s second decision – summary 
of reasons, 23 July 2013.
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the afrc appeal and rUf Trial and appeal judgements.1485 However, as argued 
by other authors and in the Taylor Trial Judgement, these particular kinds of 
‘marriages’ bear all the hallmarks of sexual slavery (and enslavement). it seems, 
therefore, that the last chapter on the legal qualification of the practice of forced 
marriage has yet to be written.
The overlap between the Khmer rouge marriages and the crimes of 
enslavement and sexual slavery is less evident, but this practice did result in a 
complete deprivation of people’s autonomy and right to self‑determination.1486 
So could the Khmer rouge marriages (also) qualify as a form of enslavement? 
Phrased differently: could the act which consists of forcing a person to enter into 
a conjugal(‑like) association amount to an exercise of powers attaching to the 
right of ownership? or does this particular act constitute a unique crime which is 
currently not adequately reflected in the statutes of international(ised) courts and 
tribunals, but ought to be included (in the rome Statute) as a separate offence?
These and other questions are addressed in chapter 10.
1485 See e.g. frulli 2008.
1486 case 002 civil Parties’ co‑Lawyers’ Second investigative request concerning forced marriages 
and forced sexual relations, para. 17.
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Specific legislation criminalising the act of forcing someone to enter into a 
marriage is on the rise. During the past decade, many european countries, 
including Belgium, Norway, Denmark, germany, austria and england (as of 
2014), have introduced a specific offence of forced marriage in their criminal laws. 
on the international level, the Sierra Leonean bush wife phenomenon sparked the 
question of whether forced marriage ought to be classified as a ‘new’ crime against 
humanity (i.e. as an ‘other inhumane act’), or whether it is caught by existing 
crimes against humanity such as (sexual) enslavement.
in the previous two chapters, the legal landscapes of Dutch and english 
criminal (and civil) law and international criminal law were described; in 
this chapter, they will be compared with each other on two different levels. 
The first part of this chapter (paragraph  2) compares the english and Dutch 
legal landscapes with each other. in england as well as in the Netherlands, the 
fight against forced marriages is high on the political agenda: mPs and Ngos 
have examined existing and new measures that could be taken to tackle this 
phenomenon and discussions on involving the criminal law have resulted in new 
legislation in both jurisdictions. What will be demonstrated below is the large 
overlap in available measures when it comes to dealing with (intended) forced 
marriages. Specific legislation comparable to the fmcPa does not exist in the 
Netherlands. Nevertheless, as will become evident, there are several comparable 
measures in Dutch law. Two landscapes that at first glance seem very different, 
appear, upon closer inspection, to have many similarities.
The second part of the chapter (paragraph  3) compares the national legal 
frameworks with the international framework.
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2. LeVeL 1: comPariNg DUTcH aND eNgLiSH 
LaW
2.1. THe STarTiNg PoiNT: a Differ eNT PoLicY aND 
Differ eNT LegiSLaTioN
The quintessential difference between the legal measures in the Netherlands and 
in england described in chapter 7, is that england has specific civil and criminal 
legislation for dealing with forced marriages and even has a special taskforce that 
deals exclusively with cases of (threatened) forced marriage. There are several 
explanations for the differences between the english and the Dutch forced 
marriage policy.
first, in england, the practice of forced marriage has been in the spotlight 
for a longer period of time. as a result, more research has been done and a large 
number of Ngos and shelters were created to offer support and advice to victims 
of forced marriage. although there are no exact figures, it does appear (with 
specific emphasis on the word ‘appear’) that relatively more forced marriages take 
place in england than in the Netherlands.1487 The (relatively) higher number of 
cases of forced marriages in england could be a consequence of the fact that the 
practice is more visible than in the Netherlands because forced marriages have 
received media attention since the 1990s (meaning that due to higher awareness, 
more forced marriages are reported). But another explanation might be found in 
the difference in the ethnic composition of minority groups in england, where 
the largest immigrant groups originate from india, Pakistan and Bangladesh, 
and the Netherlands, where the largest immigrant groups come from Turkey and 
morocco.1488
Secondly, it would appear that the colonial past of the United Kingdom plays 
a significant role, at least to some extent, with regard to the approach that is 
taken in tackling the practice of forced marriage. The British policy (centralised 
in the Home office and foreign and commonwealth office) is closely tied up 
with the presence of large migrant communities from former British colonies that 
currently form part of the commonwealth, the main three being india, Pakistan 
and Bangladesh.1489 The majority of forced marriages in england, approximately 
90%, take place among people with a background in these countries.1490 These 
historical ties might also explain the success of the fmU: the UK has had 
dealings with india, Pakistan and Bangladesh since the seventeenth century. 
1487 it is estimated that each year, between 5,000 and 8,000 forced marriages take place in england 
and Wales. in the Netherlands, the government estimates that ‘hundreds’ of forced marriages 
take place every year (see Parliamentary Papers II (Lower House), 2013/13, 32 175, no. 50, p. 1, 
the government has commissioned research into the number of forced marriages taking place 
in the Netherlands). 
1488 To the author’s knowledge no research has been done into this matter.
1489 acVZ 2005, pp. 51–52.
1490 Kazimirski et al. 2009, p. 22.
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as commonwealth countries, the links between countries such as india and 
the UK are of a different nature than the links between the Netherlands and 
morocco or Turkey.1491 especially relevant in the context of the forced marriage 
policy is the senior diplomatic post of High commissioner. This post is unique 
to commonwealth countries. a High commissioner is the ambassador of 
one commonwealth nation to another commonwealth nation, and the High 
commission is its embassy.1492 in this capacity, High commission(er)s also play a 
key role in rescue missions carried out by the fmU. indeed, rescue missions were 
already carried out by diplomats of High commissions in inter alia Pakistan, 
india and Bangladesh years before the fmU was created.1493 British diplomats 
carrying a British court order backed by, for example, a Pakistani judge and 
accompanied by armed bodyguards and sometimes local police officers drive 
to (remote) villages to rescue (mostly) women and girls with British or dual 
nationality from the houses in which they are being held against their will by 
relatives, thus saving them from a (threatened) forced marriage. once safely in 
an embassy car, they are taken to a refuge, given an emergency passport and put 
on a flight back to the UK.1494 The success of the fmU and the rescue missions of 
the British High commissions may be a result of the diplomatic ties between the 
UK and commonwealth countries. This cannot be the only explanation, however, 
seeing as British embassies carry out similar rescue and repatriation missions in 
non‑commonwealth countries.1495 The best explanation is probably the explicit 
choice made by the British government: the decision to take a proactive approach 
when it comes to forced marriages and to provide assistance to British nationals 
who are taken abroad and forced to marry.
it seems that the Dutch government has now decided to take a more proactive 
approach as well. inspired by the ways in which england and also Norway tackle 
forced marriages, the Dutch government has decided to centralise the approach 
1491 it is important to mention, however, that irrespective of the different (historical) ties between 
the Netherlands and morocco, the police in The Hague, for example, has close working 
ties  with the moroccan police, especially in the field of honour‑based violence (<www.
parlement.com/9353000/1/j4nvgs5kjg27kof_j9vvhy5i95k8zxl/viededtsb5zr/f=/blg60417.pdf> 
last accessed December 2013).
1492 See <www.gov.uk/government/world/organisations/british‑high‑commission> last accessed 
December 2013.
1493 in 2004, this ‘diplomatic snatch squad’ rescued 105 young people. See D. Walsh, ‘The rescuers’, 
The Guardian 9  December 2005 (<www.theguardian.com/world/2005/dec/09/pakistan.
declanwalsh> last accessed December 2013).
1494 The Right to Choose: Multi‑Agency Statutory Guidance for Dealing with Forced Marriage, London: 
fmU, January 2010, p.  16; and c. freeman, ‘Diplomats dash to rescue 15‑year‑old  British 
girl from threat of forced marriage in Pakistan’, The Telegraph 22  November 2008 (<www.
telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/3501442/Diplomats‑dash‑to‑rescue‑15‑year
‑old‑British‑girl‑from‑threat‑of‑forced‑marriage‑in‑Pakistan.html> last accessed December 
2013).
1495 British diplomats have also carried out rescue missions in african countries and the 
middle  east (<www.theguardian.com/world/2005/dec/09/pakistan.declanwalsh> last 
accessed December 2013).
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to forced marriage and abandonment by creating a national expertise centre. This 
centre will not unilaterally deal with individual cases of forced marriage, but will 
focus on gathering and spreading knowledge and offering assistance in forced 
marriage cases (to victims as well as to embassies) and in the coordination of the 
repatriation of victims who have been abandoned abroad.1496 embassies will be 
encouraged to take a more active stance: in case of a (suspected) forced marriage, 
embassies should contact the ministry of foreign affairs. The ministry will then 
initiate the repatriation and, if necessary, supply an emergency passport, travel 
documents and/or financial support. The expertise centre will meet the victim 
at the airport in the Netherlands and offer support and guidance, and arrange 
housing and protection.1497
a third reason for the different approach taken, more specifically for the 
creation of the fmcPa, in england is of a legal systematic nature. one of the most 
fundamental system‑related differences between the jurisdictions of england and 
the Netherlands, is that the english system provides for the possibility of court 
injunctions, a legal instrument that is not known as such in the Netherlands. 
The fmPos that can be issued on the basis of the fmcPa are similar to these 
injunctions and give the courts large discretionary powers; a court can make 
protection orders, whether on application of a petitioning party or sua sponte (of 
its own initiative), against virtually anyone relating to virtually anything. The 
origin of injunctions can be traced back to the unique english system of equity. 
Whereas the Netherlands has a civil law tradition, the legal system of england 
is based on the common law tradition. The common law started evolving after 
the Norman invasion in 1066 and is founded on judicial decisions. Because the 
common law was unjust in some cases, another branch of law evolved alongside 
the common law that was meant to remedy these flaws in justice and fairness.1498 
This branch of law is known as equity, which literally means ‘fair’ or ‘impartial’. 
equity, therefore, ‘was born as a jurisdiction to deal with difficult cases’1499 and 
brought remedies such as injunctions. Not complying with injunctions qualifies 
as contempt of court and in some cases amounts to a criminal offence. Breaching 
an fmPo, for example, constitutes a criminal offence (as of 2014). The Dutch 
legal system is unfamiliar with this so‑called two‑step prohibition scheme. 
Dutch law does have certain remedies that are very similar to injunctions 
such as provisional arrangements (voorlopige voorzieningen) and restraining 
orders, for instance prohibiting the respondent from contacting the petitioner 
(straat‑/contactverboden). But breaching these court orders is not regarded as 
1496 eindrapportage Verkennersgroep: Versterking aanpak huwelijksdwang en achterlating, 7 June 
2013, pp. 10–11.
1497 eindrapportage Verkennersgroep: Versterking aanpak huwelijksdwang en achterlating, 7 June 
2013, p. 9.
1498 as stated by Lord Winston during a debate in the House of Lords on the fmcPa ‘There is a 
long‑standing principle that the law in this country tries to prevent civil injustice’ (House of 
Lords Debate 30 June 2000, vol. 614, col. 1256).
1499 S. Worthington, Equity, oxford: oUP 2006, preface to the first edition. 
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contempt of court or a criminal offence, although it may result in an incremental 
non‑compliance penalty (dwangsom).1500
2 .2 . r eSTr aiNiNg aND ProTecTioN or DerS
restraining or protection orders, used as an umbrella term for all sorts of 
non‑molestation orders and contact and street bans, can be used both as a means 
of preventing forced marriages, but also as a form of protection against those 
involved in forcing someone to enter into a marriage. With regard to a (threatened) 
forced marriage, under english law, protection orders can be issued in the context 
of Part 4 of the family Law act 1996, which relates to domestic violence and 
occupation of the matrimonial home (non‑molestation and occupations orders), 
the Protection from Harassment act 1997 (non‑harassment orders), the crime 
and Security act 2010 (Domestic Violence Protection Notices and orders), the 
criminal Justice act 2003 (conditional release from custody on bail, and licence 
conditions for determinate or indeterminate sentence offenders), but most 
importantly, pursuant to the fmcPa in the form of fmPos. The anti‑Social 
Behaviour, crime and Policing Bill 2013 proposes to criminalise the breach of 
such orders as of 2014.
Under Dutch law, equivalents to these protection orders can be issued in 
the context of the code of civil Procedure (non‑occupation orders, contact and 
street bans etc., via interlocutory proceedings), the criminal code and the code 
of criminal Procedure (as special conditions for release from pre‑trial custody, 
a behavioural order issued by the Prosecutor, as special conditions attached to 
a (partly) suspended sentence, and as a separate measure imposed by a criminal 
court), and the Temporary House Ban act (imposed by the mayor). in addition, 
Dutch criminal courts may impose restraining orders to prevent criminal offences 
or burdensome behaviour with respect to persons, which will be especially 
relevant in case of convictions for coercion, threatening behaviour, intimidation 
or stalking.1501
There is no equivalent to the fmcPa in the Netherlands, but there is a lot of 
overlap between the different measures Dutch and english courts can impose. 
Under Dutch law, interlocutory proceedings may be used to offer relief in the 
case of a (threatened) forced marriage. interlocutory proceedings allow the court 
to make provisional arrangements or to issue a restraining order, for instance 
ordering the respondent not to contact the petitioner. a court could also order a 
person to hand over the passport of a child and could order someone to refrain from 
making any arrangements for a marriage. Provisional arrangements offer many 
1500 Dutch law is unfamiliar with the concept of contempt of court.
1501 articles 284, 285, 285a and 285b criminal code respectively. See Parliamentary Papers II 
(Lower House) 2010/11, 32 551, no. 3 (explanatory memorandum), p. 7.
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possibilities and in this sense can be seen as the Dutch equivalent to injunctions. 
But the procedure used for applying for provisional arrangements is subject to 
certain restrictions: only a lawyer is authorised to start the procedure1502 and a 
Dutch court cannot include a blanket provision in a provisional arrangement so 
as to prohibit, for example, anyone from assisting in any way with (the preparation 
of) a marriage. further, a Dutch court cannot make orders or arrangements on 
its own initiative, whereas the fmcPa authorises english courts to make fmPos 
on their own initiative. if, during civil proceedings (regardless of the legal topic 
of those proceedings), the court has reason to believe that one of the parties to 
those proceedings is in some way involved in a forced marriage case, the court 
can make an fmPo on its own initiative.
Why is it that english courts have a broader discretionary power when it 
comes to making orders and arrangements? This has to do with a reform of the 
system of english civil procedure in the form of the civil Procedure rules (cPr) 
which came into force in 1999. The cPr are the rules of procedure used by english 
courts in civil cases. They were drafted with the aim of consolidating the existing 
rules of procedure and making the previously rigid civil proceedings more 
streamlined and less complicated. The cPr were based in part on a comprehensive 
research carried out by Lord Woolf on the options to consolidate the rules of 
civil procedure.1503 in his report, Lord Woolf concluded that the system of civil 
procedure suffered from many problems, one of them being the unrestrained 
adversarial culture of the english system – which left the responsibility for the 
proceedings entirely with the parties to the case and which had reduced the role 
of the judge to that of an umpire.1504 Woolf believed that this culture did not 
promote access to justice and that ‘in this environment, questions of expense, 
delay, compromise and fairness may have only low priority.’1505 in order to change 
the unrestrained adversarial culture and to enable courts to deal with cases justly 
(which is the so‑called overriding objective of the cPr1506), the cPr introduced 
judicial case management, giving courts rather than the litigants or their legal 
advisers responsibility for the control of litigation. The english system of civil 
proceedings remains adversarial, but judicial case management gives civil courts 
an interventionist role, allowing them to deal with matters such as controlling 
1502 Note that article 255(3) ccivP makes an exception for bailiffs: in some cases, a bailiff can 
commence interlocutory proceedings without a lawyer, i.e. in those cases where summons are 
not required to institute the proceedings, see article 255(1) ccivP.
1503 Loughlin & gerlis 2004, pp. 1 and 9.
1504 Loughlin & gerlis 2004, p. 2. Access to Justice Final Report, by The right Honourable the Lord 
Woolf, July 1996, pp. 2 and 17.
1505 Loughlin & gerlis 2004, p. 3, quoting from Woolf ’s interim report.
1506 Section 1.1 cPr: ‘These rules are a new procedural code with the overriding objective of 
enabling the court to deal with cases justly and at proportionate cost.’
Forceandmarriage.indd   292 20-5-2014   10:42:17
intersentia 293




the amount of expert evidence, identifying the issues in a case and summarily 
disposing of some of those issues.1507
as part of the new role of the civil courts, section 3.3 of the cPr authorises 
civil courts to make orders on their own initiative, unless a rule or some other 
enactment restricts the court from doing so. The court can decide to notify the 
parties and hear representations before making an order, or it can decide to make 
an order without hearing the parties.1508 This power is reflected in the fmcPa.
english civil litigation, in other words, has become less adversarial than 
Dutch civil litigation. The Dutch civil judge is more passive than his english 
colleague.1509 Pursuant to articles 24 and 25 Dutch code of civil Procedure 
(ccivP), the judge examines a case and takes a decision on the case based on the 
issues selected by the parties; if necessary, he will add legal grounds ex officio. 
it should be noted, however, that the role of Dutch civil judges has never been 
that of a mere umpire: judges do have certain case management tools. article 20 
Dutch code of civil Procedure for example stipulates that the judge must prevent 
unreasonable delay in the procedure and authorises the judge to take necessary 
measures ex officio in this regard. indeed, it has been stated that during the trial, 
the judge plays a leading role.1510 Nevertheless, the Dutch civil judge does not have 
the authority to make provisional arrangements sua sponte; giving the courts this 
power would require a change in the legal system.
2.3. iNTer rUPTioN, DiVorce aND aNNULmeNT
2.3.1.  Interruption
The Dutch civil code contains an instrument specifically aimed at preventing 
a marriage from taking place: interruption (stuiting). This measure can be used 
by a select circle of people, listed exhaustively in the law, who are aware of the 
fact that the spouses do not fulfil the legal requirements to enter into a marriage. 
Secondly, it can be used to prevent sham marriages from taking place. The law on 
interruption contains no specific grounds with regard to lack of consent, meaning 
that in the case of a forced marriage, interruption will be of little use, unless the 
1507 Access to Justice Final Report, by The right Honourable the Lord Woolf, July 1996, pp. 5 and 14. 
See also N. andrews, ‘a New civil Procedural code for england: Party‑control going, going, 
gone’, (19) Civil Justice Quarterly 2009, pp. 19–38.
1508 Section 3.3(2) and (4) cPr. See also section 4.3 of the family Procedure rules 2010 which gives 
the court similar powers (‘the court may exercise its powers on an application or of its own 
initiative’).
1509 for an example of a judge taking an active stance in interlocutory proceedings, see District 
court Noord‑Holland, 26 march 2013 ecLi:NL:rBNHo:2013:BZ5529.
1510 D.J. van Dijk, ‘De lijdelijkheid van de civiele rechter; tussen praktijk en principe’, 
speech made during SUrff Symposium 25  may 2004, Utrecht (available at <www.
rechtspraak.nl/organisatie/publicaties‑en‑brochures/rapporten‑en‑artikelen/Documents/
SUrffsymposiumdef.pdf> last accessed December 2013).
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intended forced marriage would also be a sham marriage, in which case the PPS 
would have the power to interrupt the marriage. The marital coercion (civil law) 
Bill introduced into the Lower House in 2012 by the State Secretary of Security and 
Justice proposes to change this by amending the law and offering the possibility of 
interruption in the case of suspected coercion.1511
The english marriage act 1949 gives members of the public who have 
objections to an intended marriage the possibility to enter a caveat with the 
Superintendent registrar against the issue of a certificate. This possibility under 
english law is broader than the Dutch instrument of interruption: anyone may 
enter a caveat on any ground.1512 entering a caveat can therefore be a means to (at 
least temporarily) preventing a forced marriage from taking place.
2.3.2. Divorce
although not specifically aimed at forced marriages, divorce is one of the options 
to dissolve a forced marriage. This option offers – at first sight – better possibilities 
in the Netherlands than in england. The ground for divorce, in both jurisdictions, 
is that a marriage has broken down irretrievably.
Under Dutch civil law, this criterion is very broad and is relatively easily 
fulfilled. The ground is objective, meaning that the focus is on the existence of an 
irretrievable breakdown; in principle, the causes that resulted in this breakdown, 
or which of the spouses caused it, are irrelevant.1513
in england, on the other hand, the divorce criterion is subjective and 
restricted to certain circumstances prescribed by law, and unlike the Netherlands, 
this jurisdiction does not recognise no‑fault divorce. But the law in practice is 
more flexible than the law in the books: petitions for divorce are rarely defended 
and all undefended petitions are governed by a procedure that allows a decree 
for divorce to be granted on the basis of affidavit evidence only. in practice, this 
means that the court will not go into the question of whether the marriage has 
in fact irretrievably broken down, but will grant the divorce on the basis of the 
statements made in the undefended petition. Nevertheless, english law still has 
one disadvantage when compared to Dutch divorce law: under english law, there 
is an absolute bar to divorce within the first year of a marriage, meaning that one 
1511 See chapter 7.
1512 With the limitation that this ground must be reasonable; if the registrar finds that a caveat was 
entered on grounds declared to be frivolous and to be such that they ought not to obstruct the 
issue of the certificate, the person who entered the caveat on such grounds is liable for the costs 
of the proceedings before the registrar general and for damages recoverable by the person 
against whose marriage the caveat was entered (article 29(4) marriage act 1949). a person 
who knowingly enters a false caveat can even be guilty of perjury (article 3 Perjury act 1911).
1513 Yet, when divorce is requested by one party, that party will have to motivate and prove the 
existence of the breakdown of the marriage. The court will, in most cases, reject a defence by 
the other spouse that the marriage has not broken down irretrievably, and grant the divorce in 
favour of the petitioning spouse (asser/De Boer 2010, margin no. 603–606; and Wortmann & 
Duijvendijk‑Brand 2012, p. 158).
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year of married life has to lapse before spouses can petition for divorce. in the 
Netherlands, spouses can petition for divorce immediately after marrying.
irrespective of this disadvantage, english divorce law also allows for an 
interesting possibility that can be especially relevant in cases of forced religious 
marriages: by withholding the final decree of divorce, an english court can 
effectuate the parties also having their marriage dissolved in accordance with the 
usages of their religion. This possibility was introduced in 2003 by the Divorce 
(religious marriage) act 2002 and empowers courts to exercise a broad discretion 
to achieve justice in particular divorce cases. it was drafted chiefly to alleviate a 
social injustice that inflicts hardship on women in a small section of the Jewish 
community: according to Jewish religious law, only the husband can initiate the 
divorce proceedings.1514
at first glance, this seems to be a valuable measure: as was explained in 
chapter 7, in some cultures and/or religions, spouses are still regarded as married 
if they have not divorced pursuant to the rules of their religion. in the Netherlands, 
divorce proceedings do not specifically provide for a comparable provisional 
arrangement. article 827(1) ccivP authorises parties to request a divorce coupled 
with certain specified ancillary arrangements, such as maintenance payments 
and custody of children. an order to cooperate with a religious divorce is not 
specifically listed, but article 827(1)(f) ccivP stipulates that the court can decide 
to make other arrangements than those specifically listed, provided that such 
arrangements are sufficiently related to the petition for divorce and that it is not 
expected that they will not lead to unnecessary delay in the proceedings. The 
Supreme court has held that a petition for divorce and a request for cooperation 
with a religious divorce are closely related to each other and that the latter request 
can be filed in combination with a request for a divorce.1515 Therefore, it is possible 
for a party to request as an ancillary arrangement to a divorce that the other 
party cooperates in the proceedings that result in a divorce in accordance with 
the usages of the religion of the parties. in each case, it is up to the court to decide 
whether or not this would cause unnecessary delay in the divorce proceedings.1516 
further, on application of a petitioner in interlocutory proceedings, a Dutch court 
can order a person to cooperate with a religious divorce, if necessary subject to 
an incremental penalty payment.1517, 1518 The Dutch Supreme court has held that, 
1514 Lord Lester of Herne Hill, House of Lords Debate 30 June 2000, vol. 614, col. 1240–1244.
1515 Supreme court 22 January 1982, nJ 1982, 489.
1516 Parliamentary Papers II (Lower House) 2011/12, 32 175, no. 31, p. 3.
1517 See Parliamentary Papers II (Lower House) 2011/12, 32 175, no. 31, where the minister of Security 
and Justice refers to District court amsterdam 10 april 2012, ecLi:NL:rBamS:2012:BW3800, 
court of appeal amsterdam 31 august 1989, nJ 1990, 679, District court Haarlem 17 february 
1989, Kg 1989, 134; District court middelburg 28 may 1986, nIPR, 413 (all cases concerning 
rabbinical divorces); and District court amsterdam 17  November 1983, KG 1983/359 
(concerning a woman who was ordered to cooperate with a rabbinical divorce).
1518 although sanctions that are imposed on a recalcitrant husband until he grants a religious 
divorce may be problematic in the case of Jewish divorces: a husband must voluntarily provide 
his wife with a so‑called get and penalty payments and other sanctions have been interpreted 
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under some circumstances, not cooperating with a religious divorce procedure 
after having divorced according to Dutch civil law, can amount to a tortious act: 
refusal to cooperate can constitute a violation of a rule of unwritten law pertaining 
to proper social conduct between divorcees.1519
The reason why an english court, unlike a Dutch court, can withhold a decree 
of divorce until the parties promise to cooperate in the procedure that leads to 
divorce in accordance with the usages of their religion, goes back to the degree 
of secularity within the respective jurisdictions. The Netherlands is a secular 
state with a strict (although not absolute) separation of church and state. all 
religious groups have the right to live according to their own religious rules and 
principles, provided that they stay within the limits of Dutch law. With regard to 
marriage in particular, this means that individuals have the right to enter into a 
religious marriage, or have their marriage blessed by the minister of a religion, 
but religious marriages an sich have no legal effects. Dutch law only recognises 
civil marriages. indeed, celebrating a religious marriage before a civil marriage 
is even a misdemeanour (article 449 cric). This marriage law dates back to the 
Napoleonic era: before the reign of Napoleon, religious marriages conducted by 
priests or other clergy were quite common. in order to harmonise the law on 
marriage and at the same time prevent undesirable clandestine marriages, for 
example marriages between close blood relatives, Napoleon reformed the law on 
marriage, giving the state monopoly on conducting marriage ceremonies and 
introducing the office of the registrar.1520 When, during the deliberation on the 
marital coercion (criminal law) Bill, an mP pointed out to the State Secretary 
of Security and Justice that english law offers judges the possibility to withhold 
a decree of divorce until both parties cooperate with the dissolution of their 
religious marriage, the State Secretary explicitly stated that the separation of 
church and state in the Netherlands was the reason for rejecting the possibility of 
making cooperation with a religious divorce a precondition for issuing a divorce 
decree. He reiterated that the state should not intervene in the practice of religious 
marriages, unless these marriages are contrary to public policy or unlawful.1521
by rabbinical authorities as circumstances that cause a religious divorce to be invalid, because 
the get was not granted voluntarily (see inter alia m. de Blois, ‘religious law versus secular law. 
The example of the get refusal in Dutch, english and israeli law’, Utrecht Law Review (6) 2010, 
p. 99; and Baroness miller of Hendon’s speech in the House of Lords (House of Lords Debate 
30 June 2000, vol. 614, col. 1253)).
1519 Dutch Supreme court 22 January 1982, nJ 1982, 489; and District court amsterdam 10 april 
2012, ecLi:NL:rBamS:2012:BW3800 (my translation) ‘it can be contrary to the due care 
that should be observed by a person in relation to his divorced spouse according to generally 
accepted standards’ (‘kan in strijd zijn met de zorgvuldigheid die een echtgenoot in het 
maatschappelijk verkeer ten aanzien van de persoon van zijn gescheiden echtgenoot in acht 
behoort te nemen’). See also m. de Blois, ‘religious law versus secular law. The example of the 
get refusal in Dutch, english and israeli law’, Utrecht Law Review (6) 2010, p. 98.
1520 asser/De Boer 2010, margin no. 134.
1521 Parliamentary Proceedings (Lower House) 2012/2013, 11, p. 54. a marriage involving a minor 
or a marriage between a mother and her son are examples of unlawful marriages.
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england, on the other hand, is less secular and has no such strict separation 
of church and state. for one, england has an established church – the church 
of england. The sovereign is the head of this church and 26 bishops (‘Lords 
Spiritual’) of the church of england serve in Parliament in the Upper House. 
Some ecclesiastical measures adopted by the general Synod, the legislative 
body of the church of england, even form part of the law of england and, once 
given royal assent, have the same effect as acts of Parliament.1522 Non‑anglican 
religious groups have the right to live according to their own rules, which may 
be enforced by religious courts such as the Jewish Beth Din, the islamic Shari’a 
councils and the roman catholic National Tribunal for Wales.1523
consequently, english law recognises religious as well as non‑religious 
marriages: civil marriage, marriage according to the rites of the church of england, 
quaker and Jewish marriage, and other non‑anglican religious marriages. in order 
to reduce discrimination against non‑anglican religious groups,1524 the marriage 
act 1949 allows all religious groups to marry in accordance with the usages of 
their religion, subject only to a few legal requirements, including the requirement 
that certificates are issued by a superintendent registrar.1525 Divorce, however, is 
exclusively regulated by civil (i.e. non‑religious) courts: english divorce law only 
revokes the civil marriage, leaving the religious marriage intact.1526 Because of the 
very fact that the marriage act 1949 validates marriages contracted according to, 
amongst others, Jewish usages (provided, as stated, that certain legal requirements 
are met), so religious marriages, it was considered appropriate that Parliament 
also had some concern with the matter of religious divorce. for this reason, the 
government introduced the Divorce (religious marriages) act 2002: a secular act 
that recognises religious law.1527 The civil law on divorce now also offers a remedy 
in relation to possible impediments that may arise in case of religious divorce:1528 
i.e. making the issuance of the final divorce decree dependent on the spouses’ 
cooperation with religious divorce proceedings.
english law offers judges the possibility of withholding a decree of divorce 
until both parties cooperate with the dissolution of their religious marriage. is 
there reason to incorporate a similar legal remedy in Dutch civil law? Looking at 
1522 g. Douglas et al., Social Cohesion and Civil Law: Marriage, Divorce and Religious Courts, 
cardiff University June 2011, p. 8.
1523 g. Douglas et al., Social Cohesion and Civil Law: Marriage, Divorce and Religious Courts, 
cardiff University June 2011, pp. 32–37.
1524 cretney’s Principles of family Law 2008, margin no. 1–041. 
1525 in addition to abiding by the prescribed preliminaries, the person solemnising the marriages 
instead of the registrar must be authorised to this effect, the building where the marriage 
is celebrated must be registered premises, and the parties must, at some point during the 
ceremony, make the same statements that are prescribed for those marrying in a civil ceremony 
(cretney’s Principles of family Law 2008, p. 1–042). See also chapter 7.
1526 Lord Lester of Herne Hill, House of Lords Debate 30 June 2000, vol. 614, col. 1243.
1527 Lord Lester of Herne Hill, House of Lords Debate 30 June 2000, vol. 614, col. 1248.
1528 m. de Blois, ‘religious law versus secular law. The example of the get refusal in Dutch, english 
and israeli law’, Utrecht Law Review (6) 2010, pp. 100 and 107.
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the possibilities that already exist to order a person to cooperate with a religious 
divorce (as an ancillary arrangement to a divorce, and as a request in interlocutory 
proceedings) and the fact that under certain circumstances, not cooperating with 
a religious divorce procedure after having divorced according to Dutch civil law 
can amount to a tortious act,1529 the answer to this question is ‘no’. furthermore, 
withholding a decree of divorce pending the dissolution of the religious marriage 
could have a negative effect on the spouse(s) who was (were) forced to enter into 
the marriage against their will: dissolving a religious marriage can take a lot of 
time and during that time, the spouses would still be married in the eyes of Dutch 
law. So seen from this perspective, the english instrument is an instrument of 
delay.1530 instead, a better alternative might be including in the Dutch civil code 
that it is tortuous to refuse to cooperate with a religious divorce after having 
obtained a decree of divorce pursuant to Dutch law.1531
2.3.3. Annulment
The second civil law measure that can offer relief in the case of a forced marriage is 
the law on nullity. There are four main differences between the law on annulment 
in england on the one hand and the Netherlands on the other hand.
first, the effects of a decree of annulment differ. in the Netherlands, 
annulment of a marriage has retroactive effect, working back to the moment 
the marriage was solemnised (ex tunc), which means that it never existed from 
a legal point of view. in england, on the other hand, annulment of a marriage 
takes effect from the date the court issued the decree of annulment (ex nunc). 
The explanation for this difference in the effects of a decree of annulment can be 
found in the categories of nullity: in the Netherlands, a marriage is never legally 
void: in the case of flaws in the establishment of the marriage, it must be annulled 
by court order. The possibility of absolute nullity in the context of a marriage 
is considered to be contrary to legal certainty.1532 in england, however, there 
are certain cases in which a marriage is legally void, meaning that it has never 
existed in the eyes of the law and it is null and void ex tunc.1533 a marriage is void 
when there is an element of public policy against the marriage that causes such 
a fundamental flaw in the marriage that it cannot be recognised by the law.1534 
1529 This is evidenced by case law referred to in footnote 1517 et seq. (supra).
1530 Parliamentary Proceedings (Lower House) 2012/2013, 11, p. 54.
1531 Parliamentary Papers II (Lower House) 2012/2013, 33 488, no. 5 (report), p. 5.
1532 Wortmann & Van Duijvendijk‑Brand 2012, p. 49; and asser/De Boer 2010, margin no. 162.
1533 Note that pursuant to article 58(5)(a) family Law act 1986 ‘No declaration may be made by any 
court (…) that a marriage was at its inception void,’ see A local authority v. x and a child (2013) 
eWHc 3274 (fam). in this case, the local authority that cared for a 16‑year‑old girl, who had 
been forced to marry when she was 14, had requested the High court to declare the marriage 
void at its inception. The High court stated that article 58(5)(a) fLa 1986 prevented it from 
doing so. instead, the girl had to seek annulment herself by petitioning for a decree of nullity.
1534 Herring 2011, p. 49.
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Pursuant to article 11 mca, a marriage is void when the parties are within the 
prohibited degrees of relationship;1535 when either party is under the age of 16;1536 
when the parties have intermarried in disregard of certain requirements as to 
the formation of marriage;1537 when at the time of the marriage either party was 
already lawfully married or in a civil partnership; and finally, when, in the case of 
a polygamous marriage entered into outside england, either party was at the time 
of the marriage domiciled in england.
The different categories of nullity in the two jurisdictions also explain the 
second difference between the annulment of marriages in england and the 
Netherlands, which relates to the category of persons who are authorised to 
petition for annulment. in england, only the spouses themselves can apply to have 
their voidable marriage annulled.1538 in the Netherlands, the spouses themselves, 
but also their (grand‑)parents, the PPS, and all other persons who have a direct 
legal interest can seek to have a marriage annulled by a court. as stated, pursuant 
to english law, flaws in a marriage can cause a marriage to be either voidable or 
void, unlike Dutch law, which only allows for voidable marriages. according to 
the english law of nullity, a marriage is void on those grounds where there is 
a public policy objection to the marriage (such as child marriages or marriages 
between a parent and child). Due to the nature of these grounds, any member of 
the public can seek a declaration of nullity. in contrast, the grounds on which a 
marriage may be voidable do not indicate that there is an element of public policy 
against the marriage; rather, there is such a significant problem in the marriage 
that only the spouses can have their marriage annulled if they wish so.1539 in the 
Netherlands, the concept of void marriages does not exist; marriages can only be 
classified as ‘voidable’. The Dutch law of nullity is regarded as a matter of public 
policy, so all grounds for annulment are seen as public policy objections to a 
marriage. as a result, not only the spouses themselves, but the PPS as well as 
other third parties can petition for the annulment of a marriage.1540 But because 
the legislator did not want third parties to meddle in an existing marriage, it was 
determined that third parties – with the exception of the PPS and the (grand‑)
1535 See marriage (Prohibited Degrees of relationship) act 1986: parent‑child (including adoptive 
child), grandparent‑grandchild, brother‑sister, uncle‑niece, aunt‑nephew. cousins may marry 
under english law. affinity restrictions pertain to step‑parent‑stepchild.
1536 in tandem with criminal law policy that it is prohibited for a man to have sex with a girl 
younger than sixteen (Herring 2011, p.  52). Those between 16 and 18 will need parental 
consent; marriage contracted without this consent will still be valid, but possibly voidable 
(article 3 marriage act 1949).
1537 These formalities are complex and manifold and depend on the type of marriage, see chapter 8 
and Herring 2011, p. 52. a marriage is only void on the ground of breach of any of the formalities 
if the parties were aware of the breach and married wilfully in breach of the requirement, see 
articles 25 and 49 marriage act 1949 for an overview of such formalities (Herring 2011, p. 53).
1538 Herring 2011, p. 49.
1539 Herring 2011, pp. 49–50.
1540 Vlaardingerbroek, gS Personen‑ en familierecht, commentaar op artikel 69 Boek 1 BW, 
margin no. 1.
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parents of the spouses – are only authorised to petition for the annulment of a 
marriage after that marriage has been dissolved (e.g. by divorce or by the death of 
one of the spouses).1541
The third difference between the annulment of marriages in england and the 
Netherlands concerns the grounds on which a marriage can be annulled: these 
grounds are broader in england than in the Netherlands. The ground that is 
relevant in cases of forced marriages is the ground that pertains to circumstances 
that invalidate consent. Pursuant to Dutch law, there are two circumstances that 
invalidate consent: an unlawful serious threat and mistake. The Dutch law on 
mistake is virtually equal to the english law on mistake. The law on coercion/
duress at the time of entering into a marriage, however, differs. The Dutch 
civil code only recognises one such ground: ‘unlawful serious threat’ – but 
note that the marital coercion (civil law) Bill proposes to replace the ground of 
‘unlawful serious threat’ by the broader ground that the marriage came about as 
a result of coercion. The standards for the proof of the presence of an unlawful 
serious threat are high: only the more serious forms of coercion will qualify as 
such. Threatening someone with a weapon, threatening to commit suicide, and 
kidnapping someone, bringing them to another country, locking them in a house 
and physically assaulting them are examples of acts that would qualify as unlawful 
serious threats. The more subtle forms of pressure often used in cases of forced 
marriage, such as emotional blackmail and societal pressure, will not amount to 
unlawful serious threats and are therefore not covered by the annulment ground 
of article 1:71(1) civc. The alternative ground for annulment proposed by the 
marital coercion (civil law) Bill, ‘coercion’, is more inclusive and will catch these 
subtle forms of coercion/pressure.
The english equivalent of ‘unlawful serious threat’ (and in the future ‘coercion’) 
is duress, which focuses on the effect of the threat (the overborne will). Duress is 
defined in a broad and inclusive manner: the threat or pressure must have been 
such as to overbear the will of the individual. Duress therefore encompasses more 
subtle forms of social pressure, such as emotional blackmail, physical, emotional, 
sexual and financial pressure.1542 for example, the circumstances in the case 
described in chapter 7 paragraph 2.1.2 concerning the young Pakistani woman 
whose relatives pressured her into signing a marriage contract by threatening that 
she would be taken to Pakistan to be married off, would probably have qualified 
as duress under the english law of annulment. Under the future Dutch regime 
(as proposed by the marital coercion (civil law) Bill), which is no longer limited 
1541 The spouses and their (grand)parents can seek to have a marriage annulled independent 
of whether or not this marriage has (already) been dissolved; the PPS can only petition for 
annulment as long as the marriage has not yet been dissolved (after a marriage has been 
dissolved, the PPS no longer has an interest in meddling in a marriage that was contrary 
to public policy while it still existed). See article  1:69(1) civc and Vlaardingerbroek, gS 
Personen‑ en familierecht, commentaar op artikel 69 Boek 1 BW, margin no. 2.
1542 although marrying out of a sense of duty alone will not amount to duress.
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to unlawful serious threats, these acts would amount to coercion and would 
consequently also constitute a ground for annulment.1543
There is, however, an area where the Dutch law on annulment is broader 
than the english law: sham marriages. in england, a sham marriage cannot 
be nullified merely on the basis that it is not a genuine marriage (unless one of 
the spouses petitions for a decree of nullity on the basis that the marriage has 
not been consummated). Provided that both parties genuinely consented to the 
marriage, sham marriages are neither void nor voidable: they are valid.1544 in the 
Netherlands, on the other hand, sham marriages are voidable, irrespective of the 
(absence) of consent of either of the parties to the marriage. These marriages can 
be annulled upon the request of the PPS.
The fourth difference between the jurisdictions relates to the period of 
approbation. Periods of approbation guarantee a modicum of legal certainty for 
the spouses and third parties and aim to protect the institution of marriage.1545 in 
the Netherlands, the authority of a spouse to request annulment on the basis of 
an unlawful serious threat or mistake lapses three months after the spouses have 
lived together after the threat ceased or the mistake was discovered; in england, 
proceedings for annulment have to be instituted within three years after the date 
of the marriage. The Dutch marital coercion (civil law) Bill proposes to extend 
this period from six months to three years, as a result of which there would no 
longer be a difference between the period of approbation in the Netherlands and 
england.
at the time of writing of this book, english law offers more possibilities with 
regard to the annulment of forced marriages: it recognises forms of psychological 
pressure as forms of duress (which invalidates consent), whereas Dutch law 
requires an unlawful serious threat. The Dutch marital coercion (civil law) Bill 
will erase these differences. The english law on nullity does have one important 
disadvantage compared with the Dutch law, as was mentioned previously in this 
paragraph: in england, only the parties to a forced marriage can apply to have a 
voidable marriage annulled.1546
1543 in addition to mistake and duress, the english matrimonial causes act lists unsoundness of 
mind as a circumstance that can invalidate consent. Unsoundness of mind is also a ground for 
annulment under Dutch law (see article 1:69(1) in conjunction with 1:32 civc).
1544 Herring 2011, p. 64. The same goes for sham marriages that were contracted outside the UK: 
as long as both parties consented to the sham marriage, it is valid and will be recognised as 
such in england and Wales (c.m.V. clarkson & J. Hill, The conflict of laws, oxford: oUP 2006, 
p. 295). Such marriages are not recognised in the Netherlands.
1545 Herring 2011, p. 65.
1546 Herring 2011, p. 49.
Forceandmarriage.indd   301 20-5-2014   10:42:17
302 intersentia





When it comes to the field of criminal law – the core of this book – there is less 
material for comparison than in the field of civil law. as explained in chapter 7, 
there is no specific offence of forced marriage in Dutch criminal law. in english 
law there is: the aBcP Bill 2013 proposes to make it an offence to use violence, 
threats or any other form of coercion for the purpose of causing someone to enter 
into a marriage.1547
The Dutch criminal code contains two offences that are particularly relevant 
to forced marriages: a general offence of coercion and a more specific offence of 
influencing another person’s official statement. These two offences have much 
in common with the crime of forced marriage proposed by the aBcP Bill 2013: 
they cover the same forms of coercion. The english offence speaks in terms of 
‘violence, threats or any other form of coercion’. article 284 cric lists ‘violence, 
another hostile act or threats of violence’. article 285a cric uses slightly different 
wording: it prohibits influencing someone’s freedom to make an official, legal 
statement by using oral or written expressions, gestures or pictures. arguably, the 
different terms are all broad and inclusive and cover the same kinds of coercive 
conduct. obviously, the english offence has more specific elements than the 
Dutch offences exactly because this english offence was specifically tailored to 
deal with forced marriages. it requires direct intent on the side of the perpetrator, 
i.e. using coercion for the purpose of causing someone to enter into a marriage and 
it requires that the perpetrator believes or ought reasonably to believe that his 
coercive conduct will cause the victim to enter into a marriage without his or her 
free and full consent. This implies that a person will also be guilty of the offence 
of forced marriage if he believes his threats will cause the victim to marry, but 
the victim is not at all influenced by his behaviour. The same goes for the Dutch 
offence of influencing someone’s freedom to make an official, legal statement 
(article 285a cric): this crime focuses on the intended effect of the perpetrator’s 
acts – not on the actual effect they had on the victim.1548 The offence of coercion 
(article 284 cric) on the other hand, focuses on the effect the pressure had on the 
victim: the coercive behaviour of the perpetrator must have inspired in the victim 
a genuine and reasonably held fear.1549
The biggest difference between the three offences is the maximum penalty.1550 
The maximum penalty for the Dutch offences is two years (article  284 cric) 
and four years (article 285a cric) imprisonment; the maximum penalty for the 
1547 Luring someone abroad with a forced marriage in mind will also be an offence as of late 2014/
early 2015.
1548 Supreme court 27 may 2008, ecLi:NL:Hr:2008:Bc7910.
1549 Parliamentary Papers II (Lower House) 2012/2013, 33 488, no. 6, pp. 6 and 14. See also machielse 
2012, comments on article 284, margin no. 4.
1550 Note that conditional release schemes are not taken into consideration, but see chapter 10, 
paragraph 2.6.3.
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english offence of forced marriage is five years (for breaching an fmPo) and seven 
years on conviction on indictment for the separate offences of forced marriage.1551
3. LeVeL 2: comPariNg iNTerNaTioNaL aND 
NaTioNaL LaW
comparing the national and international legal frameworks for forced marriage 
with each other is challenging: the expression ‘apples and oranges’ comes to 
mind. The differences between the two fields of law have already been highlighted: 
international criminal law as codified in the rome Statute (and in the statutes 
of other internationalise(d) courts and tribunals) consists of a limited number 
of offences: four core crimes (crimes against humanity, war crimes, genocide 
and aggression) which each have their own set of distinct offences. The scope of 
national criminal law is far greater: Dutch criminal law consists of thousands of 
criminal offences, english criminal law of tens of thousands.1552
Yet there is a difference not only in quantitative terms, but also in qualitative 
terms: international criminal law deals only with the very worst of offences. 
only the most serious acts are listed as crimes under international law and 
ascribe individual criminal liability. National criminal law, however, not only 
deals with crimes such as murder, rape and battery, it also deals with ‘petty 
offences’ such as writing blasphemous texts on places visible from the public 
road, public intoxication, and walking through a planted piece of land without 
authorisation.1553 it is not surprising, therefore, that the national criminal laws 
of the Netherlands and england have a more diverse set of offences that can be 
charged in forced marriages cases. offences that may be used are coercion, threats 
of violence, kidnapping, assault, battery, stalking, blackmail, cruelty to persons 
under 16, false imprisonment, harassment, abduction of a woman by force or for 
the sake of her property, influencing a person’s freedom to make an official, legal 
statement, and, in england (as of 2014), the specific offence of forced marriage.
The rome Statute offers a more limited range of offences. offences that have 
been charged in forced marriage cases are the crimes against humanity of (sexual) 
enslavement, and ‘other inhumane acts’ and the war crimes of sexual slavery 
1551 all criminal cases are first heard at the magistrates’ court. During an administrative hearing, 
the magistrates will determine whether the forced marriage case is suitable to be heard by the 
magistrates’ court, or whether it should be sent to the crown court (martin 2010, p. 154).
1552 The quantitative difference between england and the Netherlands has to do (inter alia ) with 
the fact that the Netherlands has a system of administrative wrongs: many regulatory offences 
have been decriminalised and are enforced through administrative law. in england, on the 
other hand, regulatory or administrative violations fall within the realm of criminal law. Thus, 
traffic offences such as illegal parking are criminal offences. See Simester & Von Hirsch 2011, 
p. 7 and ashworth & Horder 2013, pp. 2, 4 and 35: ‘Some european countries have instituted 
a separate system of administrative offences (…) english law does not have a general separate 
system dealing with minor “infringements” rather than with serious wrongs’ (at p. 4).
1553 articles 429bis, 453 and 460 cric respectively.
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and committing outrages upon personal dignity. in those cases where a forced 
marriage on the national level comes about as a result of or results in human 
trafficking or enslavement, similar offences can be charged in the Netherlands 
and england.1554 a category of ‘other inhumane acts’ or ‘outrages upon personal 
dignity’ cannot be found in Dutch and english general criminal law.1555 But one 
can safely assume that those acts that are so serious that they qualify as ‘other 
inhumane acts’ or outrages upon personal dignity are also criminalised on the 
national level, be it under different nomenclature.
finally, it should be noted that, unlike the national level, there are no civil law 
remedies for forced marriages (such as protection orders, annulment or divorce) 
on the level of international law.1556 There is no international court or tribunal that 
could annul a marriage or make a protection order; victims of forced marriages 
need to turn to national courts and national law for these matters.
The differences between the systems of national and international criminal 
law described above have ramifications for the practice of criminalisation, 
more specifically, the criminalisation of forced marriage. This is addressed in 
chapter 10.
4.  coNcLUDiNg remarKS
as mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, there are many similarities 
between the Dutch and english legal frameworks concerning forced marriage. 
even though england has (civil and criminal) legislation that was created 
specifically with the aim of dealing with forced marriages, (potential) victims of a 
forced marriage can obtain similar protection from Dutch courts via provisional 
arrangements made in interlocutory proceedings.
There are two important differences. first, english courts have very 
far‑reaching discretionary powers when it comes to making orders: they can 
make protection orders on their own initiative – so without having been asked to 
do so by any party – as long as any other family proceedings are before the court 
and a person who would be a respondent to proceedings for a forced marriage 
protection order is a party to those family proceedings. The person to be protected 
by the order need not be party to the family proceedings. especially now that 
breaching a forced marriage protection order has become a criminal offence (in 
accordance with the aBcP Bill 2013) with a maximum penalty of five years on 
1554 See e.g. article 273f cric and see also the case of the moroccan girl who was forced to marry a 
Dutch man who subsequently made her prostitute herself (chapter 3).
1555 They are codified in the Dutch international crimes act 2003, which was drafted in response 
to the rome Statute.
1556 Note that there are international human rights instruments that contain provisions on the 
right to enter into a marriage with free and full consent (see chapters 1 and 10).
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conviction on indictment, the court’s sua sponte order‑making possibilities can 
have significant consequences.
Secondly, pursuant to Dutch criminal law, litigants need a legal representative 
to commence interlocutory proceedings. The fmcPa, on the other hand, allows 
people to make an application for a protection order for themselves or on behalf 
of someone else; they do not need legal representation in the form of a solicitor. 
Local authorities can also apply for a protection order on someone else’s behalf.
The comparison between the international and national legal frameworks is 
considerably less elaborate and more to the point than the comparison between 
the Netherlands and england. The two national landscapes, with their varied 
and wide range of criminal legislation contain the same (types) of crimes that 
may be used to prosecute forced marriages on the international level (such as 
enslavement), but not vice versa. The rome Statute contains a limited number 
of criminal offences and does not include crimes such as coercion, stalking or 
influencing someone’s freedom to make a legal statement. although the rome 
Statute does list a few umbrella clauses such as ‘other inhumane acts’ that catch 
crimes which are not specifically listed, offences such as using subtle psychological 
pressure on someone in order to influence their freedom of statement will not 
qualify as an ‘other inhumane act’.
Forceandmarriage.indd   305 20-5-2014   10:42:18
Forceandmarriage.indd   306 20-5-2014   10:42:18
PARt Iv
AnAlysIs And conclusIons
Forceandmarriage.indd   307 20-5-2014   10:42:18







the cRImInAlIsAtIon oF FoRced 
mARRIAge undeR dutch lAw 
And In the Rome stAtute
1. iNTroDUcTioN
(How) should forced marriage be criminalised on the levels of Dutch and 
international criminal law, more specifically the rome Statute? This question 
formed the starting point of this research and will be answered in this chapter. The 
previous chapters served to pave the way by providing a definition, description 
and legal analysis of the phenomenon of forced marriage, by comparing the Dutch 
legal framework with the english framework, and by presenting frameworks 
that may be used as guidance in criminalisation debates. There are certain 
similarities between criminalisation on the two levels, yet the approaches that 
are taken in this chapter differ. in the first part of this chapter (paragraph 2), the 
criminalisation of forced marriage in the Netherlands will be addressed.1557 The 
principles uncovered in Part ii, especially in chapter 4, will be used as guidelines 
to structure the arguments contra and pro (separate) criminalisation. The 
second part of this chapter (paragraph 3) goes into the criminalisation of forced 
marriage within the regime of the rome Statute. The specific criminalisation 
requirements of crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide will be taken 
into consideration. for a comparison between the two levels of criminalisation 
and the forced marriages that take place in times of peace and in times of conflict, 
see chapter 3 (paragraph 7), chapter 6 and chapter 9.
1557 england served as a means of comparison, as a source of inspiration to answer the question 
of whether and, if so, how the practice of forced marriage should be criminalised in the 
Netherlands. The question of whether or not forced marriage should be criminalised in 
england is not addressed in this book.
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2. THe crimiNaLiSaTioN of forceD 
marriage aND DUTcH LaW
2.1. iNTroDUcTioN
forcing someone to enter into a marriage against that person’s will is a criminal 
act pursuant to Dutch law. as was argued in chapter 7, this act is caught by 
several offences, such as the crimes of coercion, influencing someone’s freedom 
to make an official statement and stalking. many other european countries have 
also criminalised the practice and a 2011 european council convention requires 
all states parties who have not yet done so to turn forced marriage into a criminal 
offence.1558 Yet this does not address the question of how forced marriage is best 
criminalised. in the Netherlands, the act is caught by broad, general offences, yet 
the english legislator believed it necessary to create a specific offence of forcing 
someone to enter into a marriage, following the example of inter alia germany, 
Belgium and Norway.1559
in order to answer the question of how forced marriage should be criminalised, 
first, the particular harms and wrongs caused by forced marriages – which were 
extensively mapped out in chapters 1 and 2 – will be called to mind. Subsequently, 
the other four criteria for criminalisation are applied.
This requires some additional explanation. The framework set out in chapter 
4 is based on theories of criminalisation that depart from the assumption that 
there is certain conduct (X), which currently does not fall within the ambit of 
the criminal law. The theories then address the question of whether X should 
be brought within the reach of the criminal law. This chapter has a different 
point of departure, namely: how should certain conduct (i.e. forced marriage), 
which already falls within the scope of existing non‑specific criminal offences, be 
criminalised? more precisely, should forced marriage be separately criminalised 
or not?
This has certain implications for the application of the criminalisation 
criteria listed in chapters 4 and 6. it will, for example, result in a different 
application of the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity. Traditionally, 
the proportionality principle – as a criminalisation criterion – requires that the 
use of state coercion in the form of criminal law is in proportion – as in: not 
out of proportion – with the gravity of the harms and wrongs caused by an act. 
forced marriage is (already) considered to be a criminal offence, falling within 
1558 in December 2013, 32 european countries, including the Netherlands, had signed this 
convention, see <http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/commun/chercheSig.asp?NT=210& 
cm=1&Df=&cL=eNg>.
1559 article 237 Strafgesetzbuch (minimum penalty is six months – maximum penalty is five years 
imprisonment), article 391sexies Belgian criminal code (minimum penalty is three months 
– maximum penalty is five years imprisonment); article 222(2) Norwegian criminal code 
(maximum penalty is six years imprisonment).
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the ambit of inter alia article  284 cric. This means that, theoretically, the 
proportionality principle has already been addressed and criminal law has been 
deemed a proportionate response to this practice. Nevertheless, a few lines need 
to be devoted to the proportionality of the criminalisation of forced marriage 
(paragraph 2.3). Next, the principle of subsidiarity will be addressed. it has been 
argued that this principle consists of two different components: an external test 
and an internal test. Below, the focus will be on the latter, but the former will 
also be briefly addressed (paragraph 2.4). after proportionality and subsidiarity, 
the criterion of effectiveness is discussed (paragraph  2.5). in paragraph  2.6, 
this study’s research question is answered: (how) should forced marriage be 
criminalised under Dutch law?
2.2 . THe Har mS aND WroNgS of forceD 
mar riageS
2.2.1. The many harms of forced marriage
Pinpointing the harms and wrongs caused by a forced marriage is a complex task. 
as was demonstrated in chapters 1 and 2, the practice of forced marriage, which 
forms part of a bigger picture of violence, gender inequality and violence against 
women in particular, can have many different consequences and can cause a 
plethora of harms. quek summarises the possible consequences:
‘the harms of forced marriage can include: rape, forced pregnancy, lack of control 
of the number and spacing of children, interruption to or denial of education, 
physical violence and beatings, kidnapping or imprisonment (sometimes abroad), 
murder, lack of freedom of sexuality (especially if a victim is gay or lesbian), and 
psychological stress which can result in threatened suicide, mental breakdowns, 
eating disorders and self‑harm. Should a victim manage to escape, they also face 
homelessness, social ostracism, and the likelihood of increased violence from 
strangers.’1560
However, as stated, in this book, the act of forced marriage is defined restrictively: 
forcing someone to enter into a marital(‑like) association against that person’s 
will. consequently, the gamut of criminal offences that could take place within 
a forced marriage are not considered as harms that are part of the specific act 
1560 K. quek, ‘a civil rather than criminal offence? forced marriage, Harm and the Politics 
of multiculturalism in the UK’, 15 The British Journal of Politics & International Relations 
2013, pp.  626–646 (citations omitted). in addition, forced marriage involving young adults 
generally has a negative impact on health, personal development, education and economic 
status (Demos 2012, pp. 12 and 17–23).
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of forced marriage. for example, not all forced marriages will result in rape.1561 
Some marriages that were entered into under the influence of coercion or 
pressure may even become ‘voluntary’ over time, in the sense that the spouses 
decide to stay together of their own free will. conversely, some marriages that 
were entered into voluntarily may become ‘forced’ over time, in the sense that 
one or both partners wish to exit the marriage but are not able to do so. further, 
sexual or domestic violence or slavery‑like situations certainly do not require a 
forced marriage. consider the following case reported by the Dutch rapporteur 
on Human Trafficking. illegal immigrant J meets an older Dutch man who offers 
her a position as his housekeeper: he will pay her a small sum of money and offer 
board and lodging. after moving in with the man, J finds out that the man wants 
to have sex with her. J sees no possibility of refusing this and the man starts 
demanding more and more sexual favours of her and locks her in the house.1562 
There was never any (forced) marriage.
The total gamut of possible consequences of a forced marriage, therefore, will 
not be considered as harms (that are necessarily) inherent in a forced marriage. 
rather, the criminal results of a forced marriage can be separately charged for what 
they are, as concurrent offences. if a was forced to marry B and is (subsequently) 
raped by B, then B commits the distinct, independent offence of rape within the 
forced marriage; if a and B marry out of free will and B rapes a, then B commits 
the distinct, independent offence of rape; if a and B are not married and B rapes 
a, then B commits the distinct, independent offence or rape. The same goes for 
other offences generally linked to forced marriage, such as domestic violence, 
unlawful imprisonment and forced pregnancy.
2.2.2. The specific harm of forced marriage
Which specific harm, then, does the act of forcing someone to say ‘i do’ against 
that person’s will cause? forcing someone to enter into a marriage is a violation 
of personal autonomy, of the right to choose whether, when and whom to marry. 
Decisions relating to these matters are very important life choices. The core of 
forcing someone to enter into a marriage against that person’s will is taking 
away, violating personal autonomy and thereby subjecting that person to the 
possibility that they will have to share their life with a person they did not choose 
themselves. an individual is effectively robbed of an important life decision and 
the course of their lives is forever altered, by being officially bound to someone 
against their will. a marital union is generally aimed at sharing a life and usually 
also starting a family. couples will more often than not share a house and live 
1561 The vast majority of marriages will result in sexual relations: marriage is (was) often used to 
legitimise sex. forced marriages, therefore, will usually also lead to sexual intercourse, which, 
depending on the situation, may or may not amount to rape.
1562 Human trafficking, Seventh report of the National rapporteur, The Hague: Bureau Nrm 
october 2009, p. 538.
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their lives together. in the eyes of the outside world, they are officially linked and 
bound to each other.
That is the harm of forced marriage: violating someone’s personal autonomy 
by forcing the marital status on that person and thereby making that person spend 
a prolonged period of time (in some cases a lifetime) in an unwanted association.
it is reiterated that ‘marriage’ in this book is defined as any union between two 
or more people which, in a specific society, is legally, culturally and/or religiously 
sanctioned, which is binding, and which, within the particular context of that 
society, establishes certain rights and obligations between these people and is 
seen as marital or marital‑like. This is what is unique about a forced marriage: 
the fact that people are bound to each other by the marriage and that law, custom 
and/or religion create certain rights and obligations between these people.
By being married, people are bound to each other intrinsically as well 
as extrinsically. Say that a’s relatives force him to marry B. after the wedding 
ceremony, a and B sit together and it turns out that neither of them want this 
marriage, so they decide to separate and file for divorce. The harm done in this 
particular case seems to be relatively small. Yet this is an atypical example of 
a forced marriage. forced marriages mostly take place in traditional, closed 
communities.1563 These communities attach great value to (family) honour and 
living life according to certain religious and cultural norms: appearances are kept 
up and dirty laundry is not aired in public in order to prevent loss of face. in these 
communities, divorce is often stigmatised: once married, a couple is expected to 
stay together. it is to be expected that parents and other relatives who have gone to 
some length to bring about the forced marriage, will not easily be swayed by talk 
of divorce. if there has been external pressure to enter into the marriage, there 
will probably also be external (and internal as a result of internalised taboos on 
divorce) pressure to remain in the marriage – at least for a certain period of time.
exactly because of the fact that forced marriages generally take place in 
more conservative circles, the ideas surrounding marriage will also be more 
conservative, so the reality of a forced marriage is that it binds someone for an 
indefinite period of time. marriage is generally aimed at (a certain degree of) 
permanence. This is no different in the case of forced marriages.1564 The forced, 
non‑consensual entrance into a marriage will thus often also have consequences 
for the possibility to exit the marriage. reasons for not being able to exit the 
marriage depend on the particular culture, but may vary from violence, coercion, 
1563 Note that this may be different in conflict situations.
1564 There are exceptions, of course, e.g. forced marriages that are contracted with the aim of 
circumventing immigration rules. Yet even if the marriage was only meant to circumvent 
immigration rules, the marriage will have to last at least a few years. Dutch law, for example, 
requires foreigners who live in the Netherlands with a residence permit that is dependent on a 
marriage or relationship to stay in that relationship for at least five years before they are eligible 
to apply for an extended, independent permit. if the relationship ends within five years, they 
are, in principle, not eligible to apply for an independent residence permit (see the aliens 
Decree in conjunction with the aliens act).
Forceandmarriage.indd   313 20-5-2014   10:42:18
314 intersentia




threats and structural emotional pressure applied by others, such as the other 
spouse or relatives, to broader contextual issues such as poverty and financial 
reasons, the fear of being rejected by the community, perpetuating gender 
inequalities, specific forms of socialisation (such as being brought up to believe 
that marriages must be successful) and the stigmatisation of divorce.1565
Not being able to exit a (religious) marriage is referred to as marital captivity, 
which is a different phenomenon than forced marriage and does not form part 
of this study.1566 marital captivity generally refers to the inability to dissolve a 
religious marriage and causes different harms than being forced to enter into a 
(religious) marriage. for example: X and Y have divorced according to Dutch law 
and no longer live together, but Y refuses to allow X to divorce him according 
to the practices of their religion: X is captured, locked as it were in the religious 
marriage. as a result, she cannot enter into a new religious marriage with 
someone else and she may even be charged with adultery should she travel to 
certain countries with a new partner.1567 in chapters 7 and 9 this was illustrated 
using inter alia the example of the Jewish get: pursuant to Jewish marriage rites, 
divorce can only be obtained by a get given by the husband to the wife.1568 even 
though forced marriage is not the same as marital captivity, it is important to 
take into consideration that they are often linked to each other: the first will often 
result in the latter (see infra paragraphs 2.3 and 2.6.1).
a forced marriage with its inherent risks of psychological abuse, exploitation, 
sexual and/or domestic violence, constitutes a severe violation of personal 
autonomy, an attack on personal liberty. even in the absence of sexual and/or 
domestic violence, a forced marriage causes severe harm in the sense that a person 
is coerced into an unwanted association. Those who are forced to enter into a 
marriage against their will are robbed of the possibility to influence their own 
lives. Being forced into a marriage can thus have a severe psychological impact 
on victims.
2.2.3. The wrongs of forced marriage
marriage is a protected legal interest, a legal good (in german: Rechtsgut). it is 
an institution that is universally protected. So much is clear from the gamut of 
human rights instruments – analysed in chapter 1 – that all contain a provision 
concerning the right to marry. forcing someone to enter into a (religious) marriage 
constitutes a violation of this legal good (i.e. the right of free partner‑choice and 
the right to enter into a marriage with free and genuine consent), because free and 
1565 gangoli et al. 2011, pp. 27, 36, 39–40; and gill & anitha 2011, pp. 53–54. 
1566 The Dutch legislator does consider marital captivity to be part of the the practice of forced 
marriage (Parliamentary Proceedings (Lower House) 2012/2013, 11, p. 49).
1567 See <www.femmesforfreedom.com/themas/huwelijkse‑gevangenschap/> (see also general 
introduction).
1568 See chapter 7, paragraph 4.5 and chapter 9, paragraph 3.3.2.
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full consent is an essential precondition to marriage.1569 This is also recognised 
by a large number of universal and regional human rights instruments, ranging 
from the UDHr to the Universal islamic Declaration of Human rights and 
the Protocol to the african charter on human and peoples’ rights on the rights 
of women in africa. a forced marriage can consequently be seen as a wrong. 
consenting to a marriage, entering into it with genuine and full consent, is a 
human right. Taking that right away from someone and thereby restricting their 
personal autonomy (decision‑making freedom) is wrongful. forced marriages, i.e. 
marriages to which the consent of at least one of the parties was procured under 
duress, constitute a human rights violation.1570 it is often said that consent is the 
ultimate expression of self‑determination.1571 robbing someone of the possibility 
to consent by forcing him or her into a marriage therefore violates that person’s 
right to self‑determination.
2 .3. ProPorTioNaLiTY
forcing someone to enter into a marriage, which falls within the ambit of articles 
284 and 285a cric,1572 is harmful and wrongful. Depending on the culture or 
society, marriage (and divorce) can have life‑long consequences: once married, 
divorce or separation may not be possible; once divorced, a person (usually a 
woman) may be stigmatised, ostracised and unable to remarry; once widowed, 
a person (again usually a woman) may be unable to remarry, or, conversely, may 
be required to marry someone in particular (such as her late husband’s brother 
– see e.g. genesis 38). Therefore, a marriage (so not just a forced marriage) can 
drastically and permanently change people’s lives. a forced marriage has an even 
more disrupting result. as discussed in paragraph 2.2, forcing someone to marry 
results in severe harm. indeed, a victim’s psychological suffering as a result of a 
1569 Note that these human rights instruments do not distinguish between civil marriage and 
religious marriage: they refer to marriage in general without defining the term or specifying 
which type of marriage is meant. The ecHr is the exception, stating that ‘men and women of 
marriageable age have the right to marry and to found a family, according to the national laws 
governing the exercise of this right’. 
1570 forced marriage ‘infringes the fundamental human rights of the individual’ (council of 
europe, P.a., 29th Sitting, Forced marriages and child marriages, Texts adopted, res. 1468 
(2005)). See also Quila v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (2011) UKSc 45, para. 9: 
‘The forcing of a person into marriage is a gross and abhorrent violation of her or his rights 
under, for example, article 16(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human rights 1948, article 
23(3) of the international covenant on civil and Political rights 1966 and article 12 of the 
ecHr.’
1571 Boon 2001, p. 667, referring to r.W. garnett, ‘Why informed consent? Human experimentation 
and the ethics of autonomy’, Catholic Lawyer (36) 1996, p. 457. See also gill & anitha 2011, p. 7; 
and anderson 2010, p. 14.
1572 Note that article 285a cric only applies to forced civil marriages (see infra paragraph 2.6.3).
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forced marriage may even be exacerbated by social and cultural conditions.1573 
Depending on the cultural environment in which a forced marriage takes 
place and in which its effects are felt, the specific harms and the intensity and 
duration of these harms suffered by victims can vary. for example, in societies 
or communities in which divorce is difficult (which is often the case in honour 
cultures), whether as a result of institutionalised gender inequality or as a result 
of social mores, a marriage (forced or not) can have more severe and more 
long‑lasting consequences than in a society in which divorce is not stigmatised.
Because of the severe harms that are caused by coercively taking away an 
individual’s possibility to decide whether, when and whom to marry, it does not 




forcing someone to do something against that person’s will is a crime pursuant 
to article 284 cric and forcing someone to marry falls within the scope of this 
offence. in this sense, the external component of the subsidiarity principle – i.e. 
that criminalisation should only be resorted to when it is an appropriate and 
effective method that is preferable to other (non‑)legal mechanisms – has already 
been addressed, but a few lines must nevertheless be dedicated to this topic.
This book adheres to a minimalist approach to criminalisation. criminal law 
should not be resorted to lightly, but it is not per definition the ultimum remedium. 
if other (non) legal measures can be used to tackle a problematic situation, then 
they may take precedence over criminal law, but some harms and wrongs (also) 
require the condemnatory response of the criminal law.
one of the most used arguments against the criminalisation of forced 
marriage and in favour of a civil law approach is that victims would not report the 
crime to the police, whereas the de facto civil law threshold might be lower and 
not discouraging for victims. The government consultation on the criminalisation 
of forced marriage in england (discussed in chapter 7) plainly highlights that 
different victims have different expectations and preferences. obviously, there 
could never be a unanimous outcome seeing as each victim and situation are 
unique, but the results emphasise the polarised debate: opponents of criminal law 
state that the english civil law framework offers sufficient protection from forced 
1573 Čelebići Trial Judgement, para. 495. in the context of the ecHr it has also been argued that an 
individual’s culture can influence the psychological effects which particular treatment has on 
that person; see a. reidy, The prohibition of torture, A guide to the implementation of Article 3 
of the European Convention on Human Rights (Human rights handbooks, No. 6), Strasbourg: 
council of europe 2003.
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marriages; proponents argue that this is not the case. opponents of criminalisation 
state that it would make victims more vulnerable; proponents believe it would 
empower victims. opponents argue that criminalisation would deter victims 
from reporting the crime; proponents believe it would encourage them. in the 
end, 37% of the respondents to this consultation stated that the practice of forced 
marriage is best kept outside the scope of the criminal law. a small majority (54%) 
argued that criminalisation would be a positive development.
The actual impact of criminalisation on victims’ willingness to report forced 
marriages has not been researched, but it is possible to make a few general 
remarks. The negative effects of social relationships on the reporting of crimes 
by victims is well‑documented: victims are usually less likely to report a crime 
committed against them if they know the offender in any way.1574 further, the 
prospect of going through the criminal justice system will make most victims 
anxious and negatively impact their readiness to report crimes.1575 This is not, 
therefore, unique to forced marriage. Depending on the offence, whistleblowers 
and victims of crimes who step forward are often shunned by their communities 
and/or families. and although prosecutions without active victim participation 
are difficult to achieve,1576 the reluctance of victims to report a certain crime 
is in itself not a valid argument to abstain from criminalisation.1577 The risk of 
ostracism and alienation is further not restricted to invoking the criminal law. 
Seeking help in general can have severe consequences, especially in communities 
that attach high value to family honour.1578 research indicates that victims who 
decide to do something about their situation and seek external help – either from 
the police, an Ngo, a teacher or another third party – are often alienated from 
their families, making reconciliation difficult.1579
Dutch civil law, as was demonstrated in chapters 7 and 9, offers many 
possibilities to tackle (threatened) forced marriages. especially the concept 
of provisional arrangements (voorlopige voorzieningen) offers a wide range of 
options, many of which have not yet been used to their full potential. Provisional 
arrangements can be used to prevent family members or others from forcing 
1574 This is especially the case for domestic and sexual violence and goes for female as well as male 
victims, see e.g. r. felson & P.P. Paré, The Reporting of Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault 
by nonstrangers to the Police, national Criminal Justice Reference Service, March 2005.
1575 iKWro 2012, p. 9.
1576 Diversity Subcommission of the family Justice council 2012, para. 34.
1577 for example, victims of child abuse and their families in ultra‑orthodox Jewish communities 
in New York city have been ostracised by community members, expelled from schools 
and synagogues and targeted for harassment intended to destroy their businesses, see 
S. otterman & r. rivera, ‘Ultra‑orthodox Shun Their own for reporting child Sexual 
abuse’, new York Times 9 may 2012 (available at <www.nytimes.com/2012/05/10/nyregion/
ultra‑orthodox‑jews‑shun‑their‑own‑for‑reporting‑child‑sexual‑abuse.html> last accessed 
21  october 2013). With regard to rape victims, see r. Bachman, ‘Predicting the reporting 
of rape Victimizations:  Have rape reforms made a Difference?’, Criminal Justice and 
Behavior (20) 1993, pp. 254–270.
1578 See Sanghera 2007.
1579 Demos 2012, pp. 49–50.
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someone to enter into a marriage, such as by ordering someone to hand over 
someone else’s passport, or by prohibiting someone from making marriage 
arrangements. in this way, the civil law can function as a valuable framework to 
deal with forced marriages.
However, as explained in paragraph  2.2, the harms and wrongs caused 
by forced marriages are of such a nature that they require the condemnatory 
response of the criminal law. a forced marriage comprises a severe violation of 
personal autonomy – a type of harm that is not suitable for compensation.1580 
obviously, not all forced marriage cases would be heard by a criminal court: the 
prosecutor’s right to exercise prosecutorial discretion allows him to decide which 
cases to pursue and which to dismiss. a two‑track system like in england will 
allow for the graver forced marriage cases to be dealt with through criminal law, 
and the other cases through civil law.
civil law offers valuable measures to protect the victim from being forced into 
a forced marriage (e.g. provisional arrangements ordered during interlocutory 
proceedings) and to dissolve the forced marriage (e.g. by annulment). But the 
harms and wrongs caused by a forced marriage are of such a nature that they 
(also) require the condemnatory response of the criminal law.
2.4.2. Internal subsidiarity and material distinctiveness
in principle, the act of forced marriage is covered by the crime of coercion 
(article 284 cric), but in some cases, other offences, most notably threatening 
to commit a serious criminal offence (article 285 cric), influencing a person’s 
freedom to make an official statement (article  285a cric) and stalking 
(article  285b cric) could also be relevant. Do these four offences specifically 
address the distinct harm caused by forced marriage, or is the act of forcing 
someone to enter into a marriage materially distinct? obviously, this depends on 
the definition of the offence of forced marriage, i.e. on the elements of this crime. 
There is no single crime in the Dutch criminal code that specifically prohibits 
forcing someone to enter into a marriage. in this sense, it could be argued that 
none of the offences in the Dutch criminal code cover the distinct harm of a 
forced marriage. indeed, by its nature, article 284 cric is non‑specific so as to 
be applicable to a broad spectrum of coercive acts. The essence of this provision 
is to safeguard people’s physical and psychological freedom in all situations.1581 
and this is what is harmed when someone is forced to enter into a marriage 
1580 See in general: B.c.J. van Velthoven, ‘een onmogelijke opgave: criteria voor strafbaarstelling 
vanuit economisch perspectief ’, in: c.P.m. cleiren et al. (eds.), Criteria voor 
strafbaarstelling in een nieuwe dynamiek. Symbolische legitimiteit versus maatschappelijke 
en sociaalwetenschappelijke realiteit, The Hague: Boom Lemma 2012, p. 59; and Simester & 
Von Hirsch 2011, p. 17, footnote 35 and p. 198.
1581 Parliamentary Papers II (Lower House) 2009/10, 32 175, no. 2 (Letter from the minister of 
Justice), p. 5.
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against their will. article 284 cric prohibits using coercion to make someone 
do, tolerate or refrain from doing something against their will. The wording of 
article 284 cric covers a plethora of possibilities regarding (forced) marriage: 
forcing someone to marry a particular person, using coercion to force someone 
not to marry a particular person, and forcing someone to stay in a marriage.
another provision that aims to protect personal freedom and more 
specifically the feelings of personal safety and peace (in german: individuellen 
Rechtsfrieden) is article 285 cric.1582 This provision stipulates that it is a criminal 
offence, punishable by a maximum prison sentence of two years, to threaten 
someone with certain serious offences, such as rape, sexual assault, a crime 
against a person’s life, hostage taking and aggravated assault.1583 This criminal 
offence does not require that these threats are uttered with a specific aim, such 
as to force someone to enter into a marriage. Uttering such serious threats alone 
constitutes an assault on personal freedom in and of itself.
The crux of article  285a cric is to prevent people from being influenced 
(by threats or other means) as a result of which they are no longer able to freely 
make a statement before a judge or public servant. The provision was drafted 
with the eye to protecting witnesses in criminal investigations and trials, but 
during the parliamentary readings it was already recognised that this article is 
meant to guarantee the freedom of statement of ‘all civilians’ in all official (legal) 
procedures.1584 Therefore, it was argued in chapter 7 that this provision is also 
applicable in those cases where someone is forced to enter into a civil1585 marriage: 
the victim’s freedom to make a truthful statement before the registrar has been 
influenced by others as a result of which the victim is forced to say ‘i do’.1586
article  285b cric is aimed at protecting people’s privacy. Stalking was 
separately criminalised in 2000 because certain acts of stalking and harassment, 
such as persistently following a person against their will, were not caught by any 
criminal offence and the legislator believed that these acts were criminal.1587 as was 
demonstrated in chapter 7, in many cases, the period leading up to the marriage 
ceremony (i.e. the period during which pressure is exerted on an individual with 
the aim of causing that person to marry) could qualify as stalking. Under certain 
1582 machielse 2012, comments on article 285, margin no. 2.
1583 in those cases where the threats are made in writing and coupled with a certain demand (‘your 
money or your life’), the maximum sentence is four years imprisonment (article 285(2) cric).
1584 Parliamentary Papers II (Lower House), 1991/92, 22 483, no. 3, p. 39.
1585 Note that this provision is not applicable to non‑civil marriages, such as forced religious 
marriages (see also infra paragraph 2.6.3).
1586 Looking at the wording of article  285a cric, this conclusion is valid. But a teleological 
interpretation brings to the fore a different conclusion. Three sentences after saying that 
article  285a cric is not limited to criminal proceedings and is aimed at ‘protecting the 
freedom of all citizens to make a truthful statement to a judge or public servant’, the minister 
of Justice stated that the provision is intended to protect the legal interest of the ‘freedom of 
statement of witnesses and experts’ (Parliamentary Papers II (Lower House), 1991/92, 22 483, 
no. 3, p. 39).
1587 machielse 2013, comments on article 285b, margin no. 2.
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circumstances, being forced to marry someone and being forced to live with 
that person will also amount to stalking.1588 in this sense, the offence of stalking 
does capture some of the harms caused by a forced marriage, seeing as it aims to 
protect people’s privacy and a forced marriage constitutes a violation of privacy. 
Yet, again, stalking does not specifically address the act of being forced to enter 
into a marriage. a forced marriage is more than living with a stalker or being 
harassed by relatives and community members: it is about not being able to make 
important life decisions, such as deciding with whom to share your life.
is forced marriage materially distinct from existing criminal offences (internal 
subsidiarity)? it follows from the above that the discussion on the material 
distinctiveness of forced marriages from offences codified in the Dutch criminal 
code can go in two different directions. it could be argued that the distinct harms 
and wrongs of a forced marriage are not specifically covered by article 284 cric 
(or any other offence in the Dutch criminal code), which makes the act of forcing 
someone to enter into a marriage materially distinct from existing criminal 
offences: it contains an element (coercion with regard to entering into a marriage) 
that is not part of any other criminal offence. This means that, in principle, there 
would be a case for creating a separate crime of forced marriage. Yet it could also 
be argued that even though the act of forcing someone to marry is distinct in the 
sense that it is more specific (lex specialis) than general coercion, the portée is the 
same: forcing someone to enter into a marriage violates a person’s psychological 
freedom – an interest safeguarded by the lex generalis of article 284 cric.
The outcome, therefore, remains inconclusive: Dutch criminal law contains 
several offences that can be used to prosecute forced marriages, meaning that 
there are alternatives (to separate criminalisation) within criminal law, but, in a 
strict sense, none of these offences specifically focus on the act of forcing someone 
to enter into a marriage.
2 .5. effecTiVeNeSS
forced marriage cases may prove to be difficult to prosecute.1589 a forced marriage 
often takes place behind closed doors and may be the result of cumulative pressure 
exerted by a large circle of people: parents, uncles, aunts, siblings, grandparents, 
neighbours, religious leaders, and many others. This results in three problems 
– which have already been touched upon in previous chapters – with regard to the 
prosecution of forced marriages: the detection of forced marriages, the question 
of whom to prosecute and evidentiary issues.
1588 The District court Zutphen ruled that, under certain circumstances, domestic violence can 
(also) be seen as a breach of a person’s privacy and thus as a form of stalking (District court 
Zutphen 18 June 2003, NJ 2003, 451).
1589 at the time of writing (December 2013), Dutch criminal courts had not (yet) dealt with charges 
concerning forced marriage.
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2.5.1. The detection of the hidden crime of forced marriage
first, regarding the detection: not all forced marriages are reported to the police. 
indeed, it has been argued in the context of the forced marriage criminalisation 
debates in england and the Netherlands that forced marriage is a hidden problem 
with a low reporting rate.1590 This means that in many cases, the police are 
dependent on witness statements, e.g. friends or teachers of the victim, but also 
medical professionals and registrars. This is not very different from crimes such 
as child abuse and domestic violence and is not eo ipso a reason to refrain from 
(separate) criminalisation.1591 Would the creation of a separate criminal offence 
make victims more likely to step forward and report the crime? it is not possible 
to answer this question. on the one hand, it could be argued that a distinct crime 
of forced marriage would send out a clear signal that this practice is unacceptable 
and criminal, which could empower victims. on the other hand, it could also be 
argued that this would not change victims’ hesitation to go to the police. as in all 
cases, each victim is different: some will feel empowered by a (separate) criminal 
prohibition; others will not feel more encouraged to report their plight to the 
authorities (see also supra paragraph 4.1).
it has been suggested, during debates on separate criminalisation of the 
practice of forced marriage, to turn forced marriage into a distinct offence that 
is only subject to prosecution on complaint by the victim (klachtdelict).1592 it 
is doubtful that this would increase victims’ willingness to report the crime. 
arguably, this would even increase the likelihood that more coercion is used: 
families might put a victim under further pressure, forcing her not to press charges 
or to drop them. By turning forced marriage into a prosecution‑on‑complaint 
offence, the authorities would become completely dependent on the will of the 
victim. if a third party were to report to the police that he believes his neighbour’s 
daughter is being forced into a marriage, the police and prosecutor would not be 
able to proceed without the victim lodging a complaint.1593
2.5.2. Whom to prosecute?
Secondly, relating to the prosecution of forced marriage (irrespective of 
whether or not it becomes a separate offence or remains a form of coercion): it 
is not unimaginable that in some cases it would be difficult to decide whom to 
prosecute. many different people may have been involved in creating the coercion 
1590 See chapters 2 and 7.
1591 on the willingness of victims to report domestic violence and on whether or not they want 
their abusers to be prosecuted see also a.r. Klein, Practical implications of current domestic 
violence research: for law enforcement, prosecutors and judges, Washington: U.S. Department 
of Justice June 2009.
1592 Parliamentary Proceedings (Lower House) 2012/2013, 32 840, no. 11, p. 50.
1593 Unless of course there is reason to believe that other crimes (which are not subject to 
prosecution on complaint) have also been committed.
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which caused a person to marry against their will. The marriage could have been 
the result of a ‘joint venture’ of family members using (subtle) pressure. it would 
appear that the standard rules of co‑perpetration can be applied in these cases: 
in order to prove coercion, the conduct of all suspects combined must satisfy the 
elements of the offence. in this sense, the total complex of the suspects’ acts must 
amount to coercion.1594 each of the suspects will need to have had the required 
mens rea, i.e. they must have coerced the victim with the intention of causing 
them to enter into a marriage (dolus eventualis as a minimum). The elements 
‘force/coerce’ (dwingen) and ‘unlawful’ (wederrechtelijk) in article  284 cric 
imply lack of consent on the victim’s side and awareness of this lack of consent 
on the perpetrator’s side.1595 in the end, it is up to the prosecutor to decide whom 
to prosecute, a decision, which, to state the obvious, depends on the particular 
circumstances of the case. The key in these situations is the perpetrators’ shared 
mens rea, their common intent of causing the victim to marry against her will.
2.5.3. How to prove coercion was used?
Thirdly, it could also be challenging to prove that coercion was used. Different 
forms of coercion are used in forced marriage cases, ranging from emotional 
blackmail to physical violence. Victims may be threatened with abandonment, 
isolation, social ostracism, disownment, or even death. in extreme cases, victims 
are taken abroad or are abducted and imprisoned. often, victims are pressured not 
by just one person, but by multiple family members, relatives and/or community 
members. The coercion may be subtle: the victim might find herself surrounded 
by people who incessantly talk and make insinuations about future marriages 
and try to persuade her to go along with the suggested marriage. as explained 
in chapter 7, in many cases it will be difficult to determine whether the coercion 
that was used qualifies as criminal coercion in accordance with article 284 cric. 
in many cases, the eventual ‘i do’ of the victim will have come about as a result 
of a combination of protracted psychological pressure exerted by family and 
community members on the one hand and internalised ideals about marriage on 
the other hand.
How do courts deal with these issues? How could they prove that the 
perpetrator(s) coerced the victim to enter into a marriage? in some cases the very 
nature of the perpetrator’s behaviour will be decisive: if the perpetrator threatened 
the victim with violence, for example by putting a gun to her head and telling her 
1594 See Proceedings II (Lower House) 1998/99, no. 98, p. 5695 and machielse 2013, comments on 
article 285b, margin no. 5 (with regard to co‑perpetration and stalking).
1595 Lindenberg 2007, pp.  171 and 175. according to Lindenberg, the element of ‘coercion’ in 
article  284 cric implies that with his behaviour, the perpetrator intentionally caused the 
victim to do something, to refrain from doing something or to tolerate something against his 
will. Lindenberg states that the perpetrator’s intent must always cover the fact that the victim 
did not want the interference.
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to choose between marriage and her life, it will be easier for the courts to conclude 
that the perpetrator coerced the victim to enter into a marriage. But what about 
more subtle forms of coercion? Here, one of the elements of article  284 cric, 
‘hostile act’ (feitelijkheid), offers a solution. a hostile act is an act, other than an 
act of violence, by which the perpetrator intentionally caused the victim to do, 
to refrain from doing or to tolerate something that the victim would otherwise 
not have done, refrained from doing or tolerated. This element is incorporated in 
the definitions of several other coercion‑based offences, such as rape and human 
trafficking, and has the same meaning in all these offences.1596 The Supreme court 
has held that a person coerces someone by a hostile act when he intentionally 
exerts such psychological pressure or intentionally brings the victim to such a 
situation of dependency that the victim, as a result of these actions, could not 
reasonably have been expected to act differently or to remove him or herself from 
the suspect’s (hostile) influence.1597 an example could be, obviously depending 
on the circumstances, taking advantage of a victim’s devoutness.1598 So, what 
is required is that the perpetrator used any of the means of coercion listed in 
article 284 cric (i.e (threats of) violence or other hostile acts) with the intention 
to coerce the victim. The victim must have responded by acting in a way in which 
she would not have acted, had she not been coerced, and this victim could not 
reasonably have been expected to resist the coercion.1599
Turning forced marriage into a separate offence would not change any of these 
difficulties, nor would it necessarily act as a deterrent to (potential) perpetrators. 
as stated by ashworth and Horder: ‘it cannot be assumed that creating a new 
crime or increasing the maximum punishment will lead – in a kind of hydraulic 
relationship – to a reduction in the incidence of that conduct.’1600 furthermore, 
separate criminalisation would not make the (enforcement of the) criminal 
law more efficient or effective. Since the promulgation of the marital coercion 
(criminal law) act 2013, it has become possible to take suspects of criminal 
coercion (which includes forced marriages) into pre‑trial detention. as a result, the 
law enforcement authorities are now able to use a broad spectrum of investigation 
methods and powers to investigate alleged instances of criminal coercion. The 
1596 See inter alia machielse 2012, comments on article 284, margin no. 4.
1597 Dutch Supreme court 27 august 2013, ecLi:NL:Hr:2013:494 (a rape case).
1598 in this particular case, the suspect had forced an underage girl – who was brought up in a very 
religious family – to have sexual intercourse with him inter alia by telling her that the Virgin 
mary had brought them together. after having sexual intercourse with her, he told her that 
they were now married in the eyes of god. He then used this to keep forcing the girl to have sex 
with him (Dutch Supreme court 27 august 2013, ecLi:NL:Hr:2013:494).
1599 See also Lindenberg 2007, pp.  132–190. Lindenberg lists several examples to illustrate the 
broad scope of article  284 cric: forcing someone to sign a document, forcing someone to 
stop working, forcing someone to send a picture, forcing someone (via a webcam) to write the 
word ‘slut’ on her chest and to hit herself repeatedly in the face, and forcing someone to make 
a phone call. for more examples of acts that have been qualified as coercion, see Lindenberg 
2007, pp. 244–245.
1600 ashworth & Horder 2013, p. 16.
Forceandmarriage.indd   323 20-5-2014   10:42:19
324 intersentia




police and prosecutor can, for example, demand that telecommunication data 
(such as telephone records and text messages) are handed over.1601 creating a 
distinct crime of forced marriage would not increase or widen the authorities’ 
investigative powers.
2 .6. coNcLUSioN: a SePar aTe offeNce of forceD 
mar riage…
2.6.1. …is not required in Dutch criminal law
in the previous paragraphs, it was demonstrated that forcing someone to enter 
into a marriage against that person’s will causes harms and wrongs. These harms 
and wrongs are of such a severity and nature that a criminal law response would 
not be disproportional, indeed, they (also) call for the condemnatory response of 
the criminal law, irrespective of the valuable protective remedies offered by the 
civil law. But should the act of forcing someone to marry be turned into a separate 
criminal offence? in this paragraph it will be argued that this is not necessary: the 
current situation – where this act is caught by article 284 cric, and, depending 
on the circumstances, several other criminal offences – does not call for the 
creation of a distinct offence of forced marriage.
forced marriage, depending on how it is defined, covers several harms. in 
this book, it is defined as a marriage (i.e. a marital or marital‑like association), 
which at least one of the partners entered into against their will as a result of some 
form of coercion exerted by another party. But it has been argued by some that 
a forced marriage is broader than the mere conferral of marital status against 
someone’s will, and that it also refers to being forced to remain in a (religious) 
marriage, a phenomenon which has been referred to as ‘marital captivity’. 
as stated above, in many cases, a forced marriage as defined in this book will 
also result in marital captivity. Yet marital captivity is not always the result of a 
marriage that was entered into under duress: a voluntary marriage (as opposed to 
a forced marriage) can also result in marital captivity. it is here that the coercion 
offence of article 284 cric proves its worth: it covers both situations.
Because marriage in general is aimed at (some level of) permanence and 
brings about a change in someone’s (legal and societal) status, and with all (legal/
religious) consequences that entail, it is difficult to separate the event of forcing 
someone to say ‘i do’, from what follows afterwards: being married. Yet forcing 
someone to remain married (in the sense of marital captivity), is something other 
than forcing someone to enter into a marriage in the first place. forcing someone 
to say ‘i do’ (forcing someone to do something, an element of article 284) is an 
instantaneous offence (aflopend delict), but as a result, that person will, generally, 
1601 See article 126n(1) ccriP.
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also have to remain married, which amounts to coercing someone to refrain from 
doing something (e.g. filing for divorce) and/or to tolerate something (i.e. being 
married) – two other elements of article 284.1602, 1603 The latter could be qualified 
as a continuing offence (délit continu or, in Dutch, voortdurend delict). article 284 
covers all of these situations.1604
The offence of forcing someone to enter into a marriage – as an instantaneous 
offence – is completed once the victim has been forced to take part in the wedding 
ceremony (or in any ceremony that brings about the marriage). as a result, the 
dies a quo of the statutory prescription period of six years (see article 70(1) sub 2) 
will be the day after the wedding day.1605 if this victim is also forced to remain 
married (marital captivity), then the statute of limitations will depend on the way 
in which the prosecutor decides to charge the offence. if the prosecutor charges 
the defendant with forcing the victim to enter into the marriage and subsequently 
forcing the victim to remain in this marriage, then this total complex of acts 
would qualify as a continuing offence. The acts could then be seen as a so‑called 
continuous act (voorgezette handeling) as described in article 56 cric: i.e. acts 
that each individually amount to a criminal offence or misdemeanour but that 
are so closely connected that they must be regarded as one continuous act. in such 
cases, the statute of limitations starts to run on the day after the marital captivity 
has come to an end, e.g. as a result of divorce or death of a spouse.
article 284 cric catches all different types of forced marriage: forced civil 
marriage (the only type of marriage that is recognised by Dutch civil law), 
forced religious marriage and forced customary marriage.1606 even cases of 
forced registered partnership and forced cohabitation – the latter was separately 
criminalised in Belgium in october 20131607 – could fall within the scope of 
article 284 cric, as long as the perpetrator used (threats of) force or other hostile 
acts to coerce the victim to do, refrain from doing or tolerate something that the 
victim would otherwise not have done, refrained from doing or tolerated. if a 
1602 See with regard to the offence of coercion and the elements ‘to do, refrain from doing or 
tolerate’ Lindenberg 2007, pp. 64–65. compare in this regard: depriving a person unlawfully 
of his freedom versus keeping someone deprived of his freedom (both codified in article 282 
cric): the former is an instantaneous, the latter a continuing offence (remmelink 1996, 
p. 120).
1603 it is possible that there are different perpetrators involved at different stages, e.g. the victim’s 
parents forced her to enter into the marriage, but the victim’s husband is the one who forces 
her to remain in the marriage and prevents her from filing for divorce.
1604 This was also mentioned by the State Secretary of Security and Justice (Parliamentary 
Proceedings (Lower House) 2012/2013, 11, p. 49). 
1605 Unless the victim is a minor; in that case the the dies a quo of the statutory prescription period 
of six years will be the day after the victim’s 18th birthday (see marital coercion (criminal law) 
act, amending article 70(2) sub 2 cric). See also chapter 7, paragraph 3.1.
1606 forcing someone to enter into a civil marriage and also forcing them to enter into a religious 
marriage could be charged as two concurrent violations of article 284 cric.
1607 article  391septies Belgium criminal code. This provision concerns ‘legal cohabitation’ 
(wettelijke samenwoning).
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new criminal offence were created, this offence would need to be defined in broad 
terms, so that it would not be limited to forced civil marriages.
as argued above, creating a separate offence would send a clear message 
that forced marriage is wrong, unacceptable and will not be tolerated. This 
message can also be sent by others means, such as media (awareness) campaigns, 
programmes to train professionals (such as teachers and registrars) who are likely 
to encounter instances of forced marriage, and prosecutorial guidelines stating 
the ways in which forced marriage will be charged. all of these measures are 
contained in the Dutch government’s action plan concerning the prevention 
of forced marriages.1608 further, it is often argued that separate criminalisation 
would act as a strong deterrent for potential perpetrators on the one hand and 
act as a means to empower the victims on the other hand. as explained above in 
paragraphs 2.4.1 and 2.5, it is not possible to substantiate these claims.
2.6.2. The principle of legality
The law should be clear. Legal certainty in the form of the legality principle 
demands that citizens are able to understand what kind of behaviour will lead to 
criminal liability. as was argued in chapter 4, when it comes to criminalisation, 
considerations regarding the legality principle generally come to the fore after 
the criminalisation decision has been made. Had the conclusion of this research 
been that forced marriage should be separately criminalised, then the legality 
principle – more specifically the sub‑norm of lex certa – would have been used 
as a guideline in defining this new distinct offence in the sense that the elements 
of that crime must be as clear and accurate as possible. Yet the conclusion of this 
research is that it is not necessary to create a new crime. This means that the lex 
certa principle is not extensively addressed in the context of forced marriages. 
article 284 cric, the provision of choice for prosecuting acts relating to forced 
marriage, is a broad and general offence. its elements are non‑specific so that 
the offence encompasses a large number of criminal acts that can be qualified as 
‘coercive’. The provision could be used to prosecute people who force someone to 
convert to a certain religion, or who pressurise someone into joining or staying 
in a sect. in theory, it could even be used to prosecute someone who forces a 
woman to have children, or who uses coercive means to prevent someone from 
having children. and what about forcing someone to leave the country and never 
come back? These are all very harmful acts, which have not been separately 
criminalised. The elements of article 284 cric may be broad and inclusive, but 
they are not vague. all elements have been defined and interpreted by criminal 
courts. Therefore, if, for whatever reason, the decision were to be made to create a 
1608 Parliamentary Papers II (Lower House) 2011/12, 32 175, no. 35 (Prevention of forced marriages 
2012–2014); and see Letter of the State Secretary of Health Welfare and Sport to the President 
of the Lower House, 15 July 2013.
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separate criminal offence of forced marriage, it would be highly recommendable 
to use article 284 cric as a blueprint for the definition of this (new) crime.
2.6.3. Dealing with a legal anomaly: Article 284 versus Article 285a CriC
one of the conclusions of this research is that it is not necessary to create a distinct 
offence of forced marriage. This leaves us with one anomaly that has not yet 
been dealt with: the divergence between article 284 cric and 285a cric. in the 
majority of forced marriage cases, the offence of coercion (article 284 cric) will 
be applicable. it has been argued in chapter 7 and above that article 285a cric 
may also apply in some cases. article 284 cric, with a maximum penalty of two 
years imprisonment, covers all forms of forced marriage (civil as well as religious); 
whereas article 285a cric, with a maximum penalty of four years imprisonment, 
only covers those cases where force was used to cause someone to enter into a 
civil marriage. This means that a forced civil marriage (if the prosecutor decides 
to charge article  285a cric) is threatened with a higher maximum penalty 
than a forced religious marriage, even though a forced religious marriage can 
cause similar harms as a forced civil marriage. indeed, in certain communities a 
religious marriage binds the victim in similar, if not in more extreme ways than a 
civil marriage: in some communities, the religious marriage is seen as the ‘actual’ 
marriage.1609
There are two solutions to this problem: amending article 285a cric so that 
it is no longer applicable to any form of forced marriage (i.e. exclude the registrar 
as a public official within the meaning of article  285a cric), or equating the 
maximum penalties on article 284 and 285a cric. There is something to be said 
for both options. But amending article 285a cric so that it no longer covers the 
freedom to make a truthful statement in the presence of a registrar could send 
the wrong message: it could be seen as ‘devaluing’ the act of forcing someone to 
enter into a civil marriage from a four‑year offence to a two‑year offence.1610
The latter option (i.e. equating the maximum penalties) begs the question of 
whether the maximum penalty of article 285a cric should be made equal to the 
1609 See e.g. Van der Leun & Leupen 2009, p.  28. in many cases, a (forced) religious marriage 
will (also) be linked with a (forced) civil marriage (it is reiterated that conducting a religious 
marriage between two people who have not yet entered into a civil marriage is a misdemeanour 
pursuant to article 449 cric), but it cannot be ruled out that a person is only forced to enter 
into a religious marriage (i.e. without also being forced to enter into a civil marriage). See Van 
der Leun & Leupen 2009.
1610 it is also interesting to note the following, without adding any value judgement to this 
observation: as explained in chapter 7, the marital coercion (civil measures) Bill aims to 
amend the civil code in such a way that cousins who wish to marry each other must first make 
an official declaration of free consent in the presence of the registrar. currently, if parents 
were to force their child to make an untruthful statement, their behaviour could fall within the 
ambit of article 285a cric. if article 285a cric were to be amended so that it no longer covers 
the freedom to make a truthful statement in the presence of a registrar, the parents’ behaviour 
would no longer be caught by this provision. instead, it would be caught by article 284 cric.
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maximum penalty of article 284 cric or vice versa. in other words: should the 
maximum penalty be lowered or raised? The scales seem to tip in favour of the 
latter: bringing the maximum penalty of article 284 cric on a par with that of 
article 285a cric. increasing the maximum penalty on coercion from two to four 
years would not be disproportional. it goes without saying that there are many 
forms of coercion that are not worthy of a four‑year prison sentence, but some might 
warrant more than the current maximum of two years imprisonment. increasing 
the maximum penalty from two to four years gives the court a broader sentencing 
bandwidth: a court would be able to impose a prison sentence anywhere between 
one day and four years. an advantage of increasing the maximum penalty for 
article 284 cric would be that pursuant to article 70(1) sub 3 cric, the statute of 
limitations increases from six to twelve years, allowing an extra six years for cases 
of forced marriage (and marital captivity) to come to light.1611
in this context, it is illustrative1612 to note the length of the maximum penalties 
in other european countries – without using these examples as a decisive reason 
to increase the maximum penalty on coercion in the Netherlands. in england, 
the maximum penalty for forced marriage is seven years, in Norway it is six years, 
in Belgium it is five years (with a minimum of three months) and in germany1613 
it is also five years (with a minimum of six months).1614
3. THe crimiNaLiSaTioN of forceD 
marriage aND THe rome STaTUTe
3.1. iNTroDUcTioN
This paragraph answers the question of whether and, if so, how forced marriage 
should be criminalised in the rome Statute. The paragraph starts off by briefly 
recalling what forced marriages in conflict situations entail and which harms 
1611 Note that the marital coercion (criminal law) act 2013 added article 284 cric to article 67 
ccriP as an offence which allows for pre‑trial detention and several extra investigative powers 
(see chapter 7, paragraph 3.1).
1612 most jurisdictions work with possibilities of early release. These schemes have not been taken 
into consideration. in england, for example, most prisoners serving a fixed‑term sentence are 
eligible for release on a conditional licence after serving half of their sentence, which would 
mean that a maximum sentence of seven years for forced marriage would result in 3.5 years 
spent in prison (see section 237 ff criminal Justice act 2003). in the Netherlands, prisoners 
sentenced to more than two years imprisonment are eligible for conditional early release after 
serving two‑thirds of their sentence (article 15(2) cric). a prisoner convicted of four years 
would therefore serve two years and eight months.
1613 in addition to the crime of forced marriage, the german criminal code also contains a 
crime of coercion comparable to the Dutch offence of coercion. in germany, the maximum 
penalty for this offence is three years and in very severe cases five years (with a minimum of six 
months). 
1614 Section 108(7)(b) aBcP Bill 2013; article 222(2) Norwegian criminal code; article 391sexies 
Belgian criminal code and article 237 Strafgesetzbuch, respectively.
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they cause (paragraph 3.2). Subsequently, the criteria for criminalisation set out 
in chapter 5 will be applied to the three core crimes (paragraphs 3.3–3.5).
it is important to reiterate that the rome Statute, being a treaty, can be 
amended independently of the criminalisation criteria that are used below: any 
amendment can be adopted as long as it is supported by a two‑thirds majority of 
states parties. The criteria distilled from the intra article criminalisation structure 
of the core crimes and the negotiation history of the rome Statute represent the 
ideal situation: i.e. that new crimes against humanity, war crimes or forms of 
genocide are added to the rome Statute only if they satisfy the criminalisation 
criteria applied below. in this sense, it is proffered that these criteria should be 
used as guidelines whenever amendments to the core crimes are suggested. it is 
also important to keep in mind that the rome Statute, although influenced by 
icTr and icTY case law, is an independent system of criminal law in itself.1615 as a 
result, there are several differences with regard to the (interpretation of) elements 
of certain crimes by the ad hoc and internationalised courts on the one hand, and 
the icc on the other hand. Where relevant, this will be addressed. finally, special 
consideration must be given to the meaning of the legality principle in the rome 
Statute, in particular the lex stricta norm: in accordance with article 22(2) rome 
Statute, the definitions of crimes discussed below will be strictly construed and 
will not be extended by analogy.
3.2 . THe Har mS of forceD mar riage iN coNfLicT 
SiTUaTioNS
3.2.1. Introduction
The act of forced marriage and its consequences are usually described as multiple 
wrongdoings. it can comprise a multitude of criminal acts, such as rape, enforced 
pregnancy and (sexual) slavery. often, forced marriage is even conflated with 
these crimes. The ScSL, for example, struggled to distinguish between forced 
marriages on the one hand and sexual slavery on the other hand, and often 
confused the different harms caused by these two acts.1616 and the icc Pre‑Trial 
chamber, in the decision on the confirmation of the charges in the case against 
Katanga, has held that forced marriage is a form of sexual slavery.1617 But in this 
research, the act of forced marriage is defined restrictively as the act of forcing 
1615 g. Werle, ‘individual criminal responsibility in article  25 icc Statute’, Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 2007–5, pp. 961–962.
1616 See chapter 8, paragraphs 2.2.5 and 2.3.3. The afrc appeals chamber, for example, held 
that the act of forcibly conferring the marital status upon another person is in itself grave 
enough to amount to a distinct other inhumane act. But the chamber substantiated this 
claim by referring to bush wives becoming victims of rape, sexual violence, forced labour and 
deprivation of liberty (afrc appeal Judgement, para. 199). See also Toy‑cronin 2010, p. 583.
1617 Katanga and ngudjolo Chui Decision on the confirmation of charges, para. 431.
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someone to enter into a conjugal association. The focus is therefore on the harm 
caused by the forcible imposition of the marital status itself, which does not 
include any (subsequent) physical suffering as a result of, for example, rape or 
other forms of physical abuse.1618
as stated in paragraph  2 supra, forcing someone to enter into a marriage, 
taking away from that person the possibility to make the important life decision 
of whether, when and whom to marry, causes severe harm. in the context of a 
conflict, this harm manifests itself in different ways.
3.2.2. Sierra Leone (as a blueprint for many other African conflicts)1619
in her Dissenting opinion to the afrc Trial Judgement, Justice Doherty listed a 
set of harms that are often associated with or were caused by the forced marriages 
that took place within the specific context of the civil war in Sierra Leone.1620 in 
many cases, she submits, the victims were very young and therefore vulnerable. 
Because they were abducted, taken away from their families, and placed in a 
violent, hostile environment, their vulnerability increased and they became 
completely dependent on their abductors.1621 after the trauma they suffered as a 
result of being abducted and having witnessed their relatives being slaughtered or 
maimed, the girls were forced to become bush wives to individual rebels. These 
women were forced to marry the enemy, the very men who participated in the 
attack on the civilian population of which the women themselves were members. 
Having to live with, be associated with, maintain an intimate relationship 
with, and be dependent on men they feared, sometimes even the very men who 
murdered their family or previously raped them, caused severe psychological 
suffering.1622 Yet in the bush, these marriages also saved women from further 
abuse and violence: girls who did not ‘belong’ to individual rebels as wives were 
at everyone’s (sexual) disposal, had to do more hard labour, had to find food for 
themselves, and were at greater risk of being sent to the front.1623
as a result of being labelled ‘wife’, some women felt, for various reasons, that 
they were not able to exit the bush marriage and leave their rebel husband. Some 
were afraid to leave the marriage, still living in fear of their bush husbands, who 
1618 The physical suffering is already covered by crimes such as rape and (sexual) enslavement. 
1619 as has already been pointed out in chapter 3, paragraph 6, the forced marriages that took (and 
still take) place in many of the conflicts that are under investigation or already on trial before 
the icc, bear great resemblance to the Sierra Leonean bush marriages.
1620 These harms were reiterated by the Prosecutor in his appeal Brief in the afrc case, see afrc 
Prosecution appeal Brief, paras. 625–626.
1621 afrc Trial Judgement, Dissenting opinion Justice Doherty, para. 47.
1622 afrc Trial Judgement, Dissenting opinion Justice Doherty, para. 48; and afrc Prosecution 
appeal Brief, para. 620.
1623 Prosecutor vs. Brima, Kamara and Kanu (AFRC), case No. ScSL‑04–16‑T, Prosecution final 
Trial Brief, 6 December 2006, para. 1879; afrc expert report Bangura, p. 16; and carlson & 
mazurana 2008, p. 41.
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kept them in captivity after the civil war for sexual and domestic purposes.1624 
Habituation was another reason for staying in the bush marriage; after spending 
years in the bush, from an early age onwards, many women did not know any 
better, they had grown accustomed to their lives in the bush, to their lives with 
their rebel husbands. other women had nowhere else to go or stayed because of 
the children they had given birth to.1625 and in some cases, women chose to stay 
with their bush husbands because they had been treated correctly by them during 
the war, or because they had grown to love them. Some even sought to formalise 
the bush marriage after the war.1626
3.2.3. Cambodia
The Khmer rouge marriages resulted in relatively less (sexual) violence than the 
Sierra Leonean bush marriages: often, both spouses were the victim of the forced 
marriage, although there were also cases where one of the spouses was abused 
by the other. The greatest harm caused by the marriages arranged by the Khmer 
rouge is the fact that the label ‘marriage’ caused many people to feel compelled 
to remain in the association, thereby drastically and permanently disrupting 
people’s lives. as a result of their culture, for many, divorce or separation was not 
an option. So with their social engineering experiment, the Khmer rouge took 
control of people’s lives.
in addition, the Khmer rouge marriages caused specific cultural harm. 
for cambodians, at least for the older generations, rituals form an important, 
indispensible part of life. The abolition and prohibition of traditional wedding 
rituals was a great source of distress for people wed under the Khmer rouge. Not 
being able to make appeasement offerings to their ancestors and being wed to a 
person that was not carefully selected by their parents or a matchmaker could 
cause anxiety and (fear of) bad karma. rituals such as fortune‑telling are used to 
maximise luck and thereby invest in family harmony, which is considered one of 
the greatest goods to pursue in marriage.1627 The absence of rituals caused stress 
with regard to the possible lack of harmony in the (forcibly) arranged marriages. 
another source of anxiety was formed by the fact that Angkar often arranged 
marriages between complete strangers. in traditional cambodian marriages it 
is, or at least was, not uncommon for bride and groom to meet for the first time 
on the wedding day: the partner was selected by the parents who often made sure 
that spouses had an equal social and educational status.1628 Angkar had made no 
such careful selections. even though at first, the cPK seemed intent to pair people 
with the same social standing – new people with new people, base people with 
1624 Save the children 2007, p. 44.
1625 afrc Trial Judgement, Dissenting opinion Justice Doherty, para. 45.
1626 coulter 2009, pp. 1–2; and mcKay & mazurana 2004, p. 56.
1627 LeVine 2010, p. 32.
1628 LeVine 2010, p. 84; Heuveline & Poch 2006, p. 101.
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base people, soldiers with soldiers – this policy was soon abandoned and mixed 
marriages became the norm.1629 Under the reign of the Khmer rouge, keeping a 
low profile and lying about one’s past increased chances of survival. Those who 
had been doctors or (family members of) employees of the overthrown Sihanouk 
government, had best conceal their past. This became more difficult when Angkar 
arranged for them to marry. Under Angkar, betrayal ran rampant, spies were 
everywhere and people were actively encouraged to report those who acted in 
a counterrevolutionary way. it is not surprising, therefore, that some people had 
a difficult time determining whether or not they could trust their spouse. Some 
were unable to do so and lived in fear of being betrayed: there are even reports 
of men and women who reported their spouse to Angkar as ‘enemies’.1630 This 
was often the case in mixed marriages between base and new persons. especially 
people who had lied about their past had to be very careful, for fear of being 
exposed and having to suffer the consequences. others, like the majority of 
LeVine’s respondents, did not experience such trust and betrayal issues, but found 
in their spouse an ally, a companion and confidant.
3.2.4. The specific harms of forced marriage in conflict situations 
in the previous two sub‑paragraphs, (the harms of) forced marriages in two 
specific conflicts were described. This outline results in the following description 
of forced marriage in conflict situations in general. This description is consistent 
with the working definition of forced marriage that was formulated in chapter 1. 
a forced marriage during a conflict consists of a perpetrator forcing someone 
to enter into a relationship, either with himself or with another person. This 
relationship is qualified as ‘marriage’, either by the perpetrator, the victim, the 
subculture of war and/or by the society at large. in many cases, perpetrators of 
forced marriages also cause the victims to stay in the association for a certain 
period of time. The forced conferral of the marital status has consequences for 
the relationship between the parties: the forced marriage creates certain exclusive 
obligations and/or rights between the spouses that do not exist between people 
who are not (forcibly) married. These rights and/or obligations often pertain to 
inter alia sexual exclusivity, either reciprocal or unilateral. The victim is bound to 
this forced association, by the very nature of the association: ‘the term “marriage” 
serves (…) to bind the women/girls to their captors/”husbands” through the use 
of a label that has important social and cultural connotations.’1631 marriage thus 
binds people (to each other) through social and cultural mores.1632 as a result, the 
1629 LeVine 2010, p. 84.
1630 Ngor 1989, p. 293.
1631 K. Stout, ‘What’s in a name? The feasibility and desirability of naming forced marriage as a 
separate crime under international humanitarian law’, Dalhousie Journal of Legal Studies (19) 
2010, pp. 8–9.
1632 Scharf & mattler 2004, p. 9.
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label ‘marriage’ may cause people to feel compelled to remain in the association, 
long after the conflict has come to an end.1633
as was considered by the icTY Trial chamber in the Čelebići case with 
regard to rape, a victim’s psychological suffering as a result of this crime may be 
exacerbated by social and cultural conditions.1634 The same holds true for (other 
forms of gender‑based violence, such as) forced marriage. This was also argued 
above in the context of national law: depending on the cultural environment in 
which a forced marriage takes place and in which its effects are felt, the specific 
harms and the intensity and duration of these harms suffered by victims can 
vary.1635 in societies in which divorce is stigmatised, forced marriage may lead to 
extra stigma and harm to the victim. The same goes for (often patriarchal) societies 
that put great emphasis on and attach great value to the chastity and virginity of 
women.1636 These societies/cultures often define women by their roles as wives and 
mothers.1637 it is highly likely that there are differences in victims’ experiences 
of forced marriage in different conflicts and countries. These differences can be 
caused by ethnicity, religion, kinship and the ‘moral economy of sex and violence’. 
Wartime experiences, as coulter argues, are tied to social and cultural contexts 
as well as to history.1638 from this it follows that forced marriages (and the specific 
harms they cause) should be assessed in the context of the culture in which they 
occur.1639
3.3. forceD mar riage aS a (DiSTiNcT) crime 
agaiNST HUmaNiTY
3.3.1. Introduction
The list of crimes against humanity in article 7(1) rome Statute is not exhaustive. 
any inhumane act that causes great suffering, or serious injury to body or to 
mental or physical health, and is of a similar character to any other act referred to 
1633 Note that this description also reflects the forced marriages that take place outside of a conflict, 
such as the forced marriages that take place in the Netherlands.
1634 Čelebići Trial Judgement, para. 495.
1635 See also Akayesu Trial Judgement, para. 507, where the icTr Trial chamber regarded acts of 
sexual violence in the specific context of rwanda, taking into account ‘the reasons for and the 
implications of these acts on the direct victims themselves and on the group with which they 
were associated’, see De Londras 2010, pp. 290–304.
1636 Human rights Watch, The scars of death. Children Abducted by the Lord’s Resistance Army in 
Uganda, September 1997, p. 50. for Sierra Leone, see coulter 2009, p. 93.
1637 coulter 2009, pp. 73–74: in Sierra Leone, ‘(t)he hegemonic model of femininity (…) was one of 
being a wife and a mother.’
1638 coulter 2009, p. 16.
1639 See also De Londras 2010, pp. 290–304.
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in article 7(1) rome Statute can amount to a new crime against humanity.1640 in 
order to answer the question of whether forced marriage amounts to a (distinct) 
crime against humanity, the following questions – as set out in chapter 5 – must 
be addressed:
1a. is the act of forcing someone to enter into a marriage subsumed under 
listed crimes against humanity? or
2a. Does this act cause great suffering or serious injury to body or to mental 
or physical health? and
2b. is this act similar in nature and gravity to listed crimes against humanity?
3.3.2. Internal subsidiarity: is forced marriage caught by listed crimes against 
humanity?
3.3.2.1. introduction
The first step that must be taken in order to answer the question of whether and, 
if so, how forced marriage should be criminalised within the scheme of the rome 
Statute’s crimes against humanity provision is to verify whether or not the act of 
forcing someone to enter into a marital(‑like) association is already subsumed 
under listed crimes against humanity. This step voices the internal subsidiarity 
criterion.
forced marriages can go hand in hand with a number of criminal offences, 
such as rape, sexual slavery, forced pregnancy, enforced prostitution, other forms 
of sexual violence, torture and deprivation of liberty. This is evidenced by the 
forced marriages that took place inter alia in Sierra Leone, Uganda, the Drc 
and cambodia. The question that needs to be answered is whether (any of) the 
inhumane acts listed as crimes against humanity in the rome Statute cover the 
specific act of forcing another person to enter into a conjugal association. article 7 
rome Statute lists 18 (categories of) inhumane acts that amount to crimes against 
humanity when they are committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack 
directed against a civilian population, with knowledge of this attack.1641 None 
of these crimes contain an element that is related to the conferral of marital 
status, but, as will be explained below, two crimes deserve specific attention: the 
inhumane acts of persecution and (sexual) enslavement.
1640 Provided, of course that the other elements listed in the eoc are also met. This means that the 
perpetrator must have been aware of the factual circumstances that established the character 
of the act and that he must have acted with the required intent. in addition, the chapeau 
elements of crimes against humanity must be satisfied. 
1641 murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation or forcible transfer of population, 
imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules 
of international law, torture, rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, 
enforced sterilisation, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity, persecution, 
enforced disappearance, apartheid, other inhumane acts.
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3.3.2.2. forced marriage as a form of persecution
The offence of persecution requires that the perpetrator severely infringed upon 
the victim’s basic rights and did so with a discriminatory intent, ‘by reason of the 
identity of the group or collectivity’.1642 in addition to the chapeau requirements of 
crimes against humanity, the icc eoc list the following elements of persecution:
1. The perpetrator severely deprived, contrary to international law, one or more 
persons of fundamental rights.
2. The perpetrator targeted such person or persons by reason of the identity of a 
group or collectivity or targeted the group or collectivity as such.
3. Such targeting was based on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, 
religious, gender as defined in article 7, paragraph 3, of the Statute, or other 
grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international 
law.
4. The conduct was committed in connection with any act referred to in 
article 7, paragraph 1, of the Statute or any crime within the jurisdiction of 
the court.1643
Persecution must result in a severe deprivation of fundamental rights. The 
right to enter into a marriage with full and genuine consent is enshrined in 
all important human rights instruments – most notably the UDHr, iccPr, 
iceScr, the Universal islamic Declaration of Human rights and the Protocol 
to the african charter on Human and Peoples’ rights on the rights of Women 
in africa – and therefore qualifies as a fundamental right.1644 Pursuant to the 
eoc and the definition in article  7(2)(g) rome Statute, persecution requires a 
link between persecutory acts and any crime within the jurisdiction of the court. 
in other words, persecution must be committed in connection with another 
listed international crime.1645 This means that forced marriage – even if it could 
not be classified as any of the listed inhumane acts or as an ‘other inhumane 
act’ – could be prosecuted as persecution, as long as the forced marriages were 
committed with the necessary discriminatory intent and in connection with any 
other international crime listed in articles 6–8 rome Statute. in cases of forced 
marriages, the perpetrator could have targeted the victims on any of the grounds 
listed in the third element of persecution. it is not unthinkable, for instance, 
1642 Hall 2008, pp. 220 and 257; and article 7(2)(g) rome Statute.
1643 article 7(1)(h) eoc.
1644 other examples of acts which may amount to a severe deprivation of fundamental rights and 
thus to the crime against humanity of persecution are pogroms, exclusion from professions, 
restrictions on family life, obliging members of a certain group to wear a distinctive sign, 
seizure of assets and confiscation or destruction of private dwellings (Hall 2008, pp. 259–261).
1645 Hall 2008, p. 221; and Von Hebel & robinson 1999, pp. 100–101.
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that forced marriages could amount to a form of gender‑based persecution.1646 
for example: forced marriage committed with a discriminatory intent and in 
connection with enslavement could qualify as persecution. But forced marriage 
in itself does not amount to persecution.
3.3.2.3. forced marriage as a form of enslavement1647
Pursuant to article 7(2)(c) rome Statute, the quintessence of enslavement is ‘the 
exercise of any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership over a 
person.’ in this sub‑paragraph it is argued that forced marriage in itself – so 
defined as the forcible conferral of marital status upon a person against that 
person’s will – does not amount to enslavement. it will be argued that a forced 
marriage may result in enslavement and may be used as a means to enslave, but 
forcing someone to enter into a conjugal relationship sec does not constitute (an 
exercise of) a power attaching to the right of ownership over that person.
The act of making someone enter into a conjugal association is not an exercise 
of a power attached to the right of ownership. from the drafting history of the 
eoc1648 and the case law of the icTY (most notably the Kunarac et al. case),1649 
the following powers attaching to the right of ownership can be distilled. first, 
acts which are linked with transfer and procurement of an individual: purchase, 
exchange, trade, sale, loan and barter. and secondly, acts which are linked to the 
ability to exploit an individual: exacting forced labour (without commensurate 
compensation) and/or forced sexual activity, as a result of the absolute control 
someone has over another. When any of these powers are exercised, the crime 
of (sexual) enslavement comes to the fore. The act of forcing someone to enter 
into a conjugal relationship is not part of this list. Powers attaching to the 
right of ownership refer to powers that would, when exercised over a thing, be 
considered as evidence of ownership. for example, possession – which is a power 
attached to the right of ownership – of a pencil amounts to ownership of that 
pencil; possession of a human being would also amount to a right of ownership, 
1646 Several countries, including the US, the UK and canada, recognise forced marriage as a 
particular form of gender‑based persecution, which can constitute a ground for asylum claims 
(gill & anitha 2011, p. 11).
1647 for a detailed analysis of the parameters of enslavement and a discussion of the differences 
between forced marriage and enslavement, including the ways in which a forced marriage can 
result in enslavement, see Haenen 2013(ii). This paragraph is based on that publication.
1648 See inter alia V. oosterveld, ‘Sexual slavery and the international criminal court: advancing 
international law’, 25 Michigan Journal of International Law (2004), p.  631; and Discussion 
paper proposed by the Coordinator, Preparatory commission for the international criminal 
court, UN Doc. PcNicc/1999/Wgec/rT.6 (10 august 1999), p. 2.
1649 Kunarac et al. Trial Judgement, para. 543, listing the following factors that should be taken into 
consideration in determining whether enslavement was committed: ‘the control of someone’s 
movement, control of physical environment, psychological control, measures taken to prevent 
or deter escape, force, threat of force or coercion, duration, assertion of exclusivity, subjection 
to cruel treatment and abuse, control of sexuality and forced labour. The (…) ability to buy, sell, 
trade or inherit a person or his or her labours or services (…) could be a relevant factor.’
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but for the fact that ownership of a human being is illegal under modern day 
law.1650 So in the case of enslavement, the relevant powers are those of the kind 
that attach to the right of ownership, were the legal status of slavery possible. 
The power to marry someone (against their will) is not such a power. although 
forcing someone to marry can be seen as exercising control over an individual’s 
autonomy, as a form of denying someone freedom of choice, that particular act 
an sich would not be serious enough to amount to slavery. enslavement refers to 
the dominion over a human being. The crime of enslavement would be rendered 
meaningless if interpreted in such a broad manner as to encompass all exploitative 
social injustices or human rights violations.1651 The sole act of forcing someone 
to enter into a conjugal association is a serious violation of human rights and, 
depending on the circumstances, can have severe consequences for the victim, 
but the conferral of marital status in itself is not (an exercise of) a power attaching 
to the right of ownership and therefore does not constitute enslavement.1652
a forced marriage can, however, result in enslavement.1653 as is clearly 
demonstrated by the forced marriages that took place during the conflicts in inter 
alia Sierra Leone, Drc and Uganda, a forced marriage can very well lead to the 
exercise of powers attaching to the right of ownership. forced marriages may, for 
example, result in sexual exploitation and/or domestic servitude.1654 as the ScSL 
Trial chamber stated: ‘the use of the term “wife” by the rebels was deliberate and 
strategic, with the aim of enslaving and psychologically manipulating the women 
and with the purpose of treating them like possessions.’1655 When a marriage 
results in the treatment of a person as chattel, this situation can be qualified as 
enslavement.1656 in the words of Parrot and cummings, when one or both of the 
1650 J. allain, ‘The Parameters of “enslavement” in international criminal Law’, Paper presented 
at the international Symposium of the research centre for international criminal Law and 
international Humanitarian Law of the china University of Political Science and Law (25–
26 april 2009), p. 3.
1651 S. miers, Slavery in the twentieth century: the evolution of a global pattern (Walnut creek (ca): 
altamira Press 2003), at xiii and 453; and UNHcHr, Abolishing slavery and its contemporary 
forms, report prepared by D. Weissbrodt and anti‑Slavery international, New York 2002, p. 4.
1652 article  1(c) of the 1956 Supplementary Slavery convention on the abolition of Slavery 
establishes a link between slavery and certain practices of forced marriage by regarding certain 
institutions and practices (such as wife inheritance) as similar to slavery. The situations listed in 
this provision refer to acts of sale, transfer and inheritance, three acts which constitute powers 
attaching to the right of ownership. in those cases in which a forced marriage is accompanied 
by the exercise of such powers, the act can be qualified as enslavement. The conferral of marital 
status itself is, as stated, not (an exercise of) a power attaching to the right of ownership.
1653 in this regard, it is recognised that both a marriage that was entered into under duress, as well as 
a marriage that was contracted with the free and full consent of both spouses can (eventually) 
lead to the enslavement of one (or both) of the spouses. although it may be presumed that a 
marriage that was entered into voluntarily but that resulted in the enslavement of one of the 
spouses, can no longer be said to be truly voluntary.
1654 Report of the Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of slavery, including its causes and 
consequences, Gulnara Shahinian, UN Doc. a/Hrc/15/20, 28 June 2010, para. 43. 
1655 rUf Trial Judgement, para. 1466 (emphasis added).
1656 Amnesty International, Preliminary comments concerning the elements of war crimes other than 
grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions provided for the second prepcom (26 July to 13 August 
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spouses ‘has no agency, cannot leave, cannot refuse, and is often obligated to have 
sex on demand, it (the marriage; iH) is a form of sexual slavery’.1657
The fact that a (forced) marriage can result in slavery is corroborated by 
remarks made by a group of arab states during the negotiations on the elements 
of crimes. This group of states submitted a proposal in which they sought to 
limit the crime of enslavement (and sexual slavery) by adding a third element so 
that the offence would not extend to certain cultural practices: ‘Powers attaching 
to the right of ownership do not include rights, duties and obligations incident 
to marriage between a man and a woman.’1658 These states thought that the law 
on crimes against humanity was too ambiguous and feared that it might be 
used ‘by activist judges not simply to deal with atrocities but as a tool of “social 
engineering.”’1659 Some arab states, whose laws make divorce more difficult for 
women than for men or whose laws reduce married women’s legal authority 
to act, feared that without a cultural exemption, these practices could amount 
to (sexual) slavery. The proposal was not widely supported, especially because 
most delegates found it inappropriate to include culturally specific exemptions 
in a document that was to reflect a basic law for all humanity. moreover, many 
delegates believed this exemption could set an undesirable precedent that could 
also negatively impact human rights law.1660 The exemption was therefore not 
included.
These examples illustrate that someone can exercise powers attaching to the 
right of ownership by virtue of a conjugal association. This is the case when a 
husband‑wife relationship becomes a master‑slave relationship. The marriage, in 
the broad sense (i.e. not the mere conferral of marital status), then qualifies as 
enslavement.
The fact that a marriage can result in slavery and that powers attaching 
to the right of ownership can be exercised by virtue of a conjugal association 
implies that forced marriage can also be used as a means to enslave.1661 During 
the negotiations on the icc eoc, the delegates decided against including 
‘recruitment’ and ‘abduction’ in the list of examples of powers attaching to the 
1999), Preparatory commission for the international criminal court, p.  11, available at 
<www.iccnow.org/documents/aiPreliminarycommentsJuly99.pdf> (last accessed December 
2013); and UN commission on Human rights: contemporary forms of slavery 1998, paras. 8 
and 30.
1657 Parrot and cummings 2008, pp.  57–58; and Judgement of the Women’s international War 
crimes Tribunal on Japan’s military Sexual Slavery, 4 December 2001, para. 644: ‘once the 
women were not free to leave, free to dictate the nature and terms of their services, or free to 
refuse services, they were enslaved.’
1658 Proposal submitted by Bahrain, iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, the Libyan arab Jamahiriya, oman, 
qatar, Saudi arabia, the Sudan, the Syrian arab republic and the United arab emirates 
concerning the elements of crimes against humanity (UN Doc. PcNicc/1999/Wgec/DP. 39).
1659 robinson 2001, p. 65.
1660 oosterveld 2007, pp. 636–637; and robinson 2001, pp. 65.
1661 Voluntary marriage can also be used as a means to enslave. This can be the case in so‑called 
lover boy practices: men seduce vulnerable girls and women, sometimes marrying them, and 
then force them into prostitution. 
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right of ownership as these acts do not describe directly an exercise of ownership 
over a person, but rather define the means of obtaining that person.1662 in a similar 
way, forced marriage can also be a means of obtaining control over a person. 
in Sierra Leone, for example, bush marriages were used as a way to establish a 
system of individualised enslavement. By calling a woman ‘wife’, a rebel would 
gain exclusive access to her sexuality and labour. The term ‘wife’ was used by 
rebels to enslave the women, to openly stake their claim of possession. important 
in this regard is that customary law in some countries recognises the practice of 
wife ownership, which means a husband has complete control over his wife.1663 
if marriage results in wife ownership, a marriage is the necessary act to enslave 
someone. The ‘ownership’ over a woman or girl is transferred from her father to 
her husband by the act of marriage.1664 in these cases, marriage, forced or not, is 
used as a means to enslave someone.
Summarising: (forced) marriages may very well result in (sexual) enslavement 
or slavery‑like practices and they may be used as a means to enslave, but the act of 
forcing someone to enter into a marriage does not in itself amount to an exercise 
of a power attached to the right of ownership and therefore does not constitute 
enslavement.
Now that it has been established that the act of forcing someone to enter into a 
marital(‑like) association is not completely caught by any of the inhumane acts 
enumerated in the rome Statute, the question may be asked as to whether forced 
marriage could (and/or should) qualify as a new, separate crime against humanity.
3.3.3. Conclusion: forced marriage as a new, distinct crime against humanity?
3.3.3.1. great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health
international criminal law has a higher harm threshold than national criminal 
law. This difference was extensively discussed in chapter 6. and indeed, the 
elements of crimes require an (other) inhumane act to have caused the victim 
great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health. The 
internationalised courts and tribunals have held that the seriousness and gravity 
1662 La Haye 2001, p. 191. Purchasing a person, for example, is a means of obtaining a person, but 
it also constitutes an exercise attaching to the right of ownership, as opposed to abduction and 
recruitment, which are means of obtaining only.
1663 amnesty international, Uganda: ‘Breaking God’s commands’: the destruction of childhood by 
the Lord’s Resistance Army, afr 59/001/1997, 16  September 1997, p.  19; and T. Barton and 
g. Wamai, Equity and vulnerability: A situation analysis of women, adolescents, and children 
in Uganda, 1994 (Kampala: Uganda National council for children 1994), p. 140.
1664 compare to the ancient roman tradition of cum manu marriages: women ceased to be under 
the authority of their fathers (patria potestas) when they married. Upon marriage, a woman 
came under the autocratic power of her husband. in a sine manu marriage, the woman 
remained under the legal control of her father, even after marriage (Stone 2000, p. 208).
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of a particular act must be examined on a case‑by‑case basis. consideration must 
be given to all circumstances of the case, such as the context in which the act was 
committed, the nature of the act, the duration and/or any repetition of the act, 
the individual circumstances of the victim including age, gender and health as 
well as the physical, mental and moral effects the conduct had on the victim.1665 
These effects must have been seriously damaging, going beyond temporary 
unhappiness, but they need not necessarily be permanent.1666
The harms caused by forcing someone to enter into a marriage, as described 
in paragraph 3.2 supra meet the thresholds of great suffering as well as serious 
injury to body or to mental or physical health. forced marriages disrupt people’s 
lives during the actual conflict, as well as (long) after the conflict has ended. Being 
forced to enter into a marriage or marital‑like association can cause severe mental 
and moral anxiety. in cambodia, where Angkar forced complete strangers to 
marry each other, the Khmer rouge marriages greatly impacted (the rest of) the 
victims’ lives as these associations caused many people to stay together up until 
this very day. as a result, the victims have been deprived of the chance to enter 
into a marriage of their own choosing. in this particular conflict, the ‘enemy’, in 
the form of the top cPK echelons, concocted the marriage policy and orchestrated 
forced marriages between civilians and in many cases both spouses could be 
considered to be victims; but in other conflicts, such as in Sierra Leone, Uganda 
and the Drc, victims are forced to marry the enemy. as the ScSL Prosecutor 
stated in his afrc appeal Brief:
‘the gravity of forced marriage is immeasurably enhanced where it is perpetrated 
as part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population, against 
a member of the civilian population under attack. in this situation, the victim 
is held captive as the “wife” of one of the perpetrators of the attack against the 
civilian population of which she is a member.’1667
This, in itself causes the victim great suffering. The ‘suffering’ element of ‘other 
inhumane acts’ can be informed by the interpretation of the war crime of wilfully 
causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health under article 8(2)(a)(iii) 
of the rome Statute.1668 The icTY has held that serious harm ‘results in a grave 
and long‑term disadvantage to a person’s ability to lead a normal and constructive 
life.’1669 This is exactly what forced marriages cause. The act of forcing someone 
1665 See inter alia afrc Trial Judgement, para. 699; rUf Trial chamber, para. 169; Kayishema 
Trial Judgement, para. 151; and Vasiljević appeal Judgement, para. 165. This was confirmed 
by the icc Pre‑Trial chamber in Katanga and ngudjolo Chui Decision on the confirmation of 
charges, para. 449.
1666 Krstić Trial Judgement, para. 513.
1667 afrc Prosecution appeal Brief, para. 620.
1668 cryer et al. 2010, p. 291. See also infra paragraph 3.4.2.2 on the war crime of wilfully causing 
great suffering.
1669 Krstić Trial Judgement, para. 513.
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to enter into a marriage or marital‑like association against that person’s will may 
thus cause great suffering and serious injury to mental health.
3.3.3.2. Similar in nature and gravity to other inhumane acts
it is important to emphasise, from the outset, that the icc interprets the category 
of other inhumane acts in a different way than the internationalised courts and 
criminal tribunals. first, where the icTY, icTr and eccc have held that a serious 
attack on human dignity may also qualify as an ‘other inhumane act’,1670 the 
definition of ‘other inhumane’ acts enshrined in the rome Statute and eoc does 
not include a serious attack on human dignity. Secondly, and most importantly, 
where the icTY, icTr, ScSL and eccc only require an act to be of a gravity 
comparable to listed crimes against humanity,1671 the icc (in accordance with the 
rome Statute and eoc) also requires an act to be similar in nature to listed crimes 
against humanity. This has been formulated thus by the icc Pre‑Trial chamber:
‘The chamber notes, however, that the Statute has given to “other inhumane acts” 
a different scope than its antecedents like the Nuremberg charter and the icTr 
and icTY Statutes. The latter conceived “other inhumane acts” as a “catch all 
provision” leaving a broad margin for the jurisprudence to determine its limits. 
in contrast, the rome Statute contains certain limitations, as regards to the action 
constituting an inhumane act and the consequence required as a result of that 
action.’1672
a new crime against humanity must amount to an inhumane act that is of a 
character (i.e. of a gravity and nature) similar to any other act listed as a crime 
against humanity in the rome Statute. as a result of this stricter test, it would 
appear that acts such as forced nudity, which the icTr qualified as an ‘other 
inhumane act’, will not amount to an ‘other inhumane act’ in the context of the 
rome Statute.1673 according to the icc Pre‑Trial chamber, causing severe physical 
injuries and killing and mutilating people in front of relatives are examples of acts 
that could amount to ‘other inhumane acts’.1674
1670 See inter alia Jelisić Trial Judgement, para. 52; Kayishema Trial Judgement, para. 151; Duch 
Trial Judgement, para. 371; and case 002 closing order, paras. 1442–1445.
1671 See e.g. Stanišić & Župljanin Trial Judgement, para. 82; Kayishema Trial Judgement, para. 151; 
Taylor Trial Judgement, para. 436; rUf appeal Judgement, para. 735; Duch Trial Judgement, 
para. 367; and case 002 closing order, paras. 1442–1445.
1672 Katanga and ngudjolo Chui Decision on the confirmation of charges, para. 450.
1673 it is also questionable whether forced nudity would qualify as an ‘other form of sexual violence’ 
pursuant to article 7(1)(g) rome Statute, seeing as this provision requires sexual violence to 
be of comparable gravity to rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy and 
enforced sterilisation.
1674 Muthaura, Kenyatta and Ali Decision on the confirmation of charges, para. 277.
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When determining whether or not the act of forcing someone to enter into 
a marriage is of similar gravity and nature to crimes against humanity listed 
in article 7 rome Statute, it is important to take into consideration the legality 
principle as enshrined in article 22 rome Statute:
‘the (Pre‑Trial; iH) chamber opines that the language of the relevant statutory 
provision and the elements of crimes, as well as the fundamental principles of 
criminal law, make it plain that this residual category of crimes against humanity 
must be interpreted conservatively and must not be used to expand uncritically 
the scope of crimes against humanity.’1675
So is the act of forcing someone to enter into a marriage in itself of a similar 
nature and gravity as the acts listed in article 7 rome Statute? as was argued in 
chapter 5, the icc uses human rights law as a source for determining the scope of 
the clause ‘other inhumane acts’, but not every human rights violation constitutes 
an inhumane act. The acts listed as crimes against humanity in the rome Statute 
concern violations of the right to life, bodily integrity and physical liberty. is 
forcing someone to enter into a marriage, taking away the right to enter into a 
marriage with full consent, comparable to violations of these three legal goods? 
in itself, so without other offences being committed, this does not seem to be the 
case: a forced marriage in the strict sense is not comparable in nature to acts such 
as murder, rape, enslavement, torture and enforced sterilisation.
as will be explained in the next sub‑paragraph, this will not result in any 
difficulties with the situations that are currently before the icc.
3.3.3.3. forced marriages taking place in conflicts currently before the icc
The forced marriages that took (and take) place during the situations that are 
currently before the icc, such as in Uganda, the Drc, côte d’ivoire, the central 
african republic and Uganda, bear many similarities with the Sierra Leonean 
bush marriages. in these situations, the offence of forced marriage is completely 
overshadowed by the crime of (sexual) enslavement. The Sierra Leonean rebels 
used the bush marriages as a means to enslave women and girls, forcing them to 
perform and be subject to acts that are traditionally associated with ‘wives’, most 
notably sexual intercourse. By virtue of these bush marriages, the rebels created 
their very own (sex) slaves. Within the bush, the label ‘bush wife’ provided women 
in some camps with a modicum of protection. in the majority of cases, the end of 
the civil war also meant the end of the bush marriages, as Sierra Leonean society 
did not regard these associations as valid marriages: they had not been negotiated 
or sanctioned by the family or the community and no dowry had been paid to the 
1675 Muthaura, Kenyatta and Ali Decision on the confirmation of charges, para. 269.
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girl’s family.1676 The prefix ‘bush’ emphasises that the marriages that took place 
in the bush were regarded as illegitimate and not socially sanctioned.1677 many 
victims use conjugal terminology when they described what happened to them 
– they were ‘taken as wives’, they ‘had to live with him as his wife’ – while at the 
same time stating that these were ‘not real marriages’.1678
in this context, a comparison with the Kunarac et al. case mentioned above in 
paragraph 3.3.2.3 is illustrative. Kunarac and Kovać, commanders of the military 
police of the Bosnian Serb army, took women from prison camps, locked them in 
houses, made them cook, wash and clean and raped them on a regular basis. in at 
least one instance, a girl was exclusively reserved for one of the perpetrators who 
forbade other soldiers to touch her.1679 although the enslavement of the women 
did not last several years (as did some of the bush marriages), but several months, 
up to half a year, the facts are very similar to the facts of the bush marriages. The 
only difference is that the Serb soldiers did not call their victims ‘wives’. if they 
had done so, would this have changed the facts?
What was said above with regard to Sierra Leone also seems apply to Uganda, 
côte d’ivoire and other conflicts currently before the icc.1680 in the Lra 
camps, for example, unions between abductees and fighters were seen as a form 
of marriage, but Ugandan law and custom do not recognise them as legitimate 
marriages. indeed, amnesty international found that the Lra marriages are a 
twisted and extended form of customary patriarchal social settings in Uganda, 
which feature wife ownership (including the husband’s exclusive sexual rights 
over his wife, meaning that marital rape is not recognised) and polygamy.1681
in this regard, it is interesting to note that in the Drc, in some cases, the 
word ‘bush wife’ is also used to refer to men who have suffered sexual abuse at 
the hands of other men: ‘those men in the bush made you their wife.’1682 The 
word ‘wife’ is also used to refer to female rape victims. a farmer interviewed by 
amnesty international in Darfur described how a young girl was abducted by the 
Janjaweed and then raped: ‘more than six people used her as a wife.’1683 female 
rape victims also use this term to describe what happened to them. for example, 
1676 coulter 2009, p. 220; and Scharf 2005, p. 81.
1677 coulter 2009, pp. 100–101 and coulter 2008, pp. 55–56, footnote 2.
1678 Van gog 2008, pp. 64–65.
1679 See Kunarac Trial Judgement, paras.  740 et seqq. and chapter 3, paragraph  2.2. The Trial 
chamber noted that: ‘the girls were treated as personal property of the accused Kunarac and 
DP 6, they had to do household chores and they had to obey all demands’ (Kunarac et al. Trial 
Judgement, para. 728).
1680 Note that little is known about the forced marriages that have taken place in Kenya.
1681 amnesty international 1997, p. 19.
1682 r. Dassié, ‘men on men rape cases in Dr congo: the ordeal of “bush wives”’, Afrik news 
13 august 2009 (available at <www.afrik‑news.com/article16039.html> last accessed January 
2014); and J. gettleman, ‘Symbol of Unhealed congo: male rape Victims’, The new York 
Times 4  august 2009 (available at <www.nytimes.com/2009/08/05/world/africa/05congo.
html?em&_r=0> last accessed January 2014).
1683 amnesty international, Sudan: Darfur: rape as a weapon of war: sexual violence and its 
consequences, 18 July 2004, p. 12. 
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a Sierra Leonean girl interviewed by Denov and maclure states that before she 
became the wife of an officer, she was raped daily: ‘i was every man’s wife.’1684
Summarising: in those situations where forced marriages bear resemblance 
to the Sierra Leonean bush marriages, the icc should follow the ScSL Trial 
chamber in the Taylor case and classify these associations as instances of 
(sexual) enslavement. The accused in the different cases could be charged with 
enslavement, rape, and, where relevant, forced pregnancy. Depending on the 
particular circumstances of the case, forcible transfer, torture, persecution and 
deprivation of liberty could also be charged.
3.3.3.4. forced marriages comparable to Khmer rouge marriages
even though forced marriages occur in many conflicts, the factual situation, the 
reality of the act, may differ from one situation to another. This was demonstrated 
by the comparison between the Sierra Leonean bush marriages and the Khmer 
rouge marriages. The forced marriages that took place during the situations that 
are currently before the icc are comparable to the former. But what if the icc 
is ever faced with forced marriages that are similar to the ones that took place in 
cambodia?
Before turning to the icc, let us first look at the eccc. There is reason to 
believe that the forced marriages organised by the Khmer rouge could qualify 
as other inhumane acts within the regime of the eccc. The eccc does not 
require an ‘other inhumane act’ to be similar in nature to listed crimes against 
humanity; the only requirement is that such acts are comparable in gravity.1685 in 
addition, the eccc has held that violations of personal dignity may also qualify 
as ‘other inhumane acts’. in cambodia, tens of thousands of people were forced to 
enter into marriages arranged by Angkar. most of these marriages did not result 
in a master‑slave relationship between the husband and the wife, yet they did 
profoundly affect people’s lives and they caused grave mental and moral harm 
to the victims. This form of social engineering conducted by the Khmer rouge 
violated people’s psychological liberty and altered the course of their lives. as the 
co‑investigating Judges stated in the closing order of case 002, by being forced 
to enter into a conjugal relationship, the ‘victims endured mental suffering of a 
degree of gravity comparable to that of other crimes against humanity.’1686
What if a similar situation came before the icc? it seems that these particular 
instances of forced marriage, using the criteria applied above, would not qualify 
as ‘other inhumane acts’ either. forcing someone to enter into a marriage is not 
similar in nature to the listed crimes against humanity. as stated by the icc 
Pre‑Trial chamber and cited above, the category of ‘other inhumane acts’ has 
1684 Denov & maclure 2006, p. 77.
1685 The eccc Law lists eight specific inhumane acts: murder, extermination, enslavement, 
deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape and persecution (article 5 eccc Law).
1686 case 002 closing order, paras. 1442–1443.
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been given a different, more restrictive scope in the context of the rome Statute 
than, for example, in the Statutes of the icTr and the eccc. The icc Pre‑Trial 
chamber has pointed out that the clause ‘must be interpreted conservatively and 
must not be used to expand uncritically the scope of crimes against humanity.’1687 
The extra requirement that acts are comparable in nature to listed inhumane 
acts prevents such uncritical expansion. This is in line with the icc’s stricter 
application of the legality principle.1688 applying the elements of ‘other inhumane 
acts’ as enshrined in the rome Statute and eoc in accordance with the way in 
which they are interpreted by the Pre‑Trial chamber results in the outcome that a 
forced marriage in itself is not similar in nature to other inhumane acts.
it was explained above that in the majority of cases, forced marriages that 
take place during conflict situations will result in some form of enslavement.1689 
The forced marriages that took place in cambodia in the 1970s do not appear to 
be an exception to this rule. The main difference between the Sierra Leone ‘type’ 
forced marriages and the Khmer rouge marriages is that the former are used as 
a means of individual enslavement, whereas the latter were part of a scheme of 
collective enslavement. in cambodia, the government – not individual rebels – 
enslaved people. The cPK evacuated cities and villages and relocated civilians 
to communities where they were forced to perform hard labour in work units. 
People’s entire lives were controlled by Angkar and collective labour, collective 
dining and in some cases even collective motherhood were used to demonstrate 
that the work unit had replaced the family as the basic social unit. Angkar had 
taken the role of mother and father and Pol Pot had become everyone’s eldest 
brother (‘Brother Number one’). calling to mind once again the indicia of 
enslavement delineated by the icTY Trial chamber and confirmed by the appeal 
chamber in the Kunarac et al. case, it is clear that the entire complex of acts 
committed by Angkar amounted to enslavement:
‘the control of someone’s movement, control of physical environment, 
psychological control, measures taken to prevent or deter escape, force, threat of 
force or coercion, duration, assertion of exclusivity, subjection to cruel treatment 
and abuse, control of sexuality and forced labour.’1690
Angkar used the marriage policy to gain even more control over the citizens. 
forced arranged marriages were strategically used to deliberately undermine the 
traditional family and to replace the traditional family and kinship bonds with 
loyalty to Angkar. Through the marriages, the Khmer rouge gained control over 
1687 Muthaura, Kenyatta and Ali Decision on the confirmation of charges, para. 269.
1688 Stricter in comparison with the other international(ised) criminal courts and tribunals (see 
also chapter 5, paragraph 3.3.2 and chapter 6, paragraph 6).
1689 as was demonstrated in chapter 2, paragraph 2.5, forced marriages that take place in times of 
peace can also result in enslavement.
1690 Kunarac et al. Trial Judgement, para. 543.
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people’s sexuality and reproductive functions and asserted their loyalty, seeing 
as they had to pledge allegiance to Angkar during the wedding ceremony. The 
Khmer rouge marriages resulted in a serious violation of psychological liberty 
and a severe negation of personal autonomy, which demonstrated Angkar’s ability 
to exercise powers attaching to the right of ownership.
3.4. forceD mar riage aS a (DiSTiNcT) War crime
3.4.1.  Introduction
War crimes are breaches of the international law of armed conflict that are 
regarded as so serious that they entail individual criminal responsibility.1691 in 
order to determine whether or not the act of forcing someone to enter into a 
marriage could amount to a war crime in the context of the rome Statute, the 
following issues will be addressed in this paragraph:
1. is the act of forcing someone to enter into a marriage subsumed under 
serious violations of customary international law that are listed in the 
rome Statute? or
2. Does the conduct amount to a war crime which is not codified in the 
rome Statute:
a. is the conduct considered to be a breach of a rule of customary 
international humanitarian law; and
b. can the violation be qualified as ‘serious’; and
c. Does the breach give rise to individual criminal responsibility under 
customary international law?1692
3.4.2. Internal subsidiarity: is forced marriage caught by listed war crimes?
3.4.2.1. introduction
article 8 rome Statute contains an extensive catalogue of war crimes. cassese 
divided them into six categories. first, acts which are committed against persons 
taking no active part, or no longer taking active part, in the hostilities. This 
category protects civilians and members of armed forces who have laid down 
their arms or are sick or wounded (i.e. those placed hors de combat). Secondly and 
thirdly, acts committed against enemy combatants or civilians involving the use 
of prohibited methods or prohibited means (i.e. weapons) of warfare. The fourth 
class of war crimes pertains to acts committed against specially protected persons 
1691 Boas, Bischoff & reid 2009, p. 215.
1692 See chapter 5, paragraph 5 for a detailed description of the war crimes framework.
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and objects (such as medical personnel and their transport). crimes which involve 
the improper use of signs and emblems comprise the fifth category and finally, the 
use of child soldiers forms the sixth category of war crimes.1693 With regard to 
the act of forcing someone to enter into a marriage, the first category of acts is of 
particular relevance.
as has already been stated several times, forced marriages can be accompanied 
by and result in a host of criminal offences enumerated as war crimes, such 
as sexual slavery, torture and child soldiering.1694, 1695 five war crimes listed in 
article  8 rome Statute are of particular importance with regard to the act of 
forcing someone to enter into a marital(‑like) association: 1) inhuman treatment 
and 2) wilfully causing great suffering (two grave breaches of the geneva 
conventions); 3) committing outrages upon personal dignity (both as a serious 
violation of the laws and 4) customs applicable in international armed conflict 
and as a serious violation of article 3 common to the geneva conventions); and 
5) cruel treatment as a form of violence to life and person (a serious violation of 
article 3 common to the geneva conventions).
3.4.2.2. The war crimes of inhuman treatment, cruel treatment and wilfully 
causing great suffering
The war crimes of inhuman treatment (article 8(2)(a)(ii) rome Statute) and cruel 
treatment (article 8(2)(c)(i) rome Statute) ‘function as subcategories or residual 
provisions covering a range of potentially criminal conduct.’1696 Within the 
system of the rome Statute, they require similar type of conduct, namely that ‘the 
perpetrator inflicted severe physical or mental pain or suffering upon one or more 
persons’.1697 The same could be said for the war crime of wilfully causing great 
suffering (article 8(2)(a)(iii) rome Statute), requiring that ‘the perpetrator caused 
1693 cassese 2008, pp. 88–92.
1694 See chapter 3, paragraphs 3.5 and 6.3.1 on the similarities between forced marriage and child 
soldiering. 
1695 Note that the ScSL has held that forced marriages were committed with the specific intent 
to terrorise the Sierra Leonean civilian population and break family and social bonds, 
and therefore amounted to an act of terror (see chapter 8, paragraph  2.3.1; and rUf Trial 
Judgement, paras. 1349, 1352 and 1365). The rome Statute, unlike the ScSL Statute, does not 
contain a war crime relating to acts of terror(ism).
1696 Boas, Bischoff & reid 2009, p. 272. The icTY and ScSL have also held that the notions of ‘cruel’ 
in the context of the war crime of ‘cruel treatment’ and ‘inhumane’ in the context of crimes 
against humanity have the same legal meaning. See e.g. afrc appeal Brief of the Prosecution, 
para. 610; Jelisić Trial Judgement, para. 52; Vasiljević Trial Judgement, para. 234; and Gotovina 
Trial Judgement, para.  1791. See also i. erdei, ‘cumulative convictions in international 
criminal law: reconsiderations of a seemingly settled issue’, Suffolk Transnational Law Review 
(34) 2011, p. 332.
1697 article  8(2)(a)(ii) rome Statute and article  8 (2)(c)(i)‑3 eoc. The only difference between 
these two war crimes is that inhuman treatment (a grave breach of the geneva conventions) 
requires that the victims were protected under one or more of the geneva conventions of 
1949 (international conflict); whereas cruel treatment (a serious violation of article 3 common 
to the geneva conventions) requires that the victims were either hors de combat, or were 
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great physical or mental pain or suffering to one or more persons’.1698 The only 
difference between the three war crimes with regard to the actus reus element 
is the adjective used to qualify the pain and suffering: the first two war crimes 
(inhuman treatment and cruel treatment) use the adjective ‘severe’, the third uses 
the adjective ‘great’ (which is the same adjective used by the elements of ‘other 
inhumane acts’, see supra paragraph  3.3.3.1). What distinguishes the crimes 
against humanity category of ‘other inhumane acts’ from these three war crimes 
– apart from the differences in the chapeau elements – is that ‘other inhumane 
acts’ incorporate an eiusdem generis standard of interpretation, requiring acts to 
be similar in gravity and (most notably) nature to listed crimes against humanity. 
The three war crimes lack this requirement.1699
as was established above (paragraph  3.2), forcing people to enter into 
marriages can cause mental suffering that can be qualified as grave. This means 
that in those cases where a forced marriage does result in severe c.q. great mental 
suffering it may qualify as inhuman or cruel treatment or be an instance of 
wilfully causing great suffering, and thus amount to a war crime. obviously, the 
other elements of the respective war crimes will also have to be satisfied, such as 
the requirement that the victims belonged to a certain protected group of people 
(e.g. that they were hors de combat or civilians). The forced marriages must also 
have taken place in the context of and must have been associated with an armed 
conflict. See for example the rUf Trial Judgement, where the ScSL held that 
the rUf used forced marriages as both a tactic of war and a means of obtaining 
unpaid logistical support for troops.1700
3.4.2.3. The war crime of committing outrages upon personal dignity
The war crime of committing outrages upon personal dignity (article 8(2)(b)(xxi) 
and (c)(ii) rome Statute) requires that the perpetrator humiliated, degraded or 
otherwise violated the dignity of the victim(s). The severity of the humiliation, 
degradation or other violation must have been of such a degree as to be generally 
recognised as an outrage upon personal dignity.1701 in a footnote, the elements 
of crimes add that in the assessment of the severity of this humiliation, relevant 
aspects of the cultural background of the victims are to be taken into account.1702 
civilians, medical personnel, or religious personnel taking no active part in the hostilities 
(non‑international armed conflict).
1698 article 8(2)(a)(iii) eoc. in addition, the victims must have been protected under one or more 
of the geneva conventions of 1949 and the perpetrator must have been aware of the factual 
circumstances that established that protected status.
1699 it appears that the icTY does, on occasion, use the requirement that ‘the occurrence of an act 
or omission (is; iH) of similar seriousness to the other enumerated acts under (the icTY war 
crimes provision; iH)’ (see Vasiljević Trial Judgement, para. 234).
1700 rUf Trial Judgement, para. 2107.
1701 article 8(2)(b)(xxi) eoc.
1702 eoc footnote 49.
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examples of acts that have been qualified as outrages upon personal dignity 
by the ad hoc tribunals are using detainees as human shields, forced incest, 
burying corpses in latrine pits and leaving infants without care after killing their 
guardians.1703
forcing people to enter into marriages, often with a complete stranger 
– whether one spouse is the victim and the other the perpetrator or whether 
both spouses can be considered to be victims – and often also causing that 
person to remain in that conjugal association, may amount to an outrage upon 
personal dignity, especially when taking into consideration relevant aspects of 
the cultural background of the victims. for example, the ScSL has held that the 
bush marriages that took place during the civil war in Sierra Leone constituted 
‘a severe humiliation, degradation and violation of the dignity of the victims’ 
and thus constituted the war crime of outrages upon personal dignity.1704 in this 
respect, the Trial chamber considered that:
‘Due to the social stigma attached to them by virtue of their former status as “bush 
wives” and the effects of the prolonged forced conjugal relationships to which they 
were subjected, these women and girls were too ashamed or too afraid to return 
to their communities after the conflict. accordingly, many victims were displaced 
from their home towns and support networks.’1705
The previous two sub‑paragraphs demonstrate in which ways forced marriages 
can fall within the ambit of four general classes of war crimes, but the act itself, 
i.e forcing someone to enter into a marital(‑like) association, is not listed as a war 
crime. in other words: forced marriage is materially distinct from the listed war 
crimes. Therefore, the question may be asked as to whether forced marriage could 
be added to the rome Statute as a distinct war crime. This question is answered in 
the following sub‑paragraph.
3.4.3. Conclusion: forced marriage as a new, distinct war crime?
for forced marriage to be recognised as a separate war crime, it must first be 
established that this particular practice is considered to be a violation of a rule of 
customary international humanitarian law (iHL).1706 The question of which rules 
are part of customary law can prove to be challenging. However, with regard to 
iHL, the following can be said with relative certainty: the 1907 Hague regulations 
respecting the Laws and customs of War on Land (annex to Hague convention 
iV) and the four 1949 geneva conventions and many of the provisions of 
1703 for an overview of the relevant case law, see Boas, Bischoff & reid 2009, p. 278.
1704 rUf Trial Judgement, paras. 1298 and 1301.
1705 rUf Trial Judgement, para. 1474 and Taylor Trial Judgement, para. 432.
1706 for a discussion on the relevance of the status of a crime under customary international law in 
the context of the rome Statute, see chapter 5, paragraph 5.2.
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additional Protocol ii are regarded as part of customary law.1707 in determining 
which other rules of iHL are currently part of customary law, international courts 
and tribunals have used two studies undertaken by the icrc in 2005 and 2011.1708, 
1709
The act of forcing someone to enter into a marriage does not feature in any 
of these documents.1710 forced marriage unquestionably constitutes a serious 
violation of fundamental human rights. But even though the Vienna Declaration 
and Programme of action states that ‘violations of the human rights of women 
in situations of armed conflict are violations of the fundamental principles 
of international human rights and humanitarian law’,1711 stating that forced 
marriage, at this point in time, is considered to be a violation of customary iHL, 
or, what is more, a violation of customary iHL that entails individual criminal 
responsibility, would be a bridge too far. This would mean that, according to 
the three‑pronged test, which was set out in the Tadić case and was used by the 
drafters of the rome Statute, forced marriage could not qualify as a separate war 
crime.
it may very well be that the final chapter on the recognition of forced marriage 
as a distinct war crime has not yet been written. in this respect, it is interesting to 
draw parallels with the offence of forced pregnancy. Like forced marriage, forced 
pregnancy is not explicitly mentioned in the iHL documents mentioned above, 
but it was nevertheless included in the rome Statute as a war crime and crime 
against humanity. as a result of the forced pregnancies that took place during 
the wars in the former Yugoslavia, several UN documents – most notably the 
Vienna  Declaration and Programme of action and the Beijing Platform for 
action – articulated the need for an effective response to this practice.1712 The 
UN commission on Human rights had also, on several occasions, stated that 
forced pregnancy is among the gravest violations of humanitarian and human 
rights law.1713 Because the offence had received certain international recognition, 
1707 cryer et al. 2010, pp. 267 and 269; Boas, Bischoff & reid 2009, p. 261; Shaw 2008, pp. 1168 and 
1170; and Von Hebel & robinson 1999, p. 104.
1708 J.m. Heckaerts & L. Doswald‑Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law. Volume I 
and II, cambridge: cUP 2005; and f. Kalshoven & L. Zegveld, Constraints on the waging of 
war: an introduction to international humanitarian law, cambridge: cUP 2011.
1709 meron 2005, p. 833. e.g. Hadžihasanović appeal of Decision on acquittal, 11 march 2005, 
paras. 29–30; and rUf Trial Judgement, para. 216.
1710 i.e. Hague conventions, geneva conventions, additional Protocols i and ii, and the 2005 and 
2011 icrc reports.
1711 Vienna Declaration and Programme of action, para. 38.
1712 The Vienna  Declaration is an important human rights declaration adopted at the World 
conference on Human rights in 1993 (this declaration also created the post of UN High 
commissioner for Human rights); the Beijing Platform for action was adopted during the 
fourth World conference on Women in 1995 organised by the UN.
1713 for an overview of relevant documents and resolutions, see J.m. Heckaerts & L. Doswald‑Beck, 
Customary International Humanitarian Law. Volume I, cambridge: cUP 2005, p. 2208.
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the drafters of the rome Statute felt that incorporating forced pregnancy as a war 
crime in the rome Statute was justified.1714
During the past decade, similar developments have taken place with regard to 
the way in which conflict‑related forced marriage is regarded. Since at least 1996, 
forced marriage has been documented as a form of violence often committed 
in conflict situations,1715 but the practice has really started to gain international 
attention ever since it was charged as a crime against humanity and war crime 
before the ScSL. Yet it is very important to emphasise that in these Ngo and 
UN documents, the practice of forced marriage is often conflated with sexual 
enslavement.1716 in this context, forced marriage (as a form of sexual slavery) has 
also been referred to as a tactic of war and a tool that is used to win and maintain 
authority over civilians in occupied territories.1717 in a similar manner, the ScSL, 
when recognising forced marriage as an outrage upon personal dignity, conflated 
the practices of sexual slavery and forced marriage.1718 The focus, therefore, is 
mostly on sexual slavery or enslavement that is the result of forced marriages 
during conflicts and not on forced marriages as such (as a violation of a rule of 
(customary) iHL).
The conclusion is therefore as follows: at this point, it cannot be said that 
forcing someone to enter into a marital(‑like) association as such constitutes a 
violation of customary iHL that entails individual criminal responsibility. The 
general clauses in the war crimes provision can be used to prosecute forced 
marriages, so creating a specific war crime of forcing someone to enter into a 
marriage is not necessary in the sense that there is no lacuna in the law.
Why does a forced marriage, in principle, not amount to a crime against 
humanity (an ‘other inhumane act’) but why may it, under certain circumstances, 
amount to a war crime (e.g. ‘wilfully causing great suffering’)? This divergence is 
1714 La Haye 2001, p. 185.
1715 See specifically Human rights Watch 1996 on the forced marriages that took place during 
the rwandan genocide. Human rights Watch qualifies these forced marriages as instances of 
individual sexual slavery.
1716 in a thematic report on servile marriages, for example, the Special rapporteur on 
contemporary forms of slavery noted that forced marriages (especially resulting in servitude) 
increase during times of conflict (see Report of the Special Rapporteur on contemporary 
forms of slavery, including its causes and consequences, Gulnara Shahinian. Thematic report 
on servile marriage, 10  July 2012, UN Doc. a/Hrc/21/41, p.  11). See also inter alia UN 
commission on Human rights: report of the Special rapporteur on violence against women 
its causes and consequences 1998, paras. 17 and 36; and UN commission on Human rights: 
contemporary forms of slavery 1998, para.  30: ‘Sexual slavery also encompasses situations 
where women and girls are forced into “marriage”.’ and: Sexual violence in conflict. Report of 
the Secretary‑General, 14 march 2013, UN Doc. S/2013/149, pp. 2–5, 12–15, 19–20 and 30.
1717 rUf Trial Judgement, paras.  1298 and 1301 K.K. Paterson, mali conflict is latest to 
employ forced marriage as tool of war, 4  June 2013 available at <www.womenunder 
siegeproject.org/blog/entry/mali‑conflict‑is‑latest‑to‑employ‑forced‑marriage‑as‑tool‑of‑war>
 (last accessed December 2013); and <http://unu.edu/publications/articles/sexual‑ 
violence‑in‑the‑democratic‑republic‑of‑the‑congo.html> (last accessed December 2013).
1718 afrc Trial Judgement, paras. 1105, 1114, 1126, 1130, 1141, 1159, 1165, 1169, 1183 and 1185. See 
also chapter 8, paragraph 2.2.1.
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in line with the differences between war crimes and crimes against humanity: 
crimes against humanity only deal with those acts that can be qualified as 
inhuman, whereas war crimes were drafted as a result of the desire to ensure 
that in conflict situations at least some elementary principles and values are 
respected (see chapter 5, paragraph 3.4). War crimes, therefore, also deal with 
offences that are less serious in comparison with crimes against humanity, such 
as intentionally directing attacks against installations or material involved in a 
humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission in accordance with the charter 
of the United Nations (article 8(2)(b)(iii) rome Statute) and seizing the property 
of an adversary unless such seizure is imperatively demanded by the necessities of 
the conflict (article 8(2)(e)(xii) rome Statute).
3.5. forceD mar riage aS a (DiSTiNcT) geNociDaL 
acT
3.5.1. Introduction
in chapter 5 it was argued that any new genocidal act should be added to the 
definition of genocide in the rome Statute on the basis of an eiusdem generis 
standard: only those acts that are comparable in gravity and in nature to 
enumerated genocidal acts are eligible for inclusion in the definition of genocide. 
coupled with the criterion of internal subsidiarity, this results in the following 
steps:
1a. is this act subsumed under listed genocidal acts? or
2a. is the act of such a nature that it may (ultimately) result in the destruction 
of (part of) a group of people? and
2b. is the gravity of this act comparable to the listed genocidal acts (eiusdem 
generis)?
3.5.2. Internal subsidiarity: is forced marriage caught by listed genocidal acts?
genocide, ultimately, is about the intention to destroy (a part of) a group of 
people. To this end, the definition of genocide lists broad, inclusive categories of 
genocidal acts, which may encompass a plurality of acts. if particular conduct falls 
within the scope of any of the listed genocidal acts and was committed with the 
required intent, it qualifies as an act of genocide. With regard to forced marriage, 
two of the five genocidal acts listed in article 6 rome Statute are of particular 
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relevance.1719 Depending on the particular circumstances of the case, (a policy 
of) forced marriages could come within the parameters of these two categories.
first, forced marriages can cause serious mental harm to members of a 
group.1720 This is clearly evidenced by the examples of the bush marriages and 
especially the Khmer rouge marriages (see supra paragraph 3.2). it is important 
to emphasise that the perpetrators must have had the intention to inflict this 
serious mental harm ‘in pursuit of the specific intention to destroy a group in whole 
or in part.’1721 in other words: the people orchestrating the forced marriages must 
have forced people from a certain group to enter into marriages – thereby causing 
them serious mental harm – with the specific aim of ultimately destroying this 
particular group. This was not the case in the situations studied in this book, but 
it could happen in a different context. it is difficult to imagine that the mental 
harm specifically caused by the practice of forced marriage is intended, by the 
perpetrators, to (ultimately) destroy a particular group, yet it cannot be ruled out 
that this mental harm eventually may contribute to the destruction of the group, 
for example because people lose desire to live.
Secondly, and most importantly, the category of ‘measures intended to 
prevent births within a group’ must be mentioned. This category of acts refers to 
instances of biological genocide. The icTr has held that imposing measures to 
prevent births within a group includes acts such as enforced sterilisation, sexual 
mutilation, forced birth control, forced separation of the sexes, and (notably) 
prohibition of marriages.1722 in the situations that were studied in this book, the 
forced marriage policies were not used in this sense. indeed, in cambodia, the 
Khmer rouge used forced marriages as a means to try to stimulate births within 
the entire group of the cambodian population. in Sierra Leone, there was no 
indication that rebels forced women and girls into marriages with the intention of 
preventing births within a particular group. Yet forced marriages could very well 
be used as a means to prevent births within a group, particularly in conflicts where 
1719 See also c. o’Sullivan, ‘Dying for the bonds of marriage’, Hastings Women’s Law Journal 
(22) 2011, p.  290. But note that o’Sullivan mainly focuses on the underlying offences that 
are committed in forced marriages and the consequences of these offences, such as enforced 
pregnancy and transmission of HiV through rape. She does not look in depth at the forced 
conjugal association in itself. She reaches the conclusion that forced marriage could potentially 
satisfy all five listed genocidal acts. 
1720 Severe beatings, sexual violence, torture and forcible displacement have been listed in the case 
law of the icTY and icTr as examples of the genocidal act of causing serious bodily or mental 
harm to members of the group. See Boas, Bischoff & reid 2009, p. 182 and inter alia Akayesu 
Trial Judgement, para. 507.
1721 Kayishema Trial Judgement, para. 112 (emphasis added).
1722 Akayesu Trial Judgement, para. 507; and Musema Trial Judgement, para. 158. for example, 
during the genocide in rwanda (which is a patriarchal society, where membership of a group 
is determined by the identity of the father), Tutsi women who had been raped by Hutu men 
gave birth to Hutu children and were thus prevented from giving birth to children of their 
own ethnicity (Akayesu Trial Judgement, para. 507). forced abortions are also caught by this 
category, see The Secretary‑general, Draft Convention on the Crime of Genocide, 25, delivered 
to the Economic and Social Council, UN Doc. e/447 (June 26, 1947).
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different national, ethnical, racial or religious groups fight each other. especially 
in a patriarchal society, where the group membership of a child is determined by 
the identity of the father, one group (a) could force women of the other group (B) 
to marry their men. any children born in these marriages would belong to group 
a and not B. By forcing women into marriages, they would be prevented from 
having children with men from their own group. in this sense, forced marriage 
can amount to a measure which is intended to prevent births within a group and 
thus a genocidal act. as held by the icTr, making women culturally unable to 
procreate, which may be achieved by forcing them into marriages, can amount to 
a measure that is intended to prevent births within a group.1723
The act of forcing someone to enter into a marriage may therefore – depending 
on the circumstances – amount to an implicit form of genocide via the two 
genocidal acts described above.1724
3.5.3. Conclusion: forced marriage as a new, distinct genocidal act?
The definition of genocide as enshrined in the rome Statute is part of customary 
international law. Theoretically, this definition could be amended in the rome 
Statute, but the question may be asked whether new, very specific offences (such 
as forced marriage) should be added to the definition. in the author’s opinion this 
should not be done: forced marriage should not be included in the rome Statute 
as a distinct genocidal act. The most important reason is that there is no need to 
do so: the act of forced marriage is already caught by listed genocidal acts (internal 
subsidiarity). a (policy of) forced marriage can result in the destruction of (part 
of) a group in the two ways described in the previous paragraph, most notably as 
a measure which is intended to prevent births within that group. consequently, 
there is no lacuna in the law that necessitates the creation of a new genocidal act 
of forced marriage. also, it appears that a forced marriage in itself would never be 
an act that can result in the destruction of a group of people. a forced marriage 
could be means to commit a genocidal act; it is not a genocidal act in itself. for 
example, perpetrators would use forced marriage as a measure to prevent births 
within a group. Preventing births is what can ultimately result in the destruction 
of a group; forcing people into marriages cannot. in addition, creating such a 
new, specific act would be contrary to the system and methodology of article 6 
rome Statute. Because the (ultimate) destruction of groups of people can be 
achieved in innumerable ways, the definition of genocide uses broad, generic 
categories of genocidal acts, instead of listing specific acts (such as crimes against 
1723 Akayesu Trial Judgement, para. 507.
1724 compare with regard to forced pregnancy: Soh Sie eng Jessie, ‘forced pregnancy: codification 
in the rome Statute and its prospect as implicit genocide’ new Zealand Journal of Public and 
International Law (4) 2006, pp. 311–337.
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humanity).1725 This means that it does not stand to reason to add a specific act 
like forced marriage to this list. imprisoning someone in a concentration camp, 
for example, is not specifically mentioned either, but falls within the category of 
deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its 
physical destruction in whole or in part.
3.6. coNcLUDiNg r emarKS: a SePar aTe crime of 
forceD mar riage iS NoT r eqUir eD
forced marriages are serious violations of human rights. They rob people of 
the opportunity to make important life decisions and can have very severe and 
long‑lasting consequences. Yet the act of forcing someone to enter into a marital(‑
like) association sec does not qualify as a separate crime against humanity, war 
crime or genocidal act. The rome Statute and the icc are unambiguous about 
the importance of the legality principle. article  22 rome Statute clearly states 
that definitions of crimes must be strictly construed and must not be extended by 
analogy. in accordance with this interpretation of the legality principle, forcing 
someone to enter into a marriage does not constitute an inhumane act that is 
similar in nature to the inhumane acts that are listed in the rome Statute. Neither 
does it amount to a serious violation of a rule of customary iHL that entails 
individual criminal responsibility. Nor does it qualify as a specific act that can be 
used for the purpose of the destruction of a group of people.
as has been stated on several occasions, this does not mean that states 
parties cannot decide to amend the rome Statute and add forced marriage as a 
new, separate crime to the crimes against humanity, war crimes and/or genocide 
provisions: they are free to do so. Yet it has been demonstrated in the previous 
sub‑paragraphs that there is no need for separate criminalisation. existing crimes 
can be used to adequately prosecute the practice. The conflict‑related forced 
marriages that have been described in this book are committed with a particular 
motive and that motive is related to dominion or control: in the vast majority 
of cases, forced marriages will result in (sexual) enslavement. in cambodia, the 
Khmer rouge sought to gain absolute control over the cambodian population 
– the marriage policy was a means to extend that control to sexuality and 
reproduction. in conflicts taking place in countries such as Uganda, the Drc, 
rwanda, Sierra Leone and the central african republic, it is not the fact that 
(mostly) women and girls are forced to marry the perpetrators, it is the fact 
that they are treated as slaves, reduced to chattel, that makes these associations 
atrocious. as bush wives, women and girls have no right to self‑determination; 
they are under complete control of their husbands. abducted girls and women 
1725 Perhaps with the exception of article 6(e) rome Statute (forcibly transferring children of the 
group to another group); this does refer to a specific act.
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who are not given to individual rebels as ‘wives’ are treated in the same manner: 
as slaves. Therefore, it is the result of the bush marriages, i.e. (sexual) enslavement 
that the icc should focus on, and not the label ‘wife’ or ‘marriage’.1726
1726 The icc’s stance on cumulative charging and cumulative convictions is not yet entirely 
clear, but pursuant to the Bemba Gombo Decision on the confirmation of the charges, the 
prosecution can only bring multiple charges for the same conduct if each of these crimes 
requires at least one additional material element which is not required by the other. This could 
have implications for the practice of forced marriage, seeing as sexual slavery is the specialis 
of enslavement – meaning that it would not be possible to charge both offences for the same 
conduct. The practice of forced marriage would be best addressed by charging enslavement 
cumulatively with rape and any other crimes committed within the forced marriage, such as 
any other acts of sexual violence.








Specific legislation criminalising the act of forcing someone to enter into a 
marriage is on the rise. During the past decade, many european countries, 
including Belgium, Norway, Denmark, germany, austria and england (as of 
2014), have introduced a specific offence of forced marriage in their criminal laws. 
on the international level, the Sierra Leonean bush wife phenomenon sparked the 
question of whether forced marriage ought to be classified as a ‘new’ crime against 
humanity (i.e. as an ‘other inhumane act’), or whether it is caught by existing 
crimes against humanity such as (sexual) enslavement. This research focused on 
the question of whether, and, if so, how the practice of forced marriage should 
be criminalised under Dutch law and international law (with a particular focus 
on the rome Statute of the international criminal court). in order to answer 
this question, the phenomenon of forced marriage was first described, after 
which frameworks – consisting of criminalisation criteria – were created for the 
levels of national and international law. after analysing current Dutch, english 
and international criminal law in relation to forced marriage, these criteria were 
applied to the practice of forced marriage.
THe PracTice of forceD marriage
forced marriages take place all over the world, in times of conflict as well as in 
times of peace. Universal and regional human rights instruments, such as the 
UDHr, the iccPr and the iceScr, discern the right to marry and the right not 
to marry without full and free consent. This means that a forced marriage, i.e. a 
marriage at least one of the partners entered into against their will as a result of 
some form of coercion that was exerted by another party, constitutes a human 
rights violation. in many cases, a marriage arranged by parties other than the 
spouses themselves will be at the basis of a forced marriage. That is to say, an 
arranged marriage may turn into a forced marriage in those cases where the 
wishes of the arrangers are not in line with the wishes of the one(s) for whom 
the arrangements are made, and the former nevertheless force the latter to enter 
into the marriage. concepts of shame and honour (protecting family honour) 
are the underlying cause of the majority of forced (arranged) marriages. Because 
of the subtle forms of coercion and pressure that can be applied (e.g. in the form 






of socio‑cultural expectations, that, to a certain extent, are internalised) it is not 
always easy to establish the degree to which consent to an arranged marriage 
was actually free and full, and thereby distinguish between arranged and forced 
marriages. This may change if (threats of) physical violence has been used as a 
means of coercion.
THe PracTice of forceD marriage iN THe 
NeTHerLaNDS aND eNgLaND
The practice of forced marriage is not something that is generally associated with 
Western europe. often, it is assumed that this only happens in ‘other’ countries. 
Yet research shows that forced marriages are a daily reality in europe. The practice 
mainly takes place in traditional and closed communities that attach great value 
to family honour and keeping up appearances. in england and the Netherlands, 
forced marriages are especially prevalent among communities with origins in 
india, Bangladesh, Pakistan, morocco, Turkey and Surinam, but also in orthodox 
Protestant circles and strict roman catholic (irish traveller) communities.
forced marriage is a hidden practice that often takes places within the 
privacy of the family. it is mainly used as a means to control (female) children 
and uphold traditional values, both with the aim of protecting family honour. 
it is possible that only the future spouse exerts pressure on the victim, but in 
most cases, parents and relatives are the ones forcing the victim(s) to enter into 
a marriage. The force used is very diverse and ranges from (threats of) physical 
violence to psychological pressure (such as emotional blackmail) exerted by a large 
variety of people over a long period of time. Threats of disownment and social 
exclusion/ostracism are especially effective in closed and traditional communities 
because these mechanisms (i.e. disownment and exclusion) are used to display 
public disapproval if a community member transgresses what is deemed to be 
acceptable. These types of forced marriages ought to be distinguished from the 
forced marriages that occur outside the context of the family. The latter type of 
forced marriage are often linked with human trafficking, generally involve more 
physical violence and are often (also) brought about by others than the victim’s 
relatives – although forced marriages taking place within family circles may also 
amount to trafficking.
THe PracTice of forceD marriage DUriNg 
coNfLicT
in conflict situations, the taking of brides by the victor is a common occurrence. 
Through the years, many conflicts around the world have been marked by the 
abduction of women and girls who were forced into what is generally referred 






to as ‘marriages’ with their captors. There are reports of forced marriages taking 
place during many conflicts, but in this book, the forced marriages that took 
place during two conflicts in particular were highlighted: the bush marriages 
that took place during the civil war in Sierra Leone (‘rebel marriages’) and the 
forced arranged marriages that were contracted by order of the Khmer rouge 
government (‘government‑planned marriages’). in addition, the eight situations 
(i.e. côte d’ivoire, Kenya, the central african republic, mali, Uganda, the 
Democratic republic of congo, Darfur and Libya) that are currently before the 
icc were studied with regard to the practice of forced marriage.
in Sierra Leone, rebels abducted thousands of women and girls and forced 
them into associations that are known as bush marriages: situations of individual 
slavery that were referred to as marriage in the bush, but that were not recognised as 
legitimate marriages by the Sierra Leonean community. in these bush marriages, 
many girls were raped, abused and used as slaves. and although many former 
bush wives were (eventually) welcomed back by their family, they nevertheless 
suffered from secondary victimisation through stigmatisation, discrimination 
and socio‑economic marginalisation, just like the majority of rape victims and 
child soldiers.
The practice of forced marriage was also dominant in the 1970s under the 
rule of Pol Pot. During the Khmer rouge regime, the cambodian government 
arranged marriages between civilians as part of policies aimed at population 
growth and breaking all family ties to facilitate complete loyalty to Angkar. The 
systematic arrangement of marriages demonstrated that the Khmer rouge had 
taken over the traditional role of parents of all cambodians. most people had little 
or no say in this matter: they were informed by Khmer rouge officials that it had 
been decided that they would marry a certain person on a settled date and time. 
from interviews with survivors of the Khmer rouge era, it follows that in some 
collectives, married couples were ordered to have sex with each other whereas in 
other collectives, sexual intercourse was not prescribed. as evidenced by the same 
survivor narratives, couples were not expected to build an emotional bond: many 
couples were separated a few days after their wedding and those who were not 
separated hardly saw each other since they worked long days in the labour groups 
which were classified on the basis of sex and age. many couples remained married 
after the fall of the Khmer rouge.
it appears that forced marriage can be seen as a policy‑based crime: in 
conflict situations, forced marriages are often used for particular reasons. The 
main goal pertains to dominion: gaining control over people and regulating 
their sexual conduct. in cambodia and within the Ugandan Lord’s resistance 
army, life was governed by a puritanical code and sex was only allowed within 
sanctioned wedlock. Seen from this perspective, the marriages were also used 
as a way to legitimise sex. as a consequence, adultery was prohibited: unilateral 
if not bilateral. in cambodia and Uganda, married couples were not allowed to 
have sex with others; in Sierra Leone, a bush wife was forbidden to have sexual 






relations with someone other than her captor husband. in cambodia and Uganda, 
moreover, procreation seems to have been an additional goal of the forced 
associations, whereas the Sierra Leonean rebels mainly used bush marriages as a 
means to establish a system of individual slavery.
THe DiffereNceS BeTWeeN THe PracTice of 
forceD marriage iN TimeS of Peace aND 
coNfLicT
as stated, forced marriages happen on a daily basis, in times of conflict, as well 
as in times of peace. in england and the Netherlands, forced marriages are often 
the result of people close to the victim, usually parents and direct kin, interfering 
in the victim’s life. Parents use pressure to force their children to enter into a 
marriage to protect family honour, to fulfil a promise made to the parents of the 
other spouse, to facilitate entrance to a country, and/or because they believe they 
act in their child’s best interests. There are also examples where forced marriages 
take place in a different context, such as in the course of human trafficking. other 
examples of forced marriages that usually, but not necessarily exclusively, take 
place outside the family context are cases of bride kidnapping. apart from these 
exceptions, the majority of forced marriages in the Netherlands and england take 
place within the context of the family and are usually coupled with psychological 
or more subtle forms of coercion. The period over which the coercion is exercised 
is in most cases protracted. in conflict situations, this is very different. as 
demonstrated inter alia by the conflicts in Sierra Leone, Uganda, cambodia 
and the Drc, in times of conflict, family members often have no involvement 
whatsoever in the forced conjugal associations that take place and (family) 
honour is generally not a cause or contributing factor of forced marriages. in 
cambodia, the Khmer rouge took over parents’ traditional role in arranging the 
marriage of their children; in several conflicts in african countries, rebel groups 
abducted women and girls and divided them amongst themselves as wives. The 
run‑up to these marriage is considerably shorter and the means of coercion more 
aggressive and violent; the marriages are usually brought about with (threats of) 
physical violence. in addition, it appears that, in times of peace (that is to say at 
least in the Netherlands and england), relatively more men become victims of 
forced marriages than in times of conflict (with the exception of cambodia). in 
the latter situations, the vast majority of victims are women.






a frameWorK for crimiNaLiSaTioN oN THe 
NaTioNaL LeVeL
The central question of this research revolves around criminalisation of forced 
marriage: should this practice be criminalised, and, if so, how? Should it be 
prohibited as a distinct, separate offence, or under the heading of (generic) existing 
crimes? in order to answer these questions, a non‑exhaustive set of criminalisation 
criteria was distilled from the writings of inter alia mill, feinberg, Simester, Von 
Hirsch, Husak, ashworth, Horder, Duff, Hulsman, Van Bemmelen, De roos, 
corstens, Haveman and De Hullu. a total of six general criteria emerged. first, 
two threshold criteria must be fulfilled: criminal law is reserved for wrongful 
conduct that causes some (risk of) harm. The harm principle, which provides 
for a balancing of interests, facilitates informed decision making regarding 
the harmfulness and criminality of conduct. reaching an informed decision 
necessitates a clear understanding of why certain behaviour takes place (etiology) 
and this requires mapping the background of the behaviour. The conduct, its 
prevalence and its consequences must be identified and defined, and any available 
(extra) legal remedies must be critically assessed. if at all possible, the harmfulness 
should be demonstrated by empirical evidence. along with its harmfulness, the 
wrongfulness of conduct ought to be determined. Wrongfulness is a concept with 
strong moral connotations and is associated with a high level of intuitivism – 
especially in relation to traditional core crimes such murder, rape and theft.
once the dual test of harm and wrongfulness has been satisfied, a set of 
three secondary criteria should be taken into consideration. first, the principle 
of proportionality can be used to assess the severity of the harm and wrong, 
and balance this against the benefits and disadvantages of the criminal law. are 
the harm and wrong so severe that they warrant the use of the criminal law? 
Secondly, the legislator should examine the necessity of penalisation by applying 
the principle of subsidiarity. He should verify whether there are alternatives 
to criminalisation (external subsidiarity), and, if this is not the case, whether 
the criminal law already contains offences that address the conduct (internal 
subsidiarity). Thirdly, the legislator should include the more practical principles 
of effectiveness and efficiency in his deliberation. a new provision that separately 
criminalises specific behaviour should not result in investigative or prosecutorial 
problems. When contemplating the criminalisation of conduct, a legislator 
should take into consideration De roos’ argument that a criminal provision 
must offer a sufficient foundation for professionals involved in the investigation, 
prosecution and trial stages, and must not cause insurmountable evidentiary 
problems. if the crime turns out to be unprosecutable, this would be injurious to 
the deterrent effect of the offence. These pragmatic considerations, however, are 
only supplementary arguments, that is to say the other, principled criteria (such 
as subsidiarity) carry more weight. This means that the pragmatic arguments 
should not be decisive, they should not tip the scales, but they should be included 






in the decision‑making process nonetheless. Proportionality, subsidiarity and 
effectiveness function as mediating considerations: they may provide reasons not 
to criminalise, even when the threshold criteria of harm and wrongfulness are 
satisfied. finally, once the legislator has decided to criminalise conduct, it goes 
without saying that the (definition of the) new offence must be in line with the 
legality principle, which can be seen as a tertiary criterion.
These six criteria form a theory of criminalisation that can assist the legislator 
in making a decision with regard to criminalisation. These principles offer no 
panacea, but they do facilitate a (partly) principled framework in which a balanced 
and informed decision regarding criminalisation can be made. in this sense, as 
benchmarks, they offer protection from criminalisation being used as an arbitrary 
tool or a procrustean solution. in the end, however, criminalisation decisions are 
based on lists of pro and contra arguments. Therefore, as De Hullu states, the 
best approach to criminalisation is a more pragmatic, casuistic approach, which 
comes down to balancing the arguments in favour of and against criminalisation 
in each case. The principles described above can be used to uncover and systemise 
these arguments.
a frameWorK for crimiNaLiSaTioN oN THe 
iNTerNaTioNaL LeVeL
The history of international criminal law is, like that of the egregious acts and 
conflicts that necessitated its creation, a turbulent one. created and amended in 
reaction to atrocities committed during various conflicts and continuously put 
to the test by man’s ingenuity when it comes to inflicting harm upon others, the 
special part of international criminal law has traditionally not been founded 
on elaborate, crystallised theories. Several authors (such as Bassiouni, cassese 
and may) have tried to retroactively derive criteria from this history marked by 
lack of systematisation in order to uncover a doctrinal basis for international 
criminalisation that can be applied in the future. in addition to these theories, 
the legislative history of the rome Statute offers insights in dynamics of 
criminalisation under international law. The decisions to include certain specific 
acts in the provisions of crimes against humanity and war crimes in the rome 
Statute were the result of negotiations between delegations of more than 160 
countries and were in the end based on consensus, rather than a set of strict 
criteria pertaining to criminalisation. often, it seems, practical rather than 
principled arguments were decisive. These practical considerations, such as the 
requirement that a new crime is not completely subsumed under existing crimes, 
in the sense that it is distinct from these crimes, are reflected in the road maps 
constructed in this book.
The icc only has jurisdiction over those crimes codified in the rome Statute. 
Therefore, the question of how particular conduct could be criminalised in the 






rome Statute in fact demands an answer to the question if and how this conduct 
can be included in the Statute. in order to address this issue, a distinction must be 
made between the core crimes: does particular conduct constitute a crime against 
humanity, a war crime and/or an act of genocide?
To answer these questions, two steps need to be taken. The first step is to 
verify whether the conduct in question is perhaps included in offences that are 
already listed in the rome Statute. The requirement that crimes are legally distinct 
from each other is especially important with regard to crimes against humanity, 
as is evidenced by the aspiration of the majority of the drafters of the rome 
Statute to include in the provision of crimes against humanity as few duplicitous 
acts as possible. although less stringent, the argument against duplicity also 
applies to war crimes. even though the drafters of the rome Statute set out to 
include as many war crimes under customary international law as possible – as 
a consequence of which many of the serious violations listed in article 8 rome 
Statute overlap – it would hardly be desirable to incorporate new war crimes in the 
rome Statute when they are already completely covered by existing war crimes. 
it would appear that the same logic applies to the crime of genocide. Limiting the 
number of duplicitous and thus possibly superfluous crimes contributes to the 
overall coherence and applicability of the rome Statute and prevents this statute 
from turning into an unoperationalisable and impenetrable morass of offences. if 
the conduct in question is included in any of the listed crimes, the conclusion will 
therefore be that the act is criminal and falls within the jurisdiction of the icc 
under the nomenclature of existing offences.
if it has been established that the conduct under consideration does not fall 
within the scope of any of the specific crimes listed in the rome Statute, or if this 
conduct is caught by an umbrella clause, the second step raises the question of 
whether this conduct could be included as a distinct crime against humanity, 
war crime or genocidal act in the rome Statute. crimes against humanity require 
an act to constitute an inhumane act, war crimes require a serious violation 
of international humanitarian law, and genocide requires an act that could 
potentially result in the destruction of (part of) a group of people. Schematically, 
this results in the following overview.
crimes against humanity
4. is the act subsumed under or materially distinct from listed crimes 
against humanity (is it an other inhumane act)?
5. Does this act cause great suffering? and
6. is the act similar in nature and gravity to listed crimes against humanity 
(eiusdem generis)?







3. is the conduct subsumed under serious violations of customary 
international law that are listed in the rome Statute? or
4. Does the conduct amount to a war crime which is not codified in the 
rome Statute:
a. is the conduct considered to be a breach of a rule of customary 
international humanitarian law; and
b. can the violation be qualified as ‘serious’; and
c. Does the breach give rise to individual criminal responsibility under 
customary international law?
genocide
3a. is this act subsumed under listed genocidal acts? or
4a. is the act of such a nature that it may (ultimately) result in the destruction 
of (part of) a group of people? and
3b. is the gravity of this act comparable to the listed genocidal acts (eiusdem 
generis)?
if the questions listed above are answered positively, there exist valid reasons to 
include the act in question as a ‘new’ crime against humanity (e.g. as an ‘other 
inhumane act’), war crime or act of genocide in the rome Statute. especially 
when this particular act has certain prevalence in conflict situations and is likely 
to reoccur, it stands to reason to consider including it in the rome Statute.
NaTioNaL aND iNTerNaTioNaL crimiNaLiSaTioN 
comPareD
after comparing the different frameworks for national and international 
criminalisation with each other, it appears that the criteria in the national 
framework are not so ‘national’ after all. There are many similarities. The core 
crimes in the rome Statute have their own requirements for criminalisation, their 
own criminalisation frameworks, but all ‘national’ criteria are also, to some extent, 
present on the international level. Harm, wrong, internal subsidiarity and legality 
are indispensable criteria on both levels and the principles of proportionality and 
external subsidiarity are subsumed under the higher harm and wrong thresholds 
that are inherent in international criminal law.
The approach to criminalisation taken in this book is one of minimalism. 
The concept of minimalism has two implications. first, there ought to be very 
persuasive reasons for using the criminal law to prohibit certain conduct, because 
in many cases, criminal law must be regarded as the ultimum remedium. There 






exists, in the author’s opinion, a presumption against criminalisation. Secondly 
(and linked to the first observation), the volume of criminal law, i.e. the number of 
criminal provisions, should preferably not snowball and get out of control. many 
acts that cause serious harm have already been criminalised. Before the decision 
is made to create a new criminal offence, the legislator ought to give heed to the 
internal subsidiarity principle by assessing the tools that are already available: is 
the conduct in question caught by existing criminal offences or are the harms 
and wrongs caused by the conduct so specific, so unique that they are not covered 
and might require a criminal prohibition of their own? if the act is subsumed 
under existing criminal offences, then care must be taken that new criminal 
offences are not created just for the sake of it. There must be compelling reasons 
to criminalise conduct that is already completely caught by existing offences. 
Sending out a message that the conduct in question is unacceptable (symbolic 
function of criminalisation) could be a reason, but this should be assessed on a 
case‑by‑case basis.
forceD marriage aND DUTcH LaW
forced marriages have been on the Dutch political agenda since 2005 and the 
wish to tackle this issue has resulted in several legal amendments. in 2009, the 
Dutch government drafted a broad set of measures for the purpose of combating 
the problems associated with protracted integration and emancipation of 
family migrants. These measures include changes in the civil and criminal law 
pertaining to polygamy, forced marriage, marriages between cousins and raising 
the minimum age for marriage in private international law.
Dutch law recognises only one type of marriage: civil marriage celebrated 
in accordance with the requirements set out in Book 1 of the civil code. There 
are several civil law remedies that can be used in the case of a threatened forced 
marriage or if a forced marriage has already taken place. annulment currently has 
a high bar, requiring an ‘unlawful serious threat’, which means that a marriage that 
was the result of more subtle forms of coercion, such as psychological pressure, 
does not qualify for annulment. after promulgation of the marital coercion (civil 
law) Bill, marriages that were entered into as a result of any form of coercion 
will be eligible for annulment. This will offer victims of forced marriage better 
possibilities to dissolve the unwanted union. as argued above, in some cases, an 
annulment may be a better response than a divorce, because the consequence of 
an annulment is that the marriage never existed. a divorce decree does not have 
this ex tunc effect. Yet in other cases, a divorce will be a more obvious choice as it 
offers relief more quickly and does not require the party (parties) to prove that the 
marriage came about as a result of coercion. Judicial separation, the third option 
to dissolve a marriage, results in a separation between the spouses, but has limited 
added value in the context of forced marriages. When it comes to preventing 






forced marriages, it appears that the registrar is a key figure. The registrar is the 
person who actually weds a couple and if he suspects that coercion is involved, he 
is compelled by law to report this to the PPS (article 162(1)(c) cric).
The Dutch criminal code contains a number of offences that may be 
applicable to forced marriages. especially relevant in this regard are the offence 
of coercion (article 284 cric) and the offence of influencing someone’s statement 
(article 285a cric). in government documents, the offence of coercion is generally 
heralded as most applicable to forced marriages, but the offence of influencings 
someone’s statement appears to be a blueprint for the act of forcing someone to 
enter into a marriage against that person’s will.
forceD marriage aND eNgLiSH LaW
english courts have quite a long history when it comes to dealing with cases of 
forced marriage, but the phenomenon entered the political limelight only relatively 
recently. in the late 1990s, several high profile cases attracted media attention and 
outraged the British public, causing two members of Parliament to place the issue 
of forced marriage on the political agenda. in 2005, the government consulted 
on the possibility of separately criminalising the practice of forced marriage, 
but, considering that the arguments against the creation of a specific offence 
outweighed the arguments in favour, the government decided not to criminalise 
the practice. instead, a civil law approach was favoured and in 2007 legislative 
action was taken with the creation of the forced marriage (civil Protection) act. 
But the debate on criminalisation of forced marriage kept resurfacing. after a 
consultation late 2011, the government decided to create a specific criminal 
offence of forced marriage, arguing that this would send a strong message that 
the practice is unacceptable and will not be tolerated. in may 2013, the anti‑social 
Behaviour, crime and Policing Bill (aBcP Bill) was introduced in the House of 
commons. This Bill proposes to create two offences concerning forced marriage 
and proposes to criminalise the breach of a so‑called forced marriage Protection 
order, which is a civil measure.
english law also offers a varied number of tools that can be used to tackle 
forced marriages. a forced marriage that has already taken place can be annulled 
within three years from the date of the marriage ceremony on the ground that 
a party to the marriage did not validly consent to it, as a consequence of duress. 
Pursuant to the case law, there is no valid consent when a person’s will has been 
overborne, that is to say, the relevant question in these cases is ‘whether the 
threats or pressure were such as to overbear the will of the individual and destroy 
the reality of consent’ (Hirani v. Hirani). it has been recognised that duress in the 
context of consent to marriage can include physical and psychological coercion, 
but also financial, sexual and emotional pressure. Divorce can also be used to 
end a forced marriage, but is not preferable to annulment as a petition for divorce 






may be presented to the court only after the expiration of one year from the date 
of the marriage and the law strictly limits the grounds for divorce. a decree of 
divorce is granted only under certain specific circumstances; the fact that one or 
both of the spouses were forced to enter into the marriage against their will is not 
one of them. Pursuant to the matrimonial causes act, the petitioner would have 
to demonstrate that the marriage has broken down irretrievably by satisfying 
the court that his/her spouse has behaved in such a way that the petitioner 
cannot reasonably be expected to live with him/her. Someone who faces the risk 
of being forced into a marriage or who has already been forced to marry can 
also, depending on the circumstances, apply to the court for non‑molestation 
orders and occupation orders under the fLa 1996, restraining orders under the 
Protection from Harassment act 1997, or Domestic Violence Protection Notices 
and orders under the crime and Security act 2010.
The most notable legal tools at the government’s disposal are the fmcPa 
2007 and the criminal offences of forced marriage proposed by the aBcP 
Bill 2013. The fmcPa was implemented in 2008 and enables courts to make 
injunctions to protect people who are faced with a forced marriage or who have 
already been forced to enter into a marriage against their will. The content of 
these protection orders is entirely up to the discretion of the court: a protection 
order may for example prohibit the great uncle of the woman who has applied 
for the order to make arrangements for her wedding. Breach of an order is 
considered civil contempt of court. in 2011, the government announced that a 
breach of an fmPo would be made into a criminal offence, punishable with up to 
five years imprisonment. after an extensive consultation in 2012, the government 
concluded that the two‑step prohibition (i.e. the criminalisation of a breach of a 
civil order) was not sufficient and that the practice of forced marriage requires the 
creation of a specific criminal offence. The aBcP Bill 2013 makes it a criminal 
offence to use violence, threats or other forms of coercion for the purpose of 
causing another person to enter into a marriage without that person’s free and full 
consent. Practising any form of deception with the intention of causing someone 
to leave the UK and intending that person to be subjected to a forced marriage 
abroad is also a criminal offence.
forceD marriage aND iNTerNaTioNaL crimiNaL 
LaW
None of the statutes of any of the international(ised) courts or tribunals specifically 
list the act of forced marriage as a crime against humanity, a war crime or an act 
of genocide. The legal framework of forced marriage in international criminal 
law is based on the case law of the ScSL and – to a lesser extent – the eccc. 
This case law demonstrates that the legal framework for forced marriage under 
international criminal law is formed by several (categories of) crimes: the war 






crimes and crimes against humanity of enslavement and sexual slavery, the crime 
against humanity of other inhumane acts, and the war crime of outrages upon 
personal dignity.
The ScSL was the first court that was faced with the daunting task of deciding 
whether the act of forced marriage should be subsumed under existing crimes 
against humanity or whether it constitutes a separate crime against humanity. 
Since no other international or international(ised) criminal court or tribunal had 
ever addressed this issue, the ScSL entered uncharted legal area. Understandably, 
the court faced several challenges, the main problem being the definition of 
the act of forced marriage, i.e. its actus reus and (to a lesser degree) mens rea. 
The legacy of the court is unprecedented and constitutes without question an 
enrichment of international criminal law, but nonetheless presents several 
difficulties and ambiguities: no clear definition of forced marriage is given, as a 
concomitant circumstance of which no clear and convincing distinction is made 
between sexual slavery and forced marriage: the ScSL often conflated the two 
offences. The overlap between the Khmer rouge marriages and the crimes of 
enslavement and sexual slavery is less evident, but this practice did result in a 
complete deprivation of people’s autonomy and right to self‑determination. at 
the time of writing (march 2014), the eccc Trial chamber had not yet addressed 
this issue.
DUTcH, eNgLiSH aND iNTerNaTioNaL crimiNaL 
LaW comPareD
in england as well as in the Netherlands, the fight against forced marriages is 
high on the political agenda: mPs and Ngos have examined existing and new 
measures that could be taken to tackle this phenomenon and discussions on 
involving the criminal law have resulted in new legislation in both jurisdictions. 
Specific legislation comparable to the fmcPa does not exist in the Netherlands. 
Nevertheless, there are several comparable measures in Dutch law. Two landscapes 
that at first glance seem very different, appear, upon closer inspection, to have 
many similarities. even though england has (civil and criminal) legislation that 
was created specifically with the aim of dealing with forced marriages, (potential) 
victims of a forced marriage can obtain similar protection from Dutch courts via 
provisional arrangements made in interlocutory proceedings.
But there are two important differences. first, english courts have very 
far‑reaching discretionary powers when it comes to making orders: they can 
make protection orders on their own initiative – so without having been asked to 
do so by any party – as long as any other family proceedings are before the court 
and a person who would be a respondent to proceedings for a forced marriage 
protection order is a party to those family proceedings. The person to be protected 
by the order need not be party to the family proceedings. especially now that 






breaching a forced marriage protection order has become a criminal offence (in 
accordance with the aBcP Bill 2013) with a maximum penalty of five years on 
conviction on indictment, the court’s sua sponte order‑making possibilities can 
have significant consequences.
Secondly, pursuant to Dutch criminal law, litigants need a legal representative 
to commence interlocutory proceedings. The fmcPa, on the other hand, allows 
people to make an application for a protection order for themselves or on behalf 
of someone else; they do not need legal representation in the form of a solicitor. 
Local authorities can also apply for a protection order on someone else’s behalf. 
aside from these two differences, the similarities between the measures available 
to victims of forced marriages under english and Dutch law are vast.
as regards the comparison between the international and national legal 
frameworks, the following can be remarked. The two national landscapes, with 
their varied and wide range of criminal legislation contain the same (types) of 
crimes that may be used to prosecute forced marriages on the international level 
(such as enslavement), but not vice versa. The rome Statute contains a limited 
number of criminal offences and does not include crimes such as coercion, 
stalking or influencing someone’s freedom to make a legal statement. although 
the rome Statute does list a few umbrella clauses such as ‘other inhumane 
acts’ that catch crimes which are not specifically listed, offences such as using 
subtle psychological pressure on someone in order to influence their freedom of 
statement will not qualify as an ‘other inhumane act’.
coNcLUSioN: a SeParaTe offeNce of forceD 
marriage iS NoT reqUireD iN DUTcH crimiNaL 
LaW
as stated above, six criteria have emerged in this book as relevant to criminalisation 
issues under national law: harm, wrong, proportionality, subsidiarity, effectiveness 
and legality. after applying these criminalisation criteria to the practice of forced 
marriage it has become clear that there is no need for specific criminal legislation 
concerning forced marriage.
forcing someone to enter into a marriage against that person’s will causes 
harm and wrongs of such a severity and nature that a criminal law response 
would not be disproportional. currently, the act of forcing someone to enter into 
a marriage is captured by the criminal offence of coercion (article 284 cric), and, 
depending on the circumstances, several other criminal offences, including the 
crime of influencing someone’s official statement (article 285 cric). There exists 
no specific criminal offence of forced marriage. one of the conclusions of this 
research is that it is not necessary to create such a distinct offence.
forced marriage, depending on how it is defined, covers several harms. in 
this book, it is defined as a marriage (i.e. a marital or marital‑like association), 






which at least one of the partners entered into against their will as a result of some 
form of coercion exerted by another party. But it has been argued by some that 
a forced marriage is broader than the mere conferral of marital status against 
someone’s will, and that it also refers to being forced to remain in a (religious) 
marriage, a phenomenon which has been referred to as ‘marital captivity’. 
as stated above, in many cases, a forced marriage as defined in this book will 
also result in marital captivity. Yet marital captivity is not always the result of a 
marriage that was entered into under duress: a voluntary marriage (as opposed to 
a forced marriage) can also result in marital captivity. it is here that the coercion 
offence of article  284 cric – which criminalises the act of using (threats of) 
force or other hostile acts to coerce someone to do, refrain from doing or tolerate 
something – proves its worth: it covers both situations.
Unlike article 285 cric, which only covers forced civil marriages, article 284 
cric catches all different types of forced marriage: forced civil marriage (it is 
reiterated that Dutch law only recognises civil marriages), forced religious marriage 
and forced customary marriage. even cases of forced registered partnership and 
forced cohabitation could fall within the scope of article  284 cric, as long as 
the perpetrator used (threats of) force or other hostile acts to coerce the victim 
to do, refrain from doing or tolerate something that the victim would otherwise 
not have done, refrained from doing or tolerated. if a new criminal offence were 
created, this offence would need to be defined in broad terms, so that it would not 
be limited to forced civil marriages.
as argued above, creating a separate offence would send a clear message 
that forced marriage is wrong, unacceptable and will not be tolerated. But this 
message can also be sent by others means, such as media (awareness) campaigns, 
programmes to train professionals (including teachers and registrars) who are 
likely to encounter instances of forced marriage, and prosecutorial guidelines 
stating the ways in which forced marriage will be charged. all of these measures 
are contained in the Dutch government’s action plan concerning the prevention 
of forced marriages.
coNcLUSioN: No NeeD for a NeW, DiSTiNcT 
offeNce of forceD marriage iN THe rome 
STaTUTe
a forced marriage during a conflict consists of a perpetrator forcing someone 
to enter into a relationship, either with himself or with another person. This 
relationship is qualified as ‘marriage’, either by the perpetrator, the victim, the 
subculture of war and/or by the society at large. in many cases, perpetrators of 
forced marriages also cause the victims to stay in the association for a certain 
period of time. The forced conferral of the marital status has consequences for 
the relationship between the parties: the forced marriage creates certain exclusive 






obligations and/or rights between the spouses that do not exist between people 
who are not (forcibly) married. These rights and/or obligations often pertain to 
inter alia sexual exclusivity, either reciprocal or unilateral. The victim is bound to 
this forced association, by the very nature of the association. marriage thus binds 
people (to each other) through social and cultural mores. as a result, the label 
‘marriage’ may cause people to feel compelled to remain in the association, long 
after the conflict has come to an end.
forced marriages are serious violations of human rights. They rob people of 
the opportunity to make important life decisions and can have very severe and 
long‑lasting consequences. Yet the act of forcing someone to enter into a marital(‑
like) association sec does not qualify as a separate crime against humanity, war 
crime or genocidal act. The rome Statute and the icc are unambiguous about 
the importance of the legality principle. article  22 rome Statute clearly states 
that definitions of crimes must be strictly construed and must not be extended by 
analogy. in accordance with this interpretation of the legality principle, forcing 
someone to enter into a marriage does not constitute an inhumane act that is 
similar in nature and gravity to the inhumane acts that are listed in the rome 
Statute. Neither does it amount to a serious violation of a rule of customary iHL 
that entails individual criminal responsibility. Nor does it qualify as a specific act 
that can be used for the purpose of the destruction of a group of people.
as has been stated on several occasions, this does not mean that states 
parties cannot decide to amend the rome Statute and add forced marriage as a 
new, separate crime to the crimes against humanity, war crimes and/or genocide 
provisions: they are free to do so. Yet it has been demonstrated in this book that 
there is no need for separate criminalisation. in line with the internal subsidiarity 
principle, existing crimes can be used to adequately prosecute the practice. 
The conflict‑related forced marriages that have been described in this book are 
committed with a particular motive and that motive is related to dominion or 
control: in the vast majority of cases, forced marriages will result in (sexual) 
enslavement. in cambodia, the Khmer rouge sought to gain absolute control 
over the cambodian population – the marriage policy was a means to extend that 
control to sexuality and reproduction. in conflicts taking place in countries such 
as Uganda, the Drc, rwanda, Sierra Leone and the central african republic, it 
is not the fact that (mostly) women and girls are forced to marry the perpetrators, 
it is the fact that they are treated as slaves, reduced to chattel, that makes 
these associations atrocious. as bush wives, women and girls have no right to 
self‑determination; they are under complete control of their husbands. abducted 
girls and women who are not given to individual rebels as ‘wives’ are treated in 
the same manner: as slaves. Therefore, it is the result of the bush marriages, i.e. 
(sexual) enslavement that the icc should focus on, and not the label ‘wife’ or 
‘marriage’.
Forceandmarriage.indd   371 20-5-2014   10:42:22








adviescommissie voor Vreemdelingenzaken, Tot het huwelijk gedwongen. Een 
advies over preventieve, correctieve en repressieve maatregelen ter voorkoming van 
huwelijksdwang, The Hague, July 2005
African Rights 1995
african rights, Death, despair and defiance, 1995 (revised edition)
Alkema 1984
e.a. alkema, ‘Huwelijk en verdragsrecht’, in: m.J.a. van mourik et al., Het huwelijk, 
Zwolle: Tjeenk Willink 1984
Allen 2005
T. allen, War and Justice in northern Uganda: An Assessment of the International 
Criminal Court’s Intervention, Special Report, London: crisis States research centre 
2005
Amnesty International 1997
amnesty international, Uganda: ‘Breaking God’s commands’: the destruction of childhood 
by the Lord’s Resistance Army, afr 59/001/1997, 16 September 1997
Amnesty International 2008
amnesty international, Left to their own devices: the continued suffering of victims of the
conflict in northern Uganda and the need for reparations, afr 59/009/2008, 17 November 
2008
Anderson 2010
N. anderson, ‘memorandum charging forced marriages as a crime against humanity’, 
Documentation center of cambodia 2010
An‑na’im 2000
a. an‑Na’im, ‘forced marriage’, available at: <www.soas.ac.uk/honourcrimes/resources/
file55689.pdf> (last accessed march 2014).
Annan et al. 2009
J. annan, c. Blattman, D. mazurana & K. carlson, ‘Women and girls at war: “wives”, 
mothers, and fighters in the Lord’s resistance army’, Households in conflict Network 
(The institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex) Working Paper 63, october 
2009






Annan et al. 2011
J. annan, c. Blattman, D. mazurana & K. carlson, ‘civil war, reintegration, and gender 
in northern Uganda’, Journal of Conflict Resolution (55) 2011, pp. 877–908
Ashiana network 2012
ashiana Network, Forced marriage consultation, march 2012
Ashworth & horder 2013
a. ashworth & J. Horder, Principles of Criminal Law, oxford: oxford University Press 
2013
Asser/de boer 2010
c. asser & J. de Boer, Mr. C. Assers Handleiding tot de beoefening van het nederlands 
Burgerlijk Recht. 1 Personen‑ en familierecht, Deventer: Kluwer 2010
bakker & Felten 2012
H. Bakker & H. felten, ‘De mantel der liefde’. Quickscan naar huiselijk geweld in 
orthodox‑protestantse gezinnen, Utrecht: movisie 2012
bassiouni 1983
m.c. Bassiouni, ‘The penal characteristics of conventional international criminal law’, 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law (15) 1983, pp. 27–37
bassiouni 1999a
m.c. Bassiouni, Crimes against humanity in international criminal law, The Hague: 
Kluwer Law international 1999
bassiouni 2005(I)
m.c. Bassiouni, The legislative history of the International Criminal Court. Volume 1: 
Introduction, analysis and integrated text, ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers 2005
bassiouni 2005(II)
m.c. Bassiouni, The legislative history of the International Criminal Court. Volume 2: An 
article‑by‑article evolution of the Statute, ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers 2005
bassiouni 2008
m.c. Bassiouni (ed.), International criminal law. Volume I: Sources, subjects and 
contents, Leiden: martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2008
bassiouni 2013
m.c. Bassiouni, Introduction to international criminal law: second revised edition, 
Leiden/Boston: martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2013
van bemmelen 1973
J.m. van Bemmelen, ‘Positive criteria voor strafbaarstelling’, in: J.f. glastra van Loon, 
r.a.V. van Haersolte & J.m. Polak (eds.), Speculum Langemeijer, Zwolle: W.e.J. Tjeenk 
Willink 1973, pp. 1–14






boas, bischoff & Reid 2009
g. Boas, J.L. Bischoff, N.L. reid, International Criminal Law Practitioner Library. 
Volume 2: Elements of Crimes under International Law, cambridge: cUP 2009
boon 2001
K. Boon, ‘rape and forced pregnancy under the icc Statute: human dignity, autonomy 
and consent’, Columbia Human Rights Law Review (32) 2000–2001, pp. 625–675
boot 2002
m. Boot, nullum crimen sine lege and the subject matter jurisdiction of the International 
Criminal Court, antwerp: intersentia 2002
bradney 1994
a. Bradney, ‘Duress, family Law and the coherent Legal System, The Modern Law 
Review (57) 1994
broomhall 2008
B. Broomhall, ‘article 22’, in: o. Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, munich: c.H. Beck 2008
de brouwer 2005
a.L.m. de Brouwer, Supranational Criminal Prosecution of Sexual Violence: The ICC and 
the Practice of the ICTY and the ICTR, antwerp: intersentia 2005
de brouwer 2009
a.L.m. de Brouwer, ‘gacumbitsi Judgement’, in g. Sluiter & a. Klip (eds.), Annotated 
leading cases of international criminal tribunals: The international criminal tribunal for 
Rwanda 2005–2006, antwerp – oxford – Portland: intersentia 2009, pp. 583–594
de brouwer & ka hon chu 2009
a. de Brouwer & S. Ka Hon chu, The men who killed me: Rwandan survivors of sexual 
violence, Vancouver: Douglas & mcintyre 2009
brown 1967
L.N. Brown, ‘Shotgun marriage’, Tulane Law Review (42) 1967–1968, pp. 837–860
carlson & mazurana 2004
K. carlson & D. mazurana, From combat to community: women and girls of Sierra Leone, 
Washington Dc: Women Waging Peace, January 2004
carlson & mazurana 2008
K. carlson & D. mazurana, Forced marriage within the Lord’s Resistance Army, Uganda, 
medford, ma: feinstein international center, Tufts University, may 2008
cassese, gaeta & Jones 2002
a. cassese, P. gaeta & J.r.W.D. Jones (eds.), The Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court: a commentary (Vol. I), oxford: oUP 2002







a. cassese, ‘crimes against Humanity’, in: a. cassese, P. gaeta & J.r.W.D. Jones (eds.), 
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: a commentary (Vol. I), oxford: 
oUP 2002
cassese 2008
a. cassese, International criminal law, oxford: oUP 2008
cassese et al. 2013
a. cassese et al., Cassese’s International Criminal Law, oxford: oUP 2013
chalmers & leverick 2013
J. chalmers & f. Leverick, ‘Tracking the creation of criminal offences’, Criminal Law 
Review 2013, pp. 543–560
chandler 1999
D.P. chandler, Voices from S‑21: terror and history in Pol Pot’s secret prison, Berkeley, ca: 
University of california Press 1999
choice by Right 2000
Home office, A Choice by Right: The Report of the Working Group on Forced Marriage, 
London: Home office communications Directorate June 2000
choudhry 2011
S. choudhry, ‘forced marriage: the european convention on Human rights and the 
Human rights act 1998’, in a.K. gill & S. anitha (eds.), Forced marriage. Introducing a 
social justice and human rights perspective, London: Zed Books 2011
cleiren 2012
c.P.m. cleiren, ‘functie en waarde van criteria voor strafbaarstelling in het huidig 
tijdsgewricht’, in: c.P.m. cleiren e.a., Criteria voor strafbaarstelling in een nieuwe 
dynamiek. Symbolische legitimiteit versus maatschappelijke en sociaalwetenschappelijke 
realiteit, The Hague: Boom Lemma 2012, pp. 7–24
cleiren et al. 2012
c.P.m. cleiren et al., Criteria voor strafbaarstelling in een nieuwe dynamiek. Symbolische 
legitimiteit versus maatschappelijke en sociaalwetenschappelijke realiteit, The Hague: 
Boom Lemma 2012
coontz 2005
S. coontz, Marriage, a history. From obedience to intimacy or how love conquered 
marriage, New York: Viking 2005
coram children’s legal centre 2012
coram children’s Legal centre, Forced Marriage Consultation. Response by Coram 
Children’s Legal Centre, march 2012






cornelissens, kuppens & Ferwerda 2009
a. cornelissens, J. Kuppens & H. ferwerda, Huwelijksdwang: Een verbintenis voor het 
leven? Een verkenning van de aard en aanpak van gedwongen huwelijken in nederland, 
The Hague: WoDc 2009
cottier 2008
m. cottier, ‘article 8 War crimes para. 2(b)(xxvi)’, in: o. Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on 
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, munich: c.H. Beck 2008
coulter 2008
c. coulter, ‘female fighters in the Sierra Leone war: challenging the assumptions?’, 
Feminist Review (88) 2008, pp. 54–73
coulter 2009
c. coulter, Bush wives and girls soldiers. Women’s lives through war and peace in Sierra 
Leone, ithaca, NY: cornell University Press 2009
cramwinckel‑weeda 1975
c.J. cramwinckel‑Weeda, Het gedwongen huwelijk in nederland: een voortgezette 
analyse, report no. 3 published for the benefit of the royal committee on Population 
issues 1975
cryer 2001
r. cryer, ‘a “Special court” for Sierra Leone?’, International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly (50) 2001, pp. 435–446
cryer 2005
r. cryer, Prosecuting international crimes: selectivity and the international criminal law 
regime, cambridge: cambridge University Press 2005
cryer 2008
r. cryer, ‘The doctrinal foundations of international criminalization’, in: m. cherif 
Bassiouni (ed.), International criminal law. Volume I: Sources, subjects and contents, 
Leiden: martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2008, pp. 107–128
cryer et al. 2010
r. cryer et al., An introduction to international criminal law and procedure, cambridge: 
cambridge University Press 2010
darfur consortium 2009
Darfur consortium, Abductions, sexual slavery and forced labour in Darfur, 2009
demos 2012
m. Wind‑cowie, P. cheetham & T. gregory, Ending Forced Marriage, London: Demos 
2012
denov 2007
m. Denov, Girls in fighting forces: moving beyond victimhood, canadian international 
Development agency 2007






denov & maclure 2006
m. Denov & r. maclure, ‘Sierra Leone’s conflict: experiences and perspectives in a 
culture of violence’, Anthropologica (48) 2006, pp. 73–85
deveaux 2007
m. Deveaux, Gender and Justice in Multicultural Liberal States, oxford: oUP 2007
van dijk et al. 2006
P. van Dijk, f. van Hoof, a. van rijn & L. Zwaak (eds.), Theory and practice of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, antwerp: intersentia 2006 (fourth edition)
diversity subcommission of the Family Justice council 2012
Diversity Subcommission of the family Justice council, Response to the forced marriage 
consultation, march 2012
duff 2014
r.a. Duff, ‘Towards a modest Legal moralism’, (8) Criminal Law and Philosophy 2014, 
pp. 217–235
enright 2009
m. enright, ‘choice, culture and the politics of belonging: the emerging law of forced 
and arranged marriage’, The Modern Law Review (72) 2009
equality and human Rights commission 2012
equality and Human rights commission, Response of the Equality and Human Rights 
Commission to the Consultation, april 2012
Feinberg 1984
J. feinberg, Harm to others. The moral limits of the criminal law, New York: oUP 1984
Frulli 2008
m. frulli, ‘advancing international criminal Law: The Special court for Sierra 
Leone recognizes forced marriage as a “New” crime against Humanity’, Journal of 
International Criminal Justice (6) 2008, p. 1033–1042
gaeta 2009
P. gaeta, ‘international criminalization of prohibited conduct’, in: a. cassese (ed.), 
Oxford Companion to International Criminal Justice, oxford: oUP 2009, pp. 63–74
gangoli et al. 2011
g. gangoli, K. chantler, m. Hester & a. Singleton, ‘Understanding forced marriage: 
definitions and realities’, in: a.K. gill & S. anitha (eds.), Forced Marriage. Introducing a 
social justice and human rights perspective, London: Zed Books 2011, pp. 25–45
gangoli, Razak & mccarry 2006
g. gangoli, a. razak & m. mccarry, Forced Marriage and Domestic Violence among 
South Asian Communities in north East England, University of Bristol June 2006







a.K. gill, Exploring the viability of creating a specific offence for forced marriage in 
England and Wales: report on findings, roehampton University July 2011
gill & Anitha 2011
a.K. gill & S. anitha (eds.), Forced Marriage. Introducing a social justice and human 
rights perspective, London: Zed Books 2011
van gog 2008
J. van gog, Coming back from the bush. Gender, youth and reintegration in northern 
Sierra Leone, african Studies collection, vol. 9, Leiden: african Studies centre 2008
gong‑gershowitz 2009
J. gong‑gershowitz, ‘forced marriage: a “New” crime against Humanity?’, 
northwestern Journal of International Human Rights (8) 2009, pp. 53–76
groenhuijsen 1987
m.S. groenhuijsen, Straf en wet, arnhem: gouda quint 1987
groenhuijsen & kooijmans 2013
m.S. groenhuijsen & T. Kooijmans, Bestraffing in nederland, pre‑advies voor de 
nederlands Vlaamse Vereniging voor Strafrecht, Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers 2013
van grunderbeeck 2003
D. van grunderbeeck, Beginselen van personen‑ en familierecht. Een mensenrechtelijke 
benadering, antwerp: intersentia 2003
haenen 2013(I)
i. Haenen, ‘classifying acts as crimes against Humanity in the rome Statute of the 
international criminal court’, (14) German Law Journal 2013–7, pp. 404–430
haenen 2013(II)
i. Haenen, ‘The Parameters of enslavement and the act of forced marriage’, 
(13) International Criminal Law Review 2013–4, pp. 895–915
hall 2008
c.K. Hall, ‘article 7 crimes against Humanity’, in: o. Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on 
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, munich: c.H. Beck 2008
harris‑short & miles 2011
S. Harris‑Short & J. miles, Family Law. Text, cases, and materials, oxford: oUP 2011
haveman 1998
r.H. Haveman, Voorwaarden voor strafbaarstelling van vrouwenhandel, Deventer: 
gouda quint 1998
haviland et al. 2010
W.a. Haviland, H.e.L. Prins, D. Walrath & B. mcBride, Anthropology: The Human 
Challenge, Belmond, ca: Wadsworth ceNgage Learning 2010







e. La Haye, ‘The elements of war crimes: article 8(2)(b)(xxii)’, in: r.S. Lee (ed.), The 
International Criminal Court. Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 
ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers 2001, pp. 184–199
heaton, mccallum & Jogi 2009
c. Heaton, L. mccallum & r. Jogi, Forced marriage: a special bulletin, London: Jordan 
Publishing Ltd. 2009
herring 2009
J. Herring, Great Debates in Criminal Law, Hampshire: Palgrave macmillan 2009
herring 2011
J. Herring, Family Law, Harlow: Pearson 2011
von hebel & Robinson 1999
H. von Hebel & D. robinson, ‘crimes within the jurisdiction of the court’, in: r.S. 
Lee (ed.), The International Criminal Court. The making of the Rome Statute: issues, 
negotiations, results, The Hague: Kluwer international 1999, pp. 79–126
von hebel 2001
H. von Hebel, ‘The making of the elements of crimes’, in: r.S. Lee (ed.), The 
International Criminal Court. Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 
ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers 2001, pp. 3–18
heuveline & Poch 2006
P. Heuveline & B. Poch, ‘Do marriages forget their past? marital stability in post‑Khmer 
rouge cambodia’, Demography (43) 2006, pp. 99–125
von hirsch 2014
a. von Hirsch, ‘Harm and Wrongdoing in criminalisation Theory’, (8) Criminal Law 
and Philosophy 2014, pp. 245–256
hulsman 1972
L.H.c. Hulsman, ‘Kriteria voor strafbaarstelling’, in: Strafrecht te‑recht? over 
dekriminalisering en decriminalisering, Baarn: Uitgeverij in den Toorn 1972
human Rights watch 1996
Human rights Watch, Shattered lives. Sexual Violence during the Rwandan Genocide and 
its Aftermath, September 1996
human Rights watch 1997
Human rights Watch, The scars of death. Children Abducted by the Lord’s Resistance 
Army in Uganda, September 1997
human Rights watch 2003a
Human rights Watch, “We’ll kill you if you cry” Sexual Violence in the Sierra Leone 
Conflict, January 2003






human Rights watch 2003b
Human rights Watch, Stolen children: Abduction and Recruitment in northern Uganda, 
march 2003
human Rights watch 2003c
Human rights Watch, Abducted and abused: renewed conflict in northern Uganda, July 
2003
human Rights watch 2005
Human rights Watch, Uprooted and Forgotten: Impunity and Human Rights Abuses in 
northern Uganda, September 2005
husak 2008
D. Husak, Overcriminalisation, New York: oUP 2008
IkwRo 2012
iKWro, Response to the government consultation on forced marriage, february 2012
ImkAAn 2012
imKaaN, Response to the government’s forced marriage consultation, march 2012
Jain 2008
N. Jain, ‘forced marriage as a crime against Humanity: Problems of Definition and 
Prosecution’, Journal of International Criminal Justice (6) 2008, p. 1022–1025
Jareborg 2005
N. Jareborg, ‘criminalization as Last resort (Ultima Ratio)’, (2) 2005 Ohio State Journal 
of Criminal Law, pp. 521–534
Jyrkkiö 2011
T. Jyrkkiö, ‘other inhumane acts as crimes against humanity’, Helsinki Law Review (1) 
2011
kalra 2001
m.S. Kalra, ‘forced marriage: rwanda’s secret revealed’, University of California Davis 
Journal of International Law and Policy (7) 2001, pp. 197–221
kasumi 2008
N. Kasumi, Gender‑based violence during the Khmer Rouge Regime. Stories of survivors 
from the Democratic Kampuchea (1975–1979), Second edition, Phnom Penh, December 
2008
mckay & mazurana 2004
S. mcKay & D. mazurana, Where are the girls? Girls in fighting forces in northern 
Uganda, Sierra Leone and Mozambique: their lives during and after war, montréal: rights 
& Democracy (international centre for Human rights and Democratic Development) 
2004






kazimirski et al. 2009
a. Kazimirski et al., Forced Marriage – Prevalence and Service Response, London: 
National centre for Social research 2009
kimseng 2010
m. Kimseng, ‘experts see trauma after Khmer rouge forced marriage’, VoaNeWS.com, 
9 November 2010
de koning & bartels 2005
m. de Koning & e. Bartels, Over het huwelijk gesproken: partnerkeuze en gedwongen 
huwelijken onder Marokkaanse, Turkse en Hindostaanse nederlanders, The Hague: 
adviescommissie voor Vreemdelingenzaken august 2005, p. 6
kool 2012
r.S.B. Kool, ‘Drassige grondslagen voor strafbaarstelling. Het wetsvoorstel ter 
verruiming van de strafrechtelijke aanpak van huwelijksdwang’, Delikt en Delinkwent 
2012,
krause & meyer 2007
H.e. Krause & D.D. meyer, Family Law, St. Paul, mN: Thomson/West 2007
lamb 2002
S. Lamb, ‘nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege in international criminal Law’, in: 
cassese, P. gaeta & J.r.W.D. Jones (eds.), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court: a commentary (Vol. I), oxford: oUP 2002, pp. 733–766
lee 1999
r.S. Lee (ed.), The International Criminal Court. The making of the Rome Statute: Issues, 
negotiations, results, The Hague: Kluwer Law international 1999
van der leun & leupen 2009
J. van der Leun & a. Leupen, ‘informele huwelijken in Nederland; een exploratieve 
studie’, Leiden: Universiteit Leiden 2009
levine 2010
P. LeVine, Love and dread in Cambodia. Weddings, births, and ritual harm under the 
Khmer Rouge, Singapore: National University of Singapore Press 2010
lindenberg 2007
K. Lindenberg, Strafbare dwang: over het bestanddeel ‘dwingen’ en strafbaarstellingen 
van dwang, in het bijzonder art. 284 Sr, apeldoorn/antwerp: maklu 2007
de londras 2010
f. de Londras, ‘Prosecuting sexual violence in the ad hoc international criminal tribunals 
for rwanda and the former Yugoslavia’, in: m.a. fineman (ed.), Transcending the 
boundaries of law. Generations of feminism and legal theory, New York: routledge 2010, 
pp. 290–304






loughlin & gerlis 2004
P. Loughlin & S. gerlis, Civil Procedure, London: cavendish Publishing 2004
machielse 2002
a.J.m. machielse, ‘comment no. 2 to the introduction to Title XiV’, in: J.W. fokkens & 
a.J.m. machielse (eds.), Het Wetboek van strafrecht, Deventer: Kluwer 2002
mam 2000
K.e. mam, ‘Democratic Kampuchea (1975–1979): women as tools for social change’, 
Documentation center of cambodia 2000 (manuscript on file with author)
mam 2006
K.e. mam, ‘The endurance of the cambodian family under the Khmer rouge 
regime: an oral history’, in: S.e. cook (ed.), Genocide in Cambodia and Rwanda: new 
perspectives, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers 2006, pp. 119–158
martin 2010
J. martin, The English Legal System, London: Hodder education 2010
mattler 2004
S.D. mattler, ‘memorandum for the office of the Prosecutor of the Special court for 
Sierra Leone. issue: forced marriage as a prosecutable crime against humanity’, case 
Western reserve University, School of Law, international War crimes research Lab 
(available at: <http://law.case.edu/war‑crimes‑research‑portal>)
may 2005
L. may, Crimes against humanity a normative account, cambrigde: cambrigde 
University Press 2005
meetoo & safia mirza 2007
V. meetoo & H. Safia mirza, ‘There is nothing “honourable” about honour killings: 
gender, violence and the limits of multiculturalism’ Women’s Studies International 
Forum (2007), 191
meron 1995
T. meron, ‘international criminalization of internal atrocities’, American Journal of 
International Law (89) 1995
meron 2005
T. meron, ‘revival of customary humanitarian law’, American Journal of International 
Law (99) 2005, pp. 817–834
milanović 2011
m. milanović, ‘is the rome Statute binding on individuals? (and why we should care)’, 
JICJ (9) 2011, pp. 25–52
mirbach et al. 2011
T. mirbach et al., Zwangsverheiratung in Deutschland: Anzahl und Analyse von 
Beratungsfällen (Kurzfassung). Wissenschaftliche Untersuchung im Auftrag des 






Bundesministeriums für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend, Hamburg: Johann Daniel 
Lawaetz‑Stiftung 2011
muslim Arbitration tribunal 2008
muslim arbitration Tribunal, Liberation from forced marriage, 2008
ngor 1989
H.S. Ngor, Surviving the Killing Fields. The Cambodian Odyssey of Haing S. ngor, 
London/Sydney/auckland: Pan Books 1989
oosterveld 2004
V. oosterveld, ‘Sexual slavery and the international criminal court: advancing 
international law’, Michigan Journal of International Law (25) 2004, pp. 605–651
oosterveld 2007
V. oosterveld, ‘international Decisions: Prosecutor v. alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy 
Kamara & Santigie Borbor Kanu, and Prosecutor v. moinina fofana & allieu Kondewa’, 
The American Journal of International Law (101) 2007, pp. 848–857
oosterveld 2009
V. oosterveld, ‘international Decisions: Prosecutor v. alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy 
Kamara & Santigie Borbor Kanu, and Prosecutor v. moinina fofana & allieu Kondewa’, 
The American Journal of International Law (103) 2009, pp. 103–110
oosterveld 2011
V. oosterveld, ‘The gender jurisprudence of the Special court for Sierra Leone: progress 
in the revolutionary United front judgments’, Cornell International Law Journal (44) 
2011, pp. 49–74
Parrot & cummings 2008
a. Parrot & N. cummings, Sexual enslavement of girls and women worldwide, Westport 
(cT): Praeger Publishers 2008
Plan uk 2011
Plan UK, Breaking vows: early and forced marriage and girls’ education, June 2011
Probert 2008
rebecca Probert, ‘case commentary: Hanging on the telephone: City of Westminster v 
IC’ Child and Family Law Quarterly (September 2008), pp. 395–407
Proudman 2011
c.r. Proudman, Forced & Arranged Marriage Among South Asian Women in England 
& Wales. Critically Examining the Social & Legal Ramifications of Criminalisation, 
Saarbrücken: Lambert academic Publishing 2011
Ratner 1998
S.r. ratner, ‘The schizophrenias of international criminal law’, Texas International Law 
Journal (33) 1998, pp. 237–256







S.H. razack, ‘imperilled muslim women, dangerous muslim men adn civilized 
europeans: legal and social responses to forced marriages’, Feminist Legal Studies (12) 
2004, pp. 129–174
Reed 2000
a. reed, ‘essential validity of marriage: the application of interest analysis and depecage 
to anglo‑american choice of law rules’, new York Law School Journal of International 
and Comparative Law (20) 2000, pp. 387–450
Remmelink 1996
J. remmelink, Mr. D. Hazewinkel‑Suringa’s Inleiding tot de studie van het nederlandse 
Strafrecht, Deventer: gouda quint 1996 (15th ed.)
Robinson 1999
D. robinson, ‘Defining “crimes against Humanity” at the rome conference’, The 
American Journal of International Law (93) 1999, pp. 43–57
Robinson 2001
D. robinson, ‘The elements of crimes against humanity’, in: r.S. Lee (ed.), The 
International Criminal Court. Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 
ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers 2001, pp. 57–97
de Roos 1987
Th.a. de roos, Strafbaarstelling van economische delicten, arhnem: gouda quint 1987
Rude‑Antoine 2005
e. rude‑antoine, Forced marriages in Council of Europe member states. A comparative 
study of legislation and political initiatives, Strasbourg: Directorate general of Human 
rights, council of europe 2005
sadat 2007
L. Sadat, ‘The effect of amnesties before domestic and international tribunals: law, 
morality, politics’, in: e. Hughes, W. Schabas & r. Thakur (eds.), Atrocities and 
international accountability, Tokyo: United Nations University Press 2007
samad & eade 2003
Y. Samad & J. eade, Community perceptions of forced marriage, London: foreign and 
commonwealth office 2003
sanghera 2007
J. Sanghera, Shame, London: Hodder & Stoughton 2007
saul 2008
B. Saul, ‘reasons for defining and criminalizing ‘terrorism’ in international law’, The 
University of Sydney, Sydney Law School, Legal Studies research Paper no. 08/121, 
pp. 208–254






save the children 2007
Save the children, inter‑agency guidelines for developing reintegration programmes for 
children affected by armed conflict in West africa: field test version, freetown 2007
schabas 2000
W.a. Schabas, Genocide in International Law: The Crime of Crimes, cambridge: cUP 
2000
scharf 2005
m.P. Scharf, ‘forced marriage: exploring the viability of the Special court for Sierra 
Leone’s new crime against humanity’, in: e.a. ankumah & e.K. Kwakwa (eds.), African 
Perspectives on International Criminal Justice (Africa Legal Aid, 2005 Special Series 3), 
maastricht: africa Legal aid 2005, pp. 77–102
schmidt & Rijken 2005
g.e. Schmidt & c.r.J.J. rijken, Juridische aspecten van gedwongen huwelijken. 
Onderzoek voor de Adviescommissie voor Vreemdelingenzaken, The Hague, may 2005
seher 2014
g. Seher, ‘comment on andreas von Hirsch: The roles of Harm and Wrongdoing in 
criminalisation Theory’, (8) Criminal Law and Philosophy 2014, pp. 257–264
sen 2005
P. Sen, ‘“crimes of honour”, value and meaning’, in: L. Welchman & S. Hossain (eds.), 
‘Honour’. Crimes, paradigms, and violence against women, London: Zed Books 2005
shaw 2008
m.N. Shaw, International Law, cambridge: cambridge University Press 2008
siddiqi 2005
D.m. Siddiqi, ‘of consent and contradiction: forced marriages in Bangladesh’ in Lynn 
Welchman & Sara Hossain (eds.), ‘Honour’. Crimes, paradigms, and violence against 
women (Zed Books 2005)
simester & von hirsch 2011
a.P. Simester & a. von Hirsch, Crimes, Harms, and Wrongs, oxford: Hart Publishing 
2011
southall black sisters 2012
Southall Black Sisters, Response to the Home Office consultation (December 2011) on the 
criminalisation of forced marriage, march 2012
steains 1999
c. Steains, ‘gender issues’, in: r.S. Lee (ed.), The International Criminal Court. The 
making of the Rome Statute: Issues, negotiations, results, The Hague: Kluwer Law 
international 1999, pp. 357–390
stone 2000
L. Stone, Kinship and gender. An introduction, Boulder, co: Westview Press 2000







S. Studzinsky, ‘Participation and Protection of Victims of Sexual Violence in 
international criminal Law‑ Participation and Protection of Victims of Sexual Violence 
before the eccc’, presentation given during the Second Hague colloquium on 
Systematic Violence and Victim’s rights, 7–8 april 2011 The Hague (Session Vii)
swAy 2008
J. annan, c. Blattman, K. carlson & D. mazurana, The state of female youth in northern 
Uganda: findings from the Survey of War‑Affected Youth (SWAY) Phase II, april 2008
toy‑cronin 2010
B.a. Toy‑cronin, ‘What is forced marriage? Toward a definition of forced marriage as a 
crime against humanity’, Columbia Journal of Gender & Law (19) 2010, pp. 539–590
tRc Report 2004–2
Sierra Leone Truth & reconciliation commission, Report Volume 2: Witness to truth, 
Sierra Leone: Truth & reconciliation commission 2004
tRc Report 2004–3A
Sierra Leone Truth & reconciliation commission, Report Volume 3A: Witness to truth, 
Sierra Leone: Truth & reconciliation commission 2004
tRc Report 2004–3b
Sierra Leone Truth & reconciliation commission, Report Volume 3B: Witness to truth, 
Sierra Leone: Truth & reconciliation commission 2004
triffterer 2008
o. Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 
munich: c.H. Beck 2008
un commission on human Rights: Report on situation human rights in Rwanda 1996
UN commission on Human rights, Report on the situation of human rights in Rwanda, 
submitted by Mr. René Degni‑Ségui, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human 
Rights, under paragraph 20 of res S‑3/1 of 25 may 1994, UN Doc. e/cN.4/1996/68, 
29 January 1996,
un commission on human Rights: contemporary forms of slavery 1998
UN commission on Human rights, Contemporary forms of slavery: Systematic rape, 
sexual slavery and slavery‑like practices during armed conflict. Final report submitted by 
Ms. Gay J. McDougall, Special rapporteur, UN Doc. e/cN.4/Sub.2/1998/13, 22 June 1998
un commission on human Rights: Report of the special Rapporteur on violence 
against women its causes and consequences 1998
UN commission on Human rights, Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence 
against women its causes and consequences, Ms. Radhika Coomaraswamy, submitted in 
accordance with commission resolution 1997/44, UN Doc. e/cN.4/1998/54, 26 January 
1998






un demographic yearbook 2008
UN Department of economic and Social affairs, 2008 Demographic Yearbook, sixth 
edition, UN Doc. No. ST/eSa/STaT/Ser.r/39, New York: UN 2010, p. 9.
un human Rights council: Report of special Rapporteur trafficking in Persons 2007
Human rights council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights Aspects of 
the Victims of Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, prepared by Sigma 
Huda, UN Doc. a/Hrc/4/23, 24 January 2007
vandello & cohen 2003
J.a. Vandello & D. cohen, ‘male Honour and female fidelity: implicit cultural Scripts 
that Perpetuate Domestic Violence’ Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (84) 
2003, pp. 997–1000
del vecchio 2011
J. Del Vecchio, ‘continuing uncertainties: forced marriage as a crime against humanity’, 
Rapoport Center Human Rights Working Paper Series 3/2011
vlaardingerbroek et al. 2011
P. Vlaardingerbroek et al., Het hedendaagse personen‑ en familierecht, Deventer: Kluwer 
2011
vonken 2012
a.P.m.J. Vonken, Tekst & commentaar, Dutch civil code Book 10, article 6, margin 
no. 2(c)
ten voorde 2012
J.m. ten Voorde, ‘aanzetten tot criteria voor strafbaarstelling in de voorfase’, in: 
c.P.m. cleiren e.a., Criteria voor strafbaarstelling in een nieuwe dynamiek. Symbolische 
legitimiteit versus maatschappelijke en sociaalwetenschappelijke realiteit, The Hague: 
Boom Lemma 2012, pp. 65–86
de walque 2006
D. De Walque, ‘The socio‑demographic legacy of the Khmer rouge period in cambodia’, 
Population Studies (60) 2006, pp. 223–231
welchman & s. hossain
L. Welchman & S. Hossain (eds.), ‘Honour’. Crimes, paradigms, and violence against 
women, London: Zed Books 2005
werle 2009
g. Werle, Principles of international criminal law, The Hague: asser Press 2009
williamson 2006
J. Williamson, ‘The disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of child soldiers: 
social and psychological transformation in Sierra Leone’, Intervention: International 
Journal of Mental Health, Psychosocial Work and Counselling in Areas of Armed Conflict 
(4) 2006






witschel & Rückert 2001
g. Witschel & W. rückert, ‘article 7(1)(h) – crime against humanity of enforced 
disappearance of persons and article 7(1)(j) – crime against humanity of apartheid’, 
in: r.S. Lee (ed.), The International Criminal Court. Elements of Crimes and Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence, ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers 2001
women’s caucus Recommendations 1997
Women’s caucus for gender Justice in the international criminal court, see Women’s 
caucus for gender Justice in the international criminal court, Recommendations and 
Commentary for December 1997 PrepCom on the Establishment of an International 
Criminal Court United nations Headquarters (5th Preparatory committee 
1–12 December 1997)
wortmann & van duijvendijk‑brand 2012
S.f.m. Wortmann & J. van Duijvendijk‑Brand, Compendium van het personen‑ en 
familierecht, Deventer: Kluwer 2012
yanev (forthcoming)
L.D. Yanev, Joint Criminal Enterprise. A Flawed Legal Doctrine or a Cornerstone of 
International Criminal Law? (forthcoming)
Forceandmarriage.indd   389 20-5-2014   10:42:23







eUroPeaN coUrT of HUmaN rigHTS
ectHr 26 april 1979, appl. No. 6538/74 (The Sunday Times v. Great Britain)
ectHr 18 December 1986, appl. No. 9697/82 (Johnston and others v. Ireland)
ectHr 30 June 1993, appl. No. 16130/90 (Sigurdur A. Sigurjónsson v. Iceland)
ectHr 22 November 1995, appl. No. 20166/92 (S.W. v. The United Kingdom)
ectHr 18 february 1999, appl. No. 24645/94, para. 34 (Buscarini and others v. San 
Marino)
ectHr 17 february 2005, appl. No. 42758/98 (K.A. and A.D. v. Belgium)
ectHr 12 July 2007, appl. No. 74613/01, para. 100 (Jorgic v. Germany)
ectHr 12 february 2008, appl. No. 21906/04 (Kafkaris v. Cyprus)
ectHr 17 September 2009, appl. No. 10249/03 (Scoppola v. Italy, no. 2)
ectHr 24 June 2010, appl. No. 30141/04 (Schalk and Kopf v. Austria)
iNTerNaTioNaL crimiNaL coUrT
Prosecutor v. Jean‑Pierre Bemba Gombo, case No. icc‑01/05–01/08‑PT, Decision 
Pursuant to article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the rome Statute on the charges of the Prosecutor 
against Jean‑Pierre Bemba gombo, 15 June 2009
Prosecutor v. Katanga and ngudjolo Chui, case No. icc‑01/04–01/07‑T‑43, 
confirmation of charges Hearing, 4 July 2008
The Prosecutor v. Katanga and ngudjolo Chui, case No. icc‑01/04–01/07, Decision on 
the confirmation of charges, 30 September 2008
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, case No. icc‑01/04–01/06‑PT, Decision on the 
confirmation of the charges, 29 January 2007
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, case No. icc‑01/04–01/06, Trial Judgement, 
14 march 2012
Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein 
Ali, case no. icc‑01/09–02/11, Decision on the confirmation of charges Pursuant to 
article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the rome Statute, 23 January 2012
Prosecutor v. Omar Al Bashir, case No. icc‑02/05–01/09‑PT, Decision on the 
Prosecution’s application for a Warrant of arrest against omar al Bashir, 4 march 2009






SPeciaL coUrT for Sierra LeoNe
Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara and Kanu, case No. ScSL‑04–16‑T, expert report on the 
phenomenon of ‘forced marriage’ in the context of the conflict in Sierra Leone and, 
more specifically, in the context of the trials against the rUf and afrc accused only, 
annexed to Prosecution filing of expert report pursuant to rule 94(bis) and decision on 
Prosecution request for leave to call an additional witness, 8 august 2005
Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara and Kanu, case No. ScSL‑04–16‑T‑469, Decision on 
Defence motions for judgement of acquittal pursuant to rule 98, Separate concurring 
opinion of Justice Sebutinde, 31 march 2006
Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara and Kanu, case No. ScSL‑04–16‑T, Joint Defence 
disclosure of expert report on forced marriages by dr. Dorte Thorsen, 21 august 2006
Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara and Kanu, case No. ScSL‑04–16‑T, Trial Judgement, 
20 June 2007
Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara and Kanu, Judgement, case No. ScSL‑04–16‑T, Partly 
dissenting opinion Justice Doherty, 20 June 2007
Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara and Kanu, Judgement, case No. ScSL‑04–16‑T, Separate 
concurring opinion of Justice Sebutinde, 20 June 2007
Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara and Kanu, case No. ScSL‑04–16‑a, appeal Brief of the 
Prosecution, 13 September 2007
Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara and Kanu, case No. ScSL‑04–16‑a, appeal Judgement , 
22 february 2008
Prosecutor v. norman, case No. ScSL‑2002–14‑ar72(e), Decision on Preliminary 
motion based on Lack of Jurisdiction (child recruitment), 31 may 2004
Prosecutor v. norman, Fofana and Kondewa,case No. ScSL‑04–14‑PT, majority 
Decision on the Prosecution’s application for leave to file an interlocutory appeal against 
the Decision on the Prosecution request for leave to amend the indictment against 
Norman, fofana and Kondewa, 2 august 2004
Prosecutor v. Fofana and Kondewa, case No. ScSL‑04–14‑T, Trial Judgement, 2 august 
2007
Prosecutor v. Fofana and Kondewa, case No. ScSL‑04–14‑a, appeal Judgement, 28 may 
2008
Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon and Gbao, case No. ScSL‑04–15‑T, Prosecution final Trial 
Brief, 7 august 2008
Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon and Gbao, case No. ScSL‑04–15‑T, Judgement, 2 march 2009
Forceandmarriage.indd   392 20-5-2014   10:42:23
intersentia 393




Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon and Gbao, case No. ScSL‑04–15‑T, Sentencing Judgement, 
8 april 2009
Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon and Gbao, case No. ScSL‑04–15‑a, appeal Judgement, 
26 october 2009
Prosecution v. Charles Taylor, ScSL‑03–01‑PT, Second amended indictment, 29 may 
2007
Prosecution v. Charles Taylor, case No. ScSL‑03–01‑T, Prosecution opening Statement, 
Transcript 4 June 2007
Prosecution v. Charles Taylor, case No. ScSL‑03–01‑T, Trial Judgement, 18 may 2012
eXTraorDiNarY cHamBerS iN THe coUrTS of 
camBoDia
Case of Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch, case file No. 001/18–07–2007/eccc/Tc, civil 
Parties’ co‑Lawyers’ request for supplementary preliminary investigations, 9 february 
2009
Case of Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch, case file No. 001/18–07–2007/eccc/Tc, Trial 
Judgement, 26 July 2010
Case of nuon Chea, Ieng Sary, Khieu Samphan & Ieng Thirith, case file No. 002/19–09–
2007/eccc/ociJ, Second request for investigative actions concerning forced marriages 
and forced sexual relations, 15 July 2009
Case of nuon Chea, Ieng Sary, Khieu Samphan & Ieng Thirith, case file No. 002/19–09–
2007/eccc/ociJ, closing order, 15 September 2010
Case of nuon Chea, Ieng Sary, Khieu Samphan & Ieng Thirith, case file No. 002/19–
09–2007/eccc/ociJ, Decision on appeals by Nuon chea and ieng Thirith against the 
closing order, 15 february 2011
Case of nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan, case file No. 002/19–09–2007/eccc/Tc, 
Severance order pursuant to internal rule 89ter, 22 September 2011
iNTerNaTioNaL crimiNaL TriBUNaL for rWaNDa
Prosecutor v. Jean‑Paul Akayesu, case no. icTr‑96–4‑T, Trial Judgement, 2 September 
1998
The Prosecutor v. Callixte Kalimanzira, case No. icTr‑05–88‑T, Trial Judgement, 
22 June 2009
Prosecutor v. Clément Kayishema, case no. icTr‑95–1‑T, Trial Judgement, 21 may 1999






The Prosecutor v. Mikaeli Muhimana, case No. icTr‑95–1B‑T, Trial Judgement, 28 april 
2005
Prosecutor v. Ferdinand nahimana, Jean‑Bosco Barayagwiza & Hassan ngeze, case No. 
icTr‑99–52‑a, appeal Judgement, 28 November 2007
Prosecutor v. Eliézer niyitegeka, case no. icTr‑96–14‑T, Trial Judgement, 16 may 2003
iNTerNaTioNaL crimiNaL TriBUNaL for THe 
former YUgoSLaVia
Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaškić, case No. iT‑95–14‑a, appeal Judgement, 29 July 2004
Prosecutor v. Miroslav Bralo, case No. iT‑95–17‑S, Sentencing Judgement, 7 December 
2005
Prosecutor v. Delalić, Mucić, Delić and Landžo, case no. iT‑96–21‑T, Trial Judgement, 
16 November 1998
Prosecutor v. Delalić, Mucić, Delić and Landžo, case no. iT‑96–21‑a, appeal Judgement, 
20 february 2001
The Prosecutor v. Vlastimir Đorđević, case no. iT‑05–87/1‑T, Trial Judgement, 
23 february 2011
Prosecutor v. Anto Furundžija, case no. iT‑95–17/1‑T, Trial Judgment, 10 December 1998
Prosecutor v. Ante Gotovina et al., case no. iT‑06–90‑T, Trial Judgement, 15 april 2011
Prosecutor v. Enver Hadžihasanović et al., case No. iT‑01–47‑ar73.3, Decision on Joint 
Defence interlocutory appeal of Trial chamber Decision on rule 98Bis motions for 
acquittal, 11 march 2005
Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisić, case no. iT‑95–10‑T, Trial Judgement, 14 December 1999
Prosecutor v. Momcilo Krajišnik, case No. iT‑00–39‑a, appeal Judgement, 17 march 
2009
Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić, case No. iT‑98–33‑T, Trial Judgement, 2 august 2001
Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac et al., case no. iT‑96–23‑T and iT‑96–23/1‑T, Trial 
Judgement, 22 february 2001
Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac et al., case no. iT‑96–23 and iT‑96–23/1‑a, appeal 
Judgement, 12 June 2002
Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al., case no. iT‑95–16‑T, Trial Judgement, 14 January 2000
Forceandmarriage.indd   394 20-5-2014   10:42:24
intersentia 395




Prosecutor v. Miroslav Kvočka et al., case no. iT‑98–30/1‑T, Trial Judgement, 2 November 
2001
Prosecutor v. Momcilo Perišić, case no. iT‑04–81‑T, Trial Judgement, 6 September 2011
Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakić, case No. iT‑97–24‑T, Trial Judgement, 31 July 2003
Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakić, case No. icTY‑iT‑97–24‑a, appeal Judgement, 22 march 
2006
Prosecutor v. Mićo Stanišić & Stojan Župljanin, icTY‑iT‑08–91‑T, Trial Judgement, 
27 march 2013
Prosecutor v. Dragan Zelenović, case No. iT‑96–23/2‑S, Sentencing Judgement, 4 april 
2007
Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić, case No. icTY‑iT‑94–1‑a, Decision on the Defence motion 
for interlocutory appeal on Jurisdiction, october 1995
Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić, case No. icTY‑iT‑94–1‑T, Trial Judgement, 7 may 1997
Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić, case No. iT‑94–1‑a, appeal Judgement, 15 July 1999
Prosecutor v. Mitar Vasiljević, case no. iT‑98–32‑T, Trial Judgement, 29 November 2002
DUTcH coUrTS
Supreme court 22 January 1982, nJ 1982, 489
Supreme court 17 January 1984, nJ 1984, 479
Supreme court 21 february 1989, nJ 1989, 668
Supreme court 27 february 1990, nJ 1991, 109
Supreme court 2 July 1990, nJ 1991, 110
Supreme court 16 october 1998, nJ 1999, 6
Supreme court 25 march 2003, nJ 2003, 552
Supreme court 2 November 2004, ecLi:NL:Hr:2004:aq4289
Supreme court 18 January 2005, nJ 2005, 154
Supreme court 30 august 2005, ecLi:NL:Hr:2005:aT7093
Supreme court 13 September 2005, ecLi:NL:Hr:2005:aT5834
Supreme court 27 may 2008, ecLi:NL:Hr:2008:Bc7910
Supreme court 30 may 2006, ecLi:NL:Hr:2006:aW0476
Supreme court 25 January 2011, ecLi:NL:Hr:2011:Bo3400
Supreme court 12 march 2013, ecLi:NL:Hr:2013:BZ3626
Supreme court 27 august 2013, ecLi:NL:Hr:2013:494
court of appeal amsterdam 28 June 1950, nJ 1950, 736
court of appeal amsterdam 31 august 1989, nJ 1990, 679
court of appeal ’s‑Hertogenbosch 13 october 1994, ecLi:NL:gHSHe:1994:ac3237
court of appeal amsterdam 19 November 2002, ECLI:nL:GHAMS:2002:af3799






court of appeal The Hague 14 april 2004, ecLi:NL:gHSgr:2004:ao8640
court of appeal Leeuwarden 22 January 2010, LJn BL0299
court of appeal The Hague 19 July 2011, ecLi:NL:gHSgr:2011:Br2925
court of appeal The Hague, 8 february 2012, ecLi:NL:gHSgr:2012:BV4099
court of appeal amsterdam 11 april 2013, ecLi:NL:gHamS:2013:BZ8541
District court amsterdam 6 June 1979, nJ 1980, 182
District court amsterdam 17 November 1983, KG 1983/359
District court middelburg 28 may 1986, nIPR, 413
District court The Hague 10 march 1987, nIPR 1987, 234
District court Haarlem 17 february 1989, Kg 1989, 134
District court arnhem 6 June 1991, nIPR 1991, 330
District court alkmaar 20 february 1992, nJ 1993, 541
District court almelo 20 february 2002, nIPR 2002, 85
District court Zutphen 18 June 2003, NJ 2003, 451
District court alkmaar 30 July 2003, ECLI:nL:RBALK:2003:ai0650
District court Haarlem 24 December 2004, ecLi:NL:rBHaa:2004:ar8233
District court groningen 1 July 2008, ecLi:NL:rBgro:2008:Bf0508
District court Leeuwarden 30 July 2008, ecLi:NL:rBLee:2008:BD9742
District court Haarlem 11 September 2009, LJn BJ7447
District court Utrecht 24 November 2010, ecLi:NL:rBUTr:2010:Bo6170
District court Zutphen 25 January 2011, ecLi:NL:rBZUT:2011:BP1973
District court The Hague 21 february 2011, ecLi:NL:rBSgr:2011:BP7696
District court Utrecht 13 april 2011, ecLi:NL:rBUTr:2011:Bq0539
District court Utrecht 1 June 2011, ecLi:NL:rBUTr:2011:Bq6884
District court rotterdam 28 march 2012, ecLi:NL:rBroT:2012:BW0234
District court amsterdam 10 april 2012, ecLi:NL:rBamS:2012:BW3800
District court Breda 14 June 2012, ecLi:NL:rBBre:2012:BW8443
District court Noord‑Holland, 26 march 2013 ecLi:NL:rBNHo:2013:BZ5529
eNgLiSH coUrTS
Supreme court
Quila v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (2011) UKSc 45
High court of Justice
Hyde v. Hyde and Woodhouse (1866) Lr 1 PD 130 (court of Probate)
Scott (Falsely Called Sebright) v. Sebright (1886) 12 PD 31
Hussein (otherwise Blitz) v. Hussein (1938) P 159
Buckland v. Buckland (1967) 2 W.L.r. 1506
Singh v. Singh (1971) 2 W.L.r. 963
Szechter v. Szechter (1971) 2 WLr 170
P v. R (Marriage: nullity: Forced Marriage) (2003) 1 fLr 661
Forceandmarriage.indd   396 20-5-2014   10:42:24
intersentia 397




Sheffield City Council v. E 
nS v. MI (2006) 1 fLr 444
A local authority v. x and a child (2013) eWHc 3274 (fam)
court of appeal
Singh v. Kaur (1981) fam Law 152, ca
Vervoeke v. Smith (1983) 1 a.c 145, 164, ca
Hirani v. Hirani (1984) 4 fLr 232 ca
City of Westminster v. IC (by his Friend the Official Solicitor) KC and nn (2008) 2 fLr 
267, ca
ScoTLaND
Mahmood v. Mahmood (1993) SLT 589, p. 592
Mahmud v Mahmud (1994) SLT 599
Sohrab v. Khan (2002) ScLr 663
Singh v. Singh (2005) SLT 749, pp. 750–751
ireLaND
W. (C.) v. C. 
Forceandmarriage.indd   397 20-5-2014   10:42:24







iris Haenen (1986) received LLm and mPhil degrees from Tilburg University in 
2009 and 2010 respectively. from November 2010 to march 2014, she conducted 
PhD research at the Department of criminal Law at Tilburg University, including 
a stay at King’s college London to conduct comparative legal research. iris is 
currently an assistant professor at Tilburg Law School. 
iris’ publications include:
‘The Parameters of enslavement and the act of forced marriage’, 13 International 
Criminal Law Review 2013, pp. 895–915
‘classifying acts as crimes against humanity in the rome Statute of the 
international criminal court’, 14 German Law Journal 2013, pp. 404–430
‘De strafbaarstelling van gedwongen huwelijken onder internationaal strafrecht: 
de rechtspraak van het Sierra Leone‑tribunaal als bron van inspiratie voor 
rechtsvorming elders ter wereld’ (The criminalisation of forced marriage under 
international criminal law: the case law of the Special Court for Sierra Leone as a 
source of inspiration), 41 Delikt & Delinkwent 2011, pp. 583–614
‘De rechtmatigheid van de Nationale opsporingslijst’ (The legitimacy of the 
Dutch most Wanted List), Strafblad 2010, pp. 429–438
Kwalificering van doodslag. Een onderzoek naar voorbedachte raad, motief 
en uitvoeringswijze bij de opzettelijke levensdelicten (The qualification of 
manslaughter. a comparative legal study on premeditation, motive and modus 
operandi with regard to homicide offences in germany and the Netherlands), 
Tilburg: celsus Legal Publishers 2009 (monograph)
Forceandmarriage.indd   399 20-5-2014   10:42:24








abduction, 65, 74–77, 80, 221, 338
afrc, see Special Court of Sierra Leone
anti‑Social Behaviour, crime and Policing 
Bill 196, 234, 256–261, 302, 2013
annulment, see marriage
arranged marriage, see marriage
b
Bush wives, 65–66, 80–88, 99–115, 263–
275, 284, 330, 342
c
cambodia (see also ECCC), 88–115, 282, 
331, 344, 355
cDf, see Special Court of Sierra Leone
charles Taylor, see Special Court of Sierra 
Leone
child soldiering, 71–73, 114, 153, 170, 176, 
265, 347
coercion, 5, 19, 26–35, 40–52, 113, 202, 
207–228, 235–236, 266, 300, 322
coercion (article 284 cric), 28, 218–220, 
260, 302, 311, 316–328
conscription, 106–107, 265
consent, 17–27, 29–32, 41–45, 96, 106, 
197–199, 206–208, 212, 220, 235–250
crimes against humanity, 155–168, 333
 − other inhumane acts, 146, 158, 162–168, 
263, 266–275, 280, 304, 339–348
criminalisation
 − crimes against humanity, 157–168, 
182–184, 333–346
 − Doctrine, 119–133, 137–145
 − effectiveness, see effectiveness
 − genocide, 178–184, 352–355
 − Harm, see harm
 − international theories/criteria, 137–156, 
185–192
 − Legality, see legality
 − National theories/criteria, 119–136, 
185–192
 − Proportionality, see proportionality
 − Subsidiarity, see subsidiarity
 − War crimes, 168–178, 346–352
 − Wrong, see wrong
cruel treatment, see war crimes
customary international law, 142, 146, 
151, 154–155, 160–166, 172–174, 176, 
180, 349
customary international humanitarian 
law, see war crimes
d
Divorce, see marriage
Duress, 26–30, 44, 56, 221, 235–240, 300, 
324
effectiveness, 131–132, 189–191, 320–324
extraordinary chambers in the courts 
of cambodia, 100, 106, 167, 263, 
282–284, 344
enforced prostitution, 147–150, 167, 334
enslavement, 54, 68–71, 110–112, 138, 148, 
154, 188, 273, 277–287, 336–339, 344, 
355
F
force, 9, 19–29, 31, 33–34, 37, 41–45, 51, 
60, 96–98, 231, 238–240, 266
forced marriage
 − cambodia/Khmer rouge, 88–111, 282–
284, 331–332, 344–346, 353
 − causes, 31–44, 50–53, 60–61, 100–103, 
105–106, 109–114
 − (civil Protection) act 231–235, 254, 257, 
261, 290–293, 2007






 − consequences, 53–54, 61–62, 80–85, 
93–95, 103, 106–109, 112–114, 311–
315, 329–333
 − crime against humanity, 333‑346
 − Definitions, 276 9, 31–41, 48, 56, 231, 
256–257, 266, 272, 311, 324
 − Duress, see duress
 − england, 56–62, 228–259
 − genocide, 352‑355
 − Harm, 311–314, 329–333
 − international criminal court, 69–80, 
254
 − mistake, see mistake
 − Netherlands, 47–56, 195–228, 310–328
 − Protection orders, 213–216, 232–235, 
243–246, 248–257, 290–292
 − Separate offence, 195–196, 247–258, 267, 
324–328, 355
 − Sierra Leone, 80–112, 264–282, 330
 − Unit, 57–62, 256, 288–289
 − War crime, 346‑352
 − Wrong, 314, 329
forced marriage (civil Protection) act 
2007; see forced marriage
forced marriage Protection orders; see 
forced marriage
forced marriage Unit, see forced marriage




genocide, 139–140, 156, 178–182, 353–355
h
Harm (see also forced marriage)
Honour, 35–42, 45, 51, 53–56, 60–62, 
112–113, 249, 254, 313–317
I
individual criminal responsibility, see war 
crimes
influencing someone’s statement (article 
285a cric), 217–218, 260, 302, 315–
319, 327–328
inhuman treatment, see war crimes
injunctions, 232, 244–245, 261, 290–292
international criminal court
 − central african republic, 4, 70–71, 342, 
355
 − cote d’ivoire, 69–70, 342–343
 − Democratic republic of congo, 71–73, 
153, 158, 343
 − Kenya, 38, 70–71, 343
 − republic of mali, 71, 351
 − rome Statute, see Rome Statute
 − Sudan, 73–74, 142






Legality, 132–134, 143, 151–155, 191, 326, 
329, 342, 345, 355
Lex certa, see legality
m
marital captivity, 9, 314, 324–325, 328
marital coercion (civil law) Bill, 207–213, 
294, 301
marital coercion (criminal law) act, 
224–228, 323, 328
marriage
 − annulment, 43, 48, 122, 200–204, 216, 
235–241, 298–302, 318
 − arranged marriages, 33–45, 50–53
 − Definition, 14‑19
 − Divorce, 204–205, 241–243, 294–298
 − interruption, 199–200, 209, 293–294
 − Judicial separation, 204–205, 241–243
 − Legal requirements, 197–199, 228–231
 − Private international Law, 205–212, 
246–247
material distinctiveness (see also 
subsidiarity), 146–150, 160–162, 174, 
178, 188, 278, 318–320
maximum certainty, see legality
mistake, unsoundness of mind, 201, 203, 
240–241, 300–301







Nullum crimen sine lege, see legality
o
other inhumane acts, see crimes against 
humanity




Private international Law, see marriage
Proportionality, 127–128, 143, 186–187, 
310–311, 315–316
Protection orders, see forced marriage 
protection orders
R
rape, 4, 16, 28, 53, 61, 67–75, 91, 103, 178, 
190, 217, 250, 272, 280, 312, 342
restraining orders, see forced marriage 
protection orders
rome Statute, 145–182, 186, 191, 303, 
328–355
 − amendments (article 121), 115, 171, 
173, 180, 329
rUf, see Special Court for Sierra Leone
rwanda, 66–68, 100, 105, 108, 148, 353
s
Sexual slavery (see also enslavement), 
70–73, 103, 112, 147–149, 266–284, 
329, 336–339, 351
Shame, 35–37, 39–43, 48, 51, 56, 60, 113, 
221, 237–239, 253
Sierra Leone, 3–4, 14, 34, 80–88, 99–112, 
158, 263–282, 330, 337, 339, 342–343, 
345, 353–355
Special court for Sierra Leone
 − afrc case, 72, 81, 102, 111, 265–275, 
280, 330, 340
 − cDf case, 80, 101, 263, 265
 − charles Taylor‑case, 72, 158, 279–282, 
341, 344
 − rUf case, 31, 111, 275–280, 348
Stalking, 90, 214, 218, 222–224, 291, 303, 
318–320
Subsidiarity, 128–132, 135, 155, 186–189, 
316–320
 − external, 128–131, 186–187, 316–318
 − internal, 131–132, 160, 187–189, 318–
320, 334–339, 346–354
t
Torture, 4, 76, 89, 91, 147, 165, 167, 272, 
283, 334, 344, 347
w
War crimes, 139–146, 168–178, 346–352
 − cruel treatment, 111, 336, 345, 347–348
 − customary international humanitarian 
law, 165–171, 173–178, 186, 349
 − individual criminal responsibility, 155, 
168–173, 176–178, 186, 350–351, 355
 − inhuman treatment, 147, 171, 347–348
 − outrages upon personal dignity, 68, 74, 
171, 174, 265, 273, 280, 304, 348–349
 − Wilfully causing great suffering, 340, 
347–348, 351
Wilfully causing great suffering, see war 
crimes
Wrong (see also forced marriage), 122–123, 
125–127, 186, 314–315
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